September 2001 - Test - lists.nanog.org

Re: Points of Failure (was Re: National infrastructure asset) (fwd)
by George William Herbert 25 Sep '01

25 Sep '01

Some of this is drifting off topic. I have also juggled the order of some of David's points in order to address them in order of most-on-topic to least-on-topic for this list. David committed to electrons: >Unnamed Administration sources reported that George William Herbert said: >> There are many many angles to all of this. > >And who will pay? In the end the customers will, of course. For any specific protective measure, there's a balance between risk and cost to protect against it, and for all risks there's a total balance of how much the customer is willing to pay overall period. We now know that the risk spectrum is both different and wider than it was. That now has to be assessed both technically and financially (cost of protecting, costs and risks of sustaining losses, costs customers are willing to bear) by all of us in the business now. The answers will not be the same for each business. The answer probably will be more push towards more hardening the more central to the net infrastructure a particular facility or business is, though, as a sweeping generalization. We've now come very close to losing major exchange points or telco centers of equivalent criticality several times. The consequences need to be addressed. The answer is obviously not going to be every colocation facility all the way out to your POP in Elko, NV being armored enough to withstand a nearby nuclear detonation. But how we do things structurally probably needs to shift a lot as a result. Too many people in the industries have blown off physical risk too much for too long. >> Not that I'm recommending every telco facility be hardened to >> resist a direct jumbo jet hit. But it's not that ridiculous >> a task, and lesser hardening (half or 1/3 that level) would be >> downright reasonable compared to the other costs of making these >> sorts of buildings for these roles. A 2 foot thick reinforced >> concrete wall, for example, might well be extremely reasonable. > >But every n of wall thinkness is f(n^2) less interior space; >f(n^3) more cost to build, and f(n^8) more crap from local >pols who really want retail space downtown instead of tombs. For small n compared to building dimentions, it's not n^2 but only n additional ground footprint. Ground footprint of my theoretical building without armor is 200x200=40,000 ft^2; with it, it's 220x220=48,000 ft^2. 20% more total. Thicker reinforced concrete walls are actually cheaper on a per pound basis than thinner ones are, believe it or not. Forms don't care how much space is between them, and form prep work is a lot of the cost. The actual rebar inside is porportional to volume/mass, as is the concrete cost, roughly (they both get marginally cheaper as you get to larger jobs and scale improves). If the local pols care, then you can either not build your data centers downtown, or put darkened glass windows on the outside of your concrete building to make it look like offices (this is actually reasonably good disguise and has been used in actual hardened facilities before). Another option is building-within-a-building; have offices around the perimiter, with the datacenter behind an internal solid concrete wall with few openings into the datacenter. >> Let's look at the "worst credible case" though, jet aircraft. >> Nuclear reactor domes are rated to survive jumbo jet hits. > >Better check this one out; there is considerable dispute >of late on this very point.. A F4 !=747 after all. The F-4 was used for one particular demonstration and test (the famous jet-on-rocket-sled-into-concrete-block video clip). The design criterion was a moderately loaded 747. We now diverge into well and truly off topic analysis... Looking at the problem, you have a 20x200 foot fuselage weighing about 500,000 lbs with fuel and baggage, a (4-0.5)x200 foot wing weighing 200,000 lbs with fuel, and 4 8 foot diameter engines which weigh about 12,000 lbs each with fairing and mount hardware. The only parts that are really "hard" are the engine shafts and the main landing gear. The rest is pretty weak. The concrete wall mass density is around 2.3 tons/cu meter, or around 7 tons per square meter of outer wall. That works out to 1,400 lbs/ft^2. The jetliner body at 500,000 lbs and about 315 square feet has a mass loading of about 1,590 lbs/ ft^2. That will crumple in over an airframe crumple distance of 200 feet, roughly. The engines have a mass loading of around 240 lbs/ft^2, but will concentrate most of their mass over about 10% of their area briefly and are only about 15 feet long. At an airspeed of 250 m/s, (562 mph, 500 knots) the body will impact over about 0.25 second with typical forces of around 50 million lbf, which is trying to shear a 20 foot diameter 10 foot thick reinforced concrete plug out of the larger wall structure (to use the simplest but generally quite accurate penetration model). That's 630 square feet or about 90,720 square inches, or a shear force of about 550 PSI. Good reinforced concrete will withstand more like 2,500 PSI minimum, and some of the fiber strand reinforced varieties along with rebar / mesh reinforcing are several times stronger. The center secton of the wing hitting at mid-fuselage is the largest single impact transient in the collision event, but even those don't penetrate. The engine impacts are significant primarily because they are largely focused via the engine shaft; they will be decellerating over about 3 meters in 0.025 second, with force loading on the wall of 12 million lbf over a roughly 8 foot diameter plug with surface area around 250 square feet or 36,000 square in. The shear forces on the plug walls are about 333 PSI. With much of the engine inertia effectively transferred forwards via the central shaft, this can transiently be 10 times more focused for parts of the impact, to 3330 PSI, approaching the failure point for the wall and perhaps exceeding it for limited areas of traditional reinforced concrete. The vast bulk of the engine mass should be stopped by the wall, however, and higher strength reinforced concrete will resist it adequately to prevent penetration. >> Jet aircraft are remarkably poor penetrators, in military terminal >> ballistics terms. Ten feet of good reinforced concrete, at >> $400/cu yd or so installed, will do the job nicely, though there >> may be some spalling inside the aircraft won't penetrate. For a 3 >> story, 120,000 sq ft 200x200x30 ft building that would be about >> $9.3 million, about $77.70/ft^2. > >No help. You'll have intact but long since roasted into >atoms building, hardware and employees. How many KWH of heat >from the 57,285 gallons of kerosene? Not a problem... Most of those KWH go up in the fireball and atmosphere, and the 40,000 ton concrete shell is a great heat sink and insulator to absorb and resist the rest. Much thinner walled bunkers are used for nuclear weapons installations at airfields, which have to survive having loaded bombers and fighters crash on the bunker and not cook the weapons inside, for example. As a minor aside, the example building I posted was woefully mis-optimized if you're worried about such hardening issues. You want a building that more closely resembles a sphere or cube (minimum surface area for contained space) rather than a relatively flat slab. Something more like 120x120x120, 5 stories up 3 below ground with 15 foot floor heights, would be much better. -george william herbert gherbert(a)retro.com

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Need AT&T Broadband contact in Atlanta
by Jim Popovitch 25 Sep '01

25 Sep '01

If there is an AT&T Broadband engineer, with access to equipment in Atlanta, please contact me. There is an invalid route or subnet on the 24.31.98.0/255.255.254.0 subnet in Atlanta. The 'upper half' (24.31.99.1 - 24.31.99.255) is inaccessible from the public Internet, and users on that section cannot reach the default gateway of 24.31.98.1. The 'lower half' of the 24.31.98.0/255.255.254.0 subnet (24.31.98.1 - 24.31.98.255) is accessible via the public Internet. -Jim P. 404-277-8892 __________________________________________________ Do You Yahoo!? Get email alerts & NEW webcam video instant messaging with Yahoo! Messenger. http://im.yahoo.com

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Zebra users?
by Timothy R. McKee 25 Sep '01

25 Sep '01

A friend has asked me to find out if anyone on Nanog is using Zebra (a gated replacement) and, if so, to ask for their assessment of the program. Tim McKee

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Re: Points of Failure (was Re: National infrastructure asset) (fwd)
by David Lesher 25 Sep '01

25 Sep '01

George William Herbert leaked to the press: > Part of the insidiousness of all this is that currently there is > insufficient information available to a telco line end user to properly > plan for that sort of loss. Right now, it is nigh-on impossible to > get, verify, and keep on a permanent basis truly widely separated > leased lines / bandwidth from point A to point B. Because of the > increasing cooperation, shared facilities, etc. in the telco and > fiber arenas, with many providers you're really getting someone > else's service for part of the connection. Recall the train tunnel > fire from not that long ago, now seemingly trivial, but at the time > a huge disaster... That is fixable. Not easily. Not once {ie it takes ongoing effort to counter entropy} but it could be done... by the industry, IFF demanded by its customers. > On top of that, none of these facilities are sufficiently hardened. > What takes a backhoe operator ten minutes by accident would be no more > than an hours work by hand of a sufficiently educated attacker. > None of these telco buildings are hardened in the traditional > anti-terrorist sense of the word. There are still co-loc facilities > in buildings shared with offices of unrelated companies, etc., > there are still co-loc facilities in buildings with windows into > server rooms, etc. I could go on but will stop now. The situation > is hopeless in many areas. Fixing THAT is a far far harder issue. We did tackle it once. It's called variously "Continuity Of Government" or "ATT Underground" or "L4".. During our last Cold War, ATT spend a few zillion rate-payer dollars building hardened underground facilities for the #5 Transcontinental Coaxial Cable. The #5 was buried deep {~48"} from coast to coast. The underground facilities were solid; some rated for 10psi shock waves. (The crapper is hung on springs...) Air filters; generators; airlocks. There was also hardened microwave; check out the "dish in the hillside" at Mt. Weather. Most have been sold off, but not all. (DSN is based in one, as is GEP.) We gave up when things like MIRVS made it obvious that the undergrounds could be direct targets. Plus, I strongly doubt any facility other than Cheyenne Mountain or Site R would survive a 767 hit. > Longer term, we all need to think about multi-level hardening of facilities > and connectivity to avoid "cheap kills" due to accident or malicious attack. > This gets into traditional datacenter design issues and beyond, into building > hardening (the new standards for Federal buildings, for example, or even > better the new standards for US Embassies...). Note the biggest safety measure for both the above is also the hardest to get & keep.... stand-off distance. It's especially hard to maintain same when you have an active airport's flight path going overhead. And the biggest impediment is the oldest one; they co$t. LOTS. Who is going to pay? -- A host is a host from coast to coast.................wb8foz(a)nrk.com & no one will talk to a host that's close........[v].(301) 56-LINUX Unless the host (that isn't close).........................pob 1433 is busy, hung or dead....................................20915-1433

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Re: The wyrms and the law.
by ken lindahl 25 Sep '01

25 Sep '01

On Tue, 25 Sep 2001, bmanning(a)vacation.karoshi.com wrote: > "Visualize Whorld Peas" > >bonus points for quote attribution. Gregor Mendel (1822-1884)

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RE: Points of Failure (was Re: National infrastructure asset)
by Roeland Meyer 25 Sep '01

25 Sep '01

|> From: Randy Bush [mailto:randy@psg.com] |> Sent: Tuesday, September 25, 2001 1:19 PM |> |> note that richer meshes may increase forwarding reliability but they |> exacerbate routing convergence problems. see abha's nanog |> presentation. for many of us, forwarding reliability is what it's all about and convergence is what we pay you for. Are you saying that isn't factored into COGs?

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RE: The wyrms and the law.
by Roeland Meyer 25 Sep '01

25 Sep '01

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RE: The wyrms and the law.
by Roeland Meyer 25 Sep '01

25 Sep '01

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RE: The wyrms and the law.
by Los, Ralph 25 Sep '01

25 Sep '01

-----Original Message----- From: Vivien M. [mailto:vivienm@dyndns.org] Sent: Tuesday, September 25, 2001 2:38 PM To: nanog(a)merit.edu Subject: RE: The wyrms and the law. > -----Original Message----- > From: owner-nanog(a)merit.edu [mailto:owner-nanog@merit.edu]On Behalf Of > bmanning(a)vacation.karoshi.com > Sent: September 25, 2001 3:57 PM > To: Larry Diffey > Cc: nanog(a)merit.edu > Subject: Re: The wyrms and the law. > > > its worse than that.... :) > > releasing buggy software that increases your systems vulnerability > might fall within the boundary of "terrorist acts". ::Does that mean that the new training camps for terrorists will be in Redmond, WA instead of Afghanistan? <RL>That's uncalled for.....</RL> ::Vivien ::-- ::Vivien M. ::vivienm@dyndns.org ::Assistant System Administrator ::Dynamic DNS Network Services ::http://www.dyndns.org/

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Re: National infrastructure asset
by Steven M. Bellovin 25 Sep '01

25 Sep '01

In message <A86EB3E9F548D411AA6B00B0D020F53490C88C@ENVESTMAIL>, "Los, Ralph" wr ites: > >Raul, > > Yep. Look at it's stock trading! I have it on an internal link >which I can't give you. > >Here's the Reuters link: >http://www.reuters.com/news_article.jhtml?type=internetnews&StoryID=243901 > > Also see http://interactive.wsj.com/articles/SB1001378816537875400.htm if you subscribe to the Wall Street Journal --Steve Bellovin, http://www.research.att.com/~smb http://www.wilyhacker.com

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