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American Airlines down
by Michael Voity 09 Feb '17

09 Feb '17

Hello Stuck at DCA after NANOG because America airlines system are down. Anyone know anything? Mike Sent from my iPhone

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ATT-Level 3 Peering
by david peahi 08 Feb '17

08 Feb '17

We're seeing frequent dropped packets between ATT and Level 3 in Atlanta with traffic sourced from an ATT user destined for Microsoft Office 365, making Office 365 apps unusable during critical business hours. Anyone else have this problem with ATT?

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Re: Telia network quality
by John Zettlemoyer 08 Feb '17

08 Feb '17

We've been using Telia for about 3 years in Philly, and have great success. Most of our European customers noticed faster services right away when we turned them up. John Zettlemoyer Sr. Director of I.T. Infrastructure :: WCiT LLC 856.310.1375 x221 :: john(a)wcit.net :: www.wcit.net Philadelphia now has an IX! www.peering.exchange

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Re: IoT security
by Michael Yoon 08 Feb '17

08 Feb '17

Very clear illustration, thanks for sharing. It would seem solution would involve non market regulation (EPA for pollution), or aligning with market forces such as aligning impact to buyer of security with risk of public access to compromised information (like videos from IP cameras). Michael Yoon On Feb 8, 2017 9:36 AM, "Ed Lopez" <ed.lopez(a)corsa.com> wrote: In a recent article ( https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2017/02/security_and_th.html) Bruce Schneier sums up the IoT security mitigation issue quite nicely in this paragraph: "The market can't fix this because neither the buyer nor the seller cares. The owners of the webcams and DVRs used in the denial-of-service attacks don't care. Their devices were cheap to buy, they still work, and they don't know any of the victims of the attacks. The sellers of those devices don't care: They're now selling newer and better models, and the original buyers only cared about price and features. There is no market solution, because the insecurity is what economists call an externality: It's an effect of the purchasing decision that affects other people. Think of it kind of like invisible pollution." - Ed Lopez -- Ed Lopez | Security Architect | Corsa Technology Email: ed.lopez(a)corsa.com Mobile: +1.703.220.0988 www.corsa.com sent from my iPad ... I apologize for any auto-correct errors

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Data Plane open solutions available for BGP Prefix hijacking
by Nagarjun Govindraj 08 Feb '17

08 Feb '17

Hi All, Does there exists any open source implementations for detection of BGP prefix hijacking using data plane solutions. If not data plane, what are the methods used for detecting BGP IP prefix hijacking. Regards, Nagarjun

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Brainstorming acceptance issues - WAN impediment
by Kasper Adel 07 Feb '17

07 Feb '17

Hi, I am in the process of testing an 'automation/sdn' kind of controller, it will be managing configuration on our routers and also deploying some VNFs too. Before accepting it, i'd like to perform some testing, to make sure of the behavior if there are network issues between the controller and the devices (routers or servers), during creation of services. >From the top of my head, I can think of the basic tests like introducing jitter and delay but i would appreciate more ideas or even test cases that i can re-use. Thanks

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Peering BOF/Peering social @NANOG69?
by Matthew Petach 07 Feb '17

07 Feb '17

I'm squinting at the Guidebook for NANOG69, and I don't seem to see any peering BOF or peering social this time around. Am I being blind again, and it's on the agenda somewhere but I'm just overlooking it? Pointers in the right direction would be appreciated. Thanks! :) Matt

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Technical contact at Yahoo
by Joel Pinnow 06 Feb '17

06 Feb '17

Sorry for the added noise, but I need to reach out to a technical contact at Yahoo regarding incorrect geolocation on a /24 block. I've had no luck getting in contact with anyone via WHOIS or other contact info. Can someone from Yahoo please private email me at: jpinnow(a)xipe.net Thanks, Joel

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BGP IP prefix hijacking
by Nagarjun Govindraj 06 Feb '17

06 Feb '17

Hi All, I am planning to write a tool to detect real time BGP IP prefix hijacking. I am glad to know some of the open problems faced by providers/companies/community. I would like to know how the community is currently dealing and mitigating with such problems. It will be very helpful to know some of the adopted strategies by the community to detect bgp IP prefix hijacking and problems that are yet to be solved. Also I would like to know some of the very well industry standard open source tools used in the area of BGP which makes life easier. Regards, Nagarjun

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DOT FRA website broken on ipv6
by Ca By 04 Feb '17

04 Feb '17

Anyone have a contact at DOT or FRA that can solve this? It would be really nice if they remove the DNS AAAA record on www.fra.dot.gov until it works correctly, customers are complaining wget -6 -T 5 www.fra.dot.gov converted 'http://www.fra.dot.gov' (ANSI_X3.4-1968) -> ' http://www.fra.dot.gov' (UTF-8) --2017-02-02 13:20:39-- http://www.fra.dot.gov/ Resolving www.fra.dot.gov (www.fra.dot.gov) 2001:19e8:d:0:204:68:194:250 Connecting to www.fra.dot.gov (www.fra.dot.gov)|2001:19e8:d:0:204:68:194:250|:80... failed: No route to host. traceroute www.fra.dot.gov traceroute to www.fra.dot.gov (204.68.194.250), 30 hops max, 60 byte packets^C cbyrne@uranus:~$ traceroute6 www.fra.dot.gov traceroute to www.fra.dot.gov (2001:19e8:d:0:204:68:194:250), 30 hops max, 80 byte packets 1 * * * 2 xe-0-1-0-17.r04.atlnga05.us.bb.gin.ntt.net (2001:418:0:5000::622) 0.865 ms 1.043 ms 1.382 ms 3 verio-gw.attga.ipv6.att.net (2001:1890:1fff:506:192:205:36:157) 1.601 ms 1.619 ms 3.665 ms 4 attga21crs.ipv6.att.net (2001:1890:ff:ffff:12:122:141:234) 22.223 ms 22.139 ms 22.151 ms 5 nsvtn22crs.ipv6.att.net (2001:1890:ff:ffff:12:122:2:6) 20.928 ms 20.931 ms 20.934 ms 6 cl2oh21crs.ipv6.att.net (2001:1890:ff:ffff:12:122:28:74) 24.414 ms 23.878 ms 23.638 ms 7 cgcil21crs.ipv6.att.net (2001:1890:ff:ffff:12:122:2:225) 22.245 ms 22.051 ms 21.976 ms 8 2001:1890:ff:ffff:12:122:120:179 (2001:1890:ff:ffff:12:122:120:179) 20.694 ms 20.201 ms 21.323 ms 9 2001:1890:c00:2407::113f:b38f (2001:1890:c00:2407::113f:b38f) 20.340 ms 20.145 ms 20.014 ms 10 * * * 11 * * * 12 * * * 13 * * * 14 * * * 15 * * * 16 * * * 17 * * * 18 * * * 19 * * *

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