March 2001 - Test - lists.nanog.org

Secure multi-homing Internet Access
by Martin Picard 20 Mar '01

20 Mar '01

Hi all, Due to may different factors, including different filtering policies, mutli-homing to different providers might not provide the same Internet view, or even reachability. Default-routing to the upstream ISPs therefore seems not to be the way to go. Instead full BGP tables can be kept on the enterprise border routers and default routes can be originated on these border routers and injected in the enterprise IGP. iBGP is used between the enterprise border routers. From any router in the enterprise network, the IGP metric is used to get to the nearest border router, and then, the best BGP route is selected, which could very well be on one of its iBGP peers. Therefore traffic can flow from any router to Border1, then Border2, then the upstream ISP router. (Assuming there is a direct path between Border1 and Border2 (tunnels, MPLS-LSP, etc)). Everything's fine (at least I think so) until we throw in some Firewalls !!! They either ought to be on the eBGP path or on the iBGP path. That is between the enterprise border router and the upstream ISP router or between the enterprise border router and the enterprise network. Putting the firewall on the iBGP path can lead to routing loops since the firewall will only have a default route to the local border router. When putting the firewall on the eBGP path, it defaults to its outside interface toward the upstream ISP router and has the enterprise address block on its inside interface. So far so good, but that means that the upstream ISP media type has to be supported by the firewall: oc3, oc12 !!!! ;-( And in any case the firewall has to provide proper throughput !!! ;-( How are large enterprise implementing secure multi-home internet access ? And to what type of bandwidth does this scale ? tx martin

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RE: AOL holes again.
by Roeland Meyer 20 Mar '01

20 Mar '01

How many businesses use AOL? Most AOLers are consumers and their kids. They don't have the same service expectations. > -----Original Message----- > From: M. David Leonard [mailto:mdl@equinox.shaysnet.com] > Sent: Tuesday, March 20, 2001 1:42 PM > > Peter- > > This is nothing new - AOL was silently discarding e-mail a year > ago. What's worse, when I contacted them I was told that > they have an > automated system *which does NOT generate reports for the human > postmasters* so the staff does not know what domains are > being blackholed > without grepping through the logs on scores of SMTP servers. > I find it > difficult to believe that anyone could run a business like > that but, hey, > they seem to have a lot of customers who either don't care if > e-mail gets > through or don't know how much AOL loses for them. > > > David Leonard > ShaysNet > > > On Tue, 20 Mar 2001, Peter van Dijk wrote: > > > > > On Tue, Mar 20, 2001 at 01:36:02PM -0500, ken harris. wrote: > > > >If the MSNBC article is anywhere near correct (yeah, a > big assumption) then > > > >what AOL was doing was black-holing any "high-volume" > source. While that > > > >is a noble goal, the fact that any mailing list would > fall into that > > > >category is pretty lame. > > > > > > http://members.aol.com/adamkb/aol/mailfaq/dropped-mail.html#lists > > > > This basically means AOL is violating the very spirit of SMTP - you > > say '250 message accepted', and you deliver it to all recipients you > > specified acceptance for, or produce bounces. > > > > Greetz, Peter. > > > > >

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AOL holes again.
by Alan Clegg 20 Mar '01

20 Mar '01

I run mailinglists.org a non-profitable mailing list server. Several people have complained to me over the last few days about people on various lists not getting mail. The only common thread was that the users were on AOL. Contacting AOL did no good, as it was always a "problem with the list server". Well, it turns out that it is a problem with AOL that NANOG folks might be interested in: http://www.msnbc.com/news/546689.asp?0nm=C14R&cp1=1 Now, since AOL told everyone that *MY* service was faulty, what can I do? *SIGH* AlanC -- perl -le '$_="6110>374086;2064208213:90<307;55";tr[0->][ LEOR\!AUBGNSTY];print' abc(a)bsdi.com

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RE: AOL holes again.
by Richard Welty 20 Mar '01

20 Mar '01

> That may be the case, but the fix is not to put any server > that generates > "lots of mail" into the bitbucket. I've been getting > complaints from a > number of list members (no spam or relaying from mailinglists.org, I > promise) that folks on AOL suddenly stopped getting the > majority of their > list mail. i suggest not jumping to any conclusions here. i run digest.net, a smallish not-very-profitable electronic mailing list host, and i observed similar dropouts, but discovered that my reverse DNS lookups were broken, and AOL's current policy is to reject email from hosts for which reverse DNS isn't working properly. richard

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FTP exploit?
by Clayton Fiske 20 Mar '01

20 Mar '01

Is there a (fairly) recent exploit for common ftp daemons going around lately? In the past several days, I've seen a very noticeable jump in the number of people attempting anonymous ftp logins. Typically I noticed it once or twice a week, and usually single attempts, but now they're coming in every few hours and they each make 4 attempts within a second (which is one per IP bound to the box I'm watching). It looks like it has to be some kind of script. Anyone else seeing any noticeable increases like this? -c

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Re: Is www.cisco.com down?
by Richard A. Steenbergen 20 Mar '01

20 Mar '01

On Mon, Mar 19, 2001 at 11:15:59PM -0500, Kent Yu wrote: > route-server>tr 198.133.219.25 Ok, lets get with the program here. Is this topic really worth the reading time of 1,000 network engineers (and the 3 spammers who keep posting)? Do you really expect a useful answer? Cisco probably has 10 people who's only job is to click refresh on the webpage just to make sure it's up. Please, the DNS thread is bad enough without this noise. -- Richard A Steenbergen <ras(a)e-gerbil.net> http://www.e-gerbil.net/ras PGP Key ID: 0x138EA177 (67 29 D7 BC E8 18 3E DA B2 46 B3 D8 14 36 FE B6)

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Is www.cisco.com down?
by Kent Yu 19 Mar '01

19 Mar '01

route-server>tr 198.133.219.25 Type escape sequence to abort. Tracing the route to www.cisco.com (198.133.219.25) 1 white_dwarf.cbbtier3.att.net (12.0.1.1) [AS 7018] 4 msec 0 msec 0 msec 2 ar3.n54ny.ip.att.net (12.126.0.30) [AS 7018] 4 msec 4 msec 4 msec 3 gbr2-a30s2.n54ny.ip.att.net (12.127.0.26) [AS 7018] 4 msec 4 msec 4 msec 4 gbr3-p00.n54ny.ip.att.net (12.122.5.246) [AS 7018] 4 msec 4 msec 0 msec 5 gbr3-p30.cgcil.ip.att.net (12.122.2.173) [AS 7018] 24 msec 24 msec 20 msec 6 gbr3-p30.sffca.ip.att.net (12.122.2.150) [AS 7018] 64 msec 60 msec 60 msec 7 gbr2-p60.sffca.ip.att.net (12.122.5.253) [AS 7018] 60 msec 60 msec 68 msec 8 ar4-a3120s3.sffca.ip.att.net (12.123.12.101) [AS 7018] 68 msec 68 msec 60 ms ec 9 12.126.204.58 [AS 7018] 64 msec 60 msec 60 msec 10 pigpen.cisco.com (128.107.240.166) [AS 109] 60 msec 64 msec 64 msec 11 * * * 12 * * * 13 * * * 14 * * * 15 * * * 16 * * * 17 * * * Kent Yu

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California rolling blackouts - March edition
by Sean Donelan 19 Mar '01

19 Mar '01

Rolling blackouts are back in California. Starting about 11:45am PST, CA-ISO requested utilities start shedding approximately 500 to 1000 MW. Involuntary load curtailment is expected to continue through the evening. 11,500 MW of power production was unavailable due to planned and unplanned maintenance. An additional 1,000 MW of power product was lost this morning when a transformer fire knocked two plants off-line in Southern California. A couple of colocation and Internet service providers reported they were operating on backup generators for 60-90 minutes as their power blocks were affected. No customer loads were reportedly dropped. Sun Microsystems reported loss of power at a manufacturing facility for two hours. PG&E is rezoning those blocks "exempted" from rolling blackouts beinging this month. Some customers previously identified as being in an exempt block are being moved since they aren't sharing a circuit with a critical facility. Likewise, some circuits not identified as serving critical facilities are now exempt because a critical facility is on the circuit. Critical facility means a hospital, emergency operations center, etc.

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RE: Multiple Roots are "a good thing" - Karl Auerbach
by Roeland Meyer 19 Mar '01

19 Mar '01

> From: Miles Fidelman [mailto:mfidelman@civicnet.org] > Sent: Monday, March 19, 2001 3:14 PM > > On Mon, 19 Mar 2001, Shawn McMahon wrote: > > > > If you don't want to read, you don't have to. A lot of > us do feel that > > > this has operational impact, and will continue to discuss > the topic long > > > after its death. > > > > I suppose Susan could kick half of the list's members out, > if she think's > > that's productive. > > Haven't we all repeated the various positions to death? I > don't think any > minds are going to change at this point. Susan has a point, > let's drop it > - or at least take it to a venue where some policy might > really be made > (like the various DNSO lists). I sort of agree with Susan. DOMAIN-POLICY is the place to be, or the ICANN lists, for matters of policy and legitimacy. Contrary to some beliefs, those are not technical issues. The point that's made here is that most of these issues were covered years ago, on many of those other lists. I mentioned earlier that opinions expressed here were reminiscent of DOMAIN-POLICY, circa 3-years ago. The reason this is true is that many of you have NOT been keeping up with the changing issues and the moving consensus. The fact that many of NANOG felt sandbagged by the new.net play, may be explained by a sad case of denial and failing to follow the issues on those other lists. I've been expecting such a play since the November ICANN meet. Y'all may ridicule me all you want, but the sad fact remains that if y'all don't get involved you have not much room to complain, when the fecal material impacts the rotating blades. At that time, about all that you can do is duck and avoid the bigger pieces. IOW, it'll be too late. Poking your collective heads in the NANOG sands will not make these issues go away. BTW, the ORSC has been working the technical side for over three years. see www.icann.org www.dnso.org www.dnso.net www.open-rsc.org Let's take this over to the DOMAIN-POLICY lists, I'll see y'all there.

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Multiple Roots simply need context
by Chris Davis 19 Mar '01

19 Mar '01

There is no problem in having hundreds or thousands of multiple root servers for DNS. We have a problem with CONTEXT. There is no existing way to ascertain the context from which users are resolving domain names. Solution: DNS Context Servers... DNS operators subscribe their machines to the DNS context they want. In one context, ".xxx" can resolve via new.net, in another context, ".xxx" resolves via one of the other .xxx providers. To keep ICANN and friends happy, ICANN could be the "default" context. Help calls then have one and only one additional question: "To which DNS context do you subscribe?" Context servers are pretty obviously where things are headed. Sooner or later, some new.net company is going to "take." If we already have DNS context servers in place, life will be much easier when an alternative TLD provider does succeed. -Chris Davis --not really selling private address space, that was a joke --not a fan of new.net's plugin, since it breaks ping, traceroute, and tradition

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