November 1998 - Test - lists.nanog.org

[test, drop it]
by Alex P. Rudnev 27 Nov '98

27 Nov '98

[test only, sorry]

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Re: NSI policy on lame delagations
by Paul Vixie 26 Nov '98

26 Nov '98

> Given (for example) PostGreSQL, is there any reason why someone hasn't > ported the algorithms of BIND on top of something like it? It seems to > me that it ought to be possible to keep a nameserver running whilst one > is doing maintenance on it... the line of people who have asked for this would stretch out the door and into the street. bind runs from memory rather than from disk, because it has to be able to answer at wire speed for large values of "wire". we're working on a hierarchical storage system, basically a memory cache with LRU, backed by a database. we're also working on a way to load from sql databases into memory rather than always having to load from disk. it's likely that the second of those two projects will be complete a year or so before the first :-). in 8.1.2++, though, the goal is to be able to check and/or reload a zone without having to stat() all the others. for someone with 50K zones on board, this should be a huge speedup. -- Paul Vixie <paul(a)vix.com>

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RE: SOLVED! The cause of puzzling TCP (eg. WHOIS) connection failures with some InterNIC.net hosts
by Rob Gilde 25 Nov '98

25 Nov '98

Mark Kosters writes: | | On Fri, Nov 20, 1998 at 04:25:11PM -0500, Greg A. Woods wrote: | > The problem has to do with the failure of a host to fragment larger | > packets on demand (i.e. when the other host sends an ICMP "needs frag" | > notification). This may be because the ICMP packet never gets through | > (perhaps someone who didn't understand TCP/IP and ICMP and everything | > else related implemented a filter on all "abnormal" ICMP packets); or it | > may be because the receiving host doesn't understand the ICMP "needs | > frag" request (and also doesn't implement path MTU discovery, or have I | > got that backwards?). | > | > No matter what the problem really is, I'm sure a *lot* of people would | > be much happier if this problem were fixed, specifically for the WHOIS | > service (though I've also had troubles receiving HTTP too). I got quite | > a few replies about similar experiences when I first posted about this | > on NANOG recently. | | Thanks Greg for the good information. | | The InterNIC load balancers (BigIP made by F5 Labs) do have a problem with | path MTU discovery. We have taken a short term fix of turning off path MTU | discovery on the hosts behind BigIP until F5 issues a fix. | | Regards, | Mark | | -- | | Mark Kosters markk(a)internic.net InterNIC Registration Services | Firstly, thanks to Greg Woods and Mark Kosters for isolating this problem. Now that they have, the fix is fairly straight-forward, and we'll be working with Mark to deploy that shortly. We will make available a BIG/ip software patch that allows path MTU discovery for servers situated behind it. Whenever BIG/ip receives an ICMP "needs frag" message, it will replicate it to each of the servers that may need it at that time. This replication is necessary because a specific client may have concurrent connections to more than one server behind BIG/ip. By their very nature, load balancers do not play by the same rules as "normal" network devices such as routers and hosts. Except where we have implemented specific support, BIG/ip blocks all ICMP messages from reaching servers situated behind it. Chris Mauritz writes: | | Actually, this isn't a BigIP problem. It's a BSDI problem (the underlying | OS for the BigIP box). I believe BSDI has a patch available for BSD/OS 4.0 | (mayabe even 3.1). While you can't benefit from this patch directly, you | can perhaps nudge your F5 rep about expediting a patch for your boxen. | Although BIG/ip is based, in part, on BSDI, these patches are not applicable because BIG/ip's packet processing logic is very unique. So in this case, it *is* BIG/ip's problem. It's not the first problem, and it won't be the last. As Internet applications and infrastructure evolve, and BIG/ip's installed base grows and feature set expands, we are constantly discovering new ways to improve the product. The best suggestions come from our customers and from experts like the NANOG members. If anyone has any questions or comments about F5 Labs products (including their behavior on the net), please feel free to contact me directly. Thanks! Rob Gilde Principal Engineer F5 Labs, Inc. rob(a)f5.com 206-505-0800

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Internet Data Center Notes from NANOG14
by William B. Norton 25 Nov '98

25 Nov '98

Hi all - Thanks to everyone who participated in the Internet Data Center BOF at NANOG 14. As promised, I wrote down the items folks contributed to the white boards and tried to add some context to them. Since folks added stuff to the lists when we moved upstairs-I wasn't involved in the discussion and the notes are my best guess at your additions. Corrections/clarifications welcome. Here is the URL: http://www-personal.umich.edu/~wbn/DataCenterNeedsNotes.htm It would be good to turn these notes into better prose for the community that intend on building/contracting/choosing facilities for housing Internet gear. Let me know if you'd like to help write that up. Cheers - Bill

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Re: About last smurf floods - additional info
by Paul Ferguson 25 Nov '98

25 Nov '98

At 04:25 PM 11/25/98 +0300, Alex P. Rudnev wrote: >You are not right, everything should be done - clearing trojans from your >servers, filtering frauded SRC addresses (most important issue), >decreasing SMURF amplifyers, lawsuits agains the hackers. It's amazing, >but we have not ANY official complain from foreign countries (foreign >companies) through I have asked such complain any time I'v write about >the broken system/network. As aside, ingress filtering (a la RFC2267) or unicast RPF checks work quite well in filtering out traffic originating from bogons. Both of these are relatively simple to invoke. The key issue here is that (it appears that) some networks are not taking "socially responsible" actions beacuse of either (a) laziness, (b) ignorance, or (c) both. - paul

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About last smurf floods - additional info
by Alex P. Rudnev 25 Nov '98

25 Nov '98

I am not sure if it's just those SMURF attack someone write about yesterday, but in accordance to my information: - there was 3 or 4 SMURF attacks againts .PSU.EDU servers. May be, some of them was forwarded to DAL.NET because it's IRC server and all (ALL) this attacks was done to show _I am very BIG and you are NOTHING_ in IRC conversation, or _I have 10 shells in XXX.GOV and you have not_ or _My shells are better than yours_. - the server engr-mis-01.cedcc.psu.edu was broken and abused by the hacker. Through it's suspection only. - the hackers have used some accounts in NASA to provide SMURF. Unfortunately, I can't contact anyone from NASA in a few weeks and if someone can give me contact e-mail it'll be appresiated. Aleksei Roudnev, Network Operations Center, Relcom, Moscow (+7 095) 194-19-95 (Network Operations Center Hot Line),(+7 095) 239-10-10, N 13729 (pager) (+7 095) 196-72-12 (Support), (+7 095) 194-33-28 (Fax)

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Smurf attack in progress - FIX YOUR RELAYS NOW
by Dalvenjah FoxFire 25 Nov '98

25 Nov '98

Hi folks, Since Sunday, I've e-mailed, telephoned, and contacted the folks responsible for the networks involved in the current smurf against my network. Since then, a grand total of four (count 'em, *four*) have responded and shut off broadcasts. Here are the networks that have ignored me so far. If you are a contact for them, if you know the contact for them, peer with them, talk to them on the golf course, whatever - get them out of bed, wake them up, and get them to fix their routers *NOW*. If you are their uplink, block their traffic or otherwise disconnect them until they fix their routers. This is ridiculous, folks. I'm seeing networks that are customers of UUnet, Sprint, MCI/C&W, Telia, all the big ISPs that are STILL smurf amplifiers two years after we knew about the attack and how to fix it. Note, I am sending this to nanog because none of these people have responded or fixed their networks for *TWO DAYS* now. How do you configure your router for this? Insert an ACL to deny connectivity to these people until they fix their routers to not relay. If you do happen to fix one of these networks, or if perhaps you can backtrace the smurf destined for 209.133.28.69, please e-mail me back or telephone me; my phone# is in whois. -dalvenjah #0 - Probable Smurf attack detected from 206.173.226.0/24 (1028 bytes) Concentric Research Corp. (NETBLK-CONCENTRIC-BLK) 10590 N. Tantau Ave. Cupertino, CA 95014 Concentric Networks. #1 - Probable Smurf attack detected from 198.145.32.0/24 (1028 bytes) Extensis Corporation (NETBLK-AUSNET-US-EXTEN) 55 SW Yamhill, Floor 4 Portland, OR 97204 USA C&W/World.net customer #2 - Probable Smurf attack detected from 206.136.9.0/24 (1028 bytes) Primary Access Corporation (NET-PRIACC2) 12230 World Trade Drive San Deigo, CA 92128-3765 US UUnet customer #3 - Probable Smurf attack detected from 194.16.2.0/24 (1028 bytes) inetnum: 194.16.2.0 - 194.16.2.255 netname: NETCH descr: Netch Technologies AB country: SE admin-c: HD26-RIPE tech-c: SN38-RIPE Telia customer #4 - Probable Smurf attack detected from 143.224.103.0/16 (1028 bytes) Joanneum Research (NET-JR-NETWORK) A-8010 Graz Steyrergasse 17 AUSTRIA AGIS/Loralorion.net customer. #5 - Probable Smurf attack detected from 204.151.131.0/24 (1028 bytes) ANS CO+RE Systems, Inc. (NETBLK-ANS-C-BLOCK3) 100 Clearbrook Road Elmsford, NY 10523 ANS/BCtel/AGT.net customer #6 - Probable Smurf attack detected from 195.67.69.0/24 (1028 bytes) inetnum: 195.67.69.0 - 195.67.69.31 netname: PROFFICE descr: Proffice Ab country: SE admin-c: MH1035-RIPE tech-c: MH1035-RIPE Telia customer #7 - Probable Smurf attack detected from 199.185.220.0/24 (1028 bytes) ED TEL (NETBLK-EDTEL-PLANET) Edmonton, AB; T5J 2R4 CA BCtel/AGT.net customer -- Dalvenjah FoxFire (aka Sven Nielsen) "Life is anything that dies when Founder, the DALnet IRC Network you stomp on it." -Dave Barry e-mail: dalvenjah(a)dal.net WWW: http://www.dal.net/~dalvenjah/ whois: SN90 Try DALnet! http://www.dal.net/

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mae-east-atm?
by dlr＠bungi.com 25 Nov '98

25 Nov '98

Is there anyone actually live on the mae-east-atm? What's the performance like, so far? -- Dave Rand dlr(a)bungi.com http://www.bungi.com

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Re: Black Hole Vixie/RBL
by owen＠DeLong.SJ.CA.US 24 Nov '98

24 Nov '98

The price of liberty is putting up with the occasional kook. > who let the kook in? > > On Thu, 7 Feb 2036, Bob Allisat wrote: > While I don't agree with the kook, and I do agree with you that he is a kook, free speach sez the kooks have the right to talk too. Owen

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RE: Router gets hurt!
by Eric Germann 24 Nov '98

24 Nov '98

You may also wish to implement WINS so it doesn't use broadcast name resolution techniques. Also, if you have any WfWg machines, there was a fix years ago where they wouldn't relinquish a master browser role. MS issued a fix back in the 3.51 days. Similar situation, election wars, although it never took out Cat 5's or 7206's on the networks we used. Surely you're not doing broadcast flooding on the Crisco, are you? Alternatively, you can force one machine to be the master browser and the others to be backup browsers which pretty much obviates the need for an election. I would suggest http://support.microsoft.com and search for Preferred Master Browser. Eric ---"James D. Wilson" wrote: > > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > Hash: SHA1 > > I think you mean "browse master" and if your switches are falling > apart by browser elections you probably have more serious problems on > your network than NetBios traffic (however odorous it may "smell".) > I'd take a good look at your spanning tree configuration and > statistics on your switches. You could also be running into problems > with bdpu traffic confusion in your switches spanning tree if you are > also bridging and your bridge group priority 0 is not on your local > side of your bridge group. > > - -----Original Message----- > From: owner-nanog(a)merit.edu [mailto:owner-nanog@merit.edu]On Behalf Of > Jason Weisberger > Sent: Monday, November 23, 1998 8:02 PM > To: nanog(a)merit.edu > Subject: Router gets hurt! > > > > Discovered today that NT has the built in ability to drown your > network > and stomp on the routers cpu. Seems if someone sets up 2 NT domain > masters > or whatever that Netbios garbage is called, they attempt to "hold an > election." The election is comprised of slamming every machine it can > find > and then every broadcast address it can think of with udp on port 137. > > After a few minutes of it an RSP4 gets real tired and you start losing > packets as well as the switches all falling apart after trying to > forward > the zillion mbits/sec of useless data. > > Anyone else seen anything like this? > > - -- > Jason Weisberger > Chief Technology Officer > SoftAware, Inc. 310/305-0275 > > > > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- > Version: PGPfreeware 5.5.5 for non-commercial use <http://www.nai.com> > Comment: All Spammers Are Thieves - Jail Them Now > > iQA/AwUBNlpUyzAufbtGOmgdEQKO9ACg7UU/L9En2tkEbQkvINeAkGq0m1sAoJZy > YVC8jBkQfTn46xdhNduWEPOo > =fPj2 > -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- > > > > _________________________________________________________ DO YOU YAHOO!? Get your free @yahoo.com address at http://mail.yahoo.com

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