February 1996 - Test - lists.nanog.org

CERT Advisory CA-96.01 - UDP Port Denial-of-Service Attack
by CERT Advisory 08 Feb '96

08 Feb '96

============================================================================= CERT(sm) Advisory CA-96.01 February 8, 1996 Topic: UDP Port Denial-of-Service Attack ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- The CERT Coordination Center has received reports of programs that launch denial-of-service attacks by creating a "UDP packet storm" either on a system or between two systems. An attack on one host causes that host to perform poorly. An attack between two hosts can cause extreme network congestion in addition to adversely affecting host performance. The CERT staff recommends disabling unneeded UDP services on each host, in particular the chargen and echo services, and filtering these services at the firewall or Internet gateway. Because the UDP port denial-of-service attacks typically involve IP spoofing, we encourage you to follow the recommendations in advisory CA-95:01 and CA-95:01.README. As we receive additional information relating to this advisory, we will place it in ftp://info.cert.org/pub/cert_advisories/CA-96.01.README We encourage you to check our README files regularly for updates on advisories that relate to your site. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- I. Description When a connection is established between two UDP services, each of which produces output, these two services can produce a very high number of packets that can lead to a denial of service on the machine(s) where the services are offered. Anyone with network connectivity can launch an attack; no account access is needed. For example, by connecting a host's chargen service to the echo service on the same or another machine, all affected machines may be effectively taken out of service because of the excessively high number of packets produced. In addition, if two or more hosts are so connected, the intervening network may also become congested and deny service to all hosts whose traffic traverses that network. II. Impact Anyone with network connectivity can cause a denial of service. This attack does not enable them to gain additional access. III. Solution We recommend taking all the steps described below. 1. Disable and filter chargen and echo services. This attack is most readily exploited using the chargen or echo services, neither of which is generally needed as far as we are aware. We recommend that you disable both services on the host and filter them at the firewall or Internet gateway. To disable these services on a host, it is necessary to edit the inetd configuration file and cause inetd to begin using the new configuration. Exactly how to do this is system dependent so you should check your vendor's documentation for inetd(8); but on many UNIX systems the steps will be as follows: (1) Edit the inetd configuration file (e.g. /etc/inetd.conf). (2) Comment out the echo, chargen, and other UDP services not used. (3) Cause the inetd process to reread the configuration file (e.g., by sending it a HUP signal). 2. Disable and filter other unused UDP services. To protect against similar attacks against other services, we recommend - disabling all unused UDP services on hosts and - blocking at firewalls all UDP ports less than 900 with the exception of specific services you require, such as DNS (port 53). 3. If you must provide external access to some UDP services, consider using a proxy mechanism to protect that service from misuse. Techniques to do this are discussed in Chapter 8, "Configuring Internet Services," in _Building Internet Firewalls_ by Chapman and Zwicky (see Section IV below). 4. Monitor your network. If you do provide external UDP services, we recommend monitoring your network to learn which systems are using these services and to monitor for signs of misuse. Tools for doing so include Argus, tcpdump, and netlog. Argus is available from ftp://lancaster.andrew.cmu.edu/pub/argus-1.5/argus-1.5.tar.gz MD5 (argus-1.5.tar.gz) = 9c7052fb1742f9f6232a890267c03f3c Note that Argus requires the TCP wrappers to install: ftp://info.cert.org/pub/tools/tcp_wrappers/tcp_wrappers_7.2.tar.Z MD5 (tcp_wrappers_7.2.tar.Z) = 883d00cbd2dedd9bfc783b7065740e74 tcpdump is available from ftp://ftp.ee.lbl.gov/tcpdump-3.0.2.tar.Z MD5 (tcpdump-3.0.2.tar.Z) = c757608d5823aa68e4061ebd4753e591 Note that tcpdump requires libpcap, available at ftp://ftp.ee.lbl.gov/libpcap-0.0.6.tar.Z MD5 (libpcap-0.0.6.tar.Z) = cda0980f786932a7e2eebfb2641aa7a0 netlog is available from ftp://net.tamu.edu/pub/security/TAMU/netlog-1.2.tar.gz MD5 (netlog-1.2.tar.gz) = 1dd62e7e96192456e8c75047c38e994b 5. Take steps against IP spoofing. Because IP spoofing is typically involved in UDP port denial-of-service attacks, we encourage you to follow the guidance in advisory CA-95:01 and CA-95:01.README, available from ftp://info.cert.org/pub/cert_advisories/CA-95:01.IP.spoofing ftp://info.cert.org/pub/cert_advisories/CA-95:01.README IV. Sources of further information about packet filtering For a general packet-filtering recommendations, see ftp://info.cert.org/pub/tech_tips/packet_filtering For in-depth discussions of how to configure your firewall, see _Firewalls and Internet Security: Repelling the Wily Hacker_ William R. Cheswick and Steven M. Bellovin Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1994 ISBN 0-201-63357 _Building Internet Firewalls_ Brent Chapman and Elizabeth D. Zwicky O'Reilly & Associates, Inc., 1995 ISBN 1-56592-124-0 --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The CERT Coordination Center staff thanks Peter D. Skopp of Columbia University for reporting the vulnerability and Steve Bellovin of AT&T Bell Labs for his support in responding to this problem. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- If you believe that your system has been compromised, contact the CERT Coordination Center or your representative in the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST). We strongly urge you to encrypt any sensitive information you send by email. The CERT Coordination Center can support a shared DES key and PGP. Contact the CERT staff for more information. Location of CERT PGP key ftp://info.cert.org/pub/CERT_PGP.key CERT Contact Information ------------------------ Email cert(a)cert.org Phone +1 412-268-7090 (24-hour hotline) CERT personnel answer 8:30-5:00 p.m. EST (GMT-5)/EDT(GMT-4), and are on call for emergencies during other hours. Fax +1 412-268-6989 Postal address CERT Coordination Center Software Engineering Institute Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh PA 15213-3890 USA To be added to our mailing list for CERT advisories and bulletins, send your email address to cert-advisory-request(a)cert.org CERT publications, information about FIRST representatives, and other security-related information are available for anonymous FTP from ftp://info.cert.org/pub/ CERT advisories and bulletins are also posted on the USENET newsgroup comp.security.announce Copyright 1996 Carnegie Mellon University This material may be reproduced and distributed without permission provided it is used for noncommercial purposes and the copyright statement is included. CERT is a service mark of Carnegie Mellon University.

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Welcome to nanog
by Majordomo＠merit.edu 07 Feb '96

07 Feb '96

-- Welcome to the nanog mailing list! If you ever want to remove yourself from this mailing list, you can send mail to "Majordomo" with the following command in the body of your email message: unsubscribe nanog gia(a)indosat.go.id nanog(a)merit.edu Here's the general information for the list you've subscribed to, in case you don't already have it: North American Network Operators Group

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subscribe gia@indosat.go.id nanog@merit.edu
by Subagia 07 Feb '96

07 Feb '96

subscribe gia(a)indosat.go.id nanog(a)merit.edu

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Re: Policy Statement on Address Space Allocations
by Paul Ferguson 07 Feb '96

07 Feb '96

At 01:11 PM 2/5/96 -0600, Alan Hannan wrote: > > Learn how to renumber. It really is possible, you know. > > -alan > So, Alan, are you volunteering to help us out in PIER? ;-) - paul

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Re: Policy Statement on Address Space Allocations
by Paul Ferguson 07 Feb '96

07 Feb '96

Hocus Pocus. A NAT solves this problem. :-) - paul At 08:12 AM 2/5/96 -0700, Tan Chang Hu wrote: >> >> If you have a class B and use a firewall, then a /27 should be more >> than is needed on the global Internet and they should use an address >> from RFC1597 internally and return the /16. >> >> Hank >> >Hank, > Depending on the firewall design, hosts located behind firewalls >can conceivably access the Internet directly for certain services and in >this case unique addresses are required. Your assumption would be valid >when all traffic for that site is handled by proxy servers. > >-- >T. C. Hu | tchu(a)sandia.gov >Sandia National Laboratories | Tel: (505) 845-8936 >P.O.Box 5800 | FAX: (505) 844-2067 >Albuquerque, NM 87111-0807 | > > > -- Paul Ferguson || || Consulting Engineering || || Reston, Virginia USA |||| |||| tel: +1.703.716.9538 ..:||||||:..:||||||:.. e-mail: pferguso(a)cisco.com c i s c o S y s t e m s

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Re: Policy Statement on Address Space Allocations
by Vince Fuller 05 Feb '96

05 Feb '96

In message <199602021946.AA16364(a)mail.crl.com>, George Herbert writes: > > >> How do Pipex and Dante get global routes right now? > > > >Oh.. from a whole bunch of different places. > > > > ANS customer routes from ANS > > MCI customer routes from MCI > > SprintLink customer routes from Sprint > > Alternet customer routes from Alternet > > AUNET routes from EUNET > > ... > > > >You get the idea. > > How do they get to Barrnet? SURAnet? Etc? Suranet is at MeaEast. Barrnet is presently an MCI transit customer. Actually, the situation is a bit more complicated than this (in case anyone really wants to know). It is the case that each of the BBN Planet regions are MCI transit customers, but BBN Planet also has presence at MAE-East, FIX-East, MAE-West, and the Pennsauken NAP. We are in the process of finalizing the peering policy for BBN Planet as an integrated whole. In the near future, we will send a notice to the provider community that describes our policy and invites others to establish bi-lateral peering agreements with us. Vince Fuller, BBN Planet Network Engineering

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Re: Policy Statement on Address Space Allocations
by Alex.Bligh 05 Feb '96

05 Feb '96

Daniel Karrenberg <Daniel.Karrenberg(a)ripe.net> wrote: > If you insist on prefix-length filtering I have proposed a soloution > for future address space allocated via the RIPE NCC several times: > > - set your inbound prefix length filter to /19. > > - The RIPE NCC will *guarantee* that we will not make more than > 1024 non-aggregateable allocations from each /8. > > - The RIPE NCC will continue to work with the providers to > maximise aggregation. Our goal is a maximum of 1024 routes > per /8 visible at major exchange points. Incidentally this > is the same goal that you seem to have. You are not distinguishing (initial) allocation from announcement. Your guarantee is worthless in the sense that it only gurantees that the announcements (as opposed to allocations) can be aggregated if each window allocation is tied to a single AS, and thus, for instance that none of the allocation is for PI space, or for allocation to customers who aren't local-IRs but have their own AS etc. etc. You also have the problem that currently it is impossible for local-IRs to allocate blocks of IP numbers that wouldn't be filtered out to multihomed customers (with their own AS - thus almost inevitably requiring a separate announcement) where that customer under the RIPE rules isn't 'justified' in getting a /19 (too small, for instance). Conservation vs. aggregation again. What is your recommendation on this? Alex Bligh Xara Networks PS: Here's Sprint's sister company's current announcement of routes *originating* in its AS as I see them - I do hope Sprint takes the honest path if it does refuse to carry short announcements and not route all bar 4 of these nets, as well as a similar long list from AS1239 :-) I'm not convinced Sprint has the moral highground here.... Network Next Hop Metric LocPrf Weight Path *> 160.214.0.0 194.68.130.50 0 4000 ? *> 163.164.0.0 194.68.130.50 0 4000 ? *> 194.41.63.0 194.68.130.50 0 4000 ? *> 194.106.0.0/19 194.68.130.50 0 4000 ? *> 194.106.32.0 194.68.130.50 0 4000 ? *> 194.106.33.0 194.68.130.50 0 4000 ? *> 194.106.34.0 194.68.130.50 0 4000 ? *> 194.126.64.0/19 194.68.130.50 0 4000 ? *> 194.133.0.0/19 194.68.130.50 0 4000 i *> 194.133.4.0/23 194.68.130.50 0 4000 ? *> 194.133.6.0 194.68.130.50 0 4000 ? *> 194.133.7.0 194.68.130.50 0 4000 ? *> 194.133.8.0 194.68.130.50 0 4000 ? *> 194.133.15.0 194.68.130.50 0 4000 ? *> 194.133.24.0 194.68.130.50 0 4000 ? *> 194.133.28.0 194.68.130.50 0 4000 ? *> 194.140.128.0/19 194.68.130.50 0 4000 ? *> 194.140.224.0/21 194.68.130.50 0 4000 ? *> 194.149.192.0/18 194.68.130.50 0 4000 ? *> 194.158.0.0/20 194.68.130.50 0 4000 ? *> 194.176.96.0/19 194.68.130.50 0 4000 ? *> 194.204.96.0/23 194.68.130.50 0 4000 ? *> 196.27.0.0 194.68.130.50 0 4000 ? *> 196.27.1.0 194.68.130.50 0 4000 ? *> 198.169.26.0 194.68.130.50 0 4000 ? *> 204.59.0.0/16 194.68.130.50 0 4000 i *> 204.83.37.0 194.68.130.50 0 4000 ? *> 204.83.237.0 194.68.130.50 0 4000 ? *> 204.83.254.0 194.68.130.50 0 4000 ? *> 206.49.64.0/18 194.68.130.50 0 4000 i *> 206.49.65.0 194.68.130.50 0 4000 ?

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Re: Policy Statement on Address Space Allocations
by Hank Nussbacher 05 Feb '96

05 Feb '96

On Fri, 2 Feb 1996 14:29:09 -0500 (EST) you said: >On Fri, 2 Feb 1996, Howard Berkowitz wrote: > >> > > We are working on the 192.x.x.x swamp right now. >> > > Rough estimates (with much more accurate data @ NANOG) >> > > >> > > 60% - invalid or missing contact information >> > >> > This is interesting. How about a policy that says if nobody can contact >you >> > and none of your addresses are reachable, then after some period, your >> > addresses get recycled. >> > >> > >> By addresses not being reachable, are you effectively saying that any >> enterprise that does not want to connect to the Internet must use >> RFC1597 address space? >> >> Anyone have an idea how much of the address space is used for >> registered addresses of organizations that do not connect to the Internet? > >I would also be curious how the 60% missing is counted. > >If an organization places 99% of their addresses behind a firewall do all >those not count? If you have a class B and use a firewall, then a /27 should be more than is needed on the global Internet and they should use an address from RFC1597 internally and return the /16. > >Unfortunately, I don't think we can base much policy on whether or what % >of addresses are reachable from the internet. > >--- David Miller >---------------------------------------------------------------------------- > It's *amazing* what one can accomplish when > one doesn't know what one can't do! > Hank

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number seven
by bmanning＠ISI.EDU 05 Feb '96

05 Feb '96

Renumbering - What, Why and How. v.007 05feb96 ftp.isi.edu:/pub/bill/renumbering Bill Manning Sent to: inet-access(a)earth.com IAP(a)VMA.CC.ND.EDU sun-managers-relay(a)ra.mcs.anl.gov pier(a)isi.edu nanog(a)merit.edu Kudos: Don Rolph - TI Piet Beertema - Brian Carpenter - CERN Michael Patton - BBN Jeff Schiller - MIT Matt Holdridge - DECUS What: Renumbering is the action of changing the IP addresses (i.e. the prefix and/or netmask) for an administrative domain and all the machines in it. This can be as small as a single lan with a few hosts through an International Internet Service provider and all its downstream providers/clients. Why: Due to the extensive growth of the publicly visible IP (IPv4) structure, (the Internet) there has been pressure placed on both the total number of addresses in use, but also the abilities of the global routing system to handle them all. Some providers are asking their clients to help alleviate this situation by utilizing addresses already delegated to the provider. This reduces the number of prefixes that are injected into the Internet routing system[1]. Remember that Internet wide connectivity is something that -NO- provider can guarantee or control. The registries which delegate address space attempt to make the address space last as long as possible[2]. To facilitate management of high traffic/mobility environments, the use of dynamic addressing eases the burden of the support staff. A reasonable paradigm is that the network should appear flat to the user but should appear rigidly hierarchical to the network administrator. Among the tradeoffs between fully manual/static management and fully dynamic configuration is the concept of traceability or the ability to retain the identity of an end to end connection. Many network operators want to know, consistently "who" a machine really is. So, collecting techniques and tools for supporting renumbering IP hosts can be a very valuable activity and should be considered as part of ongoing network design. What follows are some tips and techniques for renumbering and designing for renumbering support. How: - basic philosophy Deciding to renumber because you have to, or because you want to Use of a "majik" line in through the address space to delineate who/where renumbering should occur is a function of time and tools.[5] The two worst case environments are: - flat routing of 32bit prefixes. Good in the hw/sw design cycle. - periodic, dynamic renumbering across the entire address space. Route flaps, name conflicts, etc. Plan for the worst case and hope for the best. - developing good designs to facilitate renumbering - Use Discovery protocols (Router, DHCP, dynamic routing etc) - Centralized services/services (DHCP Servers & Routers) - Weigh tradeoffs between full dynamic support and manual support of a small number of machines/files. (Note that this is more than just deploying DHCP et.al. This is changing the range over which DHCP et.al. will operate!) - Keep total changes to a minimum - avoid classful routing protocols (RIP, IGRP, EGP etc.) - Build robust software distribution methods - rdist (UNIX) - sms (MicroSoft) - Catalog all files that require hardcoded addresses - DNS zone files - NNTP configurations - NTP configurations - AFS servers - static host lists /etc/hosts - ROUTER configurations - NMS databases - Firewalls and Access control lists - Use names instead of numbers where ever possible. It is possible to reorganize procedures to generate most/all configuration files that require hardcoded addresses from the files that map names to addresses. (Use a network managment database) - Channels to update external databases (DNS, IRR, NNTP etc) - techniques to renumber legacy infrastructure/hosts Convince Managment with good cost/benefit arguments Give yourself plenty of time. A year or more may be required. In some situations, it may be required to renumber fairly large sections of a network in 3-6 months!! Evaluate the trade offs of incremental vs flag-day migration Decide on a new numbering policy bigger or smaller or differnet media layers changing subnet masks consider broadcast and multicast scope Consider re-architechting the topology security implications Deploy DHCP/Bootp and other dynamic discovery protocols Use routers and secondary addresses Run two subnets on the same media layer Use DNS as a migration tool Notify your secondaries Change timeouts to facilitate rapid updates Update local zone generation scripts Get the Dynamic DNS code deployed Prepare recipies for chaning each type of end-user system Can you isolate "misbehaved" hosts with ancient code? Identify software that may use IP addresses for use licenses. - ways to avoid renumbering [3],[4] - Public Relations - as viewed inside an organization - Identify which organizations you must work with - Clear and realistic timetables must be set - Publication of the changes to the user community - User community feedback and buyin - Managment acceptance - viewed outside an organization - Coordination with offsite support services (DNS Secondaries, NNTP Feeds, NTP servers etc.) Legacy tools Some predictions indicate a planned 20-30yr life expectancy for IPv4 Thats a -long- legacy. How to change to a DHCP/bootp environment. The DHCP FAQ is a really good place to start. http://web.syr.edu/~jmwobus/comfaqs/dhcp.faq.html Router secondary addresses Ensure your routers have the new prefixes as secondary or primary addresses. You may find that deletion of a primary address will delete the secondary. How to turn back addresses Generally, Email to Hostmaster(a)InterNIC.net, indicating a desire to return address space is enough. There is an appeal document that may come out of the CIDRd working group which has more to say on this topic. Virtual interfaces Use of virtual interfaces can provide a migration aid. http://inet.nttam.com/HMP/PAPER/131/ ugle.unit.no:/pub/unix/network/vif-1.0.tar.gz for SunOS4.1.4 Ensure route advertisements are done Serious Problems: Security - watch your access lists when addresses change. Managability - SNMP configurations - Passive DHCP vs Dynamic DHCP Index: [1] CIDR FAQ - anonymous FTP: ftp.ibm.net.il/pub/docs/cidr.faq [2] RFC 1466 [3] RFC 1597 & RFC 1627 [4] RFC 1631 [5] draft-ietf-cidrd-ownership-01.txt RFC 1631 - Network Address Translators RFC 1715 - "H" ratio RFC 1775 - To be on the Internet RFC 1812 - IPv4 router requirements RFC 1817 - Classful routing ------====== EOF =====----- -- --bill

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by kristina＠free.org 04 Feb '96

04 Feb '96

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