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association between ASN and company name in ARIN region
by Martin T 03 Apr '17

03 Apr '17

Hi, how to associate AS number with company name in ARIN region? For example in a small European country, where I leave, it can be done roughly like that: 1) ISP named "XYZ" and IP transit customer named "KLM Inc." sign an IP transit contract 2) IP transit customer "KLM Inc." tells to ISP that their AS number is 123 3) ISP engineers, who configure the service, check the "org" attribute value from AS123 "aut-num" object from RIPE database. This is a RIPE NCC managed value. For example it is ORG-KLM-RIPE. 4) then they check "org-name" attribute value for ORG-KLM-RIPE organisation object. Again, this is RIPE NCC managed value. "org-name" value(organization name) is exactly the same as in company registration papers. 5) now they can search for this organization name from country centre of registers and information systems database which contains registration papers for all the companies in this country and contact with this company if anything looks suspicious This is obviously simply an example to show that it is possible to trace from AS number back to company registration papers and thus to even people behind the company(listed in company registration papers). Is it possible to make a similar connection between AS number and company name in ARIN region? In other words, how do you find out that company is eligible to use AS number? thanks, Martin

3 3

Alternatives to bgpmon?
by David Hubbard 03 Apr '17

03 Apr '17

Anyone have recommendations for an alternative service that works like bgpmon (external reachability/peer monitoring, route hijack alerts, etc)? Since their OpenDNS acquisition, I’ve found the service not working reliably, as in I receive no alerts even when I’m intentionally taking one of our peers offline, and after two attempts to find out why this is, I receive no response, so it seems support is now broken as well. Thanks, David

6 5

AS9498 Bharti BGP hijacks
by George William Herbert 01 Apr '17

01 Apr '17

Hey, Bharti, knock that off. http://bgpstream.com/event/78126 http://bgpstream.com/event/78125 http://bgpstream.com/event/78124 http://bgpstream.com/event/78123 http://bgpstream.com/event/78122 Sent from my iPhone

5 4

Weekly Routing Table Report
by cscora＠apnic.net 31 Mar '17

31 Mar '17

This is an automated weekly mailing describing the state of the Internet Routing Table as seen from APNIC's router in Japan. The posting is sent to APOPS, NANOG, AfNOG, AusNOG, SANOG, PacNOG, MENOG, SAFNOG, SdNOG, BJNOG, CaribNOG and the RIPE Routing WG. Daily listings are sent to bgp-stats(a)lists.apnic.net For historical data, please see http://thyme.rand.apnic.net. If you have any comments please contact Philip Smith <pfsinoz(a)gmail.com>. Routing Table Report 04:00 +10GMT Sat 01 Apr, 2017 Report Website: http://thyme.rand.apnic.net Detailed Analysis: http://thyme.rand.apnic.net/current/ Analysis Summary ---------------- BGP routing table entries examined: 640530 Prefixes after maximum aggregation (per Origin AS): 249983 Deaggregation factor: 2.56 Unique aggregates announced (without unneeded subnets): 309623 Total ASes present in the Internet Routing Table: 56735 Prefixes per ASN: 11.29 Origin-only ASes present in the Internet Routing Table: 49101 Origin ASes announcing only one prefix: 21741 Transit ASes present in the Internet Routing Table: 7634 Transit-only ASes present in the Internet Routing Table: 218 Average AS path length visible in the Internet Routing Table: 4.3 Max AS path length visible: 41 Max AS path prepend of ASN ( 55644) 36 Prefixes from unregistered ASNs in the Routing Table: 76 Numnber of instances of unregistered ASNs: 77 Number of 32-bit ASNs allocated by the RIRs: 17957 Number of 32-bit ASNs visible in the Routing Table: 13960 Prefixes from 32-bit ASNs in the Routing Table: 56752 Number of bogon 32-bit ASNs visible in the Routing Table: 46 Special use prefixes present in the Routing Table: 0 Prefixes being announced from unallocated address space: 407 Number of addresses announced to Internet: 2840219780 Equivalent to 169 /8s, 74 /16s and 80 /24s Percentage of available address space announced: 76.7 Percentage of allocated address space announced: 76.7 Percentage of available address space allocated: 100.0 Percentage of address space in use by end-sites: 98.5 Total number of prefixes smaller than registry allocations: 212596 APNIC Region Analysis Summary ----------------------------- Prefixes being announced by APNIC Region ASes: 175385 Total APNIC prefixes after maximum aggregation: 50122 APNIC Deaggregation factor: 3.50 Prefixes being announced from the APNIC address blocks: 174735 Unique aggregates announced from the APNIC address blocks: 72195 APNIC Region origin ASes present in the Internet Routing Table: 7980 APNIC Prefixes per ASN: 21.90 APNIC Region origin ASes announcing only one prefix: 2239 APNIC Region transit ASes present in the Internet Routing Table: 1126 Average APNIC Region AS path length visible: 4.5 Max APNIC Region AS path length visible: 41 Number of APNIC region 32-bit ASNs visible in the Routing Table: 2813 Number of APNIC addresses announced to Internet: 762402692 Equivalent to 45 /8s, 113 /16s and 87 /24s APNIC AS Blocks 4608-4864, 7467-7722, 9216-10239, 17408-18431 (pre-ERX allocations) 23552-24575, 37888-38911, 45056-46079, 55296-56319, 58368-59391, 63488-64098, 64297-64395, 131072-137529 APNIC Address Blocks 1/8, 14/8, 27/8, 36/8, 39/8, 42/8, 43/8, 49/8, 58/8, 59/8, 60/8, 61/8, 101/8, 103/8, 106/8, 110/8, 111/8, 112/8, 113/8, 114/8, 115/8, 116/8, 117/8, 118/8, 119/8, 120/8, 121/8, 122/8, 123/8, 124/8, 125/8, 126/8, 133/8, 150/8, 153/8, 163/8, 171/8, 175/8, 180/8, 182/8, 183/8, 202/8, 203/8, 210/8, 211/8, 218/8, 219/8, 220/8, 221/8, 222/8, 223/8, ARIN Region Analysis Summary ---------------------------- Prefixes being announced by ARIN Region ASes: 195495 Total ARIN prefixes after maximum aggregation: 93596 ARIN Deaggregation factor: 2.09 Prefixes being announced from the ARIN address blocks: 197776 Unique aggregates announced from the ARIN address blocks: 90567 ARIN Region origin ASes present in the Internet Routing Table: 17861 ARIN Prefixes per ASN: 11.07 ARIN Region origin ASes announcing only one prefix: 6625 ARIN Region transit ASes present in the Internet Routing Table: 1767 Average ARIN Region AS path length visible: 3.8 Max ARIN Region AS path length visible: 23 Number of ARIN region 32-bit ASNs visible in the Routing Table: 1874 Number of ARIN addresses announced to Internet: 1108038560 Equivalent to 66 /8s, 11 /16s and 83 /24s ARIN AS Blocks 1-1876, 1902-2042, 2044-2046, 2048-2106 (pre-ERX allocations) 2138-2584, 2615-2772, 2823-2829, 2880-3153 3354-4607, 4865-5119, 5632-6655, 6912-7466 7723-8191, 10240-12287, 13312-15359, 16384-17407 18432-20479, 21504-23551, 25600-26591, 26624-27647, 29696-30719, 31744-33791 35840-36863, 39936-40959, 46080-47103 53248-55295, 62464-63487, 64198-64296, 393216-397212 ARIN Address Blocks 3/8, 4/8, 6/8, 7/8, 8/8, 9/8, 11/8, 12/8, 13/8, 15/8, 16/8, 17/8, 18/8, 19/8, 20/8, 21/8, 22/8, 23/8, 24/8, 26/8, 28/8, 29/8, 30/8, 32/8, 33/8, 34/8, 35/8, 38/8, 40/8, 44/8, 45/8, 47/8, 48/8, 50/8, 52/8, 53/8, 54/8, 55/8, 56/8, 57/8, 63/8, 64/8, 65/8, 66/8, 67/8, 68/8, 69/8, 70/8, 71/8, 72/8, 73/8, 74/8, 75/8, 76/8, 96/8, 97/8, 98/8, 99/8, 100/8, 104/8, 107/8, 108/8, 128/8, 129/8, 130/8, 131/8, 132/8, 134/8, 135/8, 136/8, 137/8, 138/8, 139/8, 140/8, 142/8, 143/8, 144/8, 146/8, 147/8, 148/8, 149/8, 152/8, 155/8, 156/8, 157/8, 158/8, 159/8, 160/8, 161/8, 162/8, 164/8, 165/8, 166/8, 167/8, 168/8, 169/8, 170/8, 172/8, 173/8, 174/8, 184/8, 192/8, 198/8, 199/8, 204/8, 205/8, 206/8, 207/8, 208/8, 209/8, 214/8, 215/8, 216/8, RIPE Region Analysis Summary ---------------------------- Prefixes being announced by RIPE Region ASes: 172535 Total RIPE prefixes after maximum aggregation: 84680 RIPE Deaggregation factor: 2.04 Prefixes being announced from the RIPE address blocks: 167831 Unique aggregates announced from the RIPE address blocks: 101427 RIPE Region origin ASes present in the Internet Routing Table: 23855 RIPE Prefixes per ASN: 7.04 RIPE Region origin ASes announcing only one prefix: 11015 RIPE Region transit ASes present in the Internet Routing Table: 3399 Average RIPE Region AS path length visible: 4.3 Max RIPE Region AS path length visible: 28 Number of RIPE region 32-bit ASNs visible in the Routing Table: 5692 Number of RIPE addresses announced to Internet: 710893696 Equivalent to 42 /8s, 95 /16s and 96 /24s RIPE AS Blocks 1877-1901, 2043, 2047, 2107-2136, 2585-2614 (pre-ERX allocations) 2773-2822, 2830-2879, 3154-3353, 5377-5631 6656-6911, 8192-9215, 12288-13311, 15360-16383 20480-21503, 24576-25599, 28672-29695 30720-31743, 33792-35839, 38912-39935 40960-45055, 47104-52223, 56320-58367 59392-61439, 61952-62463, 64396-64495 196608-207259 RIPE Address Blocks 2/8, 5/8, 25/8, 31/8, 37/8, 46/8, 51/8, 62/8, 77/8, 78/8, 79/8, 80/8, 81/8, 82/8, 83/8, 84/8, 85/8, 86/8, 87/8, 88/8, 89/8, 90/8, 91/8, 92/8, 93/8, 94/8, 95/8, 109/8, 141/8, 145/8, 151/8, 176/8, 178/8, 185/8, 188/8, 193/8, 194/8, 195/8, 212/8, 213/8, 217/8, LACNIC Region Analysis Summary ------------------------------ Prefixes being announced by LACNIC Region ASes: 80218 Total LACNIC prefixes after maximum aggregation: 17811 LACNIC Deaggregation factor: 4.50 Prefixes being announced from the LACNIC address blocks: 81413 Unique aggregates announced from the LACNIC address blocks: 38215 LACNIC Region origin ASes present in the Internet Routing Table: 5758 LACNIC Prefixes per ASN: 14.14 LACNIC Region origin ASes announcing only one prefix: 1536 LACNIC Region transit ASes present in the Internet Routing Table: 1051 Average LACNIC Region AS path length visible: 5.3 Max LACNIC Region AS path length visible: 31 Number of LACNIC region 32-bit ASNs visible in the Routing Table: 3279 Number of LACNIC addresses announced to Internet: 170316512 Equivalent to 10 /8s, 38 /16s and 210 /24s LACNIC AS Blocks 26592-26623, 27648-28671, 52224-53247, 61440-61951, 64099-64197, 262144-266652 + ERX transfers LACNIC Address Blocks 177/8, 179/8, 181/8, 186/8, 187/8, 189/8, 190/8, 191/8, 200/8, 201/8, AfriNIC Region Analysis Summary ------------------------------- Prefixes being announced by AfriNIC Region ASes: 16786 Total AfriNIC prefixes after maximum aggregation: 3711 AfriNIC Deaggregation factor: 4.52 Prefixes being announced from the AfriNIC address blocks: 18368 Unique aggregates announced from the AfriNIC address blocks: 6864 AfriNIC Region origin ASes present in the Internet Routing Table: 1033 AfriNIC Prefixes per ASN: 17.78 AfriNIC Region origin ASes announcing only one prefix: 326 AfriNIC Region transit ASes present in the Internet Routing Table: 201 Average AfriNIC Region AS path length visible: 4.7 Max AfriNIC Region AS path length visible: 18 Number of AfriNIC region 32-bit ASNs visible in the Routing Table: 302 Number of AfriNIC addresses announced to Internet: 88060160 Equivalent to 5 /8s, 63 /16s and 177 /24s AfriNIC AS Blocks 36864-37887, 327680-328703 & ERX transfers AfriNIC Address Blocks 41/8, 102/8, 105/8, 154/8, 196/8, 197/8, APNIC Region per AS prefix count summary ---------------------------------------- ASN No of nets /20 equiv MaxAgg Description 4538 5566 4190 74 ERX-CERNET-BKB China Education and Rese 7545 3778 391 262 TPG-INTERNET-AP TPG Telecom Limited, AU 17974 2992 904 73 TELKOMNET-AS2-AP PT Telekomunikasi Indo 4766 2762 11150 756 KIXS-AS-KR Korea Telecom, KR 9829 2729 1499 540 BSNL-NIB National Internet Backbone, IN 9808 2271 8649 45 CMNET-GD Guangdong Mobile Communication 4755 2071 421 220 TATACOMM-AS TATA Communications formerl 45899 1947 1332 113 VNPT-AS-VN VNPT Corp, VN 9583 1573 121 541 SIFY-AS-IN Sify Limited, IN 4808 1566 1791 447 CHINA169-BJ China Unicom Beijing Provin Complete listing at http://thyme.rand.apnic.net/current/data-ASnet-APNIC ARIN Region per AS prefix count summary --------------------------------------- ASN No of nets /20 equiv MaxAgg Description 22773 3687 2969 152 ASN-CXA-ALL-CCI-22773-RDC - Cox Communi 6327 3348 1333 83 SHAW - Shaw Communications Inc., CA 18566 2186 405 109 MEGAPATH5-US - MegaPath Corporation, US 6389 2068 3671 39 BELLSOUTH-NET-BLK - BellSouth.net Inc., 20115 1982 2094 408 CHARTER-NET-HKY-NC - Charter Communicat 16509 1792 3357 573 AMAZON-02 - Amazon.com, Inc., US 209 1789 5067 640 CENTURYLINK-US-LEGACY-QWEST - Qwest Com 30036 1728 321 392 MEDIACOM-ENTERPRISE-BUSINESS - Mediacom 6983 1684 854 231 ITCDELTA - Earthlink, Inc., US 701 1573 10582 647 UUNET - MCI Communications Services, In Complete listing at http://thyme.rand.apnic.net/current/data-ASnet-ARIN RIPE Region per AS prefix count summary --------------------------------------- ASN No of nets /20 equiv MaxAgg Description 39891 3334 171 18 ALJAWWALSTC-AS, SA 20940 3056 1125 2171 AKAMAI-ASN1, US 9121 2685 1691 17 TTNET, TR 34984 2005 328 384 TELLCOM-AS, TR 8551 1649 377 41 BEZEQ-INTERNATIONAL-AS Bezeqint Interne 13188 1645 99 59 TRIOLAN, UA 12479 1548 1043 53 UNI2-AS, ES 12389 1379 1288 572 ROSTELECOM-AS, RU 9198 1281 352 23 KAZTELECOM-AS, KZ 6849 1265 355 21 UKRTELNET, UA Complete listing at http://thyme.rand.apnic.net/current/data-ASnet-RIPE LACNIC Region per AS prefix count summary ----------------------------------------- ASN No of nets /20 equiv MaxAgg Description 10620 3541 545 174 Telmex Colombia S.A., CO 8151 2516 3389 549 Uninet S.A. de C.V., MX 11830 1820 369 57 Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad 7303 1555 1003 248 Telecom Argentina S.A., AR 6503 1541 437 53 Axtel, S.A.B. de C.V., MX 6147 1214 377 27 Telefonica del Peru S.A.A., PE 28573 1066 2293 185 CLARO S.A., BR 3816 1020 488 182 COLOMBIA TELECOMUNICACIONES S.A. ESP, C 11664 988 280 35 Techtel LMDS Comunicaciones Interactiva 11172 925 126 79 Alestra, S. de R.L. de C.V., MX Complete listing at http://thyme.rand.apnic.net/current/data-ASnet-LACNIC AfriNIC Region per AS prefix count summary ------------------------------------------ ASN No of nets /20 equiv MaxAgg Description 24863 1313 399 43 LINKdotNET-AS, EG 36903 717 360 127 MT-MPLS, MA 37611 700 67 6 Afrihost, ZA 36992 598 1375 26 ETISALAT-MISR, EG 24835 497 722 14 RAYA-AS, EG 8452 438 1474 16 TE-AS TE-AS, EG 37492 399 318 73 ORANGE-, TN 29571 368 36 10 CITelecom-AS, CI 15399 341 35 7 WANANCHI-, KE 2018 287 327 74 TENET-1, ZA Complete listing at http://thyme.rand.apnic.net/current/data-ASnet-AFRINIC Global Per AS prefix count summary ---------------------------------- ASN No of nets /20 equiv MaxAgg Description 4538 5566 4190 74 ERX-CERNET-BKB China Education and Rese 7545 3778 391 262 TPG-INTERNET-AP TPG Telecom Limited, AU 22773 3687 2969 152 ASN-CXA-ALL-CCI-22773-RDC - Cox Communi 10620 3541 545 174 Telmex Colombia S.A., CO 6327 3348 1333 83 SHAW - Shaw Communications Inc., CA 39891 3334 171 18 ALJAWWALSTC-AS, SA 20940 3056 1125 2171 AKAMAI-ASN1, US 17974 2992 904 73 TELKOMNET-AS2-AP PT Telekomunikasi Indo 4766 2762 11150 756 KIXS-AS-KR Korea Telecom, KR 9829 2729 1499 540 BSNL-NIB National Internet Backbone, IN Complete listing at http://thyme.rand.apnic.net/current/data-ASnet Global Per AS Maximum Aggr summary ---------------------------------- ASN No of nets Net Savings Description 22773 3687 3535 ASN-CXA-ALL-CCI-22773-RDC - Cox Communications 7545 3778 3516 TPG-INTERNET-AP TPG Telecom Limited, AU 10620 3541 3367 Telmex Colombia S.A., CO 39891 3334 3316 ALJAWWALSTC-AS, SA 6327 3348 3265 SHAW - Shaw Communications Inc., CA 17974 2992 2919 TELKOMNET-AS2-AP PT Telekomunikasi Indonesia, I 9121 2685 2668 TTNET, TR 9808 2271 2226 CMNET-GD Guangdong Mobile Communication Co.Ltd. 9829 2729 2189 BSNL-NIB National Internet Backbone, IN 18566 2186 2077 MEGAPATH5-US - MegaPath Corporation, US Complete listing at http://thyme.rand.apnic.net/current/data-CIDRnet List of Unregistered Origin ASNs (Global) ----------------------------------------- Bad AS Designation Network Transit AS Description 65001 PRIVATE 5.143.176.0/20 15468 KLGELECS-AS 38, Teatralnaya st 65602 UNALLOCATED 8.225.192.0/24 30372 SUNESYS2 - Sunesys, LLC, US 65001 PRIVATE 31.172.192.0/20 15468 KLGELECS-AS 38, Teatralnaya st 65001 PRIVATE 31.172.192.0/21 15468 KLGELECS-AS 38, Teatralnaya st 65001 PRIVATE 31.172.200.0/21 15468 KLGELECS-AS 38, Teatralnaya st 65001 PRIVATE 31.172.208.0/21 15468 KLGELECS-AS 38, Teatralnaya st 65001 PRIVATE 31.172.216.0/21 15468 KLGELECS-AS 38, Teatralnaya st 65000 PRIVATE 31.219.177.0/25 8966 ETISALAT-AS P.O. Box 1150, Dub 65000 PRIVATE 31.219.177.128/25 8966 ETISALAT-AS P.O. Box 1150, Dub 65555 UNALLOCATED 37.142.172.0/24 21450 MIRS-AS, IL Complete listing at http://thyme.rand.apnic.net/current/data-badAS Advertised Unallocated Addresses -------------------------------- Network Origin AS Description 23.157.128.0/17 393899 -Reserved AS-, ZZ 23.161.128.0/17 393899 -Reserved AS-, ZZ 27.100.7.0/24 56096 UNKNOWN 41.76.232.0/21 203496 AB-TELECOM, RU 41.77.248.0/21 203496 AB-TELECOM, RU 41.78.12.0/23 203496 AB-TELECOM, RU 41.78.180.0/23 37265 -Reserved AS-, ZZ 41.242.132.0/23 203496 AB-TELECOM, RU 43.224.140.0/24 38197 SUNHK-DATA-AS-AP Sun Network (Hong Kong) Limited - 43.224.141.0/24 38197 SUNHK-DATA-AS-AP Sun Network (Hong Kong) Limited - Complete listing at http://thyme.rand.apnic.net/current/data-add-IANA Number of prefixes announced per prefix length (Global) ------------------------------------------------------- /1:0 /2:0 /3:0 /4:0 /5:0 /6:0 /7:0 /8:16 /9:13 /10:36 /11:103 /12:280 /13:538 /14:1051 /15:1827 /16:13229 /17:7571 /18:13365 /19:24622 /20:38269 /21:41237 /22:75790 /23:63097 /24:358116 /25:551 /26:413 /27:291 /28:39 /29:25 /30:24 /31:1 /32:26 Advertised prefixes smaller than registry allocations ----------------------------------------------------- ASN No of nets Total ann. Description 6327 3139 3348 SHAW - Shaw Communications Inc., CA 39891 2896 3334 ALJAWWALSTC-AS, SA 22773 2854 3687 ASN-CXA-ALL-CCI-22773-RDC - Cox Communications 18566 2079 2186 MEGAPATH5-US - MegaPath Corporation, US 9121 1901 2685 TTNET, TR 30036 1534 1728 MEDIACOM-ENTERPRISE-BUSINESS - Mediacom Communi 10620 1458 3541 Telmex Colombia S.A., CO 6389 1375 2068 BELLSOUTH-NET-BLK - BellSouth.net Inc., US 13188 1369 1645 TRIOLAN, UA 6983 1323 1684 ITCDELTA - Earthlink, Inc., US Complete listing at http://thyme.rand.apnic.net/current/data-sXXas-nos Number of /24s announced per /8 block (Global) ---------------------------------------------- 1:1617 2:842 4:26 5:2479 6:34 8:1062 12:1819 13:107 14:1797 15:22 16:2 17:113 18:129 19:1 20:55 23:2179 24:1852 25:2 27:2380 31:1897 32:89 33:5 34:1 35:19 36:384 37:2563 38:1358 39:45 40:99 41:2924 42:461 43:1909 44:67 45:2487 46:2754 47:114 49:1207 50:964 51:18 52:799 54:360 55:7 56:4 57:41 58:1657 59:1019 60:388 61:1950 62:1524 63:1920 64:4611 65:2206 66:4534 67:2272 68:1192 69:3329 70:1306 71:570 72:2162 74:2636 75:405 76:425 77:1467 78:1656 79:1317 80:1361 81:1415 82:968 83:726 84:877 85:1787 86:487 87:1150 88:798 89:2068 90:167 91:6142 92:1024 93:2389 94:2373 95:2828 96:565 97:359 98:952 99:85 100:155 101:1282 103:14176 104:2799 105:163 106:494 107:1561 108:814 109:2603 110:1285 111:1733 112:1169 113:1342 114:1033 115:1799 116:1786 117:1687 118:2073 119:1581 120:956 121:1099 122:2181 123:1845 124:1536 125:1852 128:735 129:619 130:419 131:1415 132:517 133:190 134:606 135:219 136:518 137:429 138:1886 139:422 140:377 141:540 142:737 143:917 144:769 145:170 146:1029 147:663 148:1376 149:552 150:705 151:948 152:748 153:314 154:783 155:982 156:564 157:610 158:442 159:1458 160:568 161:751 162:2460 163:517 164:798 165:1169 166:390 167:1233 168:2600 169:771 170:3052 171:289 172:995 173:1819 174:808 175:740 176:1803 177:4060 178:2490 179:1120 180:2203 181:1895 182:2293 183:978 184:835 185:9232 186:3270 187:2199 188:2535 189:1779 190:8041 191:1271 192:9377 193:5773 194:4657 195:3844 196:1986 197:1263 198:5549 199:5876 200:7353 201:4099 202:10293 203:9840 204:4479 205:2758 206:3002 207:3112 208:3912 209:3954 210:3960 211:2113 212:2806 213:2506 214:864 215:64 216:5872 217:2039 218:840 219:612 220:1714 221:910 222:735 223:1166 End of report

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Microsoft O365 labels nanog potential fraud?
by Mel Beckman 30 Mar '17

30 Mar '17

Is anyone else getting this message on every nanog post today? "This sender failed our fraud detection checks and may not be who they appear to be. Learn about spoofing at http://aka.ms/LearnAboutSpoofing<http://aka.ms/LearnAboutSpoofing]>" I don't know if this link itself is malware, as it goes to the MS store, or if something is broken in the Nanog Mail machine. If it's just me, never mind. I'll figure it out. -mel beckman

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EFF Call for sign-ons: ISPs, networking companies and engineers opposed to FCC privacy repeal
by Peter Eckersley 30 Mar '17

30 Mar '17

Dear network operators, I'm sure this is a controversial topic in the NANOG community, but EFF and a number of ISPs and networking companies are writing to Congress opposing the repeal of the FCC's broadband privacy rules, which require explicit opt-in consent before ISPs use or sell sensitive, non-anonymized data (including non-anonymized locations and browsing histories). If you or your employer would like to sign on to such a letter, please reply off-list by midday Monday with your name, and a one-sentence description of your affiliation and/or major career accomplishments. Back story on what's happening: https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2017/03/five-creepy-things-your-isp-could-do-… https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2017/03/senate-puts-isp-profits-over-your-pri… https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2017/02/congress-contemplating-making-it-ille… Summary of the FCC Broadband Privacy Rules themselves: https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-16-148A1.pdf -- Peter Eckersley pde(a)eff.org Chief Computer Scientist Tel +1 415 436 9333 x131 Electronic Frontier Foundation Fax +1 415 436 9993

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Re: EFF Call for sign-ons: ISPs, networking companies and engineers opposed to FCC privacy repeal
by Ryan Stoner 29 Mar '17

29 Mar '17

Sorry guys. A bit of Percocet on the brain here. Yay broken spine! I meant a tizzy about AT&T and their spying on home fiber customers. They claim they don't do it anymore and offer the lower price to everyone. -- Ryan Stoner On Mar 29, 2017 2:17 PM, <jason(a)schwerberg.com> wrote: > Ryan, > > No, we're in a tizzy over a house resolution that was passed just > yesterday. > > http://thehill.com/policy/technology/326145-house-votes- > to-send-bill-undoing-obama-internet-privacy-rule-to-trumps-desk > > > On 2017-03-29 04:34, Ryan Stoner wrote: > > All if you are in a tizzy over a policy that's been dead for a while. > > < > https://www.google.com/amp/amp.timeinc.net/fortune/2016/ > 09/30/att-internet-fees-privacy/%3Fsource%3Ddam > -- > Ryan Stoner > > > On Mar 29, 2017 6:26 AM, "Rich Kulawiec" <rsk(a)gsp.org> wrote: > > On Wed, Mar 29, 2017 at 05:48:11AM -0500, Mike Hammett wrote: > > What is lost if AT&T or Comcast sells my anonymized usage habits? > > > They're NOT anonymized. Aren't you paying attention? > > Anonymization -- *real* anonymization -- is hard. Hard means expensive. > It also reduces the sale price of the data. There is no reason for any > of these companies to spend the required money in order to sell the data > for less than they could get otherwise. Why should they reduce their > obscene profits? (a) Nobody's going to make them and (b) most people > are as ignorant as you are and therefore aren't demanding it. > > It's much easier and more profitable to *claim* that the data is > anonymized, > maybe make a token (and worthless) gesture at making it so, and laugh all > the way to the bank. > > And let me note that in passing that even if -- and this is a very faint > "if" -- they're really anonymizing your data, it's not anonymized > at the point of collection. Sooner or later, someone with access -- > whether authorized or not -- will tap into that. Of course they will, > it's far too valuable to be ignored indefinitely. Maybe it'll be an > insider operation, maybe it'll be just one person, maybe it'll be outside > attackers, maybe it'll be an intelligence or law enforcement agency. > > The point is that these data collection operations are obvious, > high-value targets, therefore they WILL be attacked, and given the > thoroughly miserable history of the security postures in play, they > WILL be attacked succcessfully. So even if you're foolish and naive > enough to believe the professional spokesliars at AT&T and Comcast, > you should always keep in mind that this data will *not* be confined to > those operations. It will be for sale, in raw unredacted form, on the > darknet to anyone who can pay and/or it will be loaded into the data > warehouses of any agency that chooses to acquire it. > > ---rsk > > >

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Fwd: [ARIN-consult] Community Consultation on CKN23-ARIN Now Open
by John Curran 27 Mar '17

27 Mar '17

NANOGers - We have initiated a community consultation on a possible restructuring of existing information in the ARIN registry – this is to address the long-standing concern that some have expressed with the association of a “No Contact Known” point-of-contact (POC) in some registry records that may have potentially valid Admin and Tech contact information. If you have hold a strong view on this matter, please see the attached consultation announcement and participate in the discussion on the open arin-consult(a)arin.net<mailto:arin-consult@arin.net> mailing list <http://lists.arin.net/mailman/listinfo/arin-consult> Thanks! /John John Curran President and CEO ARIN === Begin forwarded message: From: ARIN <info(a)arin.net<mailto:info@arin.net>> Subject: [ARIN-consult] Community Consultation on CKN23-ARIN Now Open Date: 22 March 2017 at 1:24:12 PM EDT To: <arin-consult(a)arin.net<mailto:arin-consult@arin.net>> There are thousands of instances of the ARIN Point of Contact (POC) handle “No, Contact Known” or CKN23-ARIN registered in the ARIN database, most of them associated with legacy resource records. ARIN would like the community to review the history of this situation and the proposed solution and provide us with their feedback. The creation and addition of this POC handle was due to a combination of factors. * In 2002, a database conversion project was done at ARIN that created a new database structure and added a new record type (Organization ID) as well as new POC types (Admin, Tech, Abuse and NOC). When an Org ID didn’t have a clear POC that had been recently updated or vetted by ARIN staff, the original resource POC remained on the resource record only and no POCs were added to the Org record at all. * In a later 2011 database conversion, reverse DNS delegation switched from per-net to per-zone. This created significant hijacking potential by allowing resource POCs to change their reverse delegation without first being verified by staff as legitimate. * Also in 2011, ARIN added a new business rule that required an Admin and a Tech POC on all Org records as a way of enhancing data quality. * Policy 2010-14 was implemented in 2011 and required Abuse POCs on all Org records. In order to maintain ARIN’s business rules, comply with policy 2010-14, and prevent hijackings, several actions were initiated by staff: * CKN23-ARIN was created to become the Admin and Tech POC on Orgs that lacked them * Resource POCs of legacy networks that had never been updated or validated by ARIN were moved to the Organization record as the Abuse POC * ARIN’s verification and vetting requirements were thus reinstated as the Abuse POC had to be vetted before making any changes to the record, and therefore could not hijack the resource by adding or changing the nameservers Over time, the above actions have created several issues: * It is easy for hijackers to identify and target records with CKN23 (no contact known) as the handle * POCs that were moved from resource tech to Org abuse are not happy about no longer having control of their resource record There are several different courses of action that ARIN could take to resolve the current situation. Option 1 Retain the current status and do nothing Option 2 Restore the resource POCs back to their original state on the resource record keeping in mind that this would open up the hijacking risk by giving the original resource POC control of the network without a verification process * Retain the Abuse POC on the Org record * Retain CKN23-ARIN as Org POC Option 3 - **Recommended option** Restore the resource POC back to their original state on the resource record. This will allow contacts historically associated with a resource record to more readily administer that record going forward. * Retain the Abuse POC on the Org * Replace CKN23-ARIN with a handle that better explains the record’s status (e.g. “Legacy Record – See Resource POC”) * Lock all resources associated with these legacy records who have had their resource POC restored. This would ensure that any changes made by the resource POC would first have to be reviewed by ARIN. We would like to thank the ARIN Services Working Group (WG) for their helpful review of the proposed change – while the ARIN Services WG did not take a formal position in support of or in opposition of the proposed change, their review led to improvements in presentation of the options We are seeking community feedback on this proposed change (Option #3) to the ARIN Registry database. This consultation will remain open for 60 days - Please provide comments to arin-consult(a)arin.net<mailto:arin-consult@arin.net>. Discussion on arin-consult(a)arin.net<mailto:arin-consult@arin.net> will close on 22 May 2017. If you have any questions, please contact us at info(a)arin.net<mailto:info@arin.net>. Regards, John Curran President and CEO American Registry for Internet Numbers (ARIN) _______________________________________________ ARIN-Consult You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the ARIN Consult Mailing List (ARIN-consult(a)arin.net<mailto:ARIN-consult@arin.net>). Unsubscribe or manage your mailing list subscription at: http://lists.arin.net/mailman/listinfo/arin-consult Please contact the ARIN Member Services Help Desk at info(a)arin.net<mailto:info@arin.net> if you experience any issues.

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VPS plus email
by Samual Carman 27 Mar '17

27 Mar '17

Howdy y'all I would like to know if if anyone can recommend a good VPS to run a exchange server as well as host a website I would like to set up an exchange server with a professional email address unless you guys can recommend a different approach I should take to get a professional address so it would look better on resumes etc and I can consolidate all my various email accounts to one I could consider switching to google apps and or Microsoft outlook unless there are other better providers out there I am in college so if there are any special programs please feel free to advice me of such Feel free to private message me Not sure if this is allowed the rules where murkey on this Get Outlook for iOS

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How to secure link between switches in Layer2
by Pedro 25 Mar '17

25 Mar '17

Hello, Sometimes i have situation that i have to extend my layer2 (access, trunk mode) network to third parties with limited trust. Sometimes it's L2 MPLS links from isp (1x or 2x), sometimes it's just colocated switch. Mostly there are Juniper Ex4200/4300 or and Cisco 3750. Below i puts my config but maybe i miss something important ? Or i should correct ? Thanks for help 1. If two p2p links: aggregation with LACP 2. stp/rstp in portfast mode on access port stp/rstp without portfast mode on trunk port rstp root guard 3. on ports facing servers, in portfast mode, bpdu guard spanning-tree root guard 4. max amount of mac addresses ie 100 per port per vlan max mac address 5. 802.1q with vlans, but not vlan 1 6. broadcast storm for bum packets: 10 pps 7. static ip - no dhcp servers/clients in vlans 8. cpu monitoring with notification in ie zabbix 9. cdp disable (if cisco) dtp disable (if cisco) 10. eventually policer per port or per vlan. thanks in advance, Pedro

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