June 2000 - Test - lists.nanog.org

RE: Global Crossing Network Problem.
by Karyn Ulriksen 27 Jun '00

27 Jun '00

I'm not from GLBX, but I we do peer with them so I get the maint notices. They are have been doing a lot of router upgrades in SunnyVale for the past week. I seek from the trace you sent in that the failures are occuring there. -----Original Message----- From: Mohamed Hirse [mailto:madlion@justin.net] Sent: Tuesday, June 27, 2000 2:03 PM To: nanog(a)merit.edu Subject: Global Crossing Network Problem. Can someone from Global crossing help explain this problem. There seems to be some sort of internal network problem. Traceroutes attached. This affecting many of GBLX customers. Thanks Mohamed route-server.cerf.net>traceroute www.juniper.net Type escape sequence to abort. Tracing the route to www.juniper.net (207.17.137.30) 1 fe8-0-0.san-bb1.cerf.net (134.24.38.225) [AS 1740] 4 msec 0 msec 0 msec 2 fe0-0-0.san-bb2.cerf.net (134.24.29.102) [AS 1740] 0 msec 4 msec 0 msec 3 so2-1-2-155M.san-bb4.cerf.net (134.24.29.181) [AS 1740] 0 msec 4 msec 0 msec 4 pos3-0-622M.lax-bb5.cerf.net (134.24.29.14) [AS 1740] 4 msec 8 msec 4 msec 5 pos5-0-622M.lax-bb4.cerf.net (134.24.33.169) [AS 1740] 4 msec 8 msec 4 msec 6 pos6-0-622M.sfo-bb3.cerf.net (134.24.29.233) [AS 1740] 72 msec 76 msec 72 msec 7 pos5-0-0-155M.sjc-bb2.cerf.net (134.24.29.22) [AS 1740] 76 msec pos0-0-155M.sjc-bb2.cerf.net (134.24.32.90) [AS 1740] 72 msec pos5-0-0-155M.sjc-bb2.cerf.net (134.24.29.22) [AS 1740] 72 msec 8 * * * 9 pos4-0-2488M.cr1.SNV3.gblx.net (208.50.169.74) [AS 3549] !H !H !H route-server.cerf.net>traceroute www.juniper.net Type escape sequence to abort. Tracing the route to www.juniper.net (207.17.137.30) 1 fe8-0-0.san-bb1.cerf.net (134.24.38.225) [AS 1740] 0 msec 0 msec 0 msec 2 fe0-0-0.san-bb2.cerf.net (134.24.29.102) [AS 1740] 0 msec 0 msec 4 msec 3 so2-1-2-155M.san-bb4.cerf.net (134.24.29.181) [AS 1740] 0 msec 0 msec 0 msec 4 pos3-0-622M.lax-bb5.cerf.net (134.24.29.14) [AS 1740] 4 msec 8 msec 4 msec 5 pos5-0-622M.lax-bb4.cerf.net (134.24.33.169) [AS 1740] 8 msec 4 msec 8 msec 6 pos6-0-622M.sfo-bb3.cerf.net (134.24.29.233) [AS 1740] 72 msec 72 msec 72 msec 7 pos5-0-0-155M.sjc-bb2.cerf.net (134.24.29.22) [AS 1740] 76 msec pos0-0-155M.sjc-bb2.cerf.net (134.24.32.90) [AS 1740] 76 msec 72 msec 8 * * * 9 pos4-0-2488M.cr1.SNV3.gblx.net (208.50.169.74) [AS 3549] !H !H !H route-server.cerf.net>

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Global Crossing Network Problem.
by Mohamed Hirse 27 Jun '00

27 Jun '00

Can someone from Global crossing help explain this problem. There seems to be some sort of internal network problem. Traceroutes attached. This affecting many of GBLX customers. Thanks Mohamed route-server.cerf.net>traceroute www.juniper.net Type escape sequence to abort. Tracing the route to www.juniper.net (207.17.137.30) 1 fe8-0-0.san-bb1.cerf.net (134.24.38.225) [AS 1740] 4 msec 0 msec 0 msec 2 fe0-0-0.san-bb2.cerf.net (134.24.29.102) [AS 1740] 0 msec 4 msec 0 msec 3 so2-1-2-155M.san-bb4.cerf.net (134.24.29.181) [AS 1740] 0 msec 4 msec 0 msec 4 pos3-0-622M.lax-bb5.cerf.net (134.24.29.14) [AS 1740] 4 msec 8 msec 4 msec 5 pos5-0-622M.lax-bb4.cerf.net (134.24.33.169) [AS 1740] 4 msec 8 msec 4 msec 6 pos6-0-622M.sfo-bb3.cerf.net (134.24.29.233) [AS 1740] 72 msec 76 msec 72 msec 7 pos5-0-0-155M.sjc-bb2.cerf.net (134.24.29.22) [AS 1740] 76 msec pos0-0-155M.sjc-bb2.cerf.net (134.24.32.90) [AS 1740] 72 msec pos5-0-0-155M.sjc-bb2.cerf.net (134.24.29.22) [AS 1740] 72 msec 8 * * * 9 pos4-0-2488M.cr1.SNV3.gblx.net (208.50.169.74) [AS 3549] !H !H !H route-server.cerf.net>traceroute www.juniper.net Type escape sequence to abort. Tracing the route to www.juniper.net (207.17.137.30) 1 fe8-0-0.san-bb1.cerf.net (134.24.38.225) [AS 1740] 0 msec 0 msec 0 msec 2 fe0-0-0.san-bb2.cerf.net (134.24.29.102) [AS 1740] 0 msec 0 msec 4 msec 3 so2-1-2-155M.san-bb4.cerf.net (134.24.29.181) [AS 1740] 0 msec 0 msec 0 msec 4 pos3-0-622M.lax-bb5.cerf.net (134.24.29.14) [AS 1740] 4 msec 8 msec 4 msec 5 pos5-0-622M.lax-bb4.cerf.net (134.24.33.169) [AS 1740] 8 msec 4 msec 8 msec 6 pos6-0-622M.sfo-bb3.cerf.net (134.24.29.233) [AS 1740] 72 msec 72 msec 72 msec 7 pos5-0-0-155M.sjc-bb2.cerf.net (134.24.29.22) [AS 1740] 76 msec pos0-0-155M.sjc-bb2.cerf.net (134.24.32.90) [AS 1740] 76 msec 72 msec 8 * * * 9 pos4-0-2488M.cr1.SNV3.gblx.net (208.50.169.74) [AS 3549] !H !H !H route-server.cerf.net>

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CA ISO issues stage 2 alert (Here we go again)
by Sean Donelan 27 Jun '00

27 Jun '00

The California Independent System Operator issued a stage 2 alert for California at 1:30pm PDT. This means electric power reserves have dropped below 5%. An unplanned shutdown of a nuclear power plant in Washington has left the western grid short of power, combined with higher than normal temperatures. "Voluntary" curtailment of power is effect for the rest of the afternoon.

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Re: FW: public key service
by ktsolis＠mindspring.com 27 Jun '00

27 Jun '00

A slight correction.... On Tue, 27 Jun 2000, Tsolis, Kristen wrote: > > I'm going to try to keep this operational, but it's hard because you're > > going to find that support for making a robust keyserver network hinges upon > > people agreeing that such a service is needed, and many PGP users are going > > to tell you that such a keyserver violates the PGP trust model. Hm? These words have been misattributed to me. I don't see any reason why the PGP trust model would be compromised by a keyserver network since the individual PGP user is checking keys and deciding which keys to trust. I welcome further conversation re:ISP-run keyservers on the keyserver-folks list, but I hope to see further coordination re: a NANOG keysigning party on this list. cheers, Kristen

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Re: Stop Wcom and SPRINT from merging... customer service nightmare... (Snyder article)
by Mufti Ahmed 27 Jun '00

27 Jun '00

The papers for my ISP connection to UUnet was signed just over 3 Months ago and they haven't installed the circuit. Customer Service !!!!!!!!TERRIBLE!!!!!!!!!!!!! You Want to know whats really surprising ; i asked them to BGP peer authentication TWO WEEKS AGO and there reply was i am the first out of the thousands of clients that they have to ask for this. I thought when i asked two weeks ago the i was one of the last people to ask for this. Then they claim that it might be some kind of overhead. Then they were claiming that they might change their routing infrastructure with different vendors' routers. Routers are Routers and Switches are Switches. I don't know about you guys but BGP authentication and BGP4 has pretty much been a standard for the last 4-5 years. I need to ask the nanog group in general; i'm not sure if this question is more obvious than not but do normal people out there for example BIG Brokerage firms have route Authentication for BGP Peering or is this a new thing? I'm not sure where to stand on this... Mufti Nayeem Ahmed Network Systems Engineer Market Data Networks Reuters America Inc. (212)-603-3595 Ehud Gavron <GAVRON(a)ACES.COM> on 06/27/2000 10:42:01 AM To: nanog(a)merit.edu cc: GAVRON(a)ACES.COM (bcc: Mufti Ahmed/NYC/US/Reuters) Subject: Stop Wcom and SPRINT from merging... customer service nightmare... (Snyder article) http://www.nwfusion.com/columnists/2000/0626snyder.html : ---------------------------------------------------------------- MCIWorldCom should finish what's already on its plateBy Bottom Line . Joel Snyder Network World, 06/26/00MCIWorldCom is continuing to push hard for its merger with Sprint, now offering to dispose of one of the Internet's unappreciated jewels, Sprint's Internet business. All this is in the name of competition, since WorldCom would presumably control more or less all the packets, phone calls and fiber optics in the world if no one was watching. I have one request to make of the regulators in Brussels and Washington: Please, please, please, don't let WorldCom and Sprint merge. My plea has nothing to do with competition; it has everything to do with customer service. In his insatiable quest to beat Bill Gates and Larry Ellison to become the richest technodude in North America, WorldCom CEO Bernie Ebbers has forgotten those poor people who actually made him rich -the customers. Since the megamonolithic-monstrosity of WorldCom was created, service has gone to hell. Nothing can be done in real time; nobody is empowered to solve problems. Oh, and prices have gone up. Way up. All WorldCom has brought to the table is an enormous cadre of obsequious customer service reps ("I'm terribly sorry you had to hold, sir"), manning the phones 24 hours a day, who don't seem to be able to do anything. As a customer of the new, improved, WorldCom, my company hasn't seen the benefits of consolidation. One bill for all services? That would be OK if the bill were correct. But when WorldCom acquired Brooks Fiber in 1998, errors were made in moving the billing data from one system to another. We've been complaining about it for 20 months, and WorldCom still hasn't figured it out. One contact for sales? Sounds great, but the benefits escape us. Line installs and deinstalls now have to move through the WorldCom bureaucracy, and a six-month delay to do anything is average. One company for all your needs? That would be wonderful if it were really one company. In March we ordered a circuit from UUNET, WorldCom's Internet service provider division, and had every expectation that it would be installed within 30 days. The official UUNET service-level agreement (SLA) is 40 business days. We're still waiting for that line to be installed - they blew the SLA a long time ago. Meanwhile, the UUNET techs are trying to figure out a way to make the combined fiber networks of UUNET, MCI, MFS and WorldCom stretch from Tucson to Phoenix. Sprint customers, beware! Inside WorldCom there are pockets of excellence, people who know their stuff and make the network run. But the bureaucratic monstrosity smothering them makes WorldCom a darn hard company to do business with. Will things get better? Perhaps. WorldCom certainly can't continue to do business this way. As long-term contracts begin to end, customers will search for other suppliers. The end result, today, is that WorldCom hasn't been able to completely merge the companies it already has. And now it's hungry for more? Someone should tell Bernie Ebbers he can't have dessert until he finishes his peas. Snyder, a Network World Test Alliance partner, is a senior partner at Opus One in Tucson, Ariz. He can be reached at Joel.Snyder(a)opus1.com. Copyright 2000 Network World, Inc. All rights reserved ---------------------------------------------------------------- Sent by: Joel Snyder - mailto:jms@opus1.com ................................................................ This message was sent from http://www.nwfusion.com/columnists/2000/0626snyder.html on Network World Fusion http://www.nwfusion.com/ ................................................................ ----------------------------------------------------------------- Visit our Internet site at http://www.reuters.com Any views expressed in this message are those of the individual sender, except where the sender specifically states them to be the views of Reuters Ltd.

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MasterCard Flood, Personal phone lose (was Re: Fiber cut in Chicago area?)
by Sean Donelan 27 Jun '00

27 Jun '00

On Mon, 26 June 2000, Jason Legate wrote: > I didn't see a posting from Sean, yet, but there apparantly was a multi > telco fiber cut in the Chicago area. I have no additional details at this > time. Anyone know anything? I've experienced my own personal loss of phone service, so I've been off-net for the day. My home phone went dead yesterday, no dialtone. When you call the number, Josh answers. As far as I know, no Josh is living in my apartment. Naturally Pacific Bell Telephone says nothing is wrong with their lines, so it must be my telephone that is broken, and it will be $45 if pacbell looks a it. In other news, MasterCard International is building a new international datacenter outside of St. Louis (O'Fallon). St. Louis had about 9 inches of rain, and MasterCard had some unplanned water intrusion.

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Re: FW: public key service
by Steven M. Bellovin 27 Jun '00

27 Jun '00

In message <Pine.LNX.4.21.QNWS_2.0006271008461.13037-100000(a)thetis.deor.org>, " L. Sassaman" writes: > >In fact, such a network would improve the Web of Trust immensely, because >signatures and signature revocations would propogate more quickly and >thoroughly. This suggests something concrete that can be done -- a key-signing party at NANOG. --Steve Bellovin

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Re: public key service
by Randy Bush 27 Jun '00

27 Jun '00

> I'm going to try to keep this operational, but it's hard because you're > going to find that support for making a robust keyserver network hinges > upon people agreeing that such a service is needed, and many PGP users are > going to tell you that such a keyserver violates the PGP trust model. ROFL randy

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Re: public key service
by Michael Shields 27 Jun '00

27 Jun '00

In article <20000627080750.D2063(a)eiv.com>, Shawn McMahon <smcmahon(a)eiv.com> wrote: > I'm going to try to keep this operational, but it's hard because you're > going to find that support for making a robust keyserver network hinges upon > people agreeing that such a service is needed, and many PGP users are going > to tell you that such a keyserver violates the PGP trust model. The Internet is full of successful services that many people think are unnecessary, half-baked, or even detrimental. It is not required that there be a consensus of user base that a service is beneficial, only that the actual user base be large enough -- even if that is a small subset of potential user base, and even if many users are opposed. The presence of 1M keys on the existing servers despite their low level of reliability and performance does seem to indicate demand. -- Shields.

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Re: FW: public key service
by L. Sassaman 27 Jun '00

27 Jun '00

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On Tue, 27 Jun 2000, Tsolis, Kristen wrote: > > I'm going to try to keep this operational, but it's hard because you're > > going to find that support for making a robust keyserver network hinges > > upon > > people agreeing that such a service is needed, and many PGP users are > > going > > to tell you that such a keyserver violates the PGP trust model. > > > > Discussion in detail as to why that's so is seriously off-topic, and so > > I'm > > not going to try to defend the point one way or the other; I'm merely > > commenting that many PGP users will think it's so, and that's enough for > > the purposes of this discussion. I don't think it is. You can't make a statement like that (when every indication says that the opposite is true) and expect people to "accept for the sake of discussion" that it is true. Keyservers are purely distribution outlets. They have no bearing on the PGP Web of Trust. (You're right that this is probably off-topic for NANOG, which is why I suggested we move the discussion to keyserver-folks, but I just wanted to point out that I don't see how/why anyone would think that a reliable keyserver network would negatively impact the web of trust. That list can be joined by sending mail to: pgp-keyserver-folk-subscribe(a)flame.org ) In fact, such a network would improve the Web of Trust immensely, because signatures and signature revocations would propogate more quickly and thoroughly. Nothing but good can come out of a stable robust keyserver network. __ L. Sassaman System Administrator | "Everything looks bad Technology Consultant | if you remember it." icq.. 10735603 | pgp.. finger://ns.quickie.net/rabbi | --Homer Simpson -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Comment: OpenPGP Encrypted Email Preferred. iD8DBQE5WOFVPYrxsgmsCmoRAnrJAJ9+NFayvxVZKs2FYSSUotu2k4WRhwCdHi4S R/fRLvw/rTFyyDvuZrhl2S0= =hwdP -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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