June 2003 - Test - lists.nanog.org

IRR/RADB and BGP
by Vandy Hamidi 20 Jun '03

20 Jun '03

Our new ISP is asking that I create a maintainer object in the RADB and associated AS/Routes for us to be about to eBGP peer. This is the first time I've been asked by a provider to do this for something as simple as peering to advertise a couple /24's. I've peered with ATT, Sprint, UUnet, Qwest, Savvis, SBC, and Internap in the past and never had to do anything but have a valid ASN provided by ARIN. Is this just so they can dynamically build their prefix/as-path lists? Why would I need to do this and what advantages are there. Cost to register with RADB is $250/year and I want to understand it before I shell out. Thanks, -=Vandy=-

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RE: IRR/RADB and BGP
by Ejay Hire 20 Jun '03

20 Jun '03

Negative. -Ejay -----Original Message----- From: Deepak Jain [mailto:deepak@ai.net] Sent: Thursday, June 19, 2003 11:43 PM To: Kevin Oberman; Vandy Hamidi Cc: nanog(a)merit.edu Subject: RE: IRR/RADB and BGP > I strongly approve of such requirement. I know that it is in the peering > agreements of several carriers, but they often don't check or enforce > this. Many register customer routes and ASes. If routes and policies > were properly registered, securing the Internet would be a lot closer > to being possible. Is it safe to assume (now) that all the routes one would care to listen to (under normal circumstances) are registered in an IRR now? I remember there used to be well-known issues with some networks, especially internationally. Deepak Jain AiNET

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anyone has netrange -> cidr conversion script to share?
by william＠elan.net 19 Jun '03

19 Jun '03

Does anyone here has a script (or perl procedure) for converting range of ips (i.e. 10.0.0.0 - 10.0.2.255) into cidr (i.e. result would be 10.0.0.0/23,10.0.2.0/24 from the example before). If not I'll do it, I'm just hoping somebody is already done something this for another project... Reply off the list. -- William Leibzon Elan Communications Inc. william(a)elan.net

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CNN.com - Senator: Trash illegal downloaders' PCs - Jun. 18, 2003
by Richard Irving 18 Jun '03

18 Jun '03

Just to continue the discussion of the RIAA oriented Laws, and how they seem to supersede American Constitutional rights.... Haven't these people heard of Multi-User Systems ? Excerpt: "Senator: Trash illegal downloaders' PCs" <http://www.cnn.com/2003/TECH/internet/06/18/download.music.ap/index.html> I think these people think gross infringements will be prevented by the Constitution. They keep forgetting that the USA Patriot attempts to -=supersede=- your basic constitutional protections, in such matters. As such, basic constitutional rights have -=no=- protection from -=Patriot=-..... or, subsequent Electronic legislation. (AFAICT)

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IPv4 Allocation stats
by matthew.ford＠bt.com 18 Jun '03

18 Jun '03

We're not ARIN members so I can't post to arin-discuss - thought someone here might be able to help me out.... Can anyone explain to me why the ARIN IPv4 Issued statistics, e.g. http://www.arin.net/statistics/index.html#ipv4issued2003, do not seem to match up with the stats available from ftp://ftp.arin.net/pub/stats/arin/arin.20030601? For example, if you add all the allocations and assignments listed in arin.20030601 for April 2003 you get 819,456. Dividing by 256 to get /24 equivalents gives 3,201. But http://www.arin.net/statistics/index.html#ipv4issued2003 states 7,056 /24 equivalents were issued in April 2003. I'm sure there's a simple explanation. So what is it? Maybe I can't do arithmetic... -- Mat

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RE: OT: question re. the Volume of unwanted email (fwd)
by Drew Weaver 18 Jun '03

18 Jun '03

Since 00:00 (EST) 1 ACL from_senders_bogus 1 ETRN Mail theft attempt 1 ACL mta_clients_relay 1 SMTP Exceeded Hard Error Limit after RSET 1 ACL mta_clients_onedict 2 SMTP Exceeded Hard Error Limit after MAIL 4 ACL mta_clients_senders_regexp 4 SMTP Exceeded Hard Error Limit after CONNECT 7 ACL recipient(a)recipient.domain 9 SMTP invalid sender(a)sender.domain 21 ACL helo_hostnames 42 SMTP unauthorized pipelining 55 ACL mta_clients_slet 64 SMTP Exceeded Hard Error Limit after DATA 93 ACL mta_clients_bogus 107 ACL to_recipients_dead 148 ACL to_local_recipients unknown recipient 354 ACL unauthorized relay 426 ACL mta_clients_blaksender 506 ACL mta_clients_dead 594 ACL from_senders_nxdomain 1054 ACL from_senders_black 1125 DNS timeout for MTA PTR hostname (forged @sender.domain) 1658 SMTP sender address verification in progress 2251 ACL from_senders_black_regexp 2678 ACL from_senders_slet 2734 DNS no A/MX for @sender.domain 3770 SMTP sender address undeliverable 4572 RBL rbl-plus.mail-abuse.org 4703 DNS nxdomain for MTA PTR hostname (forged @sender.domain) 5152 ACL from_senders_imgfx 5334 ACL mta_clients_bw 9846 SMTP sender address unverifiable 66969 SMTP Exceeded Hard Error Limit after RCPT 217244 ACL to_relay_recipients unknown recipient 331531 TOTAL -----Original Message----- From: Paul Vixie [mailto:vixie@vix.com] Sent: Wednesday, June 18, 2003 2:04 PM To: nanog(a)merit.edu Subject: Re: OT: question re. the Volume of unwanted email (fwd) jbates(a)brightok.net (Jack Bates) writes: > While there is a cost to ISPs reguarding spam, the highest cost is still > on the recipient. End User's who are outraged by their children getting > pornography in email, or having trouble finding their legitimate emails > due to the sheer volume of spam that fills their inbox. yes. lartomatic=# select date(entered),count(*) from spam where date(entered)>now()-'20 days'::interval group by date(entered) order by date(entered) desc; date | count ------------+------- 2003-06-18 | 505 2003-06-17 | 873 2003-06-16 | 644 2003-06-15 | 621 2003-06-14 | 667 2003-06-13 | 396 2003-06-12 | 696 2003-06-11 | 517 2003-06-10 | 673 2003-06-09 | 616 2003-06-08 | 421 2003-06-07 | 398 2003-06-06 | 558 2003-06-05 | 534 2003-06-04 | 616 2003-06-03 | 464 2003-06-02 | 555 2003-06-01 | 677 2003-05-31 | 378 2003-05-30 | 642 (20 rows) that's actually not too bad. the trend is flattening after the Q1'03 surge. > In this day and age, time is often more valuable than money and the > assigned value is dependant on the individual. Unfortunately, end user's > cannot just highlight and hit delete on spam. They must look at almost > every email to verify that it is spam and not a business or personal > email. The misleading subject lines and forgeries are making this even > more necessary. let's not lose site of the privacy and property issues, though. even if all spam were accurately marked with "SPAM:" (or "ADV:") in its subject line and there were no false positives, there is no implied right to send it since it still shifts costs toward the recipient(s). all communication should be by mutual consent, and one way or another, some day it will be. -- Paul Vixie

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Minimum prefix length?
by Temkin, David 18 Jun '03

18 Jun '03

A few years ago I had an issue with a few of the larger carriers rejecting my routes (from a natural Class B space) because their prefix length was too short (at one point I simply had the /16 divided into two /17's and this still got rejected in some places). I can't remember which carriers exactly, but it may have been some larger transit providers like AboveNet/etc. Anyone know what the current attitude is by carriers about this? Nowadays with ever-growing memory and CPU it doesn't seem like it's as much of an issue. In an environment where we're all trying to conserve address space watching natural boundries doesn't seem all that smart. IMPORTANT:The information contained in this email and/or its attachments is confidential. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify the sender immediately by reply and immediately delete this message and all its attachments. Any review, use, reproduction, disclosure or dissemination of this message or any attachment by an unintended recipient is strictly prohibited. Neither this message nor any attachment is intended as or should be construed as an offer, solicitation or recommendation to buy or sell any security or other financial instrument. Neither the sender, his or her employer nor any of their respective affiliates makes any warranties as to the completeness or accuracy of any of the information contained herein or that this message or any of its attachments is free of viruses.

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Re: IntraLATA vs. InterLATA Ckt Reliability
by Ron Buchalski 17 Jun '03

17 Jun '03

You can request circuit diversity, and ask for the circuit layout record (CLR/DLR) to verify that the paths are diverse. Standard practice is to assign circuits onto available facilities, and treat each circuit independently. So, there's no concern about whether the circuits share common facilities, unless the orders are flagged that way. Unfortunately, future circuit grooming may result in your circuits being put onto a common path somewhere. You can try to get the telco to guarantee diversity in writing, with financial penalties if they fail to maintain diversity. You'll need to provide backup for lost revenue, to determine how much the financial penalties should be. By the way, there's no guarantee that intralata circuits will always be diversely routed, either. It's all dependent on the available facilities. For interlata circuits, even if you were to go with two different IXCs, you'll need to insure that they don't share common facilities, or lease capacity on the same fiber. Years ago, a train wreck in the NY-DC corridor caused multiple carriers to experience fiber outages. Seems that one carrier trenched fiber on the right side of the tracks, and another carrier trenched fiber on the left side of the tracks. The derailment dug up both sides! -rb >From: "William R. Lorenz" <wrl(a)express.org> >To: nanog(a)merit.edu >Subject: IntraLATA vs. InterLATA Ckt Reliability >Date: Mon, 16 Jun 2003 17:11:42 -0400 (EDT) > > >Can someone with a bit of experience in telco line engineering speak to >IntraLATA vs. InterLATA DS-1 circuit reliability? More specifically, is >it more likely for multiple DS-1 circuits to be aggregated using a single >piece of multiplexing equipment when heading into another LATA, thus >increasing the chance of combined failure of two diverse circuits at a >single point? I would love to have two diverse T1 circuits coming into >the offices, but it looks like they'll ultimately traverse the same telco >switches, both at the local and regional interconnection levels (? more >info ?), and it seems as though this presents increased risk. We have >entrance failities for just one LEC in our office building here, and I >understand that a new telco buildout would require lots of investment. > >I've actually talked with LEC engineers about the various switching >stations in the area, and it seems as though everything is aggregated >through a single central office before hitting the other LATAs. Have >others encountered this same kind of topology in the past? What are some >of the things that can be done to help ensure circuit diversity? > >Lots and lots of questions, I know. ;) Any insight into standard telco >engineering practices would be great and very much appreciated! Tnx. > >-- _ >__ __ ___ _| | William R. Lorenz <wrl(a)express.org> >\ V V / '_| | http://java.sun.com/; http://www.linux.org/ > \./\./|_| |_| "[...] But it's turtles all the way down." > _________________________________________________________________ Add photos to your e-mail with MSN 8. Get 2 months FREE*. http://join.msn.com/?page=features/featuredemail

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more on lame-delegation.org, seems to waste IP space and DNS
by John Brown 17 Jun '03

17 Jun '03

so i've been doing a bit more research on this. NSI has *.lame-delegation.org which is used on zones where selected or all NS are not valid for a zone. some zones have a lame-delegation.org NS listed *AND* a NS that is answering for the zone. most zones have all NS's listed as lame-delegation.org Big deal you say, who cares.... The side affect is that a good chuck of glue records are listed in the the gTLD DNS servers with NS's and IP's that are basicly invalid. In looking at a single /19 used by Rackspace.com, there are 559 NS's listed using IP's from that /19. Of those 559 NS's over 20 are IP's tagged as *.lame-delegation.org. What happens if someone sets up a service on those IP's and a "quasi" lame zone gets a flood of traffic?? That poor customer is going to see a flood of DNS traffic. Hosting providers may not be aware that THEIR IP space is being "renamed" and listed for things they don't have control over. My thoughts are that if a registry as a NS that is not proper for a zone, that it should be REMOVE from the zones NS set. If there are no valid NS's for a zone, then the registry should REMOVE the zone from the DNS. Otherwise the registry zones will just grow with random glue The other registries and registrars are doing similar things, but different names....

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domain hijacker convicted
by Dan Hollis 17 Jun '03

17 Jun '03

http://news.com.com/2100-1002_3-1016447.html Shows you how really worthless verisign's "security" is. How about the FBI start going after the netblock hijackers now? While racine's motivation was political, the netblock hijackers motivation is purely unjust enrichment and theft of service. -Dan -- [-] Omae no subete no kichi wa ore no mono da. [-]

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