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number of unaggregated class C's in swamp?
by William Allen Simpson 29 Sep '95

29 Sep '95

How would one go about determining how many /24 /23 ... /19 unaggregated advertisements are in the swamp. I assume it would have to be examined by AS, and look for multiple paths to find multi-homed, but it should be doable with the current database, shouldn't it? Has someone already done this? I asked Merit yesterday, and they don't seem to have the tools. Bill.Simpson(a)um.cc.umich.edu Key fingerprint = 2E 07 23 03 C5 62 70 D3 59 B1 4F 5E 1D C2 C1 A2

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Forwarded mail..
by santa＠north.pole 29 Sep '95

29 Sep '95

i dunno, i saw this and was sondering if it sounded paranoid or what.. merry xmas.. -------------------- Forwarded Mail -------------------- [headers deleted..] Ex-spooks take over Internet domain name registration The press recently reported that the National Science Foundation has turned over Internet Domain Name registration to Network Solutions, Inc. (NSI) of Herndon, VA. The press failed to note some interesting connections. Tomorrow morning (Sept. 26), Web Review, a biweekly online magazine (see Special Report at http://gnn.com/wr/) will reveal that NSI was purchased in May by Scientific Applications International Corporation (SAIC) of San Diego. SAIC is a $2 billion company indicted by the Justice Department on ten felony counts for fraud in managing a Superfund toxic cleanup site (SAIC pleaded guilty) and sued by the Justice Department for civil fraud on an F-15 fighter contract. SAIC's board members include Admiral Bobby Inman, former NSA head and deputy director of the CIA; Melvin Laird, Nixon's defense secretary; and retired General Max Thurman, commander of the Panama Invasion. Recently departed board members include Robert Gates, former CIA director; William Perry, current Secretary of Defense; and John Deutch, the current CIA director. Current SAIC government contracts include re-engineering information systems at the Pentagon, automation of the FBI's computerized fingerprint identification system, and building a national criminal history information system. "At the very time the Internet community is struggling with the issues of encryption and privacy, I'm more than a little uneasy to find this bunch of ex-spooks sitting at the very entry point of the Net," says Jim Warren (a leading activist in making government records accessible) in the article, which was written by investigative journalist Stephen Pizzo, Web Review Senior Editor and co-author of the book Inside Job, an expose on the savings & loan looting.

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Re: number of unaggregated class C's in swamp?
by Barney Wolff 29 Sep '95

29 Sep '95

> Date: Fri, 29 Sep 95 15:16:20 GMT > From: "William Allen Simpson" <bsimpson(a)morningstar.com> > > > From: Brian Renaud <renaud(a)merit.edu> > > Here is the breakdown of 198 in the radb, showing the number of > > route objects registered in 198 for /14 through /24. > > > > prefix length > > prefix 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 > > ------ ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- > > 198.* 4 5 39 5 19 30 41 67 98 137 5314 > > > This is interesting, showing how bad assignment has been even > _after_ CIDR. 5K sites migrating providers in 2 years. I believe the NIC was assigning out of 198 before CIDR went into effect. I got a single C directly from them in late 1993, as I recall. Barney Wolff <barney(a)databus.com>

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Re: number of unaggregated class C's in swamp?
by rrv＠uiuc.edu 29 Sep '95

29 Sep '95

How did you account for longer prefixes that are covered by shorter ones? Did you limit your study to the RADB, or did you use the whole IRR? At 9:22 AM 9/29/95, Brian Renaud wrote: >Here is the breakdown of 198 in the radb, showing the number of >route objects registered in 198 for /14 through /24. > > prefix length >prefix 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 >------ ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- > 198.* 4 5 39 5 19 30 41 67 98 137 5314 > >-Brian > >> How would one go about determining how many /24 /23 ... /19 unaggregated >> advertisements are in the swamp. I assume it would have to be examined >> by AS, and look for multiple paths to find multi-homed, but it should be >> doable with the current database, shouldn't it? >> >> Has someone already done this? I asked Merit yesterday, and they don't >> seem to have the tools. >> >> Bill.Simpson(a)um.cc.umich.edu >> Key fingerprint = 2E 07 23 03 C5 62 70 D3 59 B1 4F 5E 1D C2 C1 A2 >>

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Notes from last NANOG on line
by sob＠academ.com 29 Sep '95

29 Sep '95

All my notes (with some help from Kent England and Randy Bush) are now on line. The slides from the talks are not up yet. I will get them in as I can. I still need the mail that made up the Sprint NAP report. I don't have that at all. The URL is http://www.academ.com/nanog/sept1995 Enjoy. -- Stan | Academ Consulting Services |internet: sob(a)academ.com Olan | For more info on academ, see this |uucp: amdahl!academ!sob Barber | URL- http://www.academ.com/academ |Opinions expressed are only mine.

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Join Mailist
by prieur3＠infolink.com 28 Sep '95

28 Sep '95

Prieur J. Leary, III Infolink Information Services, Inc.

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CERT Vendor-Initiated Bulletin VB-95:07 - lsof
by CERT Bulletin 28 Sep '95

28 Sep '95

====================================================================== CERT Vendor-Initiated Bulletin VB-95:07 September 28, 1995 Topic: Directory and file vulnerability from lsof 3.18 through 3.43 Source: Vic Abell (abe(a)cc.purdue.edu) To aid in the wide distribution of essential security information, the CERT Coordination Center is forwarding the following information from Vic Abell, who urges you to act on this information as soon as possible. Please contact Vic Abell if you have any questions or need further information. ========================FORWARDED TEXT STARTS HERE============================ It may be possible to write lsof's private device cache file to system locations that are normally inaccessible to the lsof user, depending on the UNIX dialect where lsof is installed and how that dialect grants permission to access kernel memory information. The vulnerability affects lsof revisions 3.18 through 3.43, installed on these UNIX dialects: AIX 3.2.4, 3.2.5, 4.1, the IBM RISC/System 6000 4.1.1, and 4.1.2 EP/IX 2.1.1 the CDC 4680 FreeBSD 1.1.5.1, 2.0, and Intel-based systems 2.0.5 HP-UX 8.x, 9.x, and 10 HP systems (some combinations) IRIX 4.0.5H, 5.2, 5.3, SGI systems 6.0, and 6.1 Linux through 1.3.0 Intel-based systems Motorola V/88 R32V3, M88K systems R40V4.[123] NetBSD 1.0 and 1.0A Intel and SPARC-based systems NEXTSTEP 2.1 and 3.[0123] all NEXTSTEP architectures OSF/1 1.3, 2.0, 3.0, and the DEC Alpha 3.2 RISC/os 4.52 MIPS R2000-based systems SCO OpenDesktop or Intel-based systems OpenServer 1.1, 3.0, and 5.0 Sequent Dynix 3.0.12 the Sequent Symmetry Sequent PTX 2.1.[156] and Sequent systems 4.0.[23] Solaris 2.[1234] and 2.5 Sun 4 and i86pc systems BETA SunOS 4.1.[1234] Sun 3 and 4 Ultrix 2.2, 4.2, 4.3, DEC RISC and VAX and 4.4 I recommend that users of the affected revisions of lsof on these dialects install lsof revision 3.44, 3.45 or later. Section III describes its location and some appropriate installation considerations. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- I. Description A private device cache file feature was introduced at lsof revision 3.18 to speed up subsequent calls to lsof by reducing the need for a full scan of the nodes in /dev (or /devices). Accompanying the feature was an option (-D) that allowed the lsof user to specify where the device cache file was to be recorded. Since lsof normally runs with effective group ID permission set to the group that can read kernel memory devices, the -D option might allow lsof to write its device cache file to a location not normally accessible to the real user or group owning the lsof process. The locations where the lsof device cache file might be inappropriately recorded depend on the group that owns the memory devices and to what other files and directories the group has write permission. Here are two examples: 1) IBM's distribution of AIX sets group ownership of /dev/kmem and /etc to the "system" group and enables group write permission in /etc; and 2) Sun's Solaris distribution does the same thing, using the "sys" group. (Security conscious installations often create a new group -- e.g., "kmem" or "mem" -- that owns no files and is used solely for enabling read access to kernel memory devices.) A fix for this group ID vulnerability may be found in lsof revisions 3.44, 3.45, and above. A more serious vulnerability exists when lsof must run setuid to the root user and also has device cache file support. This happens for the lsof implementation that runs under Motorola's V/88 UNIX dialects R40V4.1, R40V4.2, and R40V4.3. This gives the lsof user an unlimited choice of places to record the device cache file. A partial fix for this vulnerability was introduced in lsof revision 3.43. The complete fix may be found in lsof revisions 3.44, 3.45, and above. II. Impact Unauthorized users may be able to write the lsof device cache file to normally-restricted locations, possibly in place of important system files. The vulnerability can be exploited only by users with a valid account. It cannot be exploited by arbitrary remote users. The vulnerability affects all lsof revisions 3.18 through 3.43 on UNIX dialects where device cache file support has been implemented. III. Solution Retrieve lsof revision 3.44, 3.45, or later and install it. Compressed tar archive: ftp://vic.cc.purdue.edu/pub/tools/unix/lsof/lsof.tar.Z Gzip'd tar archive: ftp://vic.cc.purdue.edu/pub/tools/unix/lsof/lsof.tar.gz Lsof 3.44 eliminates the vulnerability for all relevant UNIX dialects. However, its overly zealous restrictions for Solaris and SunOS and are relaxed in revision 3.45. Both tar archives are wrappers that contain authentication information (MD5 checksums and PGP certificates) and a tar archive of the lsof sources. 1. Retrieve the wrapper archive, extract its three files -- README.lsof_<revision>, lsof_<revision>.tar, and lsof_<revision>.tar.asc -- and verify its authentication information. (<revision> should be 3.44 or greater.) 2. Unpack the lsof source archive from lsof_<revision>.tar and read its documentation files. Pay particular attention to the 00DCACHE file that describes options for specifying the location of the device cache, and the security section in the 00README file. 3. Having selected the lsof options appropriate to the UNIX dialect where you want to install it, run the Configure script, use make to build lsof, and install the resulting lsof executable. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Vic Abell appreciates the advice and comments provided by members of the bugtraq mailing list that led him to realize this vulnerability existed. He thanks Katherine T. Fithen and Linda Hutz Pesante of the CERT Coordination Center for their help in preparing this bulletin. =========================FORWARDED TEXT ENDS HERE============================= CERT publications, information about FIRST representatives, and other information related to computer security are available for anonymous FTP from info.cert.org. CERT advisories and bulletins are also posted on the USENET newsgroup comp.security.announce. If you would like to have future advisories and bulletins mailed to you or to a mail exploder at your site, please send mail to cert-advisory-request(a)cert.org. If you wish to send sensitive incident or vulnerability information to CERT staff by electronic mail, we strongly advise that the e-mail be encrypted. The CERT Coordination Center can support a shared DES key, PGP (public key available via anonymous FTP on info.cert.org) or PEM (contact CERT staff for details). Internet email: cert(a)cert.org Telephone: +1 412-268-7090 (24-hour hotline) CERT personnel answer 8:30 a.m.-5:00 p.m. EST(GMT-5)/EDT(GMT-4), and are on call for emergencies during other hours. Fax: +1 412-268-6989 CERT Coordination Center Software Engineering Institute Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890 USA CERT is a service mark of Carnegie Mellon University.

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Operational declaration of route servers at AADS and Washington-DC NAPs
by Jake Khuon 28 Sep '95

28 Sep '95

The Routing Arbiter Service is pleased to announce it is fully in production at both the AADS and Washington-DC (MAE-East) NAPs. Two route servers are installed at each NAP to provide redundancy, and the route servers are reconfigured every 4 hours. The route server configurations are based on the routing policy information stored in the Internet Routing Registry. The IRR contains the full set of data from five databases: Routing Arbiter Database, RIPE Routing Registry, internetMCI Routing Registry, CA*net Routing Registry, and ANSnet Database. For more information about the RA Service, please refer to: http://www.ra.net/routing.arbiter/RA/ To use the RA Service at the AADS and Washington-DC NAPs, send mail to: ra-peer(a)ra.net -- /*====================[ Jake Khuon <khuon(a)Merit.Net> ]=====================+ | Systems Research Programmer, IE Group /| /|[~|)|~|~ N E T W O R K | | Vox: (313) 763-4907 Fax: (313) 747-3185 / |/ |[_|\| | Incorporated | +====[ Suite C2122, Bldg. 1 4251 Plymouth Rd. Ann Arbor, MI 48105 ]====*/

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Re: Peering in the LA region?!?
by Peter Kline 28 Sep '95

28 Sep '95

Hello All, AGIS would be happy to/interested in exchanging customer routes in LA. We're in the SMDS cloud. Further, I think that in less than 60 seconds I could convince my management to purchase a switching hub for our space with WilTel on the 14th Floor of the 1 Wilshire Building. Anyone within/nearby that space (I remember seeing BBN/Planet and UUNet for instance) would be welcome to drag a cat5 connection to that hub for the exchange of customer routes with AGIS and other attachees. I see no reason to charge anything for the connection. If there's enough interest, mebbe bmanning could provide/administer an ep.net class C. Peter At 09:21 AM 9/26/95 -0700, Pushpendra Mohta wrote: > >CERFnet has a POP in One Wilshire with 2 T3s, soon to be 4. > >CERFnet and Los Nettos/CSUnet have a private peering arrangement at two >locations. Other than that, I am not aware of large peering >arrangements in LA, but would welcome such a move. > > >--pushpendra > >Pushpendra Mohta pushp(a)cerf.net +1 619 455 3908 >Director, CERFnet http://www.cerf.net +1 800 876 2373 > >Marcos Della writes: >> >> Just curious, but after looking around at several sites in LA, I was curious >> if ANYONE was actually doing any significant peering in the LA basin? >> Currently >> we are looking for multiple interconnects down there in the 10mbps/T3 range, >> however we can't find anyone... >> >> We currently have a little >1000sq ft in the One Wilshire building. Is >> there anyone else in that building? *SIGH* I was meaning to ask this while >> I was at nanog, but other events caused me to forget to ask... >> >> Marcos >> >> -- >> >> ''' >> (o o) >> --------------------------oOO--(_)--OOo-------------------------- >> Marcos R. Della Email: mdella(a)InterNex.Net >> Director, Network Engineering InterNex Information Services >> Phone: 408/496-5466 http://www.internex.net/~mdella >> >> > > > ___________________________________________________________________ Peter Kline | pots 313-730-1130 AGIS - Internet Backbone Services | Pager 800-823-7118 22015 West Outer Drive | "Sister, I don't mind shootin' Dearborn, MI 48124 | 'em for ya', but I sure as hell peter(a)agis.net | won't sweat over them" - Clint =================================================================== AGIS - Net99 | pots 602-249-0957 4810 N. Black Canyon Road | fax 602-249-1161 Phoenix, AZ 85017 | peter(a)net99.net

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Re: 204.82.160.0/22 invisible
by Kai 27 Sep '95

27 Sep '95

Argh ! and I only did this typo ONCE over the last 10 emails. ultimate clarification: BelCom has: 204.97.218.0/219.0 (old, Sprint-owned, aggregated) 206.82.160.0/22 <- this was the point of discussion. Sorry for the noise this has caused by now. bye,Kai >> OK. What about 206.82.160.0/22? >> >> Thanks, Elliot. >> >> <markd> >> >oh hell, i should've seen this coming.. check this out: >ealbytraceroute belcom.net >traceroute to belcom.net (204.97.218.2), 30 hops max, 40 byte packets > 1 sl-hrn-1-E5 (199.0.55.1) 3 ms 2 ms 2 ms > 2 sl-dc-1-S3-T1 (144.228.0.225) 11 ms 9 ms 6 ms > 3 sl-dc-6-F0/0 (144.228.20.6) 8 ms 7 ms 5 ms > 4 sl-pen-1-H2/0-T3 (144.228.10.34) 8 ms 9 ms 8 ms > 5 sl-pen-4-F0/0 (144.228.60.4) 9 ms 32 ms 9 ms > 6 sl-computel-1-S0-T1 (144.228.64.74) 15 ms 15 ms 15 ms > 7 gate.belcom.net (204.97.218.1) 19 ms 18 ms 19 ms > 8 belcom.net (204.97.218.2) 29 ms 19 ms 21 ms >ealby >204.etc, right? >ealbywhois 206.82.160 >BelCom, Inc. (NETBLK-BELCOM-NET) > 515 Madison Ave Suite 2100 > New York, NY 10022 > Netname: BELCOM-NET > Netblock: 206.82.160.0 - 206.82.163.0 > Coordinator: > Schlichting, Kai H. (KHS) kai(a)BELCOM.NET kai(a)COMPUTEL.COM > (212) 705-9500 > Domain System inverse mapping provided by: > NS.BELCOM.NET 204.97.218.2 > CNS.COMPUTEL.COM 204.97.91.2 > Record last updated on 12-Sep-95. >The InterNIC Registration Services Host contains ONLY Internet Information >(Networks, ASN's, Domains, and POC's). >Please use the whois server at nic.ddn.mil for MILNET Information. >ealby >belcom, you need to straighten out your records at the internic asap. >someone typo'd your class c's when you were swip'd from computel. also, >why is the 204.82 block registered at the nic to 'nd dept of edu'? >is that who originally allocated computel's class c's? >- elliot/sprint >ealbywhois 204.82.160 >NB Department of Education (NETBLK-NB-SCHOOLS) > P.O. Box 6000 > Fredericton, NB > E3B 5H1 > CA > Netname: nbed-nb-ca > Netblock: 204.81.0.0 - 204.82.255.0 > Coordinator: > Lee, Jean (JL154) jeanl(a)GOV.NB.CA > +1 (506) 453-7153 > Domain System inverse mapping provided by: > ALPHA.NBED.NB.CA 204.81.0.10 > OMEGA.NBED.NB.CA 204.81.0.99 > Record last updated on 27-Dec-94. >The InterNIC Registration Services Host contains ONLY Internet Information >(Networks, ASN's, Domains, and POC's). >Please use the whois server at nic.ddn.mil for MILNET Information. >ealby '~e

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