January 2003 - Test - lists.nanog.org

Draft agenda for Phoenix
by Susan Harris 23 Jan '03

23 Jan '03

Draft Agenda: NANOG 27 February 9-11 Phoenix, Arizona Sunday Tutorials ---------------- 1:30 - 3:00 p.m. BGP Techniques for Service Providers Level: Introductory --Philip Smith, Cisco 1:30 - 3:00 p.m. A Methodology for Troubleshooting Interdomain IP Multicast Level: Intermediate/Advanced --Bill Nickless and Caren Litvanyi, Argonne Nat'l Lab 3:00 - 3:30 p.m. BREAK 3:30 - 5:00 p.m. BGP Troubleshooting with Juniper Examples Level: Intermediate/Advanced --Joseph M. Soricelli, Juniper 3:30 - 5:00 p.m. BGP Techniques (cont'd.) 5:00 - 7:30 p.m. DINNER BREAK 7:30 - 9:00 p.m. IPv6 Deployment Concepts Level: Intermediate --Tony Hain, Cisco Monday, February 10 9:00 a.m. Welcome, Introductions -- Rodney Joffe / Susan Harris, Merit 9:15 a.m. Experiences with Large-Scale Network Consolidation (Or, How I Spent My Summer Vacation) --Dave Israel and William Charnock, Allegiance Telecom 9:45 a.m. Impact of BGP Dynamics on Intra-Domain Traffic Patterns in the Sprint IP Backbone --Sharad Agarwal, Chen-Nee Chuah, Supratik Bhattacharyya, and Christophe Diot, Sprint 10:15 a.m. BREAK 10:45 a.m. BGP4 Anycast for Root Name Service -- Threat or Menace? --Suzanne Woolf, ISC, Mark Schleifer, Cogent 11:15 a.m. BST - BGP Scalable Transport --Van Jacobson, Cengiz Alaettinoglu, and Kedar Poduri, Packet Design 12:00 p.m. LUNCH 1:30 p.m. Peering Evolution --Daniel Golding, AOL Time Warner 2:00 p.m. Internet Exchange Operator Panel --Mike Hughes, LINX, moderator Celeste Anderson, LAAP Tom Bechly, MAE Services John Brown, IXNM Akira Kato, NXPIXP/JPIX/JPNAP Pete Kruckenberg, Utah REP Stephen Stuart/Brad Horak, PAIX Akio Sugeno, Telehouse America (NYIIX/LAIIX) 3:00 p.m. BREAK 3:30 p.m. Analysis of Metric-Based Traffic Engineering on Real Networks --Arman Maghbouleh, Cariden 4:00 p.m. Research Forum -------------- Achieving Near-Optimal Traffic Engineering Solutions for Current OSPF/IS-IS Networks --Ashwin Sridharan and Roch Guerin, Univ. of Pennsylvania Christophe Diot, Sprint Working Around BGP: An Incremental Approach to Improving Security and Accuracy of Interdomain Routing --Geoffrey Goodell, Harvard Univ., William Aiello, Timothy Griffin, John Ioannidis, Patrick McDaniel, and Aviel Rubin, AT&T Research 5:30 - 7:30 p.m. BEER 'N GEAR Monday Evening BOFs ------------------ 7:30 - 9:00 p.m. ISP Security BOF II --Barry Raveendran Greene, Cisco Merike Kaeo, merike.com, moderators 9:00 - 10:30 p.m. Peering BOF VI --Bill Norton, Equinix, moderator Tuesday, February 11 -------------------- 9:00 a.m. Large Scale Wireless Networks, UT's Case --Philippe Hanset, University of Tennessee 9:30 a.m. High Density Wireless Deployment --Joel Jaeggli, University of Oregon 10:00 a.m. Global RIR Statistics --Leslie Nobile, ARIN 10:15 a.m. CIDR Police - Please Pull Over and Show Us Your BGP Announcements --Barry Greene, Cisco, Hank Nussbacher, Riverhead Networks 10:35 a.m. BREAK 11:00 a.m. IPv4 Address Allocation and BGP Routing Table Evolution --Cathy Wittbrodt, Packet Design 11:30 a.m. The BGP TTL Security Hack (BTSH) --Dave Meyer, Sprint 11:45 a.m. Lack of Priority Queuing on RPs Considered Harmful --Vijay Gill, AOL Time Warner 12:00 p.m. LUNCH 1:30 a.m. Security Considerations for Network Architecture --Avi Freedman, Akamai 1:50 p.m. Operational Testing of DNS Resources - IPv6/DNS Symbiosis --Bill Manning 2:10 p.m. SIP Operation in the Public Internet: What Makes Running It a Challenge and What it Takes to Deal With It --Jiri Kuthan, iptel.org 2:40 p.m. Update on the 802.17 RPR Standard --Andrew Brown, Cisco 3:00 p.m. Adjourn More info here: http://www.nanog.org/mtg-0302/

1 0

Is there a line of defense against Distributed Reflective attacks?
by Brad Laue 23 Jan '03

23 Jan '03

Having researched this in-depth after reading a rather cursory article on the topic (http://grc.com/dos/drdos.htm) only two main methods come to my mind to protect against it. By way of quick review, such an attack is carried out by forging the source address of the target host and sending large quantities of packets toward a high-bandwidth middleman or several such. To my knowledge the network encompassing the target host is largely unable to protect itself other than 'poisoning' the route to the host in question. This succeeds in minimizing the impact of such an attack on the network itself, but also acheives the end of removing the target host from the Internet entirely. Additionally, if the targetted host is a router, little if anything can be done to stop that network from going down. One method that comes to mind that can slow the incoming traffic in a more distributed way is ECN (explicit congestion notification), but it doesn't seem as though the implementation of ECN is a priority for many small or large networks (correct me if I'm wrong on this point). If ECN is a practical solution to an attack of this kind, what prevents its implementation? Lack of awareness, or other? Also, are there other methods of protecting a targetted network from losing functionality during such an attack? Insights welcome. Brad -- // -- http://www.BRAD-X.com/ -- //

13 29

IP providers at 601 West 26th Street, NYC
by Lupi, Guy 23 Jan '03

23 Jan '03

I was wondering if anyone out there knows of providers that have a PoP at 601 West 26th Street, NYC and can provide OC3 and above? If so, please reply off list, thanks. Guy H. Lupi

1 0

aol and 69.0.0/8
by Scott Granados 23 Jan '03

23 Jan '03

Anyone hear of aol not allowing in 69.0.0.0/8 addresses. It was just claimed to me but I thought that seemed highly unlikely.

3 2

OT: Re: FW: Re: Is there a line of defense against Distributed Reflective attacks?
by Baldwin, James 23 Jan '03

23 Jan '03

Something I'm surprised no one has commented on considering the direction of this thread has been should ISPs be responsible for customer actions if they are not allowed to refuse service to customers? I'm surprised this hasn't come up since the latter half of the question also represented a fairly "popular" thread earlier. I'm interested in people's opinions. James Baldwin Worldwide Technology Services and Operations Network Operations Center Electronic Arts, Inc.

3 2

Re: [Fwd: .gov whois server down]
by Joshua Smith 23 Jan '03

23 Jan '03

i am getting duplicates too -i thought it was just my mail service or lack of coffee :-) cw <security(a)fidei.co.uk> wrote: > > Anyone else now had two copies of all the messages in this particular thread? They came through ok the first time, now they're coming through again slowly in reverse order.... > > --- Original Message --- > From: "Len Rose" <len(a)netsys.com> > To: <nanog(a)merit.edu> > Cc: > Sent: Tue, 21 Jan 2003 09:35:54 -0600 > Subject: .gov whois server down > > > > > > > > >It looks like it's broken.. I called their helpdesk and they're > >looking into it. > > > >Len > > > > "Walk with me through the Universe, And along the way see how all of us are Connected. Feast the eyes of your Soul, On the Love that abounds. In all places at once, seemingly endless, Like your own existence." - Stephen Hawking -

1 0

.gov whois server down
by Len Rose 23 Jan '03

23 Jan '03

It looks like it's broken.. I called their helpdesk and they're looking into it. Len

3 4

Re: [spamtools] Tracking a DDOS
by Avi Freedman 22 Jan '03

22 Jan '03

In article <103020.16361.319(a)avi.netaxs.com> william(a)sokol.elan.net wrote: : So did you aquire those "assets" from clearblue or where the appliedtheory's : assets kindof devided between fastnet and clearblue? And if undertand it : correctly apliedtheory name & domain are still with clearblue/navisite? : If so is it the same for CRL? : I'm primarily just curious in terms of finding out what happened to : earliest companies that made internet - CRL being one of the first : commercial isp... FastNet purchased the access business from AppliedTheory, and Clearblue got the hosting. In terms of abuse, abuse(a)netaxs.com can be used for fastnet and appliedtheory space also. I just supped with Mr. Abuse @netaxs last Saturday night, and he can resolve or forward internally anything for appliedtheory/fastnet/netaxs/etc customers. Thanks, Avi

3 2

Security Flaw Exposes 35 Million AOL Accounts
by Sean Donelan 22 Jan '03

22 Jan '03

Stones and glass houses. Not to throw stones, but to learn how to build better glass houses. California's SB 1386 doesn't become effective until July 1, 2003. http://www.betanews.com/article.php3?sid=1043252353 Security Flaw Exposes 35 Million AOL Accounts By Nate Mook and Craig Newell, BetaNews January 22nd, 2003, 11:19 AM The accounts of millions of AOL subscribers were jeopardized this week due to a serious flaw in the company's Web-based mail system, BetaNews has learned. The vulnerability stems from an error in one of AOL's international e-mail authentication systems, which granted users access without correctly verifying passwords. By simply entering an account name, an AOL user had the ability to read any other user's e-mail and all personal data contained therein.

1 0

charter.net
by Scott Granados 22 Jan '03

22 Jan '03

Anyone clueful at Charter around? Can you contact me off list, thanks!

1 0