June 2004 - Test - lists.nanog.org

Re: S.2281 Hearing (was: Justice Dept: Wiretaps...)
by Fergie (Paul Ferguson) 21 Jun '04

21 Jun '04

Hi Sean. Long time, no see, etc. ;-) In response to your baited question, it should be readily apparent -- this is a simple exercise in reasonable deduction. LEA's want to have the same technical capability to wiretap communications in technologies where they currently do not posses the capability to do so. Pretty straightforward, really. But the technicalities are hornet's nests. Vespas. - ferg -- Sean Donelan <sean(a)donelan.com> wrote: What is law enforcement actually asking for? -- "Fergie", a.k.a. Paul Ferguson Engineering Architecture for the Internet fergdawg(a)netzero.net

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Internet firms urged to sign self-discipline pact
by Sean Donelan 21 Jun '04

21 Jun '04

'The basic principles of self-discipline for the Internet industry are patriotism, observance of the law, fairness and trustworthiness,' the official Xinhua news agency reported at the weekend. http://straitstimes.asia1.com.sg/techscience/story/0,4386,257481,00.html

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what's going on with yahoo and gmail lately?
by Matthew McGehrin 21 Jun '04

21 Jun '04

Ever since the 'Akamai' Incident, Yahoo Mail hasn't been the same. I can ping to it just fine, I just can't login and read my yahoo mail. When I can it's really slow. Ever since the Upgrades and the Akamai incident, Yahoo has been really out of whack when accessing from Comcast. I'm also having issues with Gmail. But atleast gmail Isn't as bad, just really slow. ping mail.yahoo.com PING login.yahoo.akadns.net (216.109.127.60): 56 data bytes 64 bytes from 216.109.127.60: icmp_seq=0 ttl=241 time=18.868 ms 64 bytes from 216.109.127.60: icmp_seq=1 ttl=241 time=20.032 ms 64 bytes from 216.109.127.60: icmp_seq=2 ttl=241 time=18.874 ms 64 bytes from 216.109.127.60: icmp_seq=3 ttl=241 time=20.956 ms 64 bytes from 216.109.127.60: icmp_seq=4 ttl=241 time=19.990 ms ^C --- login.yahoo.akadns.net ping statistics --- 5 packets transmitted, 5 packets received, 0% packet loss round-trip min/avg/max/stddev = 18.868/19.744/20.956/0.792 ms 4 srp-8-1-ar01.verona.nj.nj01.comcast.net (68.87.47.193) 12.870 ms 9.725 ms 5 pos-7-0-cr01.plainfield.nj.core.comcast.net (68.87.19.253) 9.891 ms 8.937 ms 6 12.118.149.5 (12.118.149.5) 10.761 ms 10.216 ms 7 tbr2-p014001.n54ny.ip.att.net (12.123.3.14) 11.121 ms 19.033 ms 8 ggr2-p390.n54ny.ip.att.net (12.123.3.62) 10.752 ms 11.037 ms 9 so-1-0-0.edge1.NewYork1.Level3.net (4.68.127.5) 10.067 ms 21.489 ms 10 ge-2-1-0.bbr2.NewYork1.Level3.net (64.159.4.149) 9.882 ms 10.297 ms 11 as-1-0.bbr2.Washington1.Level3.net (64.159.1.86) 17.708 ms 18.743 ms 12 ge-7-2.ipcolo2.Washington1.Level3.net (64.159.18.132) 18.758 ms 18.791 ms 13 unknown.Level3.net (166.90.148.10) 18.932 ms 17.489 ms 14 vl49.bas1-m.dcn.yahoo.com (216.109.120.222) 18.643 ms vl33.bas2-m.dcn.yahoo.com (216.109.120.154) 23.350 ms 15 alteon2.124.dcn.yahoo.com (216.109.124.11) 21.772 ms 20.097 ms Thanks

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Threats from AS 9800
by Philip Lavine 20 Jun '04

20 Jun '04

Has anybody seen any malicous traffic eminating from AS 9800? Specifically, MS-SQL worms. --------------------------------- Do you Yahoo!? Yahoo! Mail - You care about security. So do we.

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Re: S.2281 Hearing (was: Justice Dept: Wiretaps...)
by Fergie (Paul Ferguson) 20 Jun '04

20 Jun '04

Deja vu. This sounds amazingly similar to the thoughts running through many minds back in April 1992 when Uncle Sugar thunk up the Clipper debacle in an attempt to put the strong personal encryption genie back into the bottle. ;-) - ferg ps. Happy Dad's day. -- Henry Linneweh <hrlinneweh(a)sbcglobal.net> wrote: if the pro-ported bad guys are so swift why would they use anything packaged anyway? They have engineers and scientific minds in their ranks that understand devices, boards and the likes and could simply create their own data centers and simply use new protocols to communicate over the public lines and not one person would know the difference, all the laws in the world would not stop them, since US law doesn't apply to anyone but US citizens and most other nations could care less about what we imagine, contrive and go into hysterics about. -Henry -- "Fergie", a.k.a. Paul Ferguson Engineering Architecture for the Internet fergdawg(a)netzero.net

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Announcement of third NordNOG and call for papers
by Kurt Erik Lindqvist 20 Jun '04

20 Jun '04

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 The third Nordic Operator Forum will be held in Helsinki on 9-10 September 2004. Sponsor will be Song Networks, and the conference be held at their facilities at Song Networks Mechelinkatu 1a 00018 Helsinki With this email we invite interested speakers to send a short email to kurtis(a)kurtis.pp.se describing their talk. Best regards, - - kurtis - -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP 8.0.3 iQA/AwUBQNVtaKarNKXTPFCVEQIJJwCg3P31vDJ9+9lNEsp6mMSVMHsmyl4AoJxO /81v3CsOEkuYGB7y4/fNjyq5 =Fuqp -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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RE: [Fwd: [IP] Feds: VoIP a potential haven for terrorists]
by Sean Donelan 20 Jun '04

20 Jun '04

On Sat, 19 Jun 2004, Cade,Marilyn S - LGCRP wrote: > Jim Dempsey's testimony at Senator Sununu's hearing is very > interesting, and very educational on these issues. > > CALEA was not written for the IP world. When CALEA was being written, the Internet, IP and information services were all debated. > But, the facts are that IP service providers comply with law > enforcement's requests. IF more legal vehicles are needed, beyond what > law enforcement has today, then Congress should make that determination. CALEA doesn't reduce law enforcement's wiretap authority or the obligation for carriers to provide technical assistance under Title III or ECPA or other statutes. Law enforcement has been conducting wiretaps for decades prior to the passage of CALEA. Law enforcement has been using Title III and ECPA to tap e-mail, internet communications, pagers, etc for years. The FBI even demostrated its Canivore DSC1000 box at NANOG in Washington DC a few years ago. A SPAN port could satisfy an ISP's obligations under TitleIII/ECPA, but not satisfy CALEA.

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Re: Justice Dept: Wiretaps should apply to Net calls
by Fergie (Paul Ferguson) 20 Jun '04

20 Jun '04

I guess the Akami hoopla caused me to overlook it, but one more thing: I always did like John McCain. His quote: "Since it is a breakthrough technology, there's going to be a lot of china broken." Shake, rattle, roll. Same as it ever was. - ferg -- "Fergie (Paul Ferguson)" <fergdawg(a)netzero.net> wrote: The battle rages on, apparently. The more things change, the more things stay the same, it would seem. ;-) This is from this past Wednesday --I'm surprised that I somehow overlooked it and only just now saw this. http://www.cnn.com/2004/TECH/internet/06/16/telecoms.voip.reut/index.html FYI, - ferg -- "Fergie", a.k.a. Paul Ferguson Engineering Architecture for the Internet fergdawg(a)netzero.net

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RE: [Fwd: [IP] Feds: VoIP a potential haven for terrorists]
by Hannigan, Martin 20 Jun '04

20 Jun '04

> -----Original Message----- > From: Sean Donelan [mailto:sean@donelan.com] > Sent: Saturday, June 19, 2004 8:39 PM > To: Hannigan, Martin > Cc: North American Noise and Off-topic Gripes > Subject: RE: [Fwd: [IP] Feds: VoIP a potential haven for terrorists] > > > On Sat, 19 Jun 2004, Hannigan, Martin wrote: > > Sean, the capacity requirements aren't as straightforward as you > > are interpreting them. > > You are absolutely correct, they are not that straightforward. You > should consult a telecommunications attorney with expertise > in this area > for legal advice. It's a law that has technical requirements co mingled so you need both lawyers and engineers. > > If you are a CLEC and you cover a full five state > > area in the Northeast, you probably are subject to a county > aggregate > > of a capacity requirement of 1500. > > No. The FBI is very clear, if you are a CLEC and cover a > full five state > area in the Northeast, you are subject to the CUMULATIVE > capacity require > for every county in those five states. > > See the www.askcalea.com web site for full details. I have. And I continue to disagree. [snip] > Individual carriers must provide sufficient capacity so that law > enforcement has the ability to simultaneously conduct any number of > call content interceptions, pen registers, and trap and > trace devices, > not to exceed the estimated actual and maximum > requirements (which are > based on historical interception activity) at any location within a > county. > Appendix A of the Final Notice of Capacity (63 Fed Reg 12217, > 12238) Which is what I defined. Sufficient capacity with capability to increase if needed. > > However, there is an exception, no single switch is required > to support > more than 386 simultaneous pen registers and trap and trace devices or > 75 simultaneous call content interceptions. What is a "switch?" That's what the federal register notice I pointed you at said. And in come cases, a single switch can carry a five state area. Softswitch comes to mind. > > http://www.askcalea.com/docs/capsecg.pdf > > Individual carriers can take the legal gamble and use other network > deployment strtegies, such as making assumptions of how many pen > registers, trap and trace and intercepts will occur on their network > versus a competitors network. Assume 95% of the court orders will go > to your competitors, so you only need to provide 5% of the capacity > in the county. But you can't escape the penalties by depending on your > competitor's capacity. You can't service a competitors legal orders so I'm not sure what you're getting at. You're almost saying "every carrier should have one DS0 for every single dialup user". > > The obligation to satisfy the capacity requirements in a > cost-effective andreasonable manner is the responsibility > of all carriers that operate within a given geographic area. > > How often do you see all the competitors in an industry sit down in a > room and decide how they will divide up the costs and > establish pricing? What has pricing intercepts have to do with concurrent intercepts? CLECS are not going to make money servicing legal orders. I doubt RBOCS make money doing it either. > > It's complicated, but noone is subject to a straight 1200+ capacity > > required. There were 1,442 NON FISA oral and electronic > intercepts in > > the entire United States last year.[2] > > Actually, they are expected to provide far more than that. They're expected to have the capability. So let me rephrase. They are subject. The actual and historic are relevant. > As you know, > the Wiretap report does not include pen registers. There is no public > source for the number of pen registers in the US, but some industry > sources estimate it at 70,000 to 75,000 per year. I'll check on the pen-register comment. You keep saying talk to a lawyer, but quoting legalese. Are you an attorney? Not being smarmy. Just curious. Hypothetical. How many bankrupt CLEC's do you expect to see this year complying with CALEA and providing, as an example, a fully loaded 1200 concurrent session infrastructure in a < 100 a year historically survielled area? N0TE: I am speaking from experience on the LEC side, nowhere else.

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RE: [Fwd: [IP] Feds: VoIP a potential haven for terrorists]
by Hannigan, Martin 20 Jun '04

20 Jun '04

Sean, the capacity requirements aren't as straightforward as you are interpreting them. If you are a CLEC and you cover a full five state area in the Northeast, you probably are subject to a county aggregate of a capacity requirement of 1500. You would then look at your historicals, refer to the Federal Register for the actual maximum, and adjust your capacity as required to meet your own historicals and averages -- that also should take into consideration other RBOCs/CLECs operating in the same five state region as the orders will more than likely be broken out by access line % per carrier unless a single carrier dominates in a traditionally active area. In New York City and Los Angeles, the two most active areas, there was a mean average of .035 active electronic/oral intercepts per day. It's complicated, but noone is subject to a straight 1200+ capacity required. There were 1,442 NON FISA oral and electronic intercepts in the entire United States last year.[2] I have the Federal Register Notice if you want a copy. Let me know. [1] Federal Register Volume 63, No. 48 - March 12, 1998 NOTICE 12231 [2] 30 APR 2004 Press Release, Admin office of US Courts -M -- Martin Hannigan (c) 617-388-2663 VeriSign, Inc. (w) 703-948-7018 Network Engineer IV Operations & Infrastructure hannigan(a)verisign.com > -----Original Message----- > From: owner-nanog(a)merit.edu [mailto:owner-nanog@merit.edu]On Behalf Of > Sean Donelan > Sent: Saturday, June 19, 2004 4:24 PM > To: Steven M. Bellovin > Cc: North American Noise and Off-topic Gripes > Subject: Re: [Fwd: [IP] Feds: VoIP a potential haven for terrorists] > > > > On Sat, 19 Jun 2004, Steven M. Bellovin wrote: > > There's a lot more to it than that -- there's also access without > > involving telco personnel, and possibly the ability to do many more > > wiretaps (have you looked at the capacity requirements lately), but > > funding is certainly a large part of it. From Section (e) of > > http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/18/2518.html : > > > > Any provider of wire or electronic communication service, > > landlord, custodian or other person furnishing such facilities > > or technical assistance shall be compensated therefor by the > > applicant for reasonable expenses incurred in providing such > > facilities or assistance. > > That is not part of CALEA. > > Carriers found to be covered by CALEA must provide certain > capabilities > to law enforcement. For telecommunication equipment, facilities or > services deployed after January 1 1995 the carrier must pay > all reasonable > costs to provide the capabilities. > > The capacity requirements are interesting. In some cases, > the carrier is > required to have more law enforcement tapping capacity than customer > capacity. The government sets the capacit requirements without any > regard for the cost of maintaining the capacity. If there > are multiple > competitive carriers in the same area, all of the carriers > must have the > same capacity. If you have a single customer in Los Angeles, you must > provide the capacity for at least 1,360 simultaneous > interceptions. How > many SPAN ports do you have? > > As I mentioned, the wiretap acts and CALEA are really independent. >

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