July 2003 - Test - lists.nanog.org

it's 1918 in bologna
by Randy Bush 11 Jul '03

11 Jul '03

laptop plugged into an internet shop's ether in bologna. i decided to trace to an address i had roam.psg.com:/etc# traceroute 139.7.30.125 traceroute to 139.7.30.125 (139.7.30.125), 64 hops max, 44 byte packets 1 192.168.10.1 (192.168.10.1) 0.256 ms 0.199 ms 0.137 ms 2 192.168.20.1 (192.168.20.1) 3.208 ms 0.929 ms 0.826 ms 3 37.255.104.1 (37.255.104.1) 4.618 ms 3.974 ms 3.799 ms 4 10.3.6.91 (10.3.6.91) 4.371 ms 3.890 ms 3.863 ms 5 10.3.7.9 (10.3.7.9) 3.904 ms 3.745 ms 3.790 ms 6 10.254.1.181 (10.254.1.181) 3.859 ms 3.925 ms 3.850 ms 7 213.140.31.133 (213.140.31.133) 8.148 ms 8.039 ms 8.150 ms 8 81.208.50.6 (81.208.50.6) 8.231 ms 8.073 ms 8.042 ms 9 mno-vcn-i1-geth3-0.telia.net (213.248.103.229) 8.155 ms 8.357 ms 8.234 ms ... note the 37.xxxx address. cute, eh? and i thought omphaloskepsis was greek! randy

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Re: Backbone Infrastructure and Secrecy
by Michael.Dillon＠radianz.com 11 Jul '03

11 Jul '03

>Are we going to throw a burlap sack over 60 Hudson, the Westin Building, One Wilshire, >or similar buildings and disavow knowledge of their existence? You can't hide major infrastructure. Yes. However we can work to spread out the infrastructure more so that it is harder for terrorists to find a single point of failure to attack. If they have to coordinate an attack on 3 or 4 locations, there is an increased probability that something will go wrong (as on 9/11) and one or more of their targets will escape total destruction. We all need to find ways to make our networks more resilient even if that means moving away from "comfortable" vendors like Cisco and Juniper. The costs of resilience are not immovable objects. Those costs arise because the routers and circuits we would use to implement resilience are the same things we use to carry paying traffic and the vendors price their products based on the expectation that we use them for paying traffic. Since the vendors can't tell whether or not the router/circuit earns revenue for us, they won't give up their margin on the sale. In both cases, the underlying components of the product are virtual commodities (fiber, wavelengths, circuit boards, chips) and are continually dropping in price. Perhaps it will require government regulations regarding diversity and resilience to change this but wouldn't it be nice if the industry could get together and solve this problem in a self-regulatory fashion? --Michael Dillon

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From Kelly Cooper: goodbye & good luck (fwd)
by Sean Donelan 11 Jul '03

11 Jul '03

Kelly Cooper asked me to forward this to NANOG. ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Thu, 10 Jul 2003 23:05:38 +0000 (GMT) From: Kelly J. Cooper <kcooper(a)genuity.com> To: nanog(a)merit.edu Subject: goodbye & good luck My last day with BBN/BBN Planet/GTE Internetworking/Genuity/Level3 is tomorrow, 11 July 2003. After a little more than 8.5 years, I think the time is right to go and I'm looking forward to the change. I will be taking some time off, to write and regroup and organize my life a bit. Along those lines I'll also be unsubscribing from NANOG. Why should you care? Because this is more or less the official death of my effort to create an ISP Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISP-ISAC). If you are rooting around in your pockets looking for loose change and find a whole mess of disposable capital or a financing angel, do feel free to contact me or Ira Richer (who's still contracting with CNRI). Ira can be found thru RICHER at cnri dot reston dot va dot us. You can find me thru KJC at acmehacking dot com. Regards, Kelly J. Cooper

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Student dissertation or company press releases
by Sean Donelan 11 Jul '03

11 Jul '03

A gradute student writes a dissertation, and people are talking about locking it up before they leave the building. On the other hand, government contractors are issuing press releases about Internet web portals connecting emergency first responders in the Washington DC area. While some people think any information sharing is potentially dangerous, I'm pleased to see both Sean Gorman's dissertation and the Pentagon Force Protection Agency cybercop multi-agency web portal. ARLINGTON, Va., July 10 /PRNewswire/ -- The Pentagon Force Protection Agency (PFPA), established by the Department of Defense after the attack on the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, coordinates security for the Pentagon and DoD interests and disseminates threat prevention, education and preparedness information within the Region. To assist in managing sensitive information among the many groups protecting the Pentagon, PFPA has deployed a secure, Internet based portal operated by The ESP Group, LLC. The portal provides secure collaboration support for sensitive but unclassified information including secure messaging, file sharing, threaded discussions, task tracking, calendar / scheduling, meeting coordination, security alerts and private web pages. The PFPA Cybercop Portal links together law enforcement, first responders, military and homeland security related officials in the National Capital Region. The Cybercop Portal bridges the system stovepipes at participating agencies by providing a separate means to collaborate using the security controls necessary to handle sensitive but unclassified law enforcement information. Users can access the portal from any web browser that supports high encryption. They share information on a wide range of Pentagon related issues including terrorism issues, protests and suspicious activity in the area, or area traffic flow and parking problems. The ESP Group, LLC is a secure applications service provider that specializes in operating highly secure collaboration systems for a variety of Government and commercial clients. It has been selected for numerous Homeland Security projects including support of the Office for Domestic Preparedness during the nationally recognized TOPOFF 2 exercise; providing secure collaboration for the Department of Homeland Security's Senior Advisory Committees; participation in the Domestic Emergency Response Information Service, funded by the Office of the Secretary of Defense; as well as providing a Cybercop Portal for 4000+ law enforcement and first responders from all 50 states and 18 countries. The portals are provided on a turn-key basis which includes hosting, monitoring, customization, training and a full-service help desk. The ESP Group, LLC also employs a highly skilled software development team that specializes in building customized applications to client specifications.

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Re: Backbone Infrastructure and Secrecy
by Eric Kuhnke 10 Jul '03

10 Jul '03

I stand corrected, last I saw any information on the bunker was well over a year ago. My opinion is that business continuity/disaster recovery customers can save money by using two separate commercial grade facilities in widely spaced cities (for example, London UK and Frankfurt DE), rather than going for a "all the eggs in one basket" approach. Whereas major commercial exchange points will have a large selection of carriers, government and military bunkers are usually far from any major city centre. Attack-trained guard dogs? Two ton doors? It's all very impressive when showing off to potential clients (or in novels such as Cryptonomicon), but also very useless in the real world. :-) At 12:31 PM 7/10/2003 +0100, you wrote: >I'm not subscribed to the list, so I'm not sure if this will make it. >But, anyway: it has come to my attention that Eric Kuhnke ><eric(a)fnordsystems.com> made the following post to the nanog list: > >> I recall reading, last year, about a "Cyber Bunker" outside London UK >> which is being offered as colo to major banks. The banks were raving >> praise about it. This facility is an ex-RAF centralized radar >> control site, buried dozens of feet underground w/ thick concrete and >> designed to withstand nuclear weapon overpressure. Blast doors, EMF >> shielding, dual-redundant air filtered generators, the works. >> >> The people who bought it and turned it into a colo neglected to >> mention one thing: It's in the middle of a farm field with a single >> homed fiber route to Telehouse Docklands. >> >> Anyone have a backhoe? *snip* >> >> DIVERSE ROUTES, people! > >Being the owners of what we believe to be the only ex-RAF centralized >radar control site that offers colo in the UK >(http://www.thebunker.net/) we're a little puzzled. > >Our bunker _does_ have diverse fibre which we believe is also armoured >to a higher standard than usual[1], and certainly buried deeper (since >it enters the frame room a _long_ way underground). We also have >multiple providers routed across the diverse fibre, not all terminating >in Telehouse. In short, about as far as you can get from a "a single >homed fiber route to Telehouse Docklands". > >If indeed you are talking about our bunker, we'd be very interested to >know where your information comes from, so we can correct it. If you >aren't, we'd love to hear which bunker you are talking about. > >Cheers, > >Ben (Technical Director, ALD) > >[1] Funnily enough, the military weren't exactly forthcoming about >details like this. > >-- >http://www.apache-ssl.org/ben.html http://www.thebunker.net/ > >"There is no limit to what a man can do or how far he can go if he >doesn't mind who gets the credit." - Robert Woodruff

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OT: Need to talk to mwinslow
by William D.McKinney 10 Jul '03

10 Jul '03

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RE: Backbone Infrastructure and Secrecy
by Gil Levi 10 Jul '03

10 Jul '03

Peter wrote: >I hate to be a doom sayer, but any chump with a couple of tools and >rudimentary knowledge can lift manholes, cut cables and jump to another >location in minutes. No amount of diversity could defend against a concerted >attack like that unless you start installing very special low-level routes >away from street level into many many buildings. While it is impossible to stop someone (a terrorist) from cutting fiber, it is possible to limit his ability to do damage. It is possible to create alternative routes to be used in such cases. Then while the primary route may be down, the alternate route will be used and no terrorist should be able to locate the alternative route since this is something known only to the telecom carrier and is definitely not public knowledge. While this is not new to anyone, what is new is that cutting the cost of this alternate route for every fiber is the key to making no single points of failures. This means that carriers must be able NOT to double equipment just because another link is used. There is such a solution and it is the use of optical protection. optical networks can be protected in the optical domain without the cost of additional equipment - adding only the cost of the optical protection equipment which is an order of magnitude lower than that of the high data rate equipment. This allows the carriers to double up on equipment only once (to deal with equipment failure using today's redundancy schemes) and use the SAME double equipment to protect from fiber cuts as well by providing disaster recovery architectures in the optical domain. Gil

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Re: Backbone Infrastructure and Secrecy
by Michael.Dillon＠radianz.com 10 Jul '03

10 Jul '03

>Maybe you guys in the US >are historically more paranoid, but London is just covered in single points >of major failure for telecoms. I think London is rather more paranoid. I work in London and just on Monday I was stopped by police at Tower Hill tube station and searched for explosive paraphernalia as part of their programme of random searches. When I told people about this in the office, several others had stories about friends who had been detained or searched within the city for one reason or another. At least in London, the strong arm of the law is only exercised in locations where there really is important infrastructure. In the USA in the past year I've travelled through half a dozen airports and the most intense searching scrutiny was when leaving the smallest ones, Eugene OR and Memphis TN. I don't believe that it would be as easy as you say for someone to open manholes, cut cables (very thick cables of glass and tough plastics), then run on to the next location. Certainly, in London, anything like this would be picked up on CCTV and the police would be rapidly dispatched to investigate. Yes, the single points of failure abound, but getting access to them for evil purposes is not as easy as it looks. --Michael Dillon

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EOF, Amsterdam, September - Call for Presentations
by Daniel Karrenberg 10 Jul '03

10 Jul '03

[apologies for duplicates, hint: they have the same message-id] Hi Network Operations Folk, the holiday period is starting! A good time to consider preparing a presentation at the European Operators Forum (EOF) to be held during the 46th RIPE meeting in Amsterdam on September 1st and 2nd. We would like to have as many practical, hands-on presentations as possible this time. Remember: They do not have to be long. We prefer an stand-up interesting 10 minute presentation over a well prepared 90 minutes explanation of something not so interesting to operators. Find some information about presenting below and think about all those experiences this year that might be interesting to other operators. For the EOF "Coordination Group". Daniel Karrenberg -------------------------------------------------------------------------- The EOF The European Operators Forum (EOF) exists for the exchange of Internet operations experience. It has evolved from the "information exchange" part of the early RIPE meetings to provide an open forum outside of the work programme of the working groups and the RIPE plenary. The EOF aims to attract presentations relevant to network operators, practical "hands-on" reports, outlines of future developments and small tutorials. Product marketing presentations are not appropriate, user experience reports are. The EOF programme is assembled by an informal coordination group that is always looking for new people who are able to help by attracting interesting presentations and supporting presenters. Contact: Daniel Karrenberg <daniel.karrenberg(a)ripe.net> Presenting at the EOF The EOF wants to attract practical hands-on experience reports. We aim to make turning interesting experience into a presentation as easy as possible. Consider the following: - presentations do not have to be long Something interesting can be said in as little as 10 minutes. This limits the time spent to prepare material and often is a good way to start for first-timers. - support is available We will do our best to support you in preparing your presentation. If you want, we can help structuring your material, help to polish language and arrange for a test-run of your presentation. We can also try to arrange for someone from the same country or region to support you if that is helpful. We can also help you find someone else to present your material in case you cannot make it to the meeting. In short: If you have something intersting to say, we will help you do it! Contact Daniel Karrenberg <daniel.karrenberg(a)ripe.net> for more information. - no product marketing presentations The EOF is *not* an appropriate forum for product marketing presentations. User experience reports which are presented by users are definitely relevant. In-depth technical presentations or tutorials are also possible. We expect to finalise the program in early August. We will get back to you then with scheduling details. In the meantime please provide the information below. We place special emphasis on the abstract which should contain references to related material already available if possible. Please send this to eof-coord at-sign ripe.net. - Author(s) - Speaker - (Working) Title - Abstract - Draft Presentation (if available) - Relation to other known work and/or presentations if known - Time Requested It would be helpful if the abstract was written such that potential attenders will learn what to expect from the presentation, i.e. "The presentation will describe our experiences with the Red Packet Washer (http://www.netdet.net/RPW/) We have been using the device for half a year now. It helps us deliver more hygienic datagrams to our customers and peers. We will discuss problems with packet discolouring as well as increased throughput to our upstreams due to decreased clogging by dirty micrograms. We will compare performance with the hand-scrubbing of packets which we used previously. Currently we are optimising device management and getting bugs resolved. We will strive to include the latest experiences in our report." is much better than "The presentation will describe the Red Packet Washer made by Network Detergents." More information about the meeting can be found at http://www.ripe.net/ripe/meetings/ripe-46/index.html Should you have questions, please do not hesitate to contact me by e-mail at any time. During July and August my response time may be slightly longer than usual due to the holiday period. Thanks Daniel

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RE: Backbone Infrastructure and Secrecy
by Vandy Hamidi 09 Jul '03

09 Jul '03

http://www.thebunker.net/ -----Original Message----- From: Eric Kuhnke [mailto:eric@fnordsystems.com] Sent: Wednesday, July 09, 2003 3:48 PM To: nanog(a)merit.edu Subject: Re: Backbone Infrastructure and Secrecy I recall reading, last year, about a "Cyber Bunker" outside London UK which is being offered as colo to major banks. The banks were raving praise about it. This facility is an ex-RAF centralized radar control site, buried dozens of feet underground w/ thick concrete and designed to withstand nuclear weapon overpressure. Blast doors, EMF shielding, dual-redundant air filtered generators, the works. The people who bought it and turned it into a colo neglected to mention one thing: It's in the middle of a farm field with a single homed fiber route to Telehouse Docklands. Anyone have a backhoe? *snip* DIVERSE ROUTES, people! At 05:30 PM 7/9/2003 +0100, you wrote: >Michael.Dillon(a)radianz.com wrote: >> However we can work to spread out the infrastructure more so that it >> is harder for terrorists to find a single point of failure to attack. >> If they have to coordinate an attack on 3 or 4 locations, there is an >> increased probability that something will go wrong (as on 9/11) and >> one or more of their targets will escape total destruction. > >I hate to be a doom sayer, but any chump with a couple of tools and >rudimentary knowledge can lift manholes, cut cables and jump to another >location in minutes. No amount of diversity could defend against a concerted >attack like that unless you start installing very special low-level routes >away from street level into many many buildings. Maybe you guys in the US >are historically more paranoid, but London is just covered in single points >of major failure for telecoms. > >Protecting the switching centres (IP or voice) looks great, but walk a few >hundred feet and all senblence of physical security breaks. > >Peter

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