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Weekly Routing Table Report
by cscora＠apnic.net 27 Jul '18

27 Jul '18

This is an automated weekly mailing describing the state of the Internet Routing Table as seen from APNIC's router in Japan. The posting is sent to APOPS, NANOG, AfNOG, SANOG, PacNOG, SAFNOG TZNOG, MENOG, BJNOG, SDNOG, CMNOG, LACNOG, IRNOG and the RIPE Routing WG. Daily listings are sent to bgp-stats(a)lists.apnic.net For historical data, please see http://thyme.rand.apnic.net. If you have any comments please contact Philip Smith <pfsinoz(a)gmail.com>. Routing Table Report 04:00 +10GMT Sat 28 Jul, 2018 Report Website: http://thyme.rand.apnic.net Detailed Analysis: http://thyme.rand.apnic.net/current/ Analysis Summary ---------------- BGP routing table entries examined: 707831 Prefixes after maximum aggregation (per Origin AS): 271940 Deaggregation factor: 2.60 Unique aggregates announced (without unneeded subnets): 339769 Total ASes present in the Internet Routing Table: 61314 Prefixes per ASN: 11.54 Origin-only ASes present in the Internet Routing Table: 52960 Origin ASes announcing only one prefix: 23085 Transit ASes present in the Internet Routing Table: 8354 Transit-only ASes present in the Internet Routing Table: 267 Average AS path length visible in the Internet Routing Table: 4.0 Max AS path length visible: 34 Max AS path prepend of ASN ( 30873) 32 Prefixes from unregistered ASNs in the Routing Table: 55 Number of instances of unregistered ASNs: 55 Number of 32-bit ASNs allocated by the RIRs: 23460 Number of 32-bit ASNs visible in the Routing Table: 18868 Prefixes from 32-bit ASNs in the Routing Table: 78889 Number of bogon 32-bit ASNs visible in the Routing Table: 22 Special use prefixes present in the Routing Table: 2 Prefixes being announced from unallocated address space: 282 Number of addresses announced to Internet: 2857289283 Equivalent to 170 /8s, 78 /16s and 198 /24s Percentage of available address space announced: 77.2 Percentage of allocated address space announced: 77.2 Percentage of available address space allocated: 100.0 Percentage of address space in use by end-sites: 99.0 Total number of prefixes smaller than registry allocations: 235856 APNIC Region Analysis Summary ----------------------------- Prefixes being announced by APNIC Region ASes: 193185 Total APNIC prefixes after maximum aggregation: 54926 APNIC Deaggregation factor: 3.52 Prefixes being announced from the APNIC address blocks: 191556 Unique aggregates announced from the APNIC address blocks: 78618 APNIC Region origin ASes present in the Internet Routing Table: 8971 APNIC Prefixes per ASN: 21.35 APNIC Region origin ASes announcing only one prefix: 2518 APNIC Region transit ASes present in the Internet Routing Table: 1338 Average APNIC Region AS path length visible: 4.0 Max APNIC Region AS path length visible: 29 Number of APNIC region 32-bit ASNs visible in the Routing Table: 3922 Number of APNIC addresses announced to Internet: 767760130 Equivalent to 45 /8s, 195 /16s and 23 /24s APNIC AS Blocks 4608-4864, 7467-7722, 9216-10239, 17408-18431 (pre-ERX allocations) 23552-24575, 37888-38911, 45056-46079, 55296-56319, 58368-59391, 63488-64098, 64297-64395, 131072-137529 APNIC Address Blocks 1/8, 14/8, 27/8, 36/8, 39/8, 42/8, 43/8, 49/8, 58/8, 59/8, 60/8, 61/8, 101/8, 103/8, 106/8, 110/8, 111/8, 112/8, 113/8, 114/8, 115/8, 116/8, 117/8, 118/8, 119/8, 120/8, 121/8, 122/8, 123/8, 124/8, 125/8, 126/8, 133/8, 150/8, 153/8, 163/8, 171/8, 175/8, 180/8, 182/8, 183/8, 202/8, 203/8, 210/8, 211/8, 218/8, 219/8, 220/8, 221/8, 222/8, 223/8, ARIN Region Analysis Summary ---------------------------- Prefixes being announced by ARIN Region ASes: 210288 Total ARIN prefixes after maximum aggregation: 100019 ARIN Deaggregation factor: 2.10 Prefixes being announced from the ARIN address blocks: 210480 Unique aggregates announced from the ARIN address blocks: 99420 ARIN Region origin ASes present in the Internet Routing Table: 18191 ARIN Prefixes per ASN: 11.57 ARIN Region origin ASes announcing only one prefix: 6721 ARIN Region transit ASes present in the Internet Routing Table: 1807 Average ARIN Region AS path length visible: 3.6 Max ARIN Region AS path length visible: 22 Number of ARIN region 32-bit ASNs visible in the Routing Table: 2385 Number of ARIN addresses announced to Internet: 1102770848 Equivalent to 65 /8s, 186 /16s and 242 /24s ARIN AS Blocks 1-1876, 1902-2042, 2044-2046, 2048-2106 (pre-ERX allocations) 2138-2584, 2615-2772, 2823-2829, 2880-3153 3354-4607, 4865-5119, 5632-6655, 6912-7466 7723-8191, 10240-12287, 13312-15359, 16384-17407 18432-20479, 21504-23551, 25600-26591, 26624-27647, 29696-30719, 31744-33791 35840-36863, 39936-40959, 46080-47103 53248-55295, 62464-63487, 64198-64296, 393216-397212 ARIN Address Blocks 3/8, 4/8, 6/8, 7/8, 8/8, 9/8, 11/8, 12/8, 13/8, 15/8, 16/8, 17/8, 18/8, 19/8, 20/8, 21/8, 22/8, 23/8, 24/8, 26/8, 28/8, 29/8, 30/8, 32/8, 33/8, 34/8, 35/8, 38/8, 40/8, 44/8, 45/8, 47/8, 48/8, 50/8, 52/8, 53/8, 54/8, 55/8, 56/8, 57/8, 63/8, 64/8, 65/8, 66/8, 67/8, 68/8, 69/8, 70/8, 71/8, 72/8, 73/8, 74/8, 75/8, 76/8, 96/8, 97/8, 98/8, 99/8, 100/8, 104/8, 107/8, 108/8, 128/8, 129/8, 130/8, 131/8, 132/8, 134/8, 135/8, 136/8, 137/8, 138/8, 139/8, 140/8, 142/8, 143/8, 144/8, 146/8, 147/8, 148/8, 149/8, 152/8, 155/8, 156/8, 157/8, 158/8, 159/8, 160/8, 161/8, 162/8, 164/8, 165/8, 166/8, 167/8, 168/8, 169/8, 170/8, 172/8, 173/8, 174/8, 184/8, 192/8, 198/8, 199/8, 204/8, 205/8, 206/8, 207/8, 208/8, 209/8, 214/8, 215/8, 216/8, RIPE Region Analysis Summary ---------------------------- Prefixes being announced by RIPE Region ASes: 193768 Total RIPE prefixes after maximum aggregation: 92607 RIPE Deaggregation factor: 2.09 Prefixes being announced from the RIPE address blocks: 189917 Unique aggregates announced from the RIPE address blocks: 112763 RIPE Region origin ASes present in the Internet Routing Table: 25326 RIPE Prefixes per ASN: 7.50 RIPE Region origin ASes announcing only one prefix: 11415 RIPE Region transit ASes present in the Internet Routing Table: 3503 Average RIPE Region AS path length visible: 4.1 Max RIPE Region AS path length visible: 34 Number of RIPE region 32-bit ASNs visible in the Routing Table: 7216 Number of RIPE addresses announced to Internet: 714010240 Equivalent to 42 /8s, 142 /16s and 238 /24s RIPE AS Blocks 1877-1901, 2043, 2047, 2107-2136, 2585-2614 (pre-ERX allocations) 2773-2822, 2830-2879, 3154-3353, 5377-5631 6656-6911, 8192-9215, 12288-13311, 15360-16383 20480-21503, 24576-25599, 28672-29695 30720-31743, 33792-35839, 38912-39935 40960-45055, 47104-52223, 56320-58367 59392-61439, 61952-62463, 64396-64495 196608-207259 RIPE Address Blocks 2/8, 5/8, 25/8, 31/8, 37/8, 46/8, 51/8, 62/8, 77/8, 78/8, 79/8, 80/8, 81/8, 82/8, 83/8, 84/8, 85/8, 86/8, 87/8, 88/8, 89/8, 90/8, 91/8, 92/8, 93/8, 94/8, 95/8, 109/8, 141/8, 145/8, 151/8, 176/8, 178/8, 185/8, 188/8, 193/8, 194/8, 195/8, 212/8, 213/8, 217/8, LACNIC Region Analysis Summary ------------------------------ Prefixes being announced by LACNIC Region ASes: 91315 Total LACNIC prefixes after maximum aggregation: 20268 LACNIC Deaggregation factor: 4.51 Prefixes being announced from the LACNIC address blocks: 92744 Unique aggregates announced from the LACNIC address blocks: 40795 LACNIC Region origin ASes present in the Internet Routing Table: 7348 LACNIC Prefixes per ASN: 12.62 LACNIC Region origin ASes announcing only one prefix: 2032 LACNIC Region transit ASes present in the Internet Routing Table: 1379 Average LACNIC Region AS path length visible: 4.7 Max LACNIC Region AS path length visible: 34 Number of LACNIC region 32-bit ASNs visible in the Routing Table: 4891 Number of LACNIC addresses announced to Internet: 172285216 Equivalent to 10 /8s, 68 /16s and 221 /24s LACNIC AS Blocks 26592-26623, 27648-28671, 52224-53247, 61440-61951, 64099-64197, 262144-268700 + ERX transfers LACNIC Address Blocks 177/8, 179/8, 181/8, 186/8, 187/8, 189/8, 190/8, 191/8, 200/8, 201/8, AfriNIC Region Analysis Summary ------------------------------- Prefixes being announced by AfriNIC Region ASes: 19219 Total AfriNIC prefixes after maximum aggregation: 4076 AfriNIC Deaggregation factor: 4.72 Prefixes being announced from the AfriNIC address blocks: 22852 Unique aggregates announced from the AfriNIC address blocks: 7926 AfriNIC Region origin ASes present in the Internet Routing Table: 1183 AfriNIC Prefixes per ASN: 19.32 AfriNIC Region origin ASes announcing only one prefix: 399 AfriNIC Region transit ASes present in the Internet Routing Table: 236 Average AfriNIC Region AS path length visible: 4.5 Max AfriNIC Region AS path length visible: 25 Number of AfriNIC region 32-bit ASNs visible in the Routing Table: 454 Number of AfriNIC addresses announced to Internet: 100013568 Equivalent to 5 /8s, 246 /16s and 22 /24s AfriNIC AS Blocks 36864-37887, 327680-328703 & ERX transfers AfriNIC Address Blocks 41/8, 102/8, 105/8, 154/8, 196/8, 197/8, APNIC Region per AS prefix count summary ---------------------------------------- ASN No of nets /20 equiv MaxAgg Description 4538 4692 4192 74 ERX-CERNET-BKB China Education and Rese 7545 4364 467 460 TPG-INTERNET-AP TPG Telecom Limited, AU 7552 2966 1153 83 VIETEL-AS-AP Viettel Group, VN 4766 2863 11135 765 KIXS-AS-KR Korea Telecom, KR 9829 2813 1497 543 BSNL-NIB National Internet Backbone, IN 45899 2657 1637 110 VNPT-AS-VN VNPT Corp, VN 9394 2542 4907 31 CTTNET China TieTong Telecommunications 17974 2260 930 71 TELKOMNET-AS2-AP PT Telekomunikasi Indo 9808 2238 8699 26 CMNET-GD Guangdong Mobile Communication 4755 2112 417 205 TATACOMM-AS TATA Communications formerl Complete listing at http://thyme.rand.apnic.net/current/data-ASnet-APNIC ARIN Region per AS prefix count summary --------------------------------------- ASN No of nets /20 equiv MaxAgg Description 6327 3433 1324 82 SHAW - Shaw Communications Inc., CA 22773 3272 2968 149 ASN-CXA-ALL-CCI-22773-RDC - Cox Communi 11492 2541 244 475 CABLEONE - CABLE ONE, INC., US 16509 2250 4790 759 AMAZON-02 - Amazon.com, Inc., US 18566 2167 405 109 MEGAPATH5-US - MegaPath Corporation, US 20115 2118 2616 480 CHARTER-NET-HKY-NC - Charter Communicat 16625 2014 1033 1440 AKAMAI-AS - Akamai Technologies, Inc., 30036 2013 344 148 MEDIACOM-ENTERPRISE-BUSINESS - Mediacom 209 1996 5071 607 CENTURYLINK-US-LEGACY-QWEST - Qwest Com 7018 1746 20200 1263 ATT-INTERNET4 - AT&T Services, Inc., US Complete listing at http://thyme.rand.apnic.net/current/data-ASnet-ARIN RIPE Region per AS prefix count summary --------------------------------------- ASN No of nets /20 equiv MaxAgg Description 12479 4614 1610 122 UNI2-AS, ES 39891 3778 203 20 ALJAWWALSTC-AS, SA 20940 2540 624 1886 AKAMAI-ASN1, US 8551 2523 378 44 BEZEQ-INTERNATIONAL-AS Bezeqint Interne 12389 2043 1891 731 ROSTELECOM-AS, RU 34984 2008 335 500 TELLCOM-AS, TR 9121 1865 1692 19 TTNET, TR 13188 1604 100 43 TRIOLAN, UA 6849 1241 355 21 UKRTELNET, UA 8402 1203 544 14 CORBINA-AS OJSC "Vimpelcom", RU Complete listing at http://thyme.rand.apnic.net/current/data-ASnet-RIPE LACNIC Region per AS prefix count summary ----------------------------------------- ASN No of nets /20 equiv MaxAgg Description 8151 5155 3346 605 Uninet S.A. de C.V., MX 10620 3533 538 320 Telmex Colombia S.A., CO 11830 2656 369 78 Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad 6503 1670 444 64 Axtel, S.A.B. de C.V., MX 7303 1507 1026 188 Telecom Argentina S.A., AR 28573 1039 2248 184 CLARO S.A., BR 3816 1024 508 130 COLOMBIA TELECOMUNICACIONES S.A. ESP, C 6147 931 377 31 Telefonica del Peru S.A.A., PE 11172 922 126 85 Alestra, S. de R.L. de C.V., MX 18881 913 1078 30 TELEFÔNICA BRASIL S.A, BR Complete listing at http://thyme.rand.apnic.net/current/data-ASnet-LACNIC AfriNIC Region per AS prefix count summary ------------------------------------------ ASN No of nets /20 equiv MaxAgg Description 24863 1166 396 48 LINKdotNET-AS, EG 37611 888 107 9 Afrihost, ZA 36903 778 391 137 MT-MPLS, MA 36992 742 1411 40 ETISALAT-MISR, EG 8452 641 1730 18 TE-AS TE-AS, EG 24835 635 818 18 RAYA-AS, EG 37492 473 470 57 ORANGE-, TN 29571 458 68 12 ORANGE-COTE-IVOIRE, CI 37342 386 32 1 MOVITEL, MZ 23889 378 231 15 MauritiusTelecom, MU Complete listing at http://thyme.rand.apnic.net/current/data-ASnet-AFRINIC Global Per AS prefix count summary ---------------------------------- ASN No of nets /20 equiv MaxAgg Description 8151 5155 3346 605 Uninet S.A. de C.V., MX 4538 4692 4192 74 ERX-CERNET-BKB China Education and Rese 12479 4614 1610 122 UNI2-AS, ES 7545 4364 467 460 TPG-INTERNET-AP TPG Telecom Limited, AU 39891 3778 203 20 ALJAWWALSTC-AS, SA 10620 3533 538 320 Telmex Colombia S.A., CO 6327 3433 1324 82 SHAW - Shaw Communications Inc., CA 22773 3272 2968 149 ASN-CXA-ALL-CCI-22773-RDC - Cox Communi 7552 2966 1153 83 VIETEL-AS-AP Viettel Group, VN 4766 2863 11135 765 KIXS-AS-KR Korea Telecom, KR Complete listing at http://thyme.rand.apnic.net/current/data-ASnet Global Per AS Maximum Aggr summary ---------------------------------- ASN No of nets Net Savings Description 4538 4692 4618 ERX-CERNET-BKB China Education and Research Net 12479 4614 4492 UNI2-AS, ES 7545 4364 3904 TPG-INTERNET-AP TPG Telecom Limited, AU 39891 3778 3758 ALJAWWALSTC-AS, SA 6327 3433 3351 SHAW - Shaw Communications Inc., CA 10620 3533 3213 Telmex Colombia S.A., CO 22773 3272 3123 ASN-CXA-ALL-CCI-22773-RDC - Cox Communications 7552 2966 2883 VIETEL-AS-AP Viettel Group, VN 11830 2656 2578 Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad y Telec 45899 2657 2547 VNPT-AS-VN VNPT Corp, VN Complete listing at http://thyme.rand.apnic.net/current/data-CIDRnet List of Unregistered Origin ASNs (Global) ----------------------------------------- Bad AS Designation Network Transit AS Description 230105 UNALLOCATED 38.110.79.0/24 23015 CMC180-TOR-AS - Cambridge Merc 64500 DOCUMENT 45.43.56.0/24 135391 AOFEI-HK AOFEI DATA INTERNATIO 266842 UNALLOCATED 45.238.156.0/22 265680 HNTELCO S.A, HN 65001 PRIVATE 46.237.40.0/21 13118 ASN-YARTELECOM PJSC Rostelecom 4200015017 PRIVATE 47.74.136.0/24 45102 CNNIC-ALIBABA-CN-NET-AP Alibab 4200015017 PRIVATE 47.74.161.0/24 45102 CNNIC-ALIBABA-CN-NET-AP Alibab 4200015017 PRIVATE 47.74.203.0/24 45102 CNNIC-ALIBABA-CN-NET-AP Alibab 4200015017 PRIVATE 47.88.147.0/24 45102 CNNIC-ALIBABA-CN-NET-AP Alibab 64513 PRIVATE 62.150.101.0/24 9155 QNET Kuwait, KW 65537 DOCUMENT 62.162.120.0/24 6821 MT-AS-OWN bul. Orce Nikolov bb Complete listing at http://thyme.rand.apnic.net/current/data-badAS Prefixes from private and non-routed address space (Global) ----------------------------------------------------------- Prefix Origin AS Description 100.66.224.0/19 209 CENTURYLINK-US-LEGACY-QWEST - Qwest Communicati 198.18.1.19/32 7497 CSTNET-AS-AP Computer Network Information Cente Complete listing at http://thyme.rand.apnic.net/current/data-dsua Advertised Unallocated Addresses -------------------------------- Network Origin AS Description 27.100.7.0/24 56096 UNKNOWN 41.76.136.0/22 37500 -Reserved AS-, ZZ 41.76.136.0/24 37500 -Reserved AS-, ZZ 41.76.138.0/24 37500 -Reserved AS-, ZZ 41.76.139.0/24 37500 -Reserved AS-, ZZ 41.76.140.0/22 37500 -Reserved AS-, ZZ 41.78.92.0/22 14988 BTC-GATE1, BW 41.78.180.0/23 37265 -Reserved AS-, ZZ 43.251.20.0/22 9381 WTT-AS-AP WTT HK Limited, HK 43.251.84.0/22 133676 PNPL-AS Precious netcom pvt ltd, IN Complete listing at http://thyme.rand.apnic.net/current/data-add-IANA Number of prefixes announced per prefix length (Global) ------------------------------------------------------- /1:0 /2:0 /3:0 /4:0 /5:0 /6:0 /7:0 /8:14 /9:11 /10:36 /11:99 /12:291 /13:570 /14:1096 /15:1897 /16:13374 /17:7948 /18:13788 /19:25370 /20:39367 /21:45769 /22:87770 /23:71416 /24:396848 /25:803 /26:606 /27:626 /28:35 /29:20 /30:19 /31:4 /32:54 Advertised prefixes smaller than registry allocations ----------------------------------------------------- ASN No of nets Total ann. Description 12479 3355 4614 UNI2-AS, ES 6327 3220 3433 SHAW - Shaw Communications Inc., CA 39891 2946 3778 ALJAWWALSTC-AS, SA 22773 2534 3272 ASN-CXA-ALL-CCI-22773-RDC - Cox Communications 18566 2060 2167 MEGAPATH5-US - MegaPath Corporation, US 11830 2004 2656 Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad y Telec 8551 1985 2523 BEZEQ-INTERNATIONAL-AS Bezeqint Internet Backbo 11492 1963 2541 CABLEONE - CABLE ONE, INC., US 30036 1765 2013 MEDIACOM-ENTERPRISE-BUSINESS - Mediacom Communi 10620 1601 3533 Telmex Colombia S.A., CO Complete listing at http://thyme.rand.apnic.net/current/data-sXXas-nos Number of /24s announced per /8 block (Global) ---------------------------------------------- 1:1613 2:825 4:18 5:2832 6:41 7:1 8:1123 12:1874 13:207 14:1767 15:30 16:3 17:188 18:54 20:50 23:2458 24:2202 25:2 27:2478 31:2033 32:85 35:27 36:508 37:2876 38:1490 39:247 40:122 41:3126 42:692 43:1965 44:121 45:5105 46:3092 47:204 49:1330 50:1054 51:317 52:1071 54:370 55:4 56:12 57:39 58:1619 59:993 60:401 61:2112 62:1867 63:1799 64:5048 65:2201 66:4657 67:2429 68:1166 69:3274 70:1155 71:580 72:2150 74:2713 75:419 76:461 77:1571 78:1700 79:1820 80:1533 81:1389 82:1073 83:787 84:1070 85:2004 86:564 87:1352 88:923 89:2350 90:214 91:6424 92:1253 93:2371 94:2391 95:2924 96:774 97:358 98:935 99:133 100:85 101:1234 102:170 103:18260 104:3590 105:217 106:746 107:1789 108:695 109:3173 110:1630 111:1772 112:1314 113:1293 114:1135 115:1653 116:1638 117:1767 118:2207 119:1669 120:1006 121:1061 122:2474 123:1760 124:1447 125:1920 128:1084 129:666 130:489 131:1643 132:712 133:195 134:1018 135:231 136:504 137:650 138:1925 139:663 140:477 141:735 142:805 143:1012 144:805 145:486 146:1204 147:742 148:1642 149:752 150:741 151:1098 152:816 153:320 154:1457 155:798 156:1182 157:797 158:654 159:1778 160:1266 161:799 162:2587 163:609 164:1063 165:1524 166:458 167:1307 168:3121 169:827 170:3796 171:492 172:1006 173:1991 174:905 175:761 176:2007 177:4025 178:2542 179:1240 180:2174 181:2380 182:2395 183:1239 184:1030 185:13841 186:3568 187:2398 188:2883 189:2012 190:8183 191:1371 192:9801 193:6095 194:4913 195:3976 196:2657 197:1608 198:5562 199:5903 200:7338 201:4971 202:10218 203:10254 204:4575 205:2902 206:3174 207:3199 208:3975 209:3989 210:3887 211:1977 212:3016 213:2810 214:1050 215:57 216:6041 217:2129 218:856 219:584 220:1806 221:994 222:973 223:1359 End of report

1 0

Rising sea levels are going to mess with the internet
by Sean Donelan 27 Jul '18

27 Jul '18

https://www.popsci.com/sea-level-rise-internet-infrastructure Rising sea levels are going to mess with the internet, sooner than you think [...] Despite its magnitude, this network is increasingly vulnerable to sea levels inching their way higher, according to research presented at an academic conference in Montreal this week. The findings estimate that within 15 years, thousands of miles of what should be land-bound cables in the United States will be submerged underwater. “Most of the climate change-related impacts are going to happen very soon,” says Paul Barford, a computer scientist at the University of Wisconsin and lead author of the paper. [...]

33 72

deploying RPKI based Origin Validation
by Job Snijders 26 Jul '18

26 Jul '18

Hi all, I wanted to share with you that a ton of activity is taking place in the Dutch networker community to deploy RPKI based BGP Origin Validation. The mantra is "invalid == reject" on all EBGP sessions. What's of note here is that we're now seeing the first commercial ISPs doing Origin Validation. This is a significant step forward compared to what we observed so far (it seemed OV was mostly limited to academic institutions & toy networks). But six months ago Amsio (https://www.amsio.com/en/) made the jump, and today Fusix deployed (https://fusix.nl/deploying-rpki/) We've also seen an uptake of Origin Validation at Internet Exchange route servers: AMS-IX and FranceIX have already deployed. I've read that RPKI OV is under consideration at a number of other exchanges. Other cool news is that Cloudflare launched a Certificate Transparency initiative to help keep everyone honest. Announcement at: https://twitter.com/grittygrease/status/1017224762542587907 Certificate Transparency is a fascinating tool, really a necessity to build confidence in any PKI systems. Anyone here working to deploy RPKI based Origin Validation in their network and reject invalid announcements? Anything of note to share? Kind regards, Job

12 37

Re: 2nd try: YANG daemeon for Linux
by Karl Jørn 26 Jul '18

26 Jul '18

Anyone ? Found this but i am not sure if this is going to go public or not : https://packetpushers.net/new-network-os-startup-arrcus-targets-whitebox-sw… Danke, Karl On Fri, Jul 20, 2018 at 12:30 PM, Karl Jørn <karljorn787(a)gmail.com> wrote: > Hi > > Is there a YANG daemeon for Linux ? If yes, can any one please share their > experiences ? > > Danke, > Karl >

1 0

Godaddy Contact needed for routing issue
by Erik Sundberg 26 Jul '18

26 Jul '18

Hello, Can someone from GoDaddy's routing team contact me off list. We have customer's unable to reach www.cat5cableguys.com<http://www.cat5cableguys.com> via the Equinix Chicago - Internet Exchange. #traceroute www.cat5cableguy.com Wed Jul 25 16:47:08.266 CDT Type escape sequence to abort. Tracing the route to 184.168.221.11 1 ge-0-0-0-8.ar1.chi1.us.nitelusa.net (207.200.195.173) 22 msec 21 msec 21 msec 2 eqix-ch.godaddy.com (208.115.136.141) 22 msec 22 msec 21 msec 3 * * * 4 * * * 5 * * * This website is reachable over other carrier's just not Equinix Chicago - Internet Exchange. Thanks Erik ________________________________ CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This e-mail transmission, and any documents, files or previous e-mail messages attached to it may contain confidential information that is legally privileged. If you are not the intended recipient, or a person responsible for delivering it to the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that any disclosure, copying, distribution or use of any of the information contained in or attached to this transmission is STRICTLY PROHIBITED. If you have received this transmission in error please notify the sender immediately by replying to this e-mail. You must destroy the original transmission and its attachments without reading or saving in any manner. Thank you.

2 1

Equinix SV8 Peering fabric flooded since 1:45PM PST
by Peter Kranz 25 Jul '18

25 Jul '18

Since around 1:45PM PST today we've been receiving a constant 10Gbps of flooding from the SV8 peering fabric. Traffic is not in the VLAN 6 peering VLAN so I haven't peeked at it. Anyone else seeing this at that exchange? Peter Kranz www.UnwiredLtd.com <http://www.unwiredltd.com/> Desk: 510-868-1614 x100 Mobile: 510-207-0000 pkranz(a)unwiredltd.com <mailto:pkranz@unwiredltd.com>

1 0

Re: using expect to log into devices
by Scott Weeks 25 Jul '18

25 Jul '18

--- valdis.kletnieks(a)vt.edu wrote: From: valdis.kletnieks(a)vt.edu On Sun, 22 Jul 2018 00:43:35 +0200, Niels Bakker said: > Fine as a personal exercise, of course. The inability to download > modules seems sadistic to me, though. And given the adage "Never create a rule you can't enforce", I wonder how they enforce it - have to be pretty hardcore to make sure that stuff doesn't get imported via USB or tethering off a cellphone. (Or more correctly, I know how they do those sort of things if you're a spook agency or doing classified research - how do you make it palatable to employees in corporate sites?) ------------------------------------------------- It's not corporate and believe me, they enforce it... ;-) scott

3 2

Finally some common sense - No to blocking DNS
by Jacques Latour 25 Jul '18

25 Jul '18

This is good news for the internet up here! It's unconstitutional to block DNS access!!! JF must be happy :) https://www.theglobeandmail.com/canada/article-court-rejects-quebecs-bid-to… Court rejects Quebec's bid to ban citizens' access to private online gaming sites THE CANADIAN PRESS PUBLISHED JULY 24, 2018UPDATED 18 HOURS AGO Quebec's attempt to ban its citizens' access to online gaming websites unauthorized by the state-run gambling corporation is unconstitutional because it infringes upon federal jurisdiction, indicated a recent Superior Court ruling.......

2 1

AS205869, AS57166: Featured Hijacker of the Month, July, 2018
by Ronald F. Guilmette 25 Jul '18

25 Jul '18

Before I get into talking about this month's honorary Hijacker of the Month, I really must start by thanking everyone who pitched in and helped to insure an appropriate response and outcome for the BitCanal case, which I reported here last month. You all know who you are, and I won't explicitly name you here, only because most of you have expressed to me privately that you would prefer it if I didn't. But you folks deserve the lion's share of the credit, and I, in contrast, played only the most minor supporting role. I must also say that I was astonished and very pleasantly surprised by the very effective and, to-date, very nearly 100% effective response to my call to action with respect to Bitcanal. This thief, Joao Silveira, aka Mr. Bitcanal, and his business are still limping along, and, I'm sure, trying desperately to get back online after everybody with half a brain became convinced of what he has been up to for lo these past several years. He's apparently managed to at least get his main web site (www.bitcanal.com) back online, but now he's totally dependent on GoDaddy hosting for that. :-) I guess that he doesn't have a whole lot of IP space to call his own anymore, or any least not very much of it that he can actually get anyone to route for him. I should also offer my apologies for the rather deliberately rude way that I got right up into the faces of Cogent, GTT, and Level3, right here on the NANOG list, with regards to BitCanal. I see now that that was really rather completely unfair and uncalled for. All three took swift and appropriate action once they became fully aware of the issue/problem, and I am grateful to all of them for their prompt action, and also, of course, I am equally grateful also to the many other providers and IXes who also took appropriate action in this case. Following my posting last month about BitCanal, at least one person rightly took me to task for the rude way I approached the problem, and even moreso for the fact that I escalated the problem to this list as my first response to the whole issue. With 20/20 hindsight, I can now only agree with those criticisms. I shouldn't have done that. I am pleased with the final result, i.e. Bitcanal being kicked from essentially the whole Internet, but the ends do not justify the rather hamfisted means I elected to employ. I will try to do better in future. With that in mind, when I recently found another such operation... another entity performing an entire set of obviously very deliberate hijacks, evidently for the purpose of leasing the hijacked space to snowshoe spammers... I took what I had learned from the BitCanal case and applied it. In particular, rather than me having a very public tantrum and getting on the cases of each and every company that bgp.he.net said might be connected to the hijacker somehow, I instead began by running traceroutes to all of the relevant hijacked blocks. (If I would have had the good sense to have done this in the BitCanal case, I most probably would have begun by just hasseling Cogent alone, and privately, off list, since from where I sit, all of the traceroutes to all the blocks that Bitcvanal stole had Cogent as the next-to-last hop. YMMV) Anyway, in this new case I found that the next-to-last hop for all of the relevant traceroutes was a set of routers belonging to Telecom Italia. Rather than calling them out here, this time I had the good sense to just message TelecomItalia directly about the issue. it took me a couple of tries, but I was eventually able to find a proper contact address for a proper sort of person to discuss this matter with @ Telecom Italia. The two links below are (1) my message to them and (2) their very nice and proactive response back to me: Me -> Telecom Italia https://pastebin.com/raw/Ek3mxKCR Telecom Italia -> Me https://pastebin.com/raw/mtcA4Ehy Given that I sent my message to them well after business hours on Friday, I consider their response, sent on Monday, to be super-fast and very responsive. Of course, I am absolutely ecstatic also that they have elected to stop all routing to the particular bunch of of badness that I explicitly called out to them, at least for the time being. As you can all see, my message to TelecomItalia describes the issue/problem with AS205869 - Universal IP Solution Corp. in some considerable detail. In a nutshell, these guys are criminals and they've been reselling the IPv4 space they've hijacked, specifically but perhaps not only to snowshoe spammers. (Specific evidence available upon request.) Of course, one can easily imagine even vastly worse uses that may be made of stolen IP space. By the time that I personally became aware of what these specific jerks were up to, they had already used, abused, and tossed aside several other IPv4 blocks -and- also a number of other previously abandoned ASNs. (They have been absconding with -both- abandoned IPv4 address blocks -and- also a number of previously abandoned ASNs... as well as one that was/is in active use by its legitimate owner. And they have bee doing so without any apparent restraint watever.) The evidence of all this is crystal clear from a quick review of all of the relevant RIPE records. They left their bloody fingerprints all over this mess. Anyway, by the time I noticed them. late last week, the set of routes and ASNs that this particular set of crooks were still fradulently using were as follows: ASN Route ---------------------- 10510 216.238.64.0/18 10737 207.183.96.0/20 10800 192.110.32.0/19 19529 104.143.112.0/20 19529 198.14.0.0/20 19529 198.32.208.0/20 19529 206.41.128.0/20 30237 192.73.128.0/20 30237 192.73.144.0/20 30237 192.73.160.0/20 30237 192.73.176.0/20 (The above list was present also in my private message to TelecomItalia. See link above.) I suspect that perhaps the fact that the final four routes in the list above are for IPv4 space which is formally registered to the United States Air Force may possibly have contributed somewhat to TelecomItalia's apparent readiness and willingness to take swift and decisive action in this case. (It's not every day that you see USAF IP space being routed by mysterious Ukranian networks. :-) In any case, as I've noted above, I am greatly pleased that TelecomItalia took the action it did, regardless of what factors may have entered into their decision. At this point in my presentation, anyone who might have been expecting another "call to arms", like my posting here last month, will be disappointed. I'd greatly appreciate it if readers of this post would help me to to confirm that the non-routing of the above block is both universal and complete... as it is, at least, from where I am sitting... but at this point I have nothing and nobody to rail against. (Or so I thought! But while writing this post I found some new and apparently associated curiosities relating to a different ASN, AS57166. Read on!) So, anyway with regards to AS205869... case closed? Is it Miller time? Well, yes and no. There's still the question of just who or what the devil is this thing called Universal IP Solution Corp. (which also, apparently, goes by the name of "ADMASTER-MNT" within RIPE WHOIS records). And then there is the question of what there is to prevent these hijackers from just coming back tomorrow under a different guise or corporate identity and starting the game all over again. Even more worrying is the distinct possibility that they may not even find it necessary to change out their current corporate identity before getting back into the game. They could just keep their current name... as BitCanal did... and try to reroute their connectivity via one of their other existing peers. The (ostensible) list of those is shown here: https://bgp.he.net/AS205869#_peers These crooks may have already anticipated the small setback of losing their TelecomItalia connection, and as you can see, they already have nine listed IPv4 peers, although at least four of these are provably ones that they themselves have been masquerading as, specifically: AS11717 Solarus AS7827 American Business Information AS11324 BRFHH Shreveport, LLC AS32226 Menard, Inc. The above ASNs have all been hijacked by the folks using the handle ADMASTER-MNT. The RIPE WHOIS records essentially prove that. (Menard, Inc., by the way, is a chain of retail home improvement stores, comparable to HomeDepot, located in the U.S. MidWest region. Hardly the kind of place you'd expect to be peering with mysterious Ukranian company, -or- to be indirectly routing space... 216.238.64.0/18... for a long-dead Pennsylvania ISP such as Razor, Inc. The case of BRFHH Shreveport, LLC is arguably more worrying than any of the rest of this, because in that case the hijackers apparently didn't even care that the ASN in question was still in active use by its rightful owners, uhsystem.com, which appears to be a University-based hospital in Louisiana. HIPPA horrors easily imaginable!) Anyway, eliminating the ASNs above, we are still left with multiple possible "Plan Bs" for this hijacking operation: AS6762 Telecom Italia <============== plug already pulled AS8359 MTS PJSC (Russia) AS1299 Telia Company AB (Sweden) AS35320 Eurotranstelecom Ltd. (Ukraine) AS57166 D2 International Investment Ukraine Ltd. Now that Telecom Italia has pulled the plug, I'll be emailing to the other peers listed above, and asking them to do likewise. We'll just have to wait and see what they do. But there is one ASN from the above list that I quite definitely -won't- be sending any emails to, and that's the last one, D2 International Investment Ukraine Ltd. AS57166, D2 International Investment Ukraine Ltd. was a name already known to me. It came up previously, right here on this mailing list, in the context of a discussion I had started here on October 5th, 2016 relating to a previous set of hijacks that I had reported here: https://mailman.nanog.org/pipermail/nanog/2016-October/088487.html This thing, whetever it is, has/had a peering relationship, both then and now, with AS29632 Netassist Limited, which is headquartered in... ummm... Ukraine. No. Wait. Make that Gibraltar. Anyway, we'll come back to that a bit latter on. Back in the day, D2 International Investment Ukraine Ltd. was using two different ASNs, i.e. AS43659 and AS57166. As of now, it doesn't seem to be using the former for much of anything: https://bgp.he.net/AS43659 AS57166 is a rather different story however. The listing of IPv4 peers shown currently at bgp.he.net (https://bgp.he.net/AS57166#_peers) shows the following as current peers of AS57166: AS205869 Universal IP Solution Corp. AS29632 Netassist Limited AS11695 TheStreet.Com AS8011 CoreComm Internet Services Inc The first two are (or were) headquartered in Ukraine, so other than the fact that Universal IP Solution Corp. is hip deep in IP address space thievery, those two are unremarkable as peers for D2 International Investment Ukraine Ltd. which is also allegedly located in Ukraine. That third one should come as a bit of a shock to anyone who has ever had the privlege (or misfortune, depending on your point of view) of watching "Mr. Booyah" Jim Cramer attempts to make the muundane world of stock trading entertaining for the masses. TheStreet.com is a highly popular web destination belonging to a company of the same name which was founded by the same said Mr. Jim Cramer. From Wikipedia: TheStreet, Inc. is an American financial news and services website founded by Jim Cramer and Martin Peretz. How does a company like this get mixed up with a bunch of Ukranians of dubious repute?? Well, quite simply they don't. The ASN has been hijacked by AS57166 -- D2 International Investment Ukraine Ltd. As we speak, D2 International Investment Ukraine Ltd. is using this hijacked ASN, AS11695 -- TheStreet.Com for an ongoing set of hijacks, mostly of abandoned legacy IPv4 space belonging to various defunct U.S. companies, but with one Canadian block (69.171.160.0/19) and one Mongolian block (192.82.64.0/19) mixed in just to give this portfolio of hijacks a bit of an international flavor, I suppose. The list of blocks currently announced by AS11695, according to stat.ripe.net, is as follows: 24.137.0.0/20 24.137.0.0/19 24.137.16.0/20 24.236.0.0/19 52.128.192.0/19 66.219.64.0/19 68.232.96.0/20 69.171.160.0/19 70.34.192.0/20 70.34.192.0/19 70.34.208.0/20 98.143.176.0/20 163.123.192.0/20 163.123.192.0/18 163.123.208.0/20 163.123.224.0/20 163.123.240.0/20 192.82.64.0/19 192.254.32.0/19 198.40.192.0/19 204.195.192.0/18 206.15.32.0/19 206.54.128.0/20 206.125.0.0/19 206.127.224.0/19 206.190.160.0/19 206.222.128.0/19 206.246.32.0/19 207.183.64.0/19 209.182.0.0/20 209.182.0.0/18 209.182.16.0/20 209.182.32.0/20 209.182.48.0/20 This is quite an impressive list, even if it does fall a bit short of the recent and slightly more prodigious escapades of Bitcanal. I've run a few traceroutes on a few of the above routes and I've found them to have next-to-last hops within the same batch of Telcom Italia routers as were being used by the batch of hijacks that were easily tracable back to AS205869 - Universal IP Solution Corp. Not a real huge surprise there. AS205869 is peering with AS57166 and vise versa. They are both quite obviously working together on this grand hijacking scheme. Of course, I will shortly be initiating another friendly and, I hope, equally productive chat with my new friend @ Telecom Italia regarding these additional blatant and obvious hijacks. I have so far neglected to mention the forth and final peer of AS57166, i.e. AS8011 -- CoreComm Internet Services Inc. Based on my reading of he relevant RIPE records, this ASN appears to have been registered with RIPE on or about 2017-01-12 by whoever was in control of the RIPE handle "DATASTAR-MNT" as of that date. It appears to me that, with a few exceptions, such as the RIPE WHOIS record for this ASN, pretty much everything else that has been created and installed into the RIPE WHOIS data base by "DATASTAR-MNT" is fundamentally fradulent. Here is the full list of such stuff: https://pastebin.com/raw/DQbWe0gq By extension from this premise, I think that it may be reasonably assumed that any routes currently being announced by AS8011 are most likely also hijacks. As of now, this seems to be limited to only one single route: 216.127.0.0/19. This IPv4 block would seem to have been yet another abandoned IPv4 block that was just left lying around, and which has now been very effectively repurposed in service of the hijackers' preferred ends. Finally, as some may have noted, there is one rather glaring hole in the story it has been presented above, specifically, the true and verifiable identities of the hijackers, which remain cloaked in mystery. D2 International Investment Ukraine Ltd. historically used the domain name etthua.net as part of its contact email address, but that domain currently has no DNS, and data from archives suggests that it may have never had a functioning web site. RIPE NCC undoubtedly has the name of some specific individual to go along with this corporate front name, but even before the advent of the travesty that is GDPR, they almost certainly would refuse to divulge that to any party, based on their traditional strict contractual code of omerta. A page on virustotal seems to suggest a connection of some sort between D2 International Investment Ukraine Ltd. and the now notorious coinhive scam, but it is not at all clear how this connection was derived or even whether there actually is any real connection at all: https://www.virustotal.com/#/ip-address/94.130.90.152 Googling now, I see that I myself called out this crooked enterprise on a RIPE mailing list back on 2016-10-08. (I didn't really remember doing that, as it has been nearly 2 years ago now.) https://www.ripe.net/participate/mail/forum/anti-abuse-wg/PDMxNjk3LjE0NzU5N… I also have no specific recollection of this follow-up post by a rather outspoked fellow who goes by the name of Marilson, and who has frequently appeared to drink even substantially more coffee than I do: https://lists.ripe.net/pipermail/anti-abuse-wg/2016-October/003726.html I myself have no direct knowledge of the "Samuel Joel Nirushan" that Marilson spoke of, or about any of Mr. Marilson's specific allegations against him (including that this Mr. Nirushan is even connected in any way to D2 International Investment Ukraine Ltd.) but I did find that if one simply googles for "Samuel Joel Nirushan" or alternatively, for "D2 International Investments" (note: plural, rather than singular) one quickly comes upon a plethora of public postings made by -somebody- who was apparently quite angry at this guy, many most or all of which seem to date from October, 2011, and all of which contain many of the same unsubstantiated allegations of fradulent activities. As these allegations are not accompanied by any relevant documentation, then must be judged to only be worth even less that the electrons they were written on. Arguably more relevant is this archived RIPE WHOIS record that I found online and which appears to show that D2 International Investment Ukraine Ltd. was formerly granted a sub-allocation of IPv4 space which, at that time, and also currently, is registered to NetAssist, Ltd (Ukraine): https://pastebin.com/raw/95LRyvwv This, taken together with the fact that NetAssist, Ltd (AS57166) is currently peering with AS57166 - D2 International Investment Ukraine Ltd., ertainly suggest a strong business relationship between the Netassist and D2, whatever the hell it is. Returning briefly to the other obviously crooked actor in this drama, i.e. AS205869 - Universal IP Solution Corp., it is worth mentioning that this company, like D2 International Investment, also has a domain that is used as part of its contact email address, universalipsolution.bz (BZ -- Belize??) but this domain also, like etthua.net for D2, does not currently have any web site, and based on my reading of historical passive DNS data, it appears that it may have -never- have had one. Nontheless, both D2 International Investments and Universal IP Solution are both members in good standing of RIPE: https://www.ripe.net/membership/indices/data/ua.d2investukraine.html https://www.ripe.net/membership/indices/data/bz.universal.html So, you know, one wonders how these two crooked companies that are clearly colluding together to hijack lots and lots of IP space are then able to somehow turn around and make a profit by selling off bits and pieces of what they have stolen when neither of them even have any web site via which they could entice eager buyers of their stolen property. This is an enigma, but I have a theory that seems at least possible. RIPE provides many useful services to its members, but there is one in particular that I personally have become acquainted with only quite recently. RIPE NCC apparently maintains a list of what they call "Recognised IPv4 Transfer Brokers": https://www.ripe.net/manage-ips-and-asns/resource-transfers-and-mergers/bro… As noted on the above page "there are no costs involved" in being admitted to this prestigious and exclusive club, "...however, you will need to agree to adhere to the relevant RIPE Policies and RIPE NCC procedural documents..." >From these public statements of the RIPE web site I infer that as long as one can fog a mirror, and as long as one is willing and able to raise one's right hand and swear on some sort of religious text, one can be and will be admitted into this special club of "recognised" IP brokers. One company listed on the above page that caught my eye is NetAssist LLC, formerly of Ukraine, but more recently re-incorporated in the jurisdiction of Gibraltar. (Why the company elected to up and change jurisdictions is not immediately obvious.) Whereas neither Universal IP Solution Corp. nor their apparent partners in crime, D2 International Investment Ukraine Ltd. have any web sites, and whereas they both thus have no apparent means of easily reselling/ offloading/fencing any or all of the IP space that the two of them together have stolen, it appears that D2's friend and peer, NetAssist LLC, is already well positioned to barter blocks of IPv4 space that may have unexpectedly gone walkabout. This is not to say that they have done so. I have no direct evidence of that. I just personally find NetAssist's formal registration, with RIPE, as an "recognized" IP broker to be a possibly relevant detail, and one that may perhaps be exceptionally convenient, under the curcumstances. Plesse note that Bitcanal, using its full, formal, and legal name of Ebonyhorizon Telecomunicacoes Lda., is also still a member in good standing of not only RIPE, but also of RIPE's cadre of "Recognised IPv4 Transfer Brokers". (See link above.) To reiterate, I have posted all of this information here on the NANOG list, not as a call to action... I'll be trying myself to contact any and all relevant providers and encouraging them to take appropriate action... but rather just because I felt that people here on this list might want to at least be aware of all of these convoluted shenanigans and schemes. Certainly, I encourage everyone reading this to be extra vigilant, in future, and especially if you are approached in the near future by any Ukrainian (or Gibraltarian) networks requesting peering. Regards, rfg P.S. It is left as an exercise for the reader as to why these sorts of large scale hijacking schemes always seem to originate somewhere within the RIPE geographical region and never elsewhere.

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Definition/Classification of Bogon
by Aftab Siddiqui 25 Jul '18

25 Jul '18

Hi Everyone, Just wanted to understand something about Bogons. As per RFC3871 - A "Bogon" (plural: "bogons") is a packet with an IP source address in an address block not yet allocated by IANA or the Regional Internet Registries (ARIN, RIPE, APNIC...) as well as all addresses reserved for private or special use by RFCs. See [RFC3330] and [RFC1918]. Q - Generally, Private or Reserved ASNs are considered as Bogon ASN but what about unallocated ASNs? Q - Is there any RFC (or even draft) which classify unallocated ASNs as Bogon as well? Additionally, Geoff Huston [1] explained all the possible classifications of "Bogon" in his blog post back in 2004 --> "Sometimes a bogon is just a case of keystroke error by a network operator, and the consequent bogons are entirely inadvertent, and other times it may be a disagreement between an end user and a registration authority" Q - In the above scenario when an RIR deregister a resource (IPv4/v6 or ASN) due to any disagreement (sometimes deregistration happens because of non-payment and can be resolved in a few days/weeks). How long should a service provider wait to mark them as bogon and stop advertising or accepting it? [1] - http://www.potaroo.net/ispcol/2004-04/2004-04-isp.htm

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