October 1995 - Test - lists.nanog.org

Re: Initial Route Server Stats for MAE-East
by feldman＠MFSDatanet.COM 20 Oct '95

20 Oct '95

One potential problem is that rs1 gets to nearly everyone else, including the Gigaswitch, through the shared FDDI ring. The shared FDDI is now hitting 85 Mbps 5-minute averages during peak times. Steve > From list-admin(a)merit.edu Fri Oct 20 17:58:19 1995 > To: "William B. Norton" <wbn(a)merit.edu> > Cc: Curtis Villamizar <curtis(a)ans.net>, nanog(a)home.merit.edu > Reply-To: curtis(a)ans.net > Subject: Re: Initial Route Server Stats for MAE-East > In-Reply-To: Your message of "Fri, 20 Oct 1995 14:33:51 EDT." > <Pine.SUN.3.91.951020142813.25539B-100000(a)home.merit.edu> > Date: Fri, 20 Oct 1995 20:35:24 -0400 > From: Curtis Villamizar <curtis(a)ans.net> > > > In message <Pine.SUN.3.91.951020142813.25539B-100000(a)home.merit.edu>, "William > B. Norton" writes: > > > > Thanks for the feedback Curtis. You are correct that one might get the > > wrong impression. ( Our intent here was really to show the layout of the > > web page and get some feedback, and this ANS router just happened to be > > first.) Dun just uploaded all the rest of the MAE-East Peer delay/packet > > loss graphs. Thanks for the suggestion. > > > > Web Pointer to MAE-East graphs: http://www.ra.net/~ra/statistics > > > > Bill & Dun > > > Bill, > > Could you tell us a little more about your packet loss sampling? Like > how many ping packets are you using per collection point? > > If those packet loss statistics at the Mae are correct, we have some > serious trouble there. I just fired up a ping to .181 on the ring > (MCI) and in 100 packets lost 2 (close together - I saw the sequence > numbers that were missing). I tried again with 1000 and got 0 loss. > Maybe it's just an off time. Still I can't see how you could be > approaching anything near 10-20% on all the major providers. You've > got some nasty peaks there. > > My first inclination was to wonder if you overflowed the space for UDP > packets by kicking off two much data collection on the RS at once. We > used to lose SNMP replies for that reason when we kicked off two may > GETs at 15 minute intervals. We'll be looking at this too to try to > confirm the loss you are reporting. > > Curtis >

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unscribe
by fcliu＠ttl.pactel.com 20 Oct '95

20 Oct '95

unscribe nanog Frank Liu

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Re: Asymmetric Routing
by Sean Doran 20 Oct '95

20 Oct '95

| Analysis of some of our routes shows the potential for asymmetric | routing...that is...the transmit path will be different than the return path | for packets. Asymmetry has been a reality for quite some time now; in fact it was happening during the NSFNET backbone service days, since the information in the PRDB was often in a shambles. (Using the advisory mechanism and having it driven by end site administrators makes it very easy to get ANS to route traffic the wrong way. A quick estimate done just prior to the last NANOG meeting showed that of the routes which actually are accurate, fully a third of them appeared to be localpreffed towards the wrong ENSSes. To their credit, ANS is now listening to MEDs, as a means of fixing that problem. Personally, I'm quite happy to see them do closest-exit towards AS 1239 instead; it doesn't really matter all that much unless they get starved for capacity on their long-haul lines or at certain touchdown points.) | How noticeable is this likely to be for customer traffic/applications? Modern TCPs don't even notice; older TCPs seem to cope well enough that you're liklier to have problems with small window sizes than with asymmetrical routing. You have to be careful about interpreting traceroute and ping results, however, and NTP dispersion will increase as path RTT asymmetry increases. (The fix for the former is probably Tao or Zen, the fix for the latter is to peer only with things very close to you; this usually means your direct service provider('s|s') customer-access router(s)). | Any bad experiences out their with such routes in place? SprintLink AS1239 and InternetMCI AS3561 have been doing closest-exit routing towards each other for several weeks; so far so good as far as huge-scale asymmetry goes. Lots of other (multihomed) sites have had small-scale asymmetries in abundance for more than a year. Most of the ones I know have been more concerned about balancing traffic across multiple connections than about side-effects of asymmetrical routing. Sean.

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subscribe
by sharono＠ukefl.demon.co.uk 20 Oct '95

20 Oct '95

subscribe nsfnet-cert(a)merit.edu sharono(a)ukefl.demon.co.uk

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CERT Advisory CA-95:13 - Syslog Vulnerability (with sendmail workaround)
by CERT Advisory 19 Oct '95

19 Oct '95

============================================================================= CA-95:13 CERT Advisory October 19, 1995 Syslog Vulnerability - A Workaround for Sendmail ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- The CERT Coordination Center has received reports of problems with the syslog(3) subroutine. To the best of our current knowledge, the problem is present in virtually all versions of the UNIX Operating System except the following: Sony's NEWS-OS 6.X SunOS 5.5 (Solaris 2.5) Linux with libc version 4.7.2, released May 1995 We have received reports indicating that the vulnerability is being exploited with a script that has been written to be used with sendmail. This advisory includes a workaround that you can use with sendmail. It *does not* include workarounds for any other programs that use the syslog(3) subroutine--telnetd, ftpd, httpd, etc. The CERT Coordination Center recommends installing all appropriate syslog-related patches as soon as they are available from vendors. But, in the meantime, we suggest addressing at least the syslog problem in sendmail by installing sendmail version 8.7.1. We are aware that several workarounds concerning the syslog vulnerability have been published on the Internet, but the CERT staff has not formally evaluated them. As we receive additional information relating to this advisory, we will place it in ftp://info.cert.org/pub/cert_advisories/CA-95:13.README We encourage you to check our README files regularly for updates on advisories that relate to your site. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- I. Description The syslog(3) subroutine uses an internal buffer for building messages that are sent to the syslogd(8) daemon. This subroutine does no range checking on data stored in this buffer. It is possible to overflow the internal buffer and rewrite the subroutine call stack. It is then possible to execute arbitrary programs. This problem is present in virtually all versions of the UNIX Operating System except the following: Sony's NEWS-OS 6.X SunOS 5.5 (Solaris 2.5) Linux with libc version 4.7.2 released in May, 1995 The sendmail(8) program uses the syslog(3) subroutine, and a script has been written and is being used to exploit the vulnerability. II. Impact Local and remote users can execute commands. Prior access to the system is not needed. Exploitation can lead to root access. III. Solution We recommend that you do all of A, B, and C. A. Install syslog patches from your vendor when they become available. Information we received from vendors as of the date of this advisory is attached as Appendix A and reproduced in CA-95:13.README. We will update the README file as vendors send updated information. When you install patches, you will need to recompile/relink any programs built on your system that have been compiled without shared libraries, that is, compiled statically. Be especially careful of programs that contain their own versions of the syslog(3) subroutine. You may need to do significant extra work to compile those programs to use the vendor-supplied patches. B. Install sendmail version 8.7.1. NOTE: This workaround addresses the syslog(3) vulnerability in sendmail only. The vulnerability still exists in all other programs that use syslog(3). When your vendor(s) provides a patch, we recommend that you rebuild sendmail version 8.7.1 with the patched syslog(3) and place that newly compiled version into service. Sendmail is available by anonymous FTP from ftp://info.cert.org/pub/tools/sendmail/ ftp://ftp.cs.berkeley.edu/ucb/sendmail/ ftp://ftp.auscert.org.au/pub/mirrors/ftp.cs.berkeley.edu/ucb/sendmail/ ftp://ftp.cert.dfn.de/pub/tools/net/sendmail/ Checksum: MD5 (sendmail.8.7.1.tar.Z) = 4a66d07a059d1d5af5e9ea53ff1b396a Depending upon your currently installed sendmail program, switching to a different sendmail may require significant effort (such as rewriting the sendmail.cf file). See Section VI for additional notes on installation. In addition, Sections IV and V below contain scripts for building sendmail 8.7.1 for SunOS 4.1.X and Solaris 2.X, respectively. C. Install smrsh. To restrict the sendmail program mailer facility, install and use the sendmail restricted shell program (smrsh). We recommend that you do this regardless of whether you use the vendor's supplied sendmail or you install sendmail version 8.7.1. Smrsh is now included in the sendmail 8.7.1 distribution in the subdirectory smrsh. See the RELEASE_NOTES file for a description of how to integrate smrsh into your sendmail configuration file. IV. Building this package for SunOS 4.1.X Here is a script that is given as an illustration of how to build sendmail 8.7.1 for SunOS 4.1.X. Please refer to READ_ME in the src subdirectory for a more complete explanation of other options available during the compilation process. % uname -sr SunOS 4.1.2 % ls sendmail.8.7.1.tar.Z % zcat sendmail.8.7.1.tar.Z | tar xf - % cd sendmail-8.7.1/src % ./makesendmail LIBS='-lresolv' DBMDEF='-DNDBM -DNIS' \ INCDIRS= LIBDIRS= sendmail Configuration: os=SunOS, rel=4.1.2, rbase=4, arch=sun4, sfx= Creating obj.SunOS.4.1.2.sun4 using Makefile.SunOS Making dependencies in obj.SunOS.4.1.2.sun4 Making in obj.SunOS.4.1.2.sun4 ... See Section VI for final installation steps. V. Building this package for Solaris 2.X Here is a typescript that is given as an illustration for how to build sendmail 8.7.1 for Solaris 2.X. Note that this procedure assumes that you have the GNU gcc system. The examples below used gcc version 2.6.3. Again, please refer to READ_ME in the src sub-directory for a more complete explanation of other options available during the compilation process. % uname -sr SunOS 5.4 % ls sendmail.8.7.1.tar.Z % zcat sendmail.8.7.1.tar.Z | tar xf - % cd sendmail-8.7.1/src % ./makesendmail LIBS='-lresolv -lsocket -lnsl -lelf' \ INCDIRS= LIBDIRS= sendmail Configuration: os=SunOS, rel=5.4, rbase=5, arch=sun4, sfx= Creating obj.SunOS.5.4.sun4 using Makefile.SunOS.5.4 Making dependencies in obj.SunOS.5.4.sun4 ... Note: If you wish sendmail version 8.7.1 to use the aliases and configuration file directory conventions from SunOS 5.4, use the following command: ./makesendmail LIBS='-lresolv -lsocket -lnsl -lelf' \ ENVDEF='-DSOLARIS=204 -DUSE_VENDOR_CF_PATH' INCDIRS= \ LIBDIRS= sendmail VI. Final Installation Notes Sendmail can then be installed and configured with new configuration files as needed. We strongly recommend that if you change to sendmail 8.7.1, you also change to the configuration files that are provided with that version. Significant work has been done to make this task easier. It is now possible to build a sendmail configuration file (sendmail.cf) using the configuration files provided with this release. Consult the cf/READ_ME file for a more complete explanation. We recommended that you create your configuration files using this method because it provides a technique for incorporating any future changes to sendmail into your configuration files. In addition, we recommend that you recreate your configuration file (sendmail.cf) using the configuration files provided with 8.7.1. Finally, for Sun users, a paper is available to help you convert your sendmail configuration files from the Sun version of sendmail to one that works with version 8.7.1. The paper is entitled "Converting Standard Sun Config Files to Sendmail Version 8" and was written by Rick McCarty of Texas Instruments Inc. It is included in the distribution and is located in contrib/converting.sun.configs. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The CERT Coordination Center staff thanks Eric Allman and Wolfgang Ley for their involvement in the development of this advisory, and thanks Karl Strickland and Neil Woods for reporting the vulnerability. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- If you believe that your system has been compromised, contact the CERT Coordination Center or your representative in the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST). If you wish to send sensitive incident or vulnerability information to CERT staff by electronic mail, we strongly advise that the email be encrypted. The CERT Coordination Center can support a shared DES key, PGP (public key available via anonymous FTP on info.cert.org) or PEM (contact CERT staff for details). Internet email: cert(a)cert.org Telephone: +1 412-268-7090 (24-hour hotline) CERT personnel answer 8:30 a.m.-5:00 p.m. EST(GMT-5)/EDT(GMT-4), and are on call for emergencies during other hours. Fax: +1 412-268-6989 Postal address: CERT Coordination Center Software Engineering Institute Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890 USA CERT advisories and bulletins are posted on the USENET newsgroup comp.security.announce. If you would like to have future advisories and bulletins mailed to you or to a mail exploder at your site, please send mail to cert-advisory-request(a)cert.org. Past CERT publications, information about FIRST representatives, and other information related to computer security are available for anonymous FTP from info.cert.org. Copyright 1995 Carnegie Mellon University This material may be reproduced and distributed without permission provided it is used for noncommercial purposes and the copyright statement is included. CERT is a service mark of Carnegie Mellon University. .............................................................................. Appendix A: Vendor Information Current as of October 19, 1995 See CA-95.13.README for updated information. Below is information we have received from vendors concerning the vulnerability described in this advisory. If you do not see your vendor's name, please contact the vendor directly for information. In addition to vendor information, note that the freely available Linux with libc version 4.7.2, released May 1995, is not vulnerable. -------------------- Eric Allman Sendmail version 8.7.1 is not vulnerable. This version is available by anonymous FTP from ftp://info.cert.org/pub/tools/sendmail/ ftp://ftp.cs.berkeley.edu/ucb/sendmail/ ftp://ftp.auscert.org.au/pub/mirrors/ftp.cs.berkeley.edu/ucb/sendmail/ ftp://ftp.cert.dfn.de/pub/tools/net/sendmail/ Checksum: MD5 (sendmail.8.7.1.tar.Z) = 4a66d07a059d1d5af5e9ea53ff1b396a -------------------- Berkeley Software Design, Inc. Users of BSD/OS V2.0 and V2.0.1 by Berkeley Software Design, Inc. should install patch U201-001 which works for both versions. The patch is available to all BSDI customers in: ftp://ftp.bsdi.com/bsdi/patches/ md5 checksum: 88b3fd8c83a5926589d7b87b55bc4e14 -------------------- Cray Research Information about fixes for the syslog problem can be found in FN #2011, dated October 10, 1995. Customers should receive this information from their Cray Research service representative. For all source installations, your Cray Research service representative can obtain the fix via the getfix tool. Due to the number of executables which use this library routine, it is not possible to provide getfix packages for all binary installations. UNICOS binary update packages 8.0.4.2 and 9.0.1.2 include this mod. FIX AVAILABILITY ---------------- Release Level Fix Package Affected Product Containing Fix Availability ================ ============== =========== UNICOS 8.0 UNICOS 8.0.4.2 * source only UNICOS 8.3 ** source only UNICOS 9.0 UNICOS 9.0.1.2 * source only * This update is not yet available. ** No more updates planned -------------------- Digital Equipment Corporation At the time of writing this document, patches(binary kits) for Digital's ULTRIX platforms are in final testing and packaging. V4.3 (both VAX and RISC) thru V4.5. Similar patches(binary kits) for OSF/1 versions are in progress and testing is expected to begin the week of October 23, 1995 and then packaged for Customer distribution estimated to available in November. Digital will provide notice of the completion of the kits through AES services (DIA, DSNlink FLASH) and be available from your normal Digital Support channel. Digital's Software Security Response Team 10/18/95 -------------------- Open Software Foundation OSF cannot reproduce the security hole in OSF/1. However we have reproduced the problem with syslog(3). We have a fix for the syslog(3) problem. Support customers should contact OSF for the fix. The fix will be included in the OSF/1 R1.3.2 update release. -------------------- Silicon Graphics Inc. SGI has been in coordination with CERT regarding this issue. Specific SGI information was not complete before CERTs submission deadline for this advisory. SGI does have pending information and this information will be available via anonymous ftp (sgigate.sgi.com) and/or your SGI service provider and potential future CERT advisory addendums. -------------------- Solbourne (Grumman) Solbourne 2.5 is not vulnerable. -------------------- Sony Corporation NEWS-OS 6.0.3 and 6.1 are not vulnerable. -------------------- Sun Microsystems, Inc. SunOS 5.5 is not vulnerable.

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lost RADB transactions on 10/14
by Brian Renaud 18 Oct '95

18 Oct '95

On Saturday the 14th, a mail loop caused a disk partition to fill up on the RADB server machine. It appears that any transaction sent to the RADB between 17:00 and 23:58 EDT on 10/14 was not processed. If you sent in a transaction to auto-dbm(a)ra.net during that time and did not receive a positive acknowledgement from the database software, then you should re-send the transactions. -Brian

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CERT Advisory CA-95:12 - Sun 4.1.X Loadmodule Vulnerability
by CERT Advisory 18 Oct '95

18 Oct '95

============================================================================= CA-95:12 CERT Advisory October 18, 1995 Sun 4.1.X Loadmodule Vulnerability ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- The CERT Coordination Center has received reports of problems with the loadmodule(8) program. An exploitation script is available and has been used by local users to gain root privileges. The problem is present in SunOS 4.1.X only, and there is a patch available for sun4 architectures. The CERT staff recommends that you install the appropriate patch as soon as possible and take the steps in Section III.B. to further protect your system. As we receive additional information relating to this advisory, we will place it in ftp://info.cert.org/pub/cert_advisories/CA-95:12.README We encourage you to check our README files regularly for updates on advisories that relate to your site. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- I. Description The loadmodule(8) program is used by the xnews(1) window system server to load two dynamically loadable kernel drivers into the currently running system and to create special devices in the /dev directory to use those modules. These modules and special files are used to provide a SunView binary compatibility mode while running the X11/NeWS windowing system. Because of the way the loadmodule(8) program sanitizes its environment, unauthorized users can gain root access on the local machine. A script is publicly available and has been used to exploit this vulnerability. This problem is present in SunOS 4.1.X only. II. Impact Local users can gain root privileges. III. Solution The CERT staff recommends that you take the steps described in both A and B below. A. Obtain and install the appropriate patches according to the instructions included with the patches. Patches are available through your local Sun Answer Center and by FTP from ftp://sunsolve1.sun.com/pub/patches/100448-03.tar.Z Module Patch ID Filename ---------- --------- --------------- loadmodule 100448-03 100448-03.tar.Z Checksum: MD5 (100448-03.tar.Z) = 183a22f0a2f6020f1389b6aeea5ca6c6 B. Because, in general, a set-user-id program can lead to security exposures, you should also do at least step 1 below. We recommend doing steps 2 and 3 as well. The intent of these directions is make the loadmodule(8) program work only for the super-user (currently it works for all users because it is set-user-id) and to execute it each time the system boots. By following these directions, users who require SunView binary compatibility will have it available to them. 1. If you do not need SunView binary compatibility, then as root, turn off setuid root on the loadmodule(8) program with # /bin/chmod u-s /usr/openwin/bin/loadmodule 2. If your users need SunView binary compatibility, you can enable it immediately--that is without having to reboot your system--with the following script. ------------------------cut here--8<------------------------ ARCH=`/bin/arch -k` OBJ=/sys/${ARCH}/OBJ LM=/usr/openwin/bin/loadmodule /bin/chmod u-s $LM if [ -f $OBJ/evqmod-${ARCH}.o ]; then if /usr/etc/modstat | /bin/egrep -s evqmod ; then echo evq: already loaded elif $LM evqmod-${ARCH}.o evqload; then echo evq: loaded else echo evq: unable to load module fi fi if [ -f $OBJ/winlock-${ARCH}.o ]; then if /usr/etc/modstat | /bin/egrep -s winlock ; then echo winlock: already loaded elif $LM winlock-${ARCH}.o winlockload; then echo winlock: loaded else echo winlock: unable to load module fi fi ------------------------cut here--8<------------------------ As a suggestion, store this script in /tmp/esbc and then execute it as root with: # sh /tmp/esbc 3. If you've done step 2 above, the module loadings will disappear the next time you reboot your system. To make them permanent-- that is to make these module loadings occur each time your system is rebooted--add the script to the end of your /etc/rc.local file. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- The CERT Coordination Center staff thanks Wolfgang Ley and Sun Microsystems for their support in the development of this advisory. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- If you believe that your system has been compromised, contact the CERT Coordination Center or your representative in the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST). If you wish to send sensitive incident or vulnerability information to CERT staff by electronic mail, we strongly advise that the email be encrypted. The CERT Coordination Center can support a shared DES key, PGP (public key available via anonymous FTP on info.cert.org) or PEM (contact CERT staff for details). Internet email: cert(a)cert.org Telephone: +1 412-268-7090 (24-hour hotline) CERT personnel answer 8:30 a.m.-5:00 p.m. EST(GMT-5)/EDT(GMT-4), and are on call for emergencies during other hours. Fax: +1 412-268-6989 Postal address: CERT Coordination Center Software Engineering Institute Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890 USA CERT advisories and bulletins are posted on the USENET newsgroup comp.security.announce. If you would like to have future advisories and bulletins mailed to you or to a mail exploder at your site, please send mail to cert-advisory-request(a)cert.org. Past CERT publications, information about FIRST representatives, and other information related to computer security are available for anonymous FTP from info.cert.org. Copyright 1995 Carnegie Mellon University This material may be reproduced and distributed without permission provided it is used for non-commercial purposes and the copyright statement is included. CERT is a service mark of Carnegie Mellon University.

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New RA Tools Announcement
by labovit＠merit.edu 18 Oct '95

18 Oct '95

New Routing Arbiter Tools Announce ---------------------------------- The Routing Arbiter welcomes comments, bug-reports and suggestions for new tools. Please direct email to ra-team(a)ra.net. Please feel free to redistribute this announcement. A web version of this page lives at http://www.ra.net/~ra/tools ------------------------ Online Tools and Reports ------------------------ IRRWeb This graphical interface into the Internet Routing Registry makes it possible to use the Web to query the IRR and update RADB AS objects, Route objects, and Maintainer objects. Users can enter any value that can be submitted through a whois query, such as an AS number, network IP address, or maintainer. IRRWeb then displays the corresponding AS objects, Route objects, or Maintainer objects from the various registries in the IRR. Authorized maintainers can edit the objects directly; IRRWeb performs a cursory pre-check and mails the revised object to auto-dbm(a)ra.net. The user then receives e-mail from auto-dbm confirming and displaying the revised object, or explaining why the object was rejected. See http://www.ra.net/cgi-bin/ra/query-radb.pl Source code is available at ftp://ftp.ra.net/routing.arbiter/tools/irrweb.tar.gz Daily NAP Route Flap Reports</A> This new tool set generates daily reports of route flaps (link failures at regular and short intervals) throughout the Internet. Modeled after the reports originally produced by Curtis Villamizar of ANS, the new reports are generated using tools packaged with Merit's Multi-Threaded Routing Toolkit. The data is obtained from peering sessions with Route Servers at the interconnection points. The reports note the last state of the route (up or down), the length of time that a route existed (or did not exist) for that prefix, and the number of times a route for the prefix transitioned from down to up, up to down, or was replaced by a new route with changed attribute information. AS-path-specific information is also provided for every path announced for the prefix. See http://www.ra.net/~ra/tools/flap.html Route History Server The Route History Server provides a mechanism for tracking the announce/withdraw history of a given prefix for the last 24 hours. The History Server peers with the route servers at each NAP and records all BGP updates in History Server/Route Server peering session. See http://www.ra.net/cgi-bin/ra/rshist.pl ----------------------- Tools Available for FTP ----------------------- RSd The Route Server daemon (RSd) is an enhanced version of the GateD routing software that provides multiples views of routing information. The software provides a mechanism for network service provides to off-load the computational complexity of routing policy calculations from their routers. RSd supports configuration and transparent passing of BGP MEDs. The software also supports BGP route flap dampening. Available at ftp://ftp.ra.net/routing.arbiter/tools/rsd.tar.gz Peval A policy evaluator that inputs a RIPE-181 policy expression, performs essential background calculations such as symbolic evaluations and expansions, and outputs another RIPE-181 policy expression that is used by other tools, such as RTConfig. Available as part of the RAToolSet at ftp://ftp.ra.net/routing.arbiter/tools/RAToolSet RTConfig A router configuration tool that can be used by providers to generate router configs directly from the RADB or other IRR registries. Currently in production use for the RA Route Servers, ANSNET, and CA*net, RTConfig is a front-end tool that uses peval and radbserver transparently to users. Available as part of the RAToolSet at ftp://ftp.ra.net/routing.arbiter/tools/RAToolSet rrc2r/rrmerge This Cisco-to-RIPE-181 conversion package makes it possible for users to convert Cisco router configuration files to RIPE-181 objects that can be submitted to the Internet Routing Registry (IRR). The Cisco access-list can be converted into an explicit set of nets embedded in an AS object or represented as a community. The RADBserver is queried for any missing or previously registered information. Available at ftp://ftp.ra.net/routing.arbiter/tools/RAToolSet/rrc2r-0.2.tar.gz CiscoBGP IRR users have long recognized the need for tools that check the IRR against routes actually propagated in the Internet. CiscoBGP obtains and analyzes routing information from production Ciscos, and compares the data with routes in the IRR. The software also flags prefixes that are reserved by RFC 1597, Address Allocation for Private Internets. Available as part of the MRT software distribution at http://www.merit.edu/~mrt BGPCheck BGPCheck obtains and analyzes routing information from BGP4 peering sessions, and compares the data with routes in the IRR. The software also flags prefixes that are reserved by RFC 1597, <em>Address Allocation for Private Internets</em>. Available as part of the MRT software distribution at http://www.merit.edu/~mrt PRtraceroute The 'prtraceroute' tool is a powerful form of traceroute that displays the Autonomous Systems that a packet traverses. PRtraceroute was developed by the Pride project. A version of prtraceroute that queries the RADB is available at ftp://ftp.ra.net/routing.arbiter/pride/prtraceroute-2.0beta2.shar.gz ------------------ Tool Announcements ------------------ PGP-Based Radb Authentication Follow these steps to take advantage of the new RADB support for PGP-based digital signatures: 1. Register your public key with the Routing Arbiter Service. 2. Modify your Maintainer object to reflect your use of digital signatures. 3. Use PGP to sign your RADB transactions. For detailed instructions, see: http://www.ra.net/routing.arbiter/RA/RADB.tools.docs/pgp.html -- Craig Labovitz labovit(a)merit.edu Merit Network, Inc. 4251 Plymouth Road, Suite C. (313) 764-0252 (office) Ann Arbor, MI 48105 (313) 747-3745 (fax)

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Asymmetric Routing
by joliveto＠cwi.net 18 Oct '95

18 Oct '95

Analysis of some of our routes shows the potential for asymmetric routing...that is...the transmit path will be different than the return path for packets. Questions: How noticeable is this likely to be for customer traffic/applications? Are there failure conditions waiting to haunt us? For this type of route, how does one go about troubleshooting route failures? Any bad experiences out their with such routes in place? Am I being paranoid? Thanks; - jeff - Jeff Oliveto Sr.Mgr. Operations Technical Services ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Cable & Wireless, Inc | Phone: +1.703.760.1764 1919 Gallows Road | Fax: +1.703.760.3321 Vienna, VA 22182 | Email: joliveto(a)cwi.net | URL: http://www.cwi.net/ -----------------------------------------------------------------------------

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unsubscribe..
by gopi＠ece.iisc.ernet.in 18 Oct '95

18 Oct '95

unsubscribe nanog gopi(a)ece.iisc.ernet.in

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