August 2001 - Test - lists.nanog.org

Cingular disruption in Washington DC
by Sean Donelan 09 Aug '01

09 Aug '01

I don't think wireless carriers are required to report outages to the FCC yet, at least I haven't seen the report on the FCC web site. Cingular wireless service was disrupted for almost all wireline to wireless, wireless to wireline and voice mail service in the 301 and 202 area codes in Washington DC and surrounding areas. On Wednesday night, a tranformer connection failed, which may have been related to the heat wave in the area. Potomic Electric Power Company responded to the call from Cingular on Wednesday at 6pm, but found the building deserted and the gates locked. No other Potomic Power customers in the area had any problems. The PEPCO crew checked the utility transformer in the area, and found it working. Because there was no one at the site to let them in, the PEPCO crew left. The Cingular switch lost power at approximately 4am, approximately 10 hours later. I'm guessing when the batteries completely discharged. A cingular spokesperson said the system is designed to operate without outside power for up to a month, but the switch failed as the automated system tried to transfer from battery to generator power. A Department of Energy study found it experiences approximately 250 failures a year in emergency power systems at various DOE sites. NRIC reports have been showing an increasing trend in power problems in telephone facilities for several quarters. Would it be useful if ISPs contributed information about problems in their networks, so the industry could address any root-causes which may be affecting systems across providers?

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RE: BGP with AT&T owned space
by Jeff Harper 09 Aug '01

09 Aug '01

yeah, thanks, this answered my question.... -----Original Message----- From: kysi ferul [mailto:redwingblakburdz@yahoo.com] Sent: Thursday, August 09, 2001 3:26 PM To: Christian Nielsen; Jeff Harper Cc: 'nanog(a)merit.edu' Subject: Re: BGP with AT&T owned space RE: PAC BELL REVENUES; BILLING PRACTICES (& BONUSES!); Attn: IETF, NANOG & ICANN Dear Ladies & Gentlemen, It is high time we ask the Public Utilities Commission to NAIL Pac Bell! Really! Last night on San Francisco's ABC Channel 7, Reporter Michael Finney "helped' some 65-year-old European-American males figure out how the "BILL" was something in the area of $680 pr hour...that is $11.08 for a two second call! Here is Mr. Finney finessing in behalf of Pac Bell's finagled fudged fiduciaries... "Oh, see first you accientally touched or nearly touched the 'O' for Operator BEFORE you dialled the O for Operator...it is really like ROULETTE there is a D"DOUBLE OWE"...or sometimes if your assigned Peoples Republic of China 'neighbor is at his post on your line...a "DOUBLE LOW" or funny sound which if you dialed 611 would cost you $108 extra for snooping around...where you are not wanted such as in your own backyard which has been PRIVATIZED by the GOVERNMENT so now belongs to THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS who live in back of you in front of you next door to you...in fact of the 200 HOUSE which comprise LAKESHORE AVE OCEAN AVENUE and COUNTRY CLUB...BERKSHIRE..HUNTINGTON,..etc out at LAKE MERCED in SAN FRANCISCO...only TWO individuals are REAL.."Asian-Americans"...that is SAN FARNCISCO-CHINESE! One girl on the 400 Block of Lakeshore and an older male on the 4700 Block of OCEAN...and the 'neighborhood' is clearly 98% "ASIAN!" ASIAN? They are all from CHINA! RED CHINA! Not ONE is from SINGAPORE! No one from any 'asian' places outside of MACAU...TAIWAN...HONG KONG... and MAINLAND CHINA....NONE were BORN in the USA! NOT ONE! And that is very STARNGE in that the 'BOYS' in the 3-people families...are all about 25-years-old...got here about 8-years ago from CHINA.... RED CHINA.....speaking 'perfect AMERICAN English without ANY TRACE of an ACCENT? NONE? Hell THEMS SPIES! How do I know? Channel 60 KCSM "First TV in Classrooms" PBS....says so! Yeah! The show NEW CALIFORNIA MEDIA a show about MINORITIES had the Chinese-American PArent-Teacher Association on which was SUING the 'Nutty' CITY of SAN FRANCISCO for RACIAL & NATIONAL ORIGINS DISCRIMINATION! Yes! Here was the headlines from the SF CHRONICLE..."SF SCHOOLS RE-INSTATES SEGRAGATION" about how LOWELL HIGH SCHOOL had specially OVERTURNED the NEW FEDERAL LAW which in itself had superceded 'AFFIRAMTIVE ACTION' and called for a level playing field...but to AID & ABET Foreign Nationals posing as 'typical' American TEENS...these dirty bastards not only are HIDING these SPIES out up at LOWELL...but when the SUIT was launched, quickly set about to 'recontour' the PARKING LOT...an effort which will require 80 double-trucks & the CLEVELAND WRECKING CO.? IN otherwords they are going to BULL DOZE the EEVIDENCE! More proof that a "SPACE COLONY" of COMMUNIST RED CHINESE were 'planted' here is in the 'fixing-up of the LAKESHORE PLAZA area...just before the 'INVASION" upon our shores...:"SHELTER BAY" of Mill Valley, LUCKY's , ALBERTSON, the UNIVERSITY of CALIFORNIA and the SOCIAL SECURITY AGENCY of the US Gov. are but a few deeply involved entities. There is NOPOLICE PROTECTION in an area which is 'supposed' to have something like a DOZEN various Law Enforcement & Peace Oficers looking in from time to time...but the REALITY is that the area is MONITORED by CHINESE GANGS...in their NEW CARS without LICENSE PALTES on the CELL_PHONE and with CAMERAS on the HOUSES and in their cars...so that AMERICANS are SURVEILLED! (IN OUR OWN COUNTRY! HOLY JESUS! WE NEED TO GET THE FBI TO UPROOT THIS NEST AT ONCE ! INTERN....INTERROGATE AND DEPORT! Now! The idea that a CHINESE NATIONAL who may have been raised in a "Potemkin Village" ( I mean we are letting AIWAN institute ENGLISH as the FIRST LANGUAGE...and whats more this is AFTER we allowed them to pas! ! ! ! ! ! ! s a LAW making FATHER to SON Homosexual UNIONS legally sanctioned in MARRIAGE! And that is another thing...we have given TAiwan to CHINA at least TWO Times now! Why do we go abck & forth? Why give it up the firsat time? Why this "STRATEGIC AMBIGUITY" policy? (That means if a Chinaman is so retarded to think we actually REQUIRE their 'services' here in the USA that no one is supposed to "HIP" him to the TRUTH? HOLY CRAP! Staop this NONSENSE NOW! 1st of ALL these PEOPLE do not know WHOPPS just got a call-back from someone caliming to be th eparty at "LEGAL" at "PUC" that I left a phone message with this morning...BUT,,BIY! Was she MAD! What is SHE mad about? I asked...and she said..."Well you are misrepresenting what the laws are about phone bills..." Urps! I think you got me mixed up with a recently goobled indigestible BURRITO from TACO BELL! (Don't WORRY...she has a YIDDISH name...adn MEXICAN FOOD was INVENTED in LONG BEACH by ROWAN & MARTIN after those two clowns go! ! ! ! ! ! ! t out of the AIR FORCE...CHI-CHI;s EL Doritos, El Toritos, TACO BELL MISSION BELL MISSION TACO etc..all invented by EL GRINGO! Anyway she said you can SUE but NOT PUC...which is tehre to protect PAC BELL from CITIZEN INQUIRIES..everything must go through "FILTER" or "MUFF" called PUBIC UTITILTIES COMMOTION http://www.trun.org <http://www.trun.org> http://www.cpuc.org <http://www.cpuc.org> http://www.cpuc.ca.gov <http://www.cpuc.ca.gov> http://www.pacbell.com <http://www.pacbell.com> http://www.telesis.com <http://www.telesis.com> http://www.sbc.com <http://www.sbc.com> http://://www.nanog.org <http://://www.nanog.org> http://www.ietf.org <http://www.ietf.org> ttp://www.icaan.org Christian Nielsen <cnielsen(a)nielsen.net> wrote: Jeff, Are you a peer or customer of ATT? or are you seeing these from your upstream? If it is the first case, you can ask ATT to not leak more specific routes to you. Also, they have a community you can use to block them. If it is the second, please talk to your upstream. That means they are leaking ATT more specifics. I know of one provider that has done this more than once in the past... Contact them and make sure they have the correct route-maps/filters in place. And if you really dont like seeing them... prefix-list idontlikethis 12.0.0.0/8 le 8 that should solve your problem. On Thu, 9 Aug 2001, Jeff Harper wrote: > Just curious if anyone has noticed the leaking of the more specific routes > of AT&T's IP space in their BGP table. Here's what we're seeing in ours: > > #s ip ro 12.0.0.! ! ! ! ! ! ! 0 > Routing entry for 12.0.0.0/8, 589 known subnets > Variably subnetted with 9 masks > > B 12.23.26.0/23 [20/0] via x.x.x.x > B 12.28.18.0/24 [20/0] via x.x.x.x > B 12.33.46.0/24 [20/0] via x.x.x.x, etc..... > > > I should just see the aggregation of the /8, but something changed on > 8/7/2001 at precisely 8 AM Eastern time. The same is with their 24/8 and > their other networks as well. I have about 40,000 superfluous networks in > my BGP table. ;) > > Jeff > > > Kysi Ferul redwingblakburdz(a)yahoo.com <mailto:redwingblakburdz@yahoo.com> _____ Do You Yahoo!? Make international calls for as low as $.04/minute with Yahoo! Messenger http://phonecard.yahoo.com/ <http://phonecard.yahoo.com/?.refer=mailtagline>

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BGP with AT&T owned space
by Jeff Harper 09 Aug '01

09 Aug '01

Just curious if anyone has noticed the leaking of the more specific routes of AT&T's IP space in their BGP table. Here's what we're seeing in ours: #s ip ro 12.0.0.0 Routing entry for 12.0.0.0/8, 589 known subnets Variably subnetted with 9 masks B 12.23.26.0/23 [20/0] via x.x.x.x B 12.28.18.0/24 [20/0] via x.x.x.x B 12.33.46.0/24 [20/0] via x.x.x.x, etc..... I should just see the aggregation of the /8, but something changed on 8/7/2001 at precisely 8 AM Eastern time. The same is with their 24/8 and their other networks as well. I have about 40,000 superfluous networks in my BGP table. ;) Jeff

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Worldcom outage
by Jason Beltrame 09 Aug '01

09 Aug '01

Has anyone heard of the worldcom problem in the Baltimore/Philly area? ---------------------------------------------------------- Jason Beltrame INetU, Inc.(tm)- http://www.INetU.net Electronic commerce - Web development - Web hosting jbeltram(a)INetU.net - Phone: (610) 266-7441

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RE: Static routes in an AS vs BGP advertised routes
by Greg Pendergrass 09 Aug '01

09 Aug '01

If you are advertising a /24 through both ISPs in each city then you won't need them to do anything special as routers always put the most specific route in their routing table. If you are advertising specific /24s to the ISPs and one of the peering links drop then that /24 will be withdrawn from that ISP's table and henceforth to the internet making the only available route your other ISP. The problem is if they aggregate and advertise only a /19 instead of individual /24s In this case you could: - Ask the pulverized ISP to withdraw the aggregate in favor of the specific /24s - Ask your second ISP to advertise your specific /24 in that city I'd choose the second option because if your first ISP was truly hit by an asteroid they'll be spending too much time a. Attempting to make people actually believe they were hit by a piece of ancient space debris b. Trying to recover their network c. Working on an appropriate press release showing lack of fault and sorrow for the loss of several competent engineers and d. All the surviving employees will be trying to sign a bunch of book and movie deals about their experience :> All in all your second ISP will be better equipped to get your traffic up and running. Greg Pendergrass Manager of Operations ____________________________________________ BAND-X, Inc. www.band-x.com -----Original Message----- From: owner-nanog(a)merit.edu [mailto:owner-nanog@merit.edu]On Behalf Of Murphy, Brennan Sent: Wednesday, August 08, 2001 10:16 AM To: 'nanog(a)merit.edu' Subject: Static routes in an AS vs BGP advertised routes Suppose you had a scenario where your AS is multi-homed to two ISPs in, for example, 8 cities around North America. Every site is connected to both ISPs and all of your address space occupies a /19. To your ISPs, you advertise specific /24s in each city. In turn, each ISP advertises your /19 to the rest of the Internet. Everything is going along smoothly until an asteroid crashes into the data center of one of your ISPs in one of the cities. It causes extensive damage and a certain amount of hysteria but to you, it means that only one of your ISPs can truly reach your full /19. That is, the /24 you were advertising in that city is now only reachable via one of the ISPs. But the ISP taken out by the asteroid is still advertising the full /19. Under the circumstances (loss of life, hysteria, sub-optimal routing), would it be appropriate to ask the unfortunate ISP to create a static route on their network to push traffic destined for that particular /24 over to the other ISP's network? This way, the /19 advertisements can be maintained and when traffic destined for that one /24 reaches the asteroid ISP, it can get passed over to the non-asteroid ISP. The route wouldnt be advertised to other carriers.....just used to make sure traffic reached the correct final destination. Will ISPs make these types of accommodations? Suppose the reason was less unexpected than an asteroid. For example, suppose you open a site in a 9th city, but only one carrier is available there. In other words, are ISPs reluctant to slap in static routes for every customer who comes along with some sob story about poor planning and/or unexpected growth? Your comments on this theoretical scenario are much appreciated. -BM

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Re: Worldcom
by Jason Beltrame 09 Aug '01

09 Aug '01

Are line is still up, but only at half capacity ---------------------------------------------------------- Jason Beltrame INetU, Inc.(tm)- http://www.INetU.net Electronic commerce - Web development - Web hosting jbeltram(a)INetU.net - Phone: (610) 266-7441 On Thu, 9 Aug 2001, Richard Golodner wrote: > Jason, I have dozens of circuits through MCI in that area and I > still have service. I have not noticed anything unusual either. > Richard >

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RE: Problem with routing from AS15694 to some US networks
by Hire, Ejay 09 Aug '01

09 Aug '01

>From the output there, it looks like that is the chap that is aggregating the /20 that encompasses your block. How large is your ip block? -----Original Message----- From: Adam Obszynski [mailto:awo@atm.com.pl] Sent: Thursday, August 09, 2001 11:55 AM To: nanog(a)merit.edu Subject: Problem with routing from AS15694 to some US networks Hello NONAG! I'm speaking from Poland, and would like to ask you about help in finding some kind of contact to ZephyrTele NOC/NMC becouse they absent in irrd and they recorc in arin is very simple. They anounce our network without BGP session established to our AS 15694, here is sample output which i found after some time of problems with US IP regions (the same hapends in direction to AOL.net but cannot find his looking-glass or route server) Next issue: is there any good way to avoid those situations ? Everybody could redistribute static "sh*s" to BGP and spread it around.. here is sample output from my small investigation: telnet ner-routes.bbnplanet.net [..] ner-routes>trace 217.17.34.10 Type escape sequence to abort. Tracing the route to 217.17.34.10 1 e0-1-5.burlma1-ops1.bbnplanet.net (4.2.34.162) 144 msec 8 msec 240 msec 2 s7-0-4.bstnma1-cr7.bbnplanet.net (4.0.3.181) 4 msec 4 msec 4 msec 3 p5-0.bstnma1-ba2.bbnplanet.net (4.24.4.225) 4 msec 4 msec 4 msec 4 p7-0.bstnma1-br2.bbnplanet.net (4.24.7.121) 4 msec 4 msec 4 msec 5 p2-0.bstnma1-br1.bbnplanet.net (4.24.7.113) 0 msec 4 msec 4 msec 6 p9-0.nycmny1-nbr2.bbnplanet.net (4.24.6.50) 12 msec 12 msec 8 msec 7 p15-0.nycmny1-nbr1.bbnplanet.net (4.24.10.209) 12 msec 12 msec 8 msec 8 p1-0.nycmny1-cr9.bbnplanet.net (4.24.8.162) 8 msec 12 msec 12 msec 9 h0.zephyrtel.bbnplanet.net (4.24.188.50) 12 msec 12 msec 12 msec 10 gr1-ny.ip.zephyrtele.com (12.35.239.4) 8 msec 12 msec 12 msec 11 * * * 12 * * * 13 * * * 14 * * * 15 * 12.124.183.37 !A * ner-routes>sh ip bgp reg _15694$ BGP table version is 1340345, local router ID is 4.2.34.165 Status codes: s suppressed, d damped, h history, * valid, > best, i - internal Origin codes: i - IGP, e - EGP, ? - incomplete Network Next Hop Metric LocPrf Weight Path * i217.17.32.0/20 4.24.188.50 100 0 16499 7018 1239 1755 8246 15694 i ner-routes>sh ip bg 217.17.32.1 BGP routing table entry for 217.17.32.0/20, version 0 Paths: (1 available, no best path) 16499 7018 1239 1755 8246 15694, (aggregated by 15694 217.17.34.1) 4.24.188.50 (inaccessible) from 4.24.0.48 (4.24.1.60) Origin IGP, localpref 100, valid, internal, atomic-aggregate Community: 1:1000 Originator : 4.24.0.225, Cluster list: 4.24.0.48, 4.24.0.131 -- ATM S.A., ul. Grochowska 21a, 04-186 Warszawa +48-607-608701, +48-22-5156418, http://www.atm.com.pl/

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Re: SP's & network security issues
by Travis Pugh 09 Aug '01

09 Aug '01

----- Original Message ----- From: "Martin hepworth" <martinh(a)solid-state-logic.com> > > I think you need to differentiate between broadband cable/DSl customers > at 'home' and those who run a business over it. There's alot of ranting > on /. about the fact that AT&T Broadband is stopping port 80 into the > cable modem and Verizon also not allowing port 25 in, ie stopping the > end user running web and mail servers over their nice new broadband > connection. > > Certain users want this so they can run these services locally without > paying fees for leased lines, colo's etc. Obviously the ISP's don't > like it (or the telco's) as it means they loose their leased lines that > are nice and profitable. > > Maybe the providers should offer to do this port blocking if the > customer requests it, of at least have the options to remove the port > blocking is I want to run all this stuff locally. > > Now Colo's are a different issue and IHMO the servers there should be > well segmented, but it depends on the contract. Does the colo look after > the O/S and applications or is the customer responsible. In the cases > I've seen in the UK the colo usually does this as an added service. > > just my 2 pence worth Hey Martin. I think what i'm suggesting is a "security by default" stance, even for small businesses or power users on the other end of these connections. It makes the system monstrously more complex, but I'd rather see a situation where the access customer has to "opt in" to any given open port across an upstream link, and has to take some responsibility to secure it. It is a large change from the current thinking -- a.k.a. "we just give you the line, what you do with it is your business", but it is blindingly obvious to me that the current line of thinking has failed miserably. Granted, performance considerations on faster links and any given customer's desire to manage their own security must be taken into account, but those seem to be exceptions to the rule. How many DS3 and above customers and yahoo-style server farms are we really dealing with, and how many small businesses with a competent security admin, as compared to T1/E1 and broadband customers who take the line, plug it in, and hope for the best? -travis > > > > -- > Martin Hepworth > Senior Systems Administrator > Solid State Logic Ltd > +44 (0)1865 842300

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Re: SP's & network security issues
by Travis Pugh 09 Aug '01

09 Aug '01

----- Original Message ----- From: "Christian Kuhtz" <ck(a)arch.bellsouth.net> > > > Hey there, Hi Chris, > > In our case, we have several hundred thousands of DSL customers today, and the > million plus subscriber mark is on the engineering horizon. The problem of > security threats & resulting incidents is going to get considerably worse > before it gets better. And that's for at least two reasons.. the ramp up of > broadband and presumably the declining sophistication of the subscriber > population as a result of the greater market penetration. Lack of security knowledge is also a huge problem in the collocation market. The percentage of security-conscious colo customers is low, and uneducated customers tend to be connected to Fast Ethernet or Gigabit Ethernet feeds. One compromise in a well-connected colo can have the same effect as hundreds of broadband compromises, although it's easier to track down and stop. > > How do you effectively scale the massive support effort need for collaborative > marketing of personal firewalls and the potential for false positives and > negatives? Any ideas on the legal exposure of security services? My former employer ran several different managed firewall services, both for broadband customers and colos, with some success ... all firewalls were either built into CPE or designed as part of a "managed colo" environment where large numbers of colo customers were front-ended by a few firewalls. I don't see the broadband issue fixing itself without some built-in stateful inspection firewall in the CPE itself -- if the customer has to pay for an additional piece of hardware or software, it will instantly reduce penetration. If you can do what you need from a firewalling standpoint on the CPE, it makes life a lot easier. If you can provide a default firewall installation on your choice of CPE, configuration scaling becomes much easier. As we were never taken to court on the legal issues of managing a firewall, the only shot in the dark I would make there is that our standard contract made no warranty for host security at all, and accepted no liability, even though the 'wall was managed. It's impossible to manage network security, but not host security, and make any guarantees. > > Like, in the current case, several providers have resorted to blocking port 80 > to their non-DIA subscriber base. Is this really scalable? Obviously not for > every threat. You can't effectively keep this up with the myriad of threats. > Or can you? <this should get the crowd rolling> I'd think that a good default stance would be to block all incoming TCP connections that aren't part of an established session, for all broadband customers. Most of them would never notice, as email and http still work. However, at the scale you're talking about, I don't see blocking anything on the aggregation device itself ... it'd have to happen in the CPE, since firewall rules are going to have to be customized for clients who do need to run servers on their LAN. > > So, I think it's clear that something needs to be done, but coming up with a > definitive plan of attack is everything but trivial. > > This obviously doesn't just apply to DSL, it applies to Cable and whatever > other broadband networks are out there or will evolve... Instant results could be had, by: - firewalling *all* broadband customers by default, with a strict ruleset that denies incoming connections. Most of these customers don't know that they're running open servers on what they consider desktop machines. NT and Linux are easy to yell at, but anyone seen a default installation of Solaris 8 lately? OS vendors are not going to fix this any time soon, which leaves greater responsibility on the shoulders of whoever connects the machines to the 'net. - requiring a firewall on all collocations, whether administered by you (for money) or by the customer. Exceptions exist, i'm sure, but there aren't that many of them as compared to the vast number of poorly secured installations. - if you're going to go this far, firewall all T1 customers too ... CPE exists that will happily do this. these three should take care of a lot of the "oops i left that port open" security problems, and I'd be interested to know what percentage of major infections could be cured by just putting up a firewall. Of course, it requires a lot more staff to manage, so that cost is going to affect your bottom line. That doesn't, however, address something like code red exploiting a legitimate web server. As I'm already in security nazi mode, how about: - put it in your contract that you will run vulnerability scans against all customer servers, with advance notice if necessary. Run them. - put a required response time in your contract for a customer to fix any vulnerabilities found. Shut them off if they don't patch the holes. (note that if you are firewalling the customer, you don't have to unplug them, just block access to the server until it's fixed) - recognize your limits. try to stop the canned, automated exploits -- after the fact if necessary, but realize that a determined attacker would require much greater effort to stop. That one may be best left to the customer. This is really just a small start, but if you're going to get this serious about security, some amount of education is necessary ... even if it's just so you can say "i told you so." Translate and bounce all CERT, security focus, etc. exploit announcements to your customer base, making it clear what is in danger and what must be done to fix it. Remind customers that they may be shut down if they're compromised. Put links up to patches on your website. Run an abuse department that responds quickly to customers, and to other providers, within limits. 24 x 7 is necessary, responding instantly to black ice freaking out because someone ran nmap past it is not. I've probably ranted enough already, but I don't think that the cost of adequate security has *ever* been addressed at SPs. I may be wrong, but the emphasis just doesn't seem to be there. In order to protect yourself from your customer base, you have to incur significant costs ... how do you compete with someone who doesn't care? How do you blackball those who don't care, so you can compete with them? Is this something that requires general agreement from the SP community, or is it possible for single companies to make an effort without pricing themselves out of the market? I've probably already stepped on enough toes this morning, so i'll drop it ... except to say it's nice to see someone trying to wrap their head around these issues. Cheers. -travis > Cheers, > Chris > > -- > Christian Kuhtz <ck(a)arch.bellsouth.net> -wk, <ck(a)gnu.org> -hm > Sr. Architect, Engineering & Architecture, BellSouth.net, Atlanta, GA, U.S. > "I speak for myself only." >

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Problem with routing from AS15694 to some US networks
by Adam Obszynski 09 Aug '01

09 Aug '01

Hello NONAG! I'm speaking from Poland, and would like to ask you about help in finding some kind of contact to ZephyrTele NOC/NMC becouse they absent in irrd and they recorc in arin is very simple. They anounce our network without BGP session established to our AS 15694, here is sample output which i found after some time of problems with US IP regions (the same hapends in direction to AOL.net but cannot find his looking-glass or route server) Next issue: is there any good way to avoid those situations ? Everybody could redistribute static "sh*s" to BGP and spread it around.. here is sample output from my small investigation: telnet ner-routes.bbnplanet.net [..] ner-routes>trace 217.17.34.10 Type escape sequence to abort. Tracing the route to 217.17.34.10 1 e0-1-5.burlma1-ops1.bbnplanet.net (4.2.34.162) 144 msec 8 msec 240 msec 2 s7-0-4.bstnma1-cr7.bbnplanet.net (4.0.3.181) 4 msec 4 msec 4 msec 3 p5-0.bstnma1-ba2.bbnplanet.net (4.24.4.225) 4 msec 4 msec 4 msec 4 p7-0.bstnma1-br2.bbnplanet.net (4.24.7.121) 4 msec 4 msec 4 msec 5 p2-0.bstnma1-br1.bbnplanet.net (4.24.7.113) 0 msec 4 msec 4 msec 6 p9-0.nycmny1-nbr2.bbnplanet.net (4.24.6.50) 12 msec 12 msec 8 msec 7 p15-0.nycmny1-nbr1.bbnplanet.net (4.24.10.209) 12 msec 12 msec 8 msec 8 p1-0.nycmny1-cr9.bbnplanet.net (4.24.8.162) 8 msec 12 msec 12 msec 9 h0.zephyrtel.bbnplanet.net (4.24.188.50) 12 msec 12 msec 12 msec 10 gr1-ny.ip.zephyrtele.com (12.35.239.4) 8 msec 12 msec 12 msec 11 * * * 12 * * * 13 * * * 14 * * * 15 * 12.124.183.37 !A * ner-routes>sh ip bgp reg _15694$ BGP table version is 1340345, local router ID is 4.2.34.165 Status codes: s suppressed, d damped, h history, * valid, > best, i - internal Origin codes: i - IGP, e - EGP, ? - incomplete Network Next Hop Metric LocPrf Weight Path * i217.17.32.0/20 4.24.188.50 100 0 16499 7018 1239 1755 8246 15694 i ner-routes>sh ip bg 217.17.32.1 BGP routing table entry for 217.17.32.0/20, version 0 Paths: (1 available, no best path) 16499 7018 1239 1755 8246 15694, (aggregated by 15694 217.17.34.1) 4.24.188.50 (inaccessible) from 4.24.0.48 (4.24.1.60) Origin IGP, localpref 100, valid, internal, atomic-aggregate Community: 1:1000 Originator : 4.24.0.225, Cluster list: 4.24.0.48, 4.24.0.131 -- ATM S.A., ul. Grochowska 21a, 04-186 Warszawa +48-607-608701, +48-22-5156418, http://www.atm.com.pl/

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