December 1995 - Test - lists.nanog.org

CERT Advisory CA-95:18 - Widespread Attacks
by CERT Advisory 18 Dec '95

18 Dec '95

============================================================================= CA-95:18 CERT Advisory December 18, 1995 Widespread Attacks on Internet Sites ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Over the last several weeks, the CERT Coordination Center has been working on a set of incidents in which the intruders have launched widespread attacks against Internet sites. Hundreds of sites have been attacked, and many of the attacks have been successful, resulting in root compromises at the targeted sites. We continue to receive reports, and we believe that more attacks are going undetected. ********************************************************************** All the vulnerabilities exploited in these attacks are known, and are addressed by CERT advisories (see Section III). ********************************************************************** We urge everyone to obtain these advisories and take action to ensure that systems are protected against these attacks. Also, please feel free to redistribute this message. As we receive additional information relating to this advisory, we will place it in ftp://info.cert.org/pub/cert_advisories/CA-95:18.README We encourage you to check our README files regularly for updates on advisories that relate to your site. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- I. Description Intruders are doing the following: - using automated tools to scan sites for NFS and NIS vulnerabilities - exploiting the rpc.ypupdated vulnerability to gain root access - exploiting the loadmodule vulnerability to gain root access - installing Trojan horse programs and packet sniffers - launching IP spoofing attacks II. Impact Successful exploitation of the vulnerabilities can result in unauthorized root access. III. Solution The CERT staff urges you to immediately take the steps described in the advisories and README files listed below. Note that it is important to check README files as they contain updated information we received after the advisory was published. a. Using automated tools to scan sites for NFS and NIS vulnerabilities * CA-94:15.NFS.Vulnerabilities * CA-94:15.README * CA-92:13.SunOS.NIS.vulnerability b. Exploiting the rpc.ypupdated vulnerability to gain root access * CA-95:17.rpc.ypupdated.vul * CA-95:17.README c. Exploiting the loadmodule vulnerability to gain root access * CA-93:18.SunOS.Solbourne.loadmodule.modload.vulnerability * CA-95:12.sun.loadmodule.vul * CA-95:12.README d. Installing Trojan horse programs and packet sniffers * CA-94:01.ongoing.network.monitoring.attacks * CA-94:01.README e. Launching IP spoofing attacks * CA-95:01.IP.spoofing * CA-95:01.README The CERT advisories and README files are available from ftp://info.cert.org/pub/cert_advisories If you find a compromise, please complete the Incident Reporting Form that we have provided in the appendix of this advisory, and return the form to cert(a)cert.org. This completed form will help us better assist you. Note: Because of our workload, we must ask you not to send log files of activity, but we would be happy to work with you as needed on how to interpret data that you may collect. Also, the CERT staff can provide guidance and advice, if needed, on how to handle incidents and work with law enforcement. If you see activity that indicates an attack is in progress, we encourage you to contact other sites involved and the service providers, as well as the CERT Coordination Center. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Contacting the CERT Coordination Center For sensitive information, please use encrypted email. The CERT public PGP key is available from ftp://info.cert.org/pub/CERT_PGP.key If you prefer to use DES, please call the CERT hotline +1 412 268 7090 to exchange a DES key over the phone. Other CERT contact information: Internet email: cert(a)cert.org Telephone: +1 412-268-7090 (24-hour hotline) CERT personnel answer 8:30 a.m.-5:00 p.m. EST(GMT-5)/EDT(GMT-4), and are on call for emergencies during other hours. Fax: +1 412-268-6989 Postal address: CERT Coordination Center Software Engineering Institute Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890 USA CERT advisories and bulletins are posted on the USENET newsgroup comp.security.announce. If you would like to have future advisories and bulletins mailed to you or to a mail exploder at your site, please send mail to cert-advisory-request(a)cert.org. Past CERT publications, information about FIRST representatives, and other information related to computer security are available from ftp://info.cert.org/pub/ Copyright 1995 Carnegie Mellon University This material may be reproduced and distributed without permission provided it is used for noncommercial purposes and the copyright statement is included. CERT is a service mark of Carnegie Mellon University. .............................................................................. Appendix: Incident Reporting Form (also available from ftp://info.cert.org/pub/incident.reporting.form) CERT(sm) Coordination Center Incident Reporting Form CERT has developed the following form in an effort to facilitate our interaction with members of the Internet community. We would appreciate your completing the form included below in as much detail as possible. The information is optional, but the more information you can provide, the better we will be able to assist you. Note that our policy is to keep confidential any information you provide unless we receive your permission to release that information. (See questions 8 and 11 below.) Please feel free to duplicate any section as required. Please return this form to cert(a)cert.org. If you are unable to e-mail this form, please send it via FAX. Our FAX telephone number is +1 412-268-6989. Thank you for your cooperation and help. 1) Incident number (assigned by CERT): CERT# 2) Reporting site information Organizational Name (e.g. CERT Coordination Center): Domain Name (e.g. cert.org) 3) Your contact information Name: E-mail address: Telephone number: FAX number (optional): Pager number (optional): Home telephone number (for CERT internal use only): 4) Additional contact information (if available) Name: E-mail address: Telephone number: FAX number (optional): Pager number (optional): Home telephone number (for CERT internal use only): 5) Compromised host(s) at your site (one entry per host please) Hostname: IP address: Vendor: Hardware: OS: Version: Security patches applied: 6) Please list the other sites compromised that you have notified, and the contact information for each site (one entry per site please) Hostname: IP address: Contact information: Name: E-mail address: Telephone number: FAX number (optional): Pager number (optional): Home telephone number (optional, for CERT internal use only): 7) Please list the other sites compromised that you have not yet notified (one entry per site please) Hostname: IP address: Contact information (if available): Name: E-mail address: Telephone number: FAX number (optional): Pager number (optional): Home telephone number (optional, CERT internal use only): 8) Would you be willing to contact these sites if CERT provided you the relevant contact information (Yes/No): Or, can CERT give your contact information to these sites when we contact them (Yes/No): 9) Incident category (Yes/No) Probe: Prank: Mail Spoofing: Break-in: Installed Trojan Horse: Intruder gained root access: NIS (yellow pages) attack: NFS attack: TFTP attack: FTP attack: Telnet attack: Rlogin or rsh attack: Product vulnerability: Worm: Virus: Other (please specify): 10) Are you currently using (Yes/No/Periodically) COPS (The Computer Oracle and Password System): TCP access control using packet filtering: Host access control via modified daemons or wrappers: Crack: Tripwire: Proactive password checkers (e.g. npasswd, passwd+): Shadow passwords: Other (please specify): 11) Miscellaneous Please specify any other incident response team(s) you have contacted Team: Contact information Name: E-mail address: Telephone number: FAX number (optional): Pager number (optional): Home telephone number (optional, CERT internal use only): If you have not contacted another incident response team, could we give them your contact information (Yes/No): Please specify any law enforcement agency(ies) you have contacted Agency: Contact information Name: E-mail address: Telephone number: FAX number (optional): Pager number (optional): Home telephone number (optional, CERT internal use only): If you have not contacted any law enforcement agency, could we give them your contact information, if necessary (Yes/No): 12) Detailed description of incident (e.g. method of intrusion, etc) 13) What assistance would you like from CERT? Copyright 1995 Carnegie Mellon University This form may be reproduced and distributed without permission provided it is used for noncommercial purposes and the CERT Coordination Center is acknowledged. CERT is a service mark of Carnegie Mellon University.

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Re: Routing registry was Re: Sprint BGP filters in 207.x.x.x?
by jbarrows＠digex.net 18 Dec '95

18 Dec '95

At 10:30 PM 12/13/95, cook(a)cookreport.com wrote: ... >So if they were supposed to use the services of the routing arbiter and >appear to have renigged on this, what can anyone do?? Are they determined >to make it painfully obvious for all to see that there are no enforcement >teeth left at the NSF? I think you are assuming too much at this point. [About contractually having to play with the RA.] You should address that question to Sprint, rather than the mailing list. I believe SprintLink has voiced their willingness to work with any tool that will help the Internet scale better, so long as it does not have adverse effects on their network. The last time I checked, the _biggest_ argument against using the RA was that alot of the data is incorrect. I have also heard a lot about work that has been done to clean up the RA. Is this still the biggest factor? -Jeff [mssg. from the nanog archive...] ================================================================================== | Knowing Sean for who he is, I'm fairly sure that no RADB or RS will ever be | suitable to him. In particular... On the contrary; I believe Peter Lothberg's proposals for an RS scheme are quite reasonable. I think his criticisms of the current RADB and RS models are pretty well known, and valid. I would point out one more thing though, and that's that at the Stockholm IETF I had a genial chat with a number of folks from MERIT and the RA Team in general, and suggested several ways that the RADB could be made incrementally useful. I hope that some good comes out of that conversation. I'll use any tool that will make my job easier, and help our operation and the Internet scale better. At the moment, though, the RADB does the opposite, and the RS has no value whatsoever. Sean. =================================================================================== >Of course sprint is running a nap too. i understand that their position >is that the NAP is full. They have a BUNCH of people trying to get into >the NAP who are complaining to me that they get no answqers from sprint >as to when that will be possible. > >******************************************************************** >Gordon Cook, Editor & Publisher Subscriptions: Individ-ascii $85 >The COOK Report on Internet Individ. hard copy $150 >431 Greenway Ave, Ewing, NJ 08618 Small Corp & Gov't $200 >(609) 882-2572 Corporate $350 >Internet: cook(a)cookreport.com Corporate Site Lic. $650 >Web: http://pobox.com/cook/ Newly expanded COOK Report Web Pages >******************************************************************** > > >On Wed, 13 Dec 1995 Jeff.Ogden(a)um.cc.umich.edu wrote: > >> The large scale provider MichNet uses is MCI and they are required >> to cooperate with the RA and others. This is in their contract. I suspect >> that something similar might be in some of the other contracts of providers >> that provide service to networks that received funding from NSF for >> Interregional Connectivity. People might want to go read the fine >> print in their contracts. >> -Jeff Ogden >> Merit/MichNet >> > > >

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URGENT CERT message -- CERT#7023
by CERT Coordination Center 18 Dec '95

18 Dec '95

============================================================================= Alert to Network Service Providers - Widespread attacks on Internet sites CERT Coordination Center December 18, 1995 ============================================================================= Over the last several weeks, the CERT Coordination Center has been working on related incidents where the intruders have launched widespread attacks against Internet sites. Due to the scope of this incident, we ask that you alert your customers/constituency as soon as possible, and urge them to take action to ensure that systems are protected against these attacks. Please feel free to redistribute this message. Hundreds of sites have been attacked, and many of the attacks have been successful, resulting in root compromises at the targeted sites. We are working directly with the root-compromised sites. We continue to receive reports, and we believe that more attacks are going undetected. ************************************************************************** NOTE -- all of the vulnerabilities exploited in this attack are known, and are addressed by CERT advisories. ************************************************************************** The MO of the attacks and advisories that address these vulnerabilities are listed below. We cannot emphasize enough the importance of taking the actions suggested in these advisories and README files. - using automated tools to scan sites for NFS and NIS vulnerabilities * CA-94:15.NFS.Vulnerabilities and CA-94:15.README * CA-92:13.SunOS.NIS.vulnerability - exploiting the rpc.ypupdated vulnerability to gain root access * CA-95:17.rpc.ypupdated.vul and CA-95:17.README - exploiting the loadmodule vulnerability to gain root access * CA-93:18.SunOS.Solbourne.loadmodule.modload.vulnerability, CA-95:12.sun.loadmodule.vul and CA-95:12.README - installing Trojan horse programs and packet sniffers * CA-94:01.ongoing.network.monitoring.attacks and CA-94:01.README - launching IP spoofing attacks * CA-95:01.IP.spoofing and CA-95:01.README The CERT advisories and README files are available from: ftp://info.cert.org:/pub/cert_advisories Please feel free to forward this alert to other providers of Internet services, in addition to notifying your customers/constituents of this attack. We will also be launching CERT advisory CA-95:18.widespread.attacks this morning. I have appended a copy of this advisory below. Communicating with us - ---------------------- Warning: For sensitive information, use encrypted email. You will find the CERT public PGP key at the end of this document. If you would prefer to use DES, please call the CERT hotline: +1 412 268 7090 to exchange a DES key over the phone. If you or one of your customers find a compromise, please complete and return the Incident Reporting Form (IRF) appended below. This completed form will help us better assist you. Because of our workload, we must ask you not to send log files of activity, but we would be happy to work with you as needed on how to interpret data that you may collect. If you see activity that indicates an attack is in progress, we encourage you to contact your customer, or other sites involved or their service provider. We will also be happy to provide guidance and advice, if needed, on how to handle incidents and work with law enforcement. CERT Public Key - ---------------------- - -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.6 mQCNAi2a4WoAAAEEAN0IPkqCmoGRud0Kts3g4ZGgZ4zyqY8C5VTOgUcqU+D2U1so 21K6dxj/lewKFduXtNpqDeg6C0wR6GIMJ2jWLU4GUEq0xHohioWGGg5O3QTvCpN3 rnLIKO9urv4Wjgkp1n1ys7xcOYl5jb7kuhdlXs3kNgKi4zBB5XVP+x0t4w7BAAUR tChDRVJUIENvb3JkaW5hdGlvbiBDZW50ZXIgPGNlcnRAY2VydC5vcmc+iQCVAgUQ LZrkOXVP+x0t4w7BAQEI3QP/d9gl7GD52Pd8KbsBMb0hiploigL8kZW1Q1fVsIm1 cO9xumU89CLf2jrN+IdrIMpVWAO3DyJjZooZTaJBg/9jjv3HltHTq/XFD5c+WYlM G+fQZVuR8qu8+D8P8pPbNVm94wxj9fyKO39/dnub1UfjDedJBtt+zgMJmstADkOv QBM= =N6E5 - -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Incident Reporting Form - ---------------------- Please complete this form if you are reporting a compromise. CERT(sm) Coordination Center Incident Reporting Form CERT has developed the following form in an effort to facilitate our interaction with members of the Internet community. We would appreciate your completing the form included below in as much detail as possible. The information is optional, but the more information you can provide, the better we will be able to assist you. Note that our policy is to keep confidential any information you provide unless we receive your permission to release that information. (See questions 8 and 11 below.) Please feel free to duplicate any section as required. Please return this form to cert(a)cert.org. If you are unable to e-mail this form, please send it via FAX. Our FAX telephone number is +1 412-268-6989. Thank you for your cooperation and help. 1) Incident number (after assigned by CERT): 2) Reporting site information Organizational Name (e.g. CERT Coordination Center): Domain Name (e.g. cert.org) 3) Your contact information Name: E-mail address: Telephone number: FAX number (optional): Pager number (optional): Home telephone number (for CERT internal use only): 4) Additional contact information (if available) Name: E-mail address: Telephone number: FAX number (optional): Pager number (optional): Home telephone number (for CERT internal use only): 5) Compromised host(s) at your site (one entry per host please) Hostname: IP address: Vendor: Hardware: OS: Version: Security patches applied: 6) Please list the other sites compromised that you have notified, and the contact information for each site (one entry per site please) Hostname: IP address: Contact information: Name: E-mail address: Telephone number: FAX number (optional): Pager number (optional): Home telephone number (optional, for CERT internal use only): 7) Please list the other sites compromised that you have not yet notified (one entry per site please) Hostname: IP address: Contact information (if available): Name: E-mail address: Telephone number: FAX number (optional): Pager number (optional): Home telephone number (optional, CERT internal use only): 8) Would you be willing to contact these sites if CERT provided you the relevant contact information (Yes/No): Or, can CERT give your contact information to these sites when we contact them (Yes/No): 9) Incident category (Yes/No) Probe: Prank: Mail Spoofing: Break-in: Installed Trojan Horse: Intruder gained root access: NIS (yellow pages) attack: NFS attack: TFTP attack: FTP attack: Telnet attack: Rlogin or rsh attack: Product vulnerability: Worm: Virus: Other (please specify): 10) Are you currently using (Yes/No/Periodically) COPS (The Computer Oracle and Password System): TCP access control using packet filtering: Host access control via modified daemons or wrappers: Crack: Tripwire: Proactive password checkers (e.g. npasswd, passwd+): Shadow passwords: Other (please specify): 11) Miscellaneous Please specify any other incident response team(s) you have contacted Team: Contact information Name: E-mail address: Telephone number: FAX number (optional): Pager number (optional): Home telephone number (optional, CERT internal use only): If you have not contacted another incident response team, could we give them your contact information (Yes/No): Please specify any law enforcement agency(ies) you have contacted Agency: Contact information Name: E-mail address: Telephone number: FAX number (optional): Pager number (optional): Home telephone number (optional, CERT internal use only): If you have not contacted any law enforcement agency, could we give them your contact information, if necessary (Yes/No): 12) Detailed description of incident (e.g. method of intrusion, etc) 13) What assistance would you like from CERT? Copyright 1995 Carnegie Mellon University This form may be reproduced and distributed without permission provided it is used for noncommercial purposes and the CERT Coordination Center is acknowledged. CERT is a service mark of Carnegie Mellon University. ============================================================================= CA-95:18 CERT Advisory December 18, 1995 Widespread Attacks on Internet Sites ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Over the last several weeks, the CERT Coordination Center has been working on a set of incidents in which the intruders have launched widespread attacks against Internet sites. Hundreds of sites have been attacked, and many of the attacks have been successful, resulting in root compromises at the targeted sites. We continue to receive reports, and we believe that more attacks are going undetected. ********************************************************************** All the vulnerabilities exploited in these attacks are known, and are addressed by CERT advisories (see Section III). ********************************************************************** We urge everyone to obtain these advisories and take action to ensure that systems are protected against these attacks. Also, please feel free to redistribute this message. As we receive additional information relating to this advisory, we will place it in ftp://info.cert.org/pub/cert_advisories/CA-95:18.README We encourage you to check our README files regularly for updates on advisories that relate to your site. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- I. Description Intruders are doing the following: - using automated tools to scan sites for NFS and NIS vulnerabilities - exploiting the rpc.ypupdated vulnerability to gain root access - exploiting the loadmodule vulnerability to gain root access - installing Trojan horse programs and packet sniffers - launching IP spoofing attacks II. Impact Successful exploitation of the vulnerabilities can result in unauthorized root access. III. Solution The CERT staff urges you to immediately take the steps described in the advisories and README files listed below. Note that it is important to check README files as they contain updated information we received after the advisory was published. a. Using automated tools to scan sites for NFS and NIS vulnerabilities * CA-94:15.NFS.Vulnerabilities * CA-94:15.README * CA-92:13.SunOS.NIS.vulnerability b. Exploiting the rpc.ypupdated vulnerability to gain root access * CA-95:17.rpc.ypupdated.vul * CA-95:17.README c. Exploiting the loadmodule vulnerability to gain root access * CA-93:18.SunOS.Solbourne.loadmodule.modload.vulnerability * CA-95:12.sun.loadmodule.vul * CA-95:12.README d. Installing Trojan horse programs and packet sniffers * CA-94:01.ongoing.network.monitoring.attacks * CA-94:01.README e. Launching IP spoofing attacks * CA-95:01.IP.spoofing * CA-95:01.README The CERT advisories and README files are available from ftp://info.cert.org/pub/cert_advisories If you find a compromise, please complete the Incident Reporting Form that we have provided in the appendix of this advisory, and return the form to cert(a)cert.org. This completed form will help us better assist you. Note: Because of our workload, we must ask you not to send log files of activity, but we would be happy to work with you as needed on how to interpret data that you may collect. Also, the CERT staff can provide guidance and advice, if needed, on how to handle incidents and work with law enforcement. If you see activity that indicates an attack is in progress, we encourage you to contact other sites involved and the service providers, as well as the CERT Coordination Center. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Contacting the CERT Coordination Center For sensitive information, please use encrypted email. The CERT public PGP key is available from ftp://info.cert.org/pub/CERT_PGP.key If you prefer to use DES, please call the CERT hotline +1 412 268 7090 to exchange a DES key over the phone. Other CERT contact information: Internet email: cert(a)cert.org Telephone: +1 412-268-7090 (24-hour hotline) CERT personnel answer 8:30 a.m.-5:00 p.m. EST(GMT-5)/EDT(GMT-4), and are on call for emergencies during other hours. Fax: +1 412-268-6989 Postal address: CERT Coordination Center Software Engineering Institute Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890 USA CERT advisories and bulletins are posted on the USENET newsgroup comp.security.announce. If you would like to have future advisories and bulletins mailed to you or to a mail exploder at your site, please send mail to cert-advisory-request(a)cert.org. Past CERT publications, information about FIRST representatives, and other information related to computer security are available from ftp://info.cert.org/pub/ Copyright 1995 Carnegie Mellon University This material may be reproduced and distributed without permission provided it is used for noncommercial purposes and the copyright statement is included. CERT is a service mark of Carnegie Mellon University. .............................................................................. Appendix: Incident Reporting Form (also available from ftp://info.cert.org/pub/incident.reporting.form) CERT(sm) Coordination Center Incident Reporting Form CERT has developed the following form in an effort to facilitate our interaction with members of the Internet community. We would appreciate your completing the form included below in as much detail as possible. The information is optional, but the more information you can provide, the better we will be able to assist you. Note that our policy is to keep confidential any information you provide unless we receive your permission to release that information. (See questions 8 and 11 below.) Please feel free to duplicate any section as required. Please return this form to cert(a)cert.org. If you are unable to e-mail this form, please send it via FAX. Our FAX telephone number is +1 412-268-6989. Thank you for your cooperation and help. 1) Incident number (assigned by CERT): CERT# 2) Reporting site information Organizational Name (e.g. CERT Coordination Center): Domain Name (e.g. cert.org) 3) Your contact information Name: E-mail address: Telephone number: FAX number (optional): Pager number (optional): Home telephone number (for CERT internal use only): 4) Additional contact information (if available) Name: E-mail address: Telephone number: FAX number (optional): Pager number (optional): Home telephone number (for CERT internal use only): 5) Compromised host(s) at your site (one entry per host please) Hostname: IP address: Vendor: Hardware: OS: Version: Security patches applied: 6) Please list the other sites compromised that you have notified, and the contact information for each site (one entry per site please) Hostname: IP address: Contact information: Name: E-mail address: Telephone number: FAX number (optional): Pager number (optional): Home telephone number (optional, for CERT internal use only): 7) Please list the other sites compromised that you have not yet notified (one entry per site please) Hostname: IP address: Contact information (if available): Name: E-mail address: Telephone number: FAX number (optional): Pager number (optional): Home telephone number (optional, CERT internal use only): 8) Would you be willing to contact these sites if CERT provided you the relevant contact information (Yes/No): Or, can CERT give your contact information to these sites when we contact them (Yes/No): 9) Incident category (Yes/No) Probe: Prank: Mail Spoofing: Break-in: Installed Trojan Horse: Intruder gained root access: NIS (yellow pages) attack: NFS attack: TFTP attack: FTP attack: Telnet attack: Rlogin or rsh attack: Product vulnerability: Worm: Virus: Other (please specify): 10) Are you currently using (Yes/No/Periodically) COPS (The Computer Oracle and Password System): TCP access control using packet filtering: Host access control via modified daemons or wrappers: Crack: Tripwire: Proactive password checkers (e.g. npasswd, passwd+): Shadow passwords: Other (please specify): 11) Miscellaneous Please specify any other incident response team(s) you have contacted Team: Contact information Name: E-mail address: Telephone number: FAX number (optional): Pager number (optional): Home telephone number (optional, CERT internal use only): If you have not contacted another incident response team, could we give them your contact information (Yes/No): Please specify any law enforcement agency(ies) you have contacted Agency: Contact information Name: E-mail address: Telephone number: FAX number (optional): Pager number (optional): Home telephone number (optional, CERT internal use only): If you have not contacted any law enforcement agency, could we give them your contact information, if necessary (Yes/No): 12) Detailed description of incident (e.g. method of intrusion, etc) 13) What assistance would you like from CERT? Copyright 1995 Carnegie Mellon University This form may be reproduced and distributed without permission provided it is used for noncommercial purposes and the CERT Coordination Center is acknowledged. CERT is a service mark of Carnegie Mellon University.

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unsubscribe
by Bob Castelli 18 Dec '95

18 Dec '95

unsubscribe castelli(a)hq.si.net

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Sprint BGP filters in 207.x.x.x?
by Avi Freedman 17 Dec '95

17 Dec '95

What's the smallest CIDR block Sprint will listen to from an external source in the 207.x.x.x-208.x.x.x range? Is it different than the filters on > /19s in 206.x.x.x-207.x.x.x range? Avi

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Re: Routing registry was Re: Sprint BGP filters in 207.x.x.x?
by Jeff.Ogden＠um.cc.umich.edu 17 Dec '95

17 Dec '95

The large scale provider MichNet uses is MCI and they are required to cooperate with the RA and others. This is in their contract. I suspect that something similar might be in some of the other contracts of providers that provide service to networks that received funding from NSF for Interregional Connectivity. People might want to go read the fine print in their contracts. -Jeff Ogden Merit/MichNet

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Re: Routing registry was Re: Sprint BGP filters in 207.x.x.x? (fwd)
by Elise Gerich 14 Dec '95

14 Dec '95

Peter, >Peter Lothberg writes: > > [stuff deleted] > > The RA is broken, just relabeling work of Ripe and mess it upp is > not very usefull for the Global Internet. Ripe-81 (that most of this > is based on) was supposed to be a start of a toolkit for ISP's, not a > tol for someone who think they are the network Police. > > -Peter > We've had this discussion many times, and will probably never agree. The RA adopted the RIPE database work since it seemed reasonable to express global information in a standard fashion. Credit is given to RIPE and the PRIDE project whenever there is talk of the IRR, RIPE NCC Database, the RADB, etc. The RA team has announced many tools based on the database and the routes known to the route servers: 1) IRRWeb - graphical interface to query the IRR and to update the RADB 2) Route History Server - provides a mechanism for tracking the announce/ withdraw history of a given prefix for the last 24 hours 3) Route Flap Statistics Generator - provides mechanism for calculating the level of routing instability at all of the four NAPs 4) Route Server Routing Table Statistics Generator - reports on the size an content of the Internet routing tables as seen by the Route Servers at each Network Access Point 5) Peval - policy evaluator that inputs RIPE-181 policy expression, performs certain calculations, and outputs expressions that can be used by other tools, like RTConfig 6) RTConfig - front-end tool that uses Peval and RADBserver to generate router configurations 7) RADBserver - extension of the RIPE whoisd server which provides a protocol for getting information from RIPE-style database files 8) RSd - an enhanced version of GateD routing software that provides multiple views of routing information 9) rrc2r/rrmerge - a package to convert Cisco router configuration files to RIPE-181 objects that can be submitted to a RIPE-style database 10) CiscoBGP - analyzes routing information from production Ciscos and compares the data with routes in the IRR 11) BGPCheck - compares information from BGP4 peering sessions with the route serves with data in the IRR 12) PRtraceroute - developed by the PRIDE project, the RA team provides a version that queries the RADB In addition if you look at the RA web pages, you will find descriptions of other tools which are under development. The RA is committed to working with the community to develop tools that are seen as beneficial. --Elise (does NOT rhyme with police)

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CERT Vendor-Initiated Bulletin VB-95:09 - Hewlett-Packard
by CERT Bulletin 14 Dec '95

14 Dec '95

CERT Vendor-Initiated Bulletin VB-95:09 December 14, 1995 Topic: Security vulnerability in ftp in releases 9.X and 10.X of HP-UX Source: Hewlett-Packard Company To aid in the wide distribution of essential security information, the CERT Coordination Center is forwarding the following information from Hewlett-Packard. HP urges you to act on this information as soon as possible. HP contact information is included in the forwarded text below; please contact them if you have any questions or need further information. ========================FORWARDED TEXT STARTS HERE============================ - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- HEWLETT-PACKARD SECURITY BULLETIN: HPSBUX9511-028, 28 Nov 95 - ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Hewlett-Packard recommends that the information in the following Security Bulletin should be acted upon as soon as possible. Hewlett- Packard will not be liable for any consequences to any customer resulting from customer's failure to fully implement instructions in this Security Bulletin as soon as possible. _______________________________________________________________________ PROBLEM: Security vulnerability in ftp in releases 9.X and 10.X of HP-UX PLATFORM: HP 9000 series 300/400s and 700/800s DAMAGE: A vulnerability in ftp behavior exists which involves ftp server bouncing. This is a cumulative ftp(1) and ftpd(1M) patch. SOLUTION: Apply patch PHNE_6013 (series 700/800, HP-UX 9.x), or PHNE_6014 (series 700/800, HP-UX 10.x), or PHNE_6146 (series 300/400, HP-UX 9.x), or PHNE_6170 (series 700, HP-UX 9.09), or PHNE_6169 (series 700, HP-UX 9.09+), or PHNE_6171 (series 800, HP-UX 9.08) PHNE_5965 (series 700, HP-UX 10.09) AVAILABILITY: All patches are available now, except for the 9.0X BLS patches which will be available after January 2, 1996. _______________________________________________________________________ I. Update A. Vulnerability The vulnerability allows users to exploit ftp. If these patches are properly installed, the vulnerability cannot be exploited. It has been found that all HP-UX systems have this vulnerability. B. Fixing the problem The vulnerability can be eliminated from releases 9.x and 10.x of HP-UX by applying a patch. To treat only the commercial releases of HP-UX prior to 9.x, administrators should make plans to upgrade their systems to a currently supported release listed above. Hewlett-Packard recommends that all customers concerned with the security of their HP-UX systems apply the appropriate patch described above as soon as possible. Side effects: none. C. How to Install the Patch (for HP-UX 9.x and 10.x) 1. Determine which patch is appropriate for your hardware platform and operating system: For the Commercial HP-UX releases: PHNE_6013 (series 700/800, HP-UX 9.x), or PHNE_6014 (series 700/800, HP-UX 10.x), or PHNE_6146 (series 300/400, HP-UX 9.x). For the BLS HP-UX releases: PHNE_6169 (series 700, HP-UX 9.09+), or PHNE_6170 (series 700, HP-UX 9.09), or PHNE_6171 (series 800, HP-UX 9.08), or PHNE_5965 (series 700, HP-UX 10.09). The three 9.0x B Level Security (BLS) patches will be available after January 2, 1996. 2. Hewlett Packard's HP-UX patches are available via email and World Wide Web. To obtain a copy of the HP SupportLine email service user's guide, send the following in the TEXT PORTION OF THE MESSAGE to support(a)us.external.hp.com (no Subject is required): send guide The user's guide explains the process for downloading HP-UX patches via email and other services available. World Wide Web service for downloading of patches is available via our URL: (http://us.external.hp.com/) 3. Apply the patch to your HP-UX system. 4. Examine /tmp/update.log for any relevant WARNINGs or ERRORs. This can be done as follows: a. At the shell prompt, type "tail -60 /tmp/update.log | more" b. Page through the next three screens via the space bar, looking for WARNING or ERROR messages. D. Impact of the patch and workaround The patch for HP-UX releases 9.x and 10.x provides a new version of /usr/bin/ftp and /etc/ftpd which fixes the vulnerability. No patches will be available for versions of HP-UX prior to 9.0. To protect those affected systems, we recommend upgrading to a currently supported release of HP-UX. E. To subscribe to automatically receive future NEW HP Security Bulletins from the HP SupportLine mail service via electronic mail, send an email message to: support(a)us.external.hp.com (no Subject is required) Multiple instructions are allowed in the TEXT PORTION OF THE MESSAGE, here are some basic instructions you may want to use: To add your name to the subscription list for new security bulletins, send the following in the TEXT PORTION OF THE MESSAGE: subscribe security_info To retrieve the index of all HP Security Bulletins issued to date, send the following in the TEXT PORTION OF THE MESSAGE: send security_info_list To get a patch matrix of current HP-UX and BLS security patches referenced by either Security Bulletin or Platform/OS, put the following in the text portion of your message: send hp-ux_patch_matrix World Wide Web service for browsing of bulletins is available via our URL: (http://us.external.hp.com/) Choose "Support news", then under Support news, choose "Security Bulletins" F. To report new security vulnerabilities, send email to security-alert(a)hp.com _______________________________________________________________________ ============================================================================== ***HP SupportLine Mail Service Notice*** This digest contains a summary of all newly received Security Bulletins. You do not have to have any form of support from Hewlett-Packard to subscribe to this digest or to procure the recommended patches via the HP SupportLine mail service. - ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- To obtain a copy of the HP SupportLine mail service user's guide, send the following (in the TEXT PORTION OF THE MESSAGE to) to the HP SupportLine mail service. To: support(a)us.external.hp.com Message Text: send guide - ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- To obtain a patch identified within this Security Bulletin, send the following (in the TEXT PORTION OF THE MESSAGE) to the HP SupportLine mail service. To: support(a)us.external.hp.com Message Text: send xxxxxxxxxxxx (where xxxxxxxxxxxx represents the specified patch name). - ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- If you have concerns about security issues, please forward them to: security-alert(a)hp.com The security-alert node is monitored during working hours Pacific Daylight Time by multiple HP Security Response Team personnel. We reply to your message only if necessary to obtain additional information. - ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- If you would like to be REMOVED from this mailing lists, send the following (in the TEXT PORTION OF THE MESSAGE) to the HP SupportLine mail service. To: support(a)us.external.hp.com Message Text: unsubscribe security_info =========================FORWARDED TEXT ENDS HERE============================= CERT publications, information about FIRST representatives, and other information related to computer security are available for anonymous FTP from info.cert.org. CERT advisories and bulletins are also posted on the USENET newsgroup comp.security.announce. If you would like to have future advisories and bulletins mailed to you or to a mail exploder at your site, please send mail to cert-advisory-request(a)cert.org. If you wish to send sensitive incident or vulnerability information to CERT staff by electronic mail, we strongly advise that the e-mail be encrypted. The CERT Coordination Center can support a shared DES key, PGP (public key available via anonymous FTP on info.cert.org) or PEM (contact CERT staff for details). Internet email: cert(a)cert.org Telephone: +1 412-268-7090 (24-hour hotline) CERT personnel answer 8:30 a.m.-5:00 p.m. EST(GMT-5)/EDT(GMT-4), and are on call for emergencies during other hours. Fax: +1 412-268-6989 CERT Coordination Center Software Engineering Institute Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890 USA CERT is a service mark of Carnegie Mellon University.

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Re: Routing registry was Re: Sprint BGP filters in 207.x.x.x?
by Jeff.Ogden＠um.cc.umich.edu 13 Dec '95

13 Dec '95

MichNet's agreement is with MCI. I can't speak about deals others may have with Sprint. I think it is unlikely that Sprint got any Interregional Connectivity money, however. That money went to regional networks. Those networks may be spending some of the NSF funds with Sprint. The agreements that came from NSF along with the money imposed requirements on the regional networks and not directly on the NSPs. It is up to the regional networks to pass those requirements on to their NSP and I'd think it was up to the regional networks and not NSF to see that the NSPs follow the requirements. Sprint is a funny beast in this discussion because they are both an NSP and a NAP operator (and still the International Connections Manager?), but I think the recent discussion has been talking about NSPs and not NAP operators. -Jeff Ogden Merit

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unsuscribe
by Peter deBlanc 13 Dec '95

13 Dec '95

unsuscribe

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