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PGP key signing at NANOG 29 in Chicago [REVISED]
by Joe Abley 10 Oct '03

10 Oct '03

[the original mail I sent had the wrong date in the third paragraph; this one has the right date. sorry about the confusion.] There will be a brief introduction to PGP key signing presented in the General Session at 11:15 a.m. on Monday, entitled "Building a Web of Trust". New for NANOG 29: you will find stickers available at the checkin desk which which you can stick on your name tag. The red dot means "I sign keys"; the idea is to make it easier to identify people for whom PGP key signing is interesting when you meet them outside the signing party. Key Signing Party We will be holding a PGP Key signing party at the NANOG 29 meeting in Chicago. We have been scheduled to meet on Monday 20 October, after the ISP Security and NSP-SEC BOF, at around 9pm in Salon F. If the BOF runs on, we will delay a little. The procedure we will use at the key signing party is as follows: 1. People who wish to participate should email an ASCII extract of their PGP public key to <jabley(a)isc.org> by noon on Monday 20 October 2003. Please include a subject line of "NANOG PGP KEY", and please avoid MIME-encrypting your e-mail if possible. The method of generating the ASCII extract under Unix is: pgp -kxa my_email_address mykey.asc (pgp 2.6.2) pgpk -xa my_email_address > mykey.asc (pgp 5.x) gpg --export -a my_email_address > mykey.asc (gpg) If you're using Windows or Macintosh, hopefully it will be Intuitively Obvious (tm) using the GUI interface how to generate an ASCII armored key that begins: -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- 2. After 6pm on Monday, you will be able to fetch a complete key ring with all of the keys that were submitted from <http://www.isc.org/misc/nanog29.pgp> (an ASCII copy will also be available from <http://www.isc.org/misc/nanog29.txt>). 3. At 9pm, come prepared with the PGP Key fingerprint of your PGP public key; we will have handouts with all of the key fingerprints of the keys that people have mailed in. 4. In turn, readers at the front of the room will recite people's keys; as your key fingerprint is read, stand up, and at the end of reading of your PGP key fingerprint, acknowledge that the fingerprint as read was correct. 5. While everybody is in the room together, it's a good chance to verify the identities of people whose key fingerprints you have checked, if you don't already know them personally. You might want to bring photo id with you (drivers licence, passport, etc) to make it easier for other people to confirm your identity. 6. Later that day, or perhaps when you get home, you can sign the keys corresponding to the fingerprints which you were able to verify on the handout; note that it is advisable that you only sign keys of people when you have personal knowledge that the person who stood up during the reading of his/her fingerprint really is the person which he/she claimed to be. 7. Submit the keys you have signed to the PGP keyservers. A good one to use is the one at MIT: simply send mail containing the ascii armored version of your PGP public key to pgp(a)pgp.mit.edu. Note that you don't have to have a laptop with you; if you don't have any locally trusted computing resources during the key signing party, you can make notes on the handout, and then take the handout home and sign the keys later.

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Re: PGP key signing at NANOG 29 in Chicago
by Joe Abley 10 Oct '03

10 Oct '03

On 10 Oct 2003, at 13:30, Valdis.Kletnieks(a)vt.edu wrote: > On Fri, 10 Oct 2003 13:20:16 EDT, you said: > >> Chicago. We have been scheduled to meet on Monday, June 2, after the >> ISP Security and NSP-SEC BOF, at around 9pm in Salon F. If the BOF >> runs > > date/time/location check??? Arrgh. Monday 20 October, is what I meant. June 2 was the last one :) I will send another one. Apologies for the idiocy.

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PGP key signing at NANOG 29 in Chicago
by Joe Abley 10 Oct '03

10 Oct '03

There will be a brief introduction to PGP key signing presented in the General Session at 11:15 a.m. on Monday, entitled "Building a Web of Trust". New for NANOG 29: you will find stickers available at the checkin desk which which you can stick on your name tag. The red dot means "I sign keys"; the idea is to make it easier to identify people for whom PGP key signing is interesting when you meet them outside the signing party. Key Signing Party We will be holding a PGP Key signing party at the NANOG 29 meeting in Chicago. We have been scheduled to meet on Monday, June 2, after the ISP Security and NSP-SEC BOF, at around 9pm in Salon F. If the BOF runs on, we will delay a little. The procedure we will use at the key signing party is as follows: 1. People who wish to participate should email an ASCII extract of their PGP public key to <jabley(a)isc.org> by noon on Monday 20 October 2003. Please include a subject line of "NANOG PGP KEY", and please avoid MIME-encrypting your e-mail if possible. The method of generating the ASCII extract under Unix is: pgp -kxa my_email_address mykey.asc (pgp 2.6.2) pgpk -xa my_email_address > mykey.asc (pgp 5.x) gpg --export -a my_email_address > mykey.asc (gpg) If you're using Windows or Macintosh, hopefully it will be Intuitively Obvious (tm) using the GUI interface how to generate an ASCII armored key that begins: -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- 2. After 6pm on Monday, you will be able to fetch a complete key ring with all of the keys that were submitted from <http://www.isc.org/misc/nanog29.pgp> (an ASCII copy will also be available from <http://www.isc.org/misc/nanog29.txt>). 3. At 9pm, come prepared with the PGP Key fingerprint of your PGP public key; we will have handouts with all of the key fingerprints of the keys that people have mailed in. 4. In turn, readers at the front of the room will recite people's keys; as your key fingerprint is read, stand up, and at the end of reading of your PGP key fingerprint, acknowledge that the fingerprint as read was correct. 5. While everybody is in the room together, it's a good chance to verify the identities of people whose key fingerprints you have checked, if you don't already know them personally. You might want to bring photo id with you (drivers licence, passport, etc) to make it easier for other people to confirm your identity. 6. Later that day, or perhaps when you get home, you can sign the keys corresponding to the fingerprints which you were able to verify on the handout; note that it is advisable that you only sign keys of people when you have personal knowledge that the person who stood up during the reading of his/her fingerprint really is the person which he/she claimed to be. 7. Submit the keys you have signed to the PGP keyservers. A good one to use is the one at MIT: simply send mail containing the ascii armored version of your PGP public key to pgp(a)pgp.mit.edu. Note that you don't have to have a laptop with you; if you don't have any locally trusted computing resources during the key signing party, you can make notes on the handout, and then take the handout home and sign the keys later.

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RE: contact at yahoo mail? (they think we're an open relay :< )
by Mark Jeftovic 10 Oct '03

10 Oct '03

Its a very confusing page to read, we are listed as 127.0.0.2 and that is NERD-CA. The other entries like: ARIXDICTSTALE Sender has a history of dictionary spamming: stale.dict.rbl.arix.com -> 127.0.0.1 I think indicate what that RBL is for and what the value indicates, we are NOT in there: host smtp.easydns.comstale.dict.rbl.arix.com and the txt record looks like a wildcard for all of the lists. In fact, several of the people who emailed me off list saying "you're in no-more-funn" were ALSO listed in "no-more-funn" in the same manner. So that, combined with the number of "same here" posts wrt yahoo lead me to believe that that's not the reason. -mark On Thu, 9 Oct 2003, Thor Larholm wrote: > If you would read the page through, you would see that you are listed > MULTIPLE places. > > No-more-funn.moensted.dk > ARIXDICTSTALE > NERD-CA > NERD-ZZ > > Only the last two are country specific > > /thor > > -----Original Message----- > From: Mark Jeftovic [mailto:markjr@easydns.com] > Sent: Thursday, October 09, 2003 2:30 PM > To: Thor Larholm > Cc: nanog(a)merit.org > Subject: RE: contact at yahoo mail? (they think we're an open relay :< ) > > > > We are listed in no-more-funn.moensted.dk as 127.0.0.2 which > is described as: > > + NERD-CA ip-space assigned to Canada: ca.countries.nerd.dk -> 127.0.0.2 > 216.220.40/24 is in ca, rejected based on geographical location > about: Please see our webpage for more information > about: This zone lists ONLY based on geographic information > about: The zone does NOT contain known spammers, nor open relays > > We do cop to being Canadian, but that's about it. I hope yahoo isn't > keying on this RBL. > > -mark > > ...and we've already filled out the retest form at Yahoo. > > On Thu, 9 Oct 2003, Thor Larholm wrote: > > > If you read through all of that page, you will notice that Yahoo > > itself has a re-test script you can use to trigger a verification. > > > > http://add.yahoo.com/fast/help/us/mail/cgi_retest > > > > Yahoo is not your only problem, if you look at > > http://moensted.dk/spam/?addr=216.220.40.247 you will notice that > > several DNSBL lists that IP address. No-more-fun believes it to be a > > "Direct spam source" and ArixDictStale says it has performed active > > dictionary attacks within the last 3 months. > > > > If you want to positively check whether you are an open relay, I would > > > recommend testing through ORDB at http://ordb.org/submit/ > > > > > > Regards > > Thor Larholm > > PivX Solutions, LLC - Senior Security Researcher > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: Mark Jeftovic [mailto:markjr@easydns.com] > > Sent: Thursday, October 09, 2003 1:23 PM > > To: nanog(a)merit.org > > Subject: contact at yahoo mail? (they think we're an open relay :< ) > > > > > > > > > > Today our email forwarders started getting this from yahoo.com mail > > handlers: > > > > 553 Mail from 216.220.40.247 not allowed - VS99-IP1 deferred - see > > help.yahoo.com/help/us/mail/defer/defer-02.html (#5.7.1) Connection > > closed by foreign host. > > > > Which when you go look at that page basically tells you you're > > probably an open relay (which we're not), etc. > > > > Can any mail admins at Yahoo contact me offlist, or post what the > > restrictions are or at what levels this will kick in? > > > > -mark > > > > > > -- Mark Jeftovic <markjr(a)easydns.com> Co-founder, easyDNS Technologies Inc. ph. +1-(416)-535-8672 ext 225 fx. +1-(416)-535-0237

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Sitefinder and DDoS
by Howard C. Berkowitz 10 Oct '03

10 Oct '03

Let's assume for a moment that Verisign's wildcards and Sitefinder go back into operation. Let's also assume someone sets up a popular webpage with malware HTML causing it, perhaps with a time delay, to issue rapid GETs to deliberately nonexistent domains. What would be the effect on overall Internet traffic patterns if there were one Sitefinder site? (flashback to ARPANET node announcing it had zero cost to any route) How many Sitefinder nodes would we need to avoid massive single-point congestion? AFAIK, the issues of distribution of Sitefinder, and even a formal content distribution network, were not discussed. I asked some general questions that touched on this at the ICANN ISSC committee meeting, but I think they were interpreted as directed toward the reliability of the Sitefinder service in operation, rather than potential vulnerabilities it might create. I am NOT suggesting this simply as an argument against Sitefinder, and I'd like to see engineering analysis of how this vulnerability could be prevented.

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Fw: New mail blocks result of Ralsky's latest attacks?
by Brian Bruns 10 Oct '03

10 Oct '03

MessageThis is something I sent to someone offlist. I've strpped out his name, etc. -------------------------- Brian Bruns The Summit Open Source Development Group Open Solutions For A Closed World / Anti-Spam Resources http://www.2mbit.com ICQ: 8077511 ----- Original Message ----- From: Brian Bruns To: XXXXX Cc: admins(a)2mbit.com Sent: Friday, October 10, 2003 11:35 AM Subject: Re: New mail blocks result of Ralsky's latest attacks? Hey XXX, There are a few ways to lock down an Exchange server. Luckily, I used to be an Exchange admin two years ago, so let me quickly dig up my notebook... Ok, first, make sure on your exchange server you have Guest disabled. According to reports, the following usernames are being tested and cracked: abc, web, admin, www, administrator, data, server, backup, master, test, root, webmaster. Basically, if you have any of these accounts active, please make sure they have a strong password on them. Please be careful though when changing them - you'll have to make sure that all services which depend on the account also are updated with the new password. Second, if you don't use SMTP auth, simply disable it. Open the SMTP virtual server properties under Exchange Server Manager, select the Access tab, click Relay in the Relay restrictions group. Clear the check off of "Allow all computers which successfully authenticate, regardless of the list above" You should be in good shape then. On a side note (and I do recommend this to my customers), if you want added security, yeah, you are going to want to use a UNIX/Linux box in front of the exchange server and then relay mail to it. That way, you are less likely to fall victim to Exchange exploits as well. Its not too hard to setup, but takes time. -------------------------- Brian Bruns The Summit Open Source Development Group Open Solutions For A Closed World / Anti-Spam Resources http://www.2mbit.com ICQ: 8077511

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Hotmail Problems
by Michael Heitland 10 Oct '03

10 Oct '03

Has anyone seen issues with hotmail receiving emails several days after they are sent. We are not getting bounces, just long delays in what appears to be hotmails posting to inboxes. Some customers have waited 2 days to see an email reach their inbox. We have tested this from not only our domain but yahoo's webmail service as well. -- Regards, ------------------------------------------- Michael D. Heitland | Systems Engineer ------------------------------------------- noc-manager at 702com dot net

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Re: Wired mag article on spammers playing traceroute games with trojaned boxes
by Dr. Jeffrey Race 10 Oct '03

10 Oct '03

On Thu, 9 Oct 2003 12:55:36 -0400 (EDT), jlewis(a)lewis.org wrote: >Trouble is, how do you stop this? You use the same principles that are successfully applied every in society (except the Internet) to prevent the negligent from injuring the public. <http://www.camblab.com/misc/univ_std.txt> and (if you have a moment for some chuckles as well as some deep insights into what ails our favorite organism) <http://www.camblab.com/nugget/spam_03.pdf> (Brief extract: "One needs only to enforce existing contracts and management charters (e.g. ICANN's) and to apply the basic principles of civilization to the Internet. No one would fly an airline run like today's Internet. Why should we tolerate such misoperation of an ever more critical resource in modern life? Spam is not inevitable. It is the predictable consequence of management decisions to use the Environmental Polluter business model . . . .) It's not a technical problem and there are NO technical solutions. The only one that works is what is used in every other type of human activity. Jeffrey Race

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Block all servers?
by Michael.Dillon＠radianz.com 10 Oct '03

10 Oct '03

>I think it's more complicated than "prevent residential users from >hosting servers". You're right. As soon as we begin talking about what all ISPs should do, we are out of the realm of technical solutions and into the realm of psychology and politics. After all, we first have to convince all ISPs that something should be done and we have to demonstrate that there is a way to present the action to customers so that the customers will accept it. Customers generally don't like ISPs to tell them "you can't do this" unless there is a very well reasoned argument attached. I suggest that people should start thinking about ways to incorporate security services into their broadband access products and allow customers the choice of paying for the security services monthly to the ISP or paying up front one time by buying a broadband router. NANOG could help by collecting together some of the technical information about the various broadband routers so that ISPs have an exhaustive and definitive source to refer to. --Michael Dillon P.S. I have always used a router on my Internet connection even when it was only a dialup connection. Back then it was a FreeBSD box running TIS firewalls toolkit. Today it's a Speedstream 510 DSL router.

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The Cidr Report
by cidr-report＠potaroo.net 10 Oct '03

10 Oct '03

This report has been generated at Fri Oct 10 21:48:24 2003 AEST. The report analyses the BGP Routing Table of an AS4637 (Reach) router and generates a report on aggregation potential within the table. Check http://www.cidr-report.org/as4637 for a current version of this report. Recent Table History Date Prefixes CIDR Agg 03-10-03 125747 89436 04-10-03 126580 89388 05-10-03 126497 89489 06-10-03 126591 89487 07-10-03 126458 89568 08-10-03 126764 89635 09-10-03 126859 89610 10-10-03 126906 89738 AS Summary 15899 Number of ASes in routing system 6299 Number of ASes announcing only one prefix 1432 Largest number of prefixes announced by an AS AS701 : ALTERNET-AS UUNET Technologies, Inc. 73481472 Largest address span announced by an AS (/32s) AS568 : SUMNET-AS DISO-UNRRA Aggregation Summary The algorithm used in this report proposes aggregation only when there is a precise match using the AS path, so as to preserve traffic transit policies. Aggregation is also proposed across non-advertised address space ('holes'). --- 10Oct03 --- ASnum NetsNow NetsAggr NetGain % Gain Description Table 127024 89708 37316 29.4% All ASes AS6198 1214 369 845 69.6% BATI-MIA BellSouth Network Solutions, Inc AS6197 987 277 710 71.9% BATI-ATL BellSouth Network Solutions, Inc AS4323 677 196 481 71.0% TW-COMM Time Warner Communications, Inc. AS701 1432 997 435 30.4% ALTERNET-AS UUNET Technologies, Inc. AS7018 1394 977 417 29.9% ATT-INTERNET4 AT&T WorldNet Services AS7843 532 142 390 73.3% ADELPHIA-AS Adelphia Corp. AS3908 934 554 380 40.7% SUPERNETASBLK SuperNet, Inc. AS22909 299 15 284 95.0% DNEO-OSP1 Comcast Cable Communications, Inc. AS1221 977 694 283 29.0% ASN-TELSTRA Telstra Pty Ltd AS4355 388 106 282 72.7% ERMS-EARTHLNK EARTHLINK, INC AS6347 347 87 260 74.9% DIAMOND SAVVIS Communications Corporation AS1239 928 674 254 27.4% SPRINTLINK Sprint AS22773 289 38 251 86.9% CCINET-2 Cox Communications Inc. Atlanta AS27364 314 70 244 77.7% ACS-INTERNET Armstrong Cable Services AS4134 354 118 236 66.7% CHINANET-BACKBONE No.31,Jin-rong Street AS17676 270 37 233 86.3% GIGAINFRA Softbank BB Corp. AS25844 242 15 227 93.8% SKADDEN1 Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP AS6140 339 123 216 63.7% IMPSAT-USA ImpSat AS209 506 292 214 42.3% ASN-QWEST Qwest AS11305 229 37 192 83.8% INTERLAND-NET1 Interland Incorporated AS4519 183 7 176 96.2% MAAS Maas Communications AS6327 202 27 175 86.6% SHAW Shaw Communications Inc. AS2386 382 208 174 45.5% INS-AS AT&T Data Communications Services AS14654 175 2 173 98.9% WAYPORT Wayport AS2048 252 86 166 65.9% LANET-1 State of Louisiana AS9498 185 21 164 88.6% BBIL-AP BHARTI BT INTERNET LTD. AS705 400 244 156 39.0% ALTERNET-AS UUNET Technologies, Inc. AS9800 203 52 151 74.4% UNICOM CHINA UNICOM AS17557 302 151 151 50.0% PKTELECOM-AS-AP Pakistan Telecom AS9583 234 85 149 63.7% SATYAMNET-AS Satyam Infoway Ltd., Total 15170 6701 8469 55.8% Top 30 total Possible Bogus Routes 24.119.0.0/16 AS11492 CABLEONE CABLE ONE 61.12.32.0/24 AS7545 TPG-INTERNET-AP TPG Internet Pty Ltd 61.12.34.0/24 AS7545 TPG-INTERNET-AP TPG Internet Pty Ltd 64.30.64.0/19 AS14900 USLEC-CORP-1 USLEC Corp. 65.19.128.0/18 AS6939 HURRICANE Hurricane Electric 66.41.192.0/18 AS13367 CCCH-AS3 Comcast Cable Communications Holdings, Inc 66.160.128.0/20 AS6939 HURRICANE Hurricane Electric 132.0.0.0/10 AS568 SUMNET-AS DISO-UNRRA 137.0.0.0/13 AS568 SUMNET-AS DISO-UNRRA 138.136.0.0/13 AS568 SUMNET-AS DISO-UNRRA 140.143.2.0/24 AS1221 ASN-TELSTRA Telstra Pty Ltd 140.240.0.0/13 AS1 GNTY-1 Genuity 142.105.0.0/21 AS19800 GCPUD-ORG Grant County Public UtilityDistrict 142.105.220.0/22 AS3908 SUPERNETASBLK SuperNet, Inc. 142.105.224.0/22 AS3908 SUPERNETASBLK SuperNet, Inc. 142.105.228.0/22 AS3908 SUPERNETASBLK SuperNet, Inc. 142.105.232.0/22 AS3908 SUPERNETASBLK SuperNet, Inc. 158.0.0.0/13 AS568 SUMNET-AS DISO-UNRRA 165.212.0.0/16 AS7424 USANET USA.Net 166.16.0.0/16 AS7132 SBIS-AS SBC Internet Services - Southwest 192.43.230.0/24 AS4738 SAARDNET-AS South Australian Academic Research and Development Network 192.44.0.0/19 AS702 ALTERNET-AS UUNET Technologies, Inc. 192.83.16.0/20 AS5515 SONERA-GLOBAL-IP Sonera Solution Autonomous System 192.83.32.0/19 AS5515 SONERA-GLOBAL-IP Sonera Solution Autonomous System 192.83.64.0/19 AS5515 SONERA-GLOBAL-IP Sonera Solution Autonomous System 192.83.96.0/22 AS5515 SONERA-GLOBAL-IP Sonera Solution Autonomous System 192.83.100.0/24 AS5515 SONERA-GLOBAL-IP Sonera Solution Autonomous System 192.119.135.0/24 AS270 PSCNI-AS National Aeronautics and Space Administration 192.124.252.0/22 AS680 AS680 DFN-IP service G-WiN 192.135.50.0/24 AS7018 ATT-INTERNET4 AT&T WorldNet Services 192.136.71.0/24 AS719 AS719 LANLINK autonomous system 192.136.79.0/24 AS719 AS719 LANLINK autonomous system 192.153.136.0/21 AS568 SUMNET-AS DISO-UNRRA 192.153.144.0/21 AS568 SUMNET-AS DISO-UNRRA 192.172.0.0/19 AS568 SUMNET-AS DISO-UNRRA 192.188.208.0/20 AS568 SUMNET-AS DISO-UNRRA 192.243.32.0/23 AS2044 PALIN-AS Palin Aquisitions Inc. 198.23.26.0/24 AS4390 BELLATLANTIC-COM Bell Atlantic, Inc. 198.97.72.0/21 AS568 SUMNET-AS DISO-UNRRA 198.97.80.0/20 AS568 SUMNET-AS DISO-UNRRA 198.97.88.0/24 AS89 NUSC-CSTLNET-AS Naval Underwater Systems Center 198.97.192.0/20 AS568 SUMNET-AS DISO-UNRRA 198.97.240.0/20 AS568 SUMNET-AS DISO-UNRRA 198.98.8.0/21 AS3701 NERONET Oregon Joint Graduate Schools of Engineering 198.101.4.0/22 AS568 SUMNET-AS DISO-UNRRA 198.136.32.0/20 AS19329 MCNET Martin County Board of County Commissioners 198.144.32.0/19 AS3998 CITY-NET CityNet, Inc. 198.161.87.0/24 AS6539 GROUPTLCOM GT Group Telecom Services Corp. 198.161.165.0/24 AS852 ASN852 Telus Advanced Communications 198.163.155.0/24 AS684 MBNET-AS Manitoba Regional Network 198.167.0.0/16 AS7456 INTERHOP Interhop Network SERVICES Inc. 198.167.163.0/24 AS15290 ATTCA-15290 AT&T Canada Telecom Services Company 198.168.0.0/16 AS701 ALTERNET-AS UUNET Technologies, Inc. 198.169.0.0/16 AS803 SASKTEL SaskTel 198.232.133.0/24 AS23075 SKOTOS-AS Skotos Tech, Inc 199.10.0.0/16 AS568 SUMNET-AS DISO-UNRRA 199.60.0.0/20 AS271 BCNET-AS University of British Columbia 199.79.32.0/20 AS3701 NERONET Oregon Joint Graduate Schools of Engineering 199.84.0.0/16 AS701 ALTERNET-AS UUNET Technologies, Inc. 199.114.0.0/18 AS568 SUMNET-AS DISO-UNRRA 199.114.0.0/21 AS568 SUMNET-AS DISO-UNRRA 199.114.128.0/18 AS568 SUMNET-AS DISO-UNRRA 199.114.130.0/24 AS721 DLA-ASNBLOCK-AS DoD Network Information Center 199.114.132.0/24 AS721 DLA-ASNBLOCK-AS DoD Network Information Center 199.114.140.0/24 AS3544 ITSDN-U7 DISA/UNRRA 199.114.142.0/24 AS721 DLA-ASNBLOCK-AS DoD Network Information Center 199.114.144.0/24 AS721 DLA-ASNBLOCK-AS DoD Network Information Center 199.114.148.0/24 AS721 DLA-ASNBLOCK-AS DoD Network Information Center 199.114.150.0/24 AS721 DLA-ASNBLOCK-AS DoD Network Information Center 199.114.152.0/24 AS1913 DLA4 Defense Logistics Agency 199.114.154.0/24 AS1733 CENTAF-SWA AF DDN PMO 199.114.160.0/24 AS1733 CENTAF-SWA AF DDN PMO 199.120.32.0/19 AS16582 NEXTLEVELINTERNET NEXTLEVEL INTERNET, INC. 199.121.0.0/16 AS568 SUMNET-AS DISO-UNRRA 199.123.0.0/18 AS568 SUMNET-AS DISO-UNRRA 199.123.16.0/20 AS568 SUMNET-AS DISO-UNRRA 199.123.80.0/21 AS568 SUMNET-AS DISO-UNRRA 199.166.18.0/24 AS701 ALTERNET-AS UUNET Technologies, Inc. 199.189.32.0/19 AS7332 IQUEST-AS IQuest Internet 199.202.0.0/16 AS701 ALTERNET-AS UUNET Technologies, Inc. 202.0.180.0/24 AS4058 APNIC-4058 Asia Pacific Network Information Centre 202.3.158.0/24 AS17557 PKTELECOM-AS-AP Pakistan Telecom 202.3.159.0/24 AS17557 PKTELECOM-AS-AP Pakistan Telecom 202.4.252.0/22 AS4808 CHINA169-BJ CNCGROUP IP network¡ªChina169 Beijing Province Network 202.4.255.0/24 AS4799 UNSPECIFIED Ji Tong Communications Co., Ltd. 202.44.112.0/20 AS17458 CWNETDG-IO-AP Cable and Wireless 202.74.32.0/19 AS9315 CWN-AS-AP Chomanan WorldNet Co., Ltd. 202.93.0.0/20 AS4134 CHINANET-BACKBONE No.31,Jin-rong Street 202.93.64.0/19 AS9425 I-NEXT-AS-AP Inter.net Philippines border AS 202.122.76.0/24 AS17553 TIMELESS-AP System Integration provider 202.136.254.0/23 AS4808 CHINA169-BJ CNCGROUP IP network¡ªChina169 Beijing Province Network 202.136.254.0/24 AS4808 CHINA169-BJ CNCGROUP IP network¡ªChina169 Beijing Province Network 202.142.130.0/23 AS17820 DIL-AP DIRECT INTERNET LTD. 202.142.132.0/22 AS17820 DIL-AP DIRECT INTERNET LTD. 202.143.48.0/21 AS4795 INDOSAT2-ID-AP INDOSATNET-ASN 202.143.56.0/21 AS4795 INDOSAT2-ID-AP INDOSATNET-ASN 202.164.192.0/19 AS7599 IPXC-AS-AP IP Exchange 202.165.0.0/19 AS9443 INTERNETPRIMUS-AS-AP Primus Telecommunications 202.179.64.0/24 AS7633 SOFTNET-AS-AP Software Technology Parks of India 202.179.65.0/24 AS7633 SOFTNET-AS-AP Software Technology Parks of India 202.179.66.0/24 AS7633 SOFTNET-AS-AP Software Technology Parks of India 202.179.67.0/24 AS7633 SOFTNET-AS-AP Software Technology Parks of India 202.179.68.0/24 AS7633 SOFTNET-AS-AP Software Technology Parks of India 202.189.234.0/23 AS9658 ETPI-IDS-AS-AP Eastern Telecoms Phils., Inc. 203.10.17.0/24 AS9266 VIPER-AU-AP Vipernet 203.10.18.0/24 AS9266 VIPER-AU-AP Vipernet 203.10.19.0/24 AS9266 VIPER-AU-AP Vipernet 203.10.21.0/24 AS9266 VIPER-AU-AP Vipernet 203.10.22.0/24 AS9266 VIPER-AU-AP Vipernet 203.10.23.0/24 AS9266 VIPER-AU-AP Vipernet 203.32.4.0/23 AS7617 APNIC-AS-2-BLOCK Asia Pacific Network Information Centre 203.62.0.0/17 AS7572 AARNET-ACT-RNO Australian Academic and Reasearch Network (AARNet) 203.76.128.0/24 AS9729 IS-AP iAdvantage Limited 203.76.224.0/24 AS9549 COMDEK-ISP-AS-AP Comdek ISP 203.86.2.0/23 AS4058 APNIC-4058 Asia Pacific Network Information Centre 203.90.192.0/20 AS9658 ETPI-IDS-AS-AP Eastern Telecoms Phils., Inc. 203.129.126.0/24 AS7473 SINGTEL-AS-AP Singapore Telecom 203.129.127.0/24 AS7473 SINGTEL-AS-AP Singapore Telecom 203.132.95.0/24 AS9787 CONCEPT-AU-AP Concept Networks 203.132.97.0/24 AS7652 VIANET-AS-AP Vianet Communications Pty Ltd 203.132.99.0/24 AS7657 TIG-US-PAS-AP The Internet Group Limited 203.132.102.0/24 AS9398 ARACHNET-AS-AP Arachnet 203.132.103.0/24 AS9398 ARACHNET-AS-AP Arachnet 203.132.104.0/24 AS9398 ARACHNET-AS-AP Arachnet 203.132.105.0/24 AS9398 ARACHNET-AS-AP Arachnet 203.132.106.0/24 AS9398 ARACHNET-AS-AP Arachnet 203.132.107.0/24 AS10236 FOXGOLD-NET-AU-AP FOXGOLD COMMUNICATIONS 203.132.108.0/24 AS10236 FOXGOLD-NET-AU-AP FOXGOLD COMMUNICATIONS 203.132.109.0/24 AS10141 CALOUNDRA-AS-AP Caloundra.net 203.132.110.0/24 AS7598 ALPHALINK-AS-AP Alphalink Pty Limited - Melbourne, Australia 203.132.111.0/24 AS10236 FOXGOLD-NET-AU-AP FOXGOLD COMMUNICATIONS 203.132.112.0/24 AS10236 FOXGOLD-NET-AU-AP FOXGOLD COMMUNICATIONS 203.132.118.0/24 AS18065 CENTRALDATA-WA Central Data Pty Ltd. 203.132.122.0/24 AS4802 WANTREE-AS-AP Wantree Development 203.132.123.0/24 AS18065 CENTRALDATA-WA Central Data Pty Ltd. 203.132.124.0/24 AS18065 CENTRALDATA-WA Central Data Pty Ltd. 203.132.125.0/24 AS4817 TECHEX1-AS-AP Techex Primary Netblock 203.135.99.0/24 AS2687 IBM-MMD-AS IBM 203.135.224.0/19 AS4058 APNIC-4058 Asia Pacific Network Information Centre 203.161.39.0/24 AS4768 CLIX-NZ CLEAR Internet Exchange 204.19.224.0/19 AS816 UUNET-AS4 UUNET Technologies, Inc. 204.29.189.0/24 AS3956 TX-METRO Texas Metronet 204.52.232.0/24 AS7177 DFWNET DFW Internet Services, Inc. 204.89.225.0/24 AS2495 KANREN Kansas Research and Education Network 204.154.126.0/24 AS3952 TELLABS-ASN TELLABS Operations, Inc. 204.194.110.0/23 AS10588 ICSNET Intelligent Computer Solutions, Inc 205.150.0.0/15 AS701 ALTERNET-AS UUNET Technologies, Inc. 206.41.32.0/19 AS14824 NEWSOUTH NewSouth Communications Corp. 206.81.187.0/24 AS19194 JOVITA Sentris Network LLC 206.82.64.0/18 AS7029 ALLTELNET Alltel Information Services, Inc. 206.108.34.0/24 AS852 ASN852 Telus Advanced Communications 206.108.35.0/24 AS852 ASN852 Telus Advanced Communications 206.167.57.0/24 AS376 RISQ-AS Reseau Interordinateurs Scientique Quebecois (RISQ) 206.191.64.0/18 AS15290 ATTCA-15290 AT&T Canada Telecom Services Company 206.251.69.0/24 AS27429 TIL Telesat International Ltd. 207.47.39.0/24 AS816 UUNET-AS4 UUNET Technologies, Inc. 207.162.192.0/19 AS4589 EASYNET Easynet Group Plc 207.192.254.0/23 AS7018 ATT-INTERNET4 AT&T WorldNet Services 207.231.96.0/19 AS11194 NUNETPA NuNet Inc 208.65.232.0/23 AS701 ALTERNET-AS UUNET Technologies, Inc. 208.81.187.0/24 AS19194 JOVITA Sentris Network LLC 208.104.103.0/24 AS1239 SPRINTLINK Sprint 209.151.128.0/19 AS816 UUNET-AS4 UUNET Technologies, Inc. 209.169.219.0/24 AS189 GENUITY-AS189 Genuity 209.169.223.0/24 AS189 GENUITY-AS189 Genuity 209.172.0.0/18 AS7770 TRITON Triton Technologies, Inc. 209.213.32.0/19 AS10629 INTERPAC Inter-Pacific Network Services 209.213.50.0/24 AS10629 INTERPAC Inter-Pacific Network Services 209.213.51.0/24 AS10629 INTERPAC Inter-Pacific Network Services 209.213.55.0/24 AS10629 INTERPAC Inter-Pacific Network Services 209.213.56.0/24 AS10629 INTERPAC Inter-Pacific Network Services 209.222.137.0/24 AS27429 TIL Telesat International Ltd. 209.240.96.0/19 AS10815 KCNET KCnet, Inc. 209.251.0.0/19 AS11036 SISCOM SISCOM, Inc 209.251.64.0/19 AS10266 NETWAY-AS MDC, Inc. 210.213.0.0/19 AS6453 TELEGLOBE-AS Teleglobe Inc 216.18.224.0/21 AS11458 IMBRIS IMBRIS, INC. 216.18.224.0/22 AS11458 IMBRIS IMBRIS, INC. 216.18.228.0/22 AS11458 IMBRIS IMBRIS, INC. 216.47.32.0/19 AS11304 SPLUS Solutions Plus Inc. 216.96.128.0/18 AS7018 ATT-INTERNET4 AT&T WorldNet Services 216.226.108.0/22 AS3602 SPRINT-CA-AS Sprint Canada Inc. Please see http://www.cidr-report.org for the full report ------------------------------------ Copies of this report are mailed to: nanog(a)merit.edu eof-list(a)ripe.net apops(a)apops.net routing-wg(a)ripe.net afnog(a)afnog.org

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