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Voice Compression
by Robert White 14 Nov '03

14 Nov '03

I am looking for an economical solution to compress 1248 voice DS-0s to 240 DS0s. My application is to extend the voice and data for a call center that needs roughly 63 T-1 equivalents of bandwidth down 21 physical T-1 ciscuits.

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re: This may be stupid but
by Don Mills 14 Nov '03

14 Nov '03

I just had to respond to this thread and throw my 2 cents in. I can certainly see the frustration of hiring managers (having done so myself) that receive a load of resumes full of "certified" individuals who don't know squat. That is what a tech interview is for, though isn't it? Unfortunately to get to that interview you need a bit of flash to get your foot in the door. The world is as full of people claiming to be a linux guru as it is of MCSE's. I think some certs at least show that you are capable of learning, and some of the higher level ones show that you are capable of understanding/using concepts as well. Now I freely admit to being a cert collector/whore - I just do it for fun nowadays but I am willing to back every bit of it up in a tech interview - in fact I normally ask to tech interview with the heads of the unix, security, AND networking groups to prove I know what I claim to know (and I'm pretty sure I could pass as a high-level Microsoft guy if I desired). But it would be a tragic mistake on anyone's behalf to pre-assume that all those letters means I don't know what I am talking about. That's stereotyping, isn't it? -- Don Mills SCSA SCNA CCNP CCDP CISSP CQS-VPN CQS-PIX Chief Network Security/WAN Architect VA Dept. of Social Services don.mills(a)dss.virginia.gov

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Re: looking for pull traffic
by Paul Vixie 14 Nov '03

14 Nov '03

> Ahh, but are you saying that current blow-based transit pricing is stable? ah. no. current transit pricing is way way lower than a non-bankrupt provider can afford to do it for on an ROI that the public markets would find worthy of their praise. eventually, all kinds of flies are going to hit all kinds of windshields. but there's so much bankrupt asset in the field right now that nobody still knows how much anything really costs them to produce. so it's apparently stable for now. > Maybe I am exceptionally naive, but are DDOSes *REALLY* that consistent > between providers to affect month-over-month or quarterly ratios? yes. because if you're a small provider then you only need a small flow to balance yourself. and the 95th percentile cuts both ways.

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NANOG30 Call for Presentations
by Susan Harris 13 Nov '03

13 Nov '03

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * CALL FOR PRESENTATIONS NANOG 30 ****************************************** CELEBRATING OUR 30th MEETING and 10th YEAR ****************************************** General Session Tutorials Case Studies Research Forum February 8-10, 2004 * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * The North American Network Operators' Group (NANOG) will hold its 30th meeting February 8-10, 2004, in Miami, Florida. The meeting will be hosted by Terremark and held at the Radisson Miami Hotel. This is the second time Terremark has hosted NANOG - NANOG24 was also held in Miami, in February 2002. Registration for NANOG30 opens December 15. NANOG conferences provide a forum for the coordination and dissemination of technical information related to backbone/enterprise networking technologies and operational practices. Meetings are held three times each year, and include two days of short presentations, plus afternoon/evening tutorial sessions. The meetings are informal, with an emphasis on relevance to current backbone engineering practices. NANOG conferences draw over 450 participants, mainly consisting of engineering staff from national service providers, and members of the research and education community. For more information about NANOG meetings, schedules, and logistics, see: http://www.nanog.org ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ CALL FOR PRESENTATIONS NANOG invites presentations on backbone/enterprise engineering, coordination, and research topics. Presentations should highlight issues relating to technology already deployed or soon to be deployed in core Internet backbones and exchange points. Vendors are encouraged to work with operators to present deployment experiences with the vendor's products. Researchers are invited to present short (10-minute) summaries of their work for operator feedback. Topics include routing, network performance, statistical measurement and analysis, and protocol development and implementation. Studies presented may be works in progress. Researchers from academia, government, and industry are encouraged to present. The community is invited to present talks on: -- Security attacks/mitigation, tools, and analysis -- Operator experience/how-to's on building packet-switched networks (e.g., IP or MPLS) that can carry TDM, Layer 2 (e.g., Frame Relay and ATM), IP services, and emerging services such as VPLS -- Experience with active DoS retaliation methods, e.g., reverse port scanning -- Operator case studies on: - Implementation experience with 10/100Gig E - VOIP architectures and deployment - Integration with optical control planes (GMPLS, ASON, etc.), voice (enterprise, Class 4 and Class 5), and video - Provisioning and automation - Enterprise network security, management, and route control - Network troubleshooting and problems solved -- Experience with active DoS retaliation methods, e.g., reverse port scanning. -- Implementation and use of measurement technologies in vendor devices Other potential topics include: -- Backbone traffic engineering -- Impact of BGP dynamics on backbone traffic patterns -- Route processor architecture -- Large-scale wireless deployment -- Building large-scale measurement infrastructure -- Inter-domain multicast deployment NANOG also welcomes suggestions/recommendations for tutorials, panels, and other presentation topics. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ HOW TO PRESENT Submit a detailed abstract or outline describing the presentation in email to nanog-support(a)nanog.org. The deadline for proposals is December 22, 2003. While the majority of speaking slots will be filled by December 22, a limited number of slots will be available after that date for topics that are exceptionally timely and important. Submissions will be reviewed by the NANOG Program Committee, and presenters will be notified of acceptance by January 12. Final drafts of presentation slides are due by January 28, and final versions February 4. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

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Re: FW: Cost of Worm Attack Protection
by sgorman1＠gmu.edu 13 Nov '03

13 Nov '03

Ideally you would have a different metric for each AS type depending on their tolerance for risk. The lower the tolerance for risk the higher the investment made in security precautions. Unfortanately classifying 14,000+ AS's is taking a little longer than I thought, but that is the end goal. Hopefully another few weeks. Even once you have some type of classification schema ideally you still need some kind of cost metric you can scale. There is also the problem of data. The only solid data I've seen at the AS level to approximate size is number of connections to other AS's. I've seen some stats with number of servers at the AS level but not for the whole AS population. ----- Original Message ----- From: Sean Donelan <sean(a)donelan.com> Date: Thursday, November 13, 2003 5:35 pm Subject: Re: FW: Cost of Worm Attack Protection > On Thu, 13 Nov 2003 sgorman1(a)gmu.edu wrote: > > I guess the hypothetical would be if you were in charge of > security for > > an AS what would be the cost to put a best-effort worm > mitigation system > > in. > > What kind of AS? > > An AS used by a military organization that has authority over its > usersand can through them in the brig for failing to follow > commands and > policy? > > An AS used by a commercial enterprise that has authority over its > usersand can fire them for failing to follow commands and policy? > > An AS used by a university enterprise that has authority over its > usersand can expell them for failing to follow commands and policy? > > An AS used by a service provider that has authority over its users and > can terminate their network access for failing to follow commands and > policy? > > An AS used by a public agency that is required by law to permit all > citizens access to information until proven beyond reasonable > doubt the > access was misused? > > >

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Re: FW: Cost of Worm Attack Protection
by sgorman1＠gmu.edu 13 Nov '03

13 Nov '03

I guess the hypothetical would be if you were in charge of security for an AS what would be the cost to put a best-effort worm mitigation system in. The second question being how would you scale that cost with the size of the AS. Maybe it is a case that there is not a best practice to fix a cost to, too much variability in the market and theories of how best to defend, if defend at all. Just figured it would be prudent to ask before we made something up - usually not such a good idea. ----- Original Message ----- From: kgraham(a)rogers.com Date: Thursday, November 13, 2003 4:40 pm Subject: Re: FW: Cost of Worm Attack Protection > > It would be great not to spend any money and let the worms run > their course. But when you have to deal with downed production at > the cost of give or take possibly 500K per attack it unfortunately > cannot be done without one loosing their job. The last worm that > spread throughout enterprises mentioned having to reinstall the > entire server. If that server is a critical production server > what would you do? > > Would spending 100K prevent the attack, very likely not. Would > spending 100K help track the offending machine(s) and enable > someone to remove them from the network until they are serviced, > possibly? > Would this help keep production rolling, possibly? > > The installation management and response time needed to implement > an IDS solution does have to be investigated to see if the ROI > comes in line with the cost. The ROI would need to include any > saved downtime. If someone has this information please pass it > along. > > A nicer solution would be an operating system that does not need a > critical patch every other week, due to it's exploitable nature. > > Yes I am dreaming :) > > Kim > > > > > From: "Braun, Mike" <MBraun(a)firstam.com> > > Date: 2003/11/13 Thu PM 03:02:59 EST > > To: "'nanog(a)merit.edu'" <nanog(a)merit.edu> > > Subject: FW: Cost of Worm Attack Protection > > > > > > The old saying of "you get what you pay for" seems to be well > directed when > > it comes to this topic. If you're willing to allocate $100K > more than you > > currently spend to mitigating the effects from Worms and > Viruses, I'm sure > > you will have some increased success. If you allocate 1 mill > more, your > > success will increase substantially. The true cost really boils > down to > > what you are trying to protect, such as how many servers, users, > network> segments, and other critical devices you are willing to > encompass in your > > protection plan. Also, you may be able to mitigate the cost by > using the > > functionality built into devices you may already own. A good > protection> schema needs to address the use and benefits from the > following: Firewalls, > > VPN tunnels and policies, HIDs, NIDs, Antivirus software, and a > good network > > security policy that grows with your network. You may already > have most of > > this in place and need only a little extra funding allocated to > give you the > > protection level you feel comfortable with. > > > > If you're looking for pricing on each component, they will vary > widely> depending on the brand and model you go with. You should > shop around for > > components that suit your budget. An example of this price > variance can be > > found by looking at a Net Forensics project priced at $500k > compared to a > > similar solution going will Network Intelligence at $40K. The > Network> Intelligence solution may not have all the functionality > offered by Net > > Forensics, but it may be enough for your needs. > > > > Best of luck in fighting this ever growing problem, > > > > Mike Braun > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: sgorman1(a)gmu.edu [mailto:sgorman1@gmu.edu] > > Sent: Thursday, November 13, 2003 7:59 AM > > To: Joel Jaeggli > > Cc: nanog(a)merit.edu > > Subject: Re: Cost of Worm Attack Protection > > > > > > > > Good point - then what is the cost of attempting to mitigate or > handle> attacks vs. doing nothing? > > > > ----- Original Message ----- > > From: Joel Jaeggli <joelja(a)darkwing.uoregon.edu> > > Date: Thursday, November 13, 2003 10:14 am > > Subject: Re: Cost of Worm Attack Protection > > > > > I haven't seen any network or customer site that has protected > > > itself from > > > worms... only mitigated them. > > > > > > joelja > > > > > > On Thu, 13 Nov 2003 sgorman1(a)gmu.edu wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > I was hoping to get some estimates from folks on the costs > of > > > defending> networks from various worm attacks. It is a pretty > > > wide open question, > > > > but if anyone has some rough estimates of what it costs per > edge,> > > manpower vs. equipment costs, or any combination > thereof it > > > would be of > > > > great assistance. We are doing some simulations of attack > and > > > defense> strategies and looking for some good metrics to plug > into > > > a cost benefit > > > > model. We'd be happy to share the results if anyone is > > > interested as > > > > well. > > > > > > > > Thanks in advance, > > > > > > > > sean > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > --------------------------------------------------------------- > ---- > > > ------- > > > Joel Jaeggli Unix Consulting > > > joelja(a)darkwing.uoregon.edu > > > GPG Key Fingerprint: 5C6E 0104 BAF0 40B0 5BD3 C38B F000 > 35AB > > > B67F 56B2 > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > "MMS <firstam.com>" made the following > > annotations on 11/13/2003 12:03:21 PM > > ----------------------------------------------------------------- > ------------- > > "THIS E-MAIL MESSAGE AND ANY FILES TRANSMITTED HEREWITH, ARE > INTENDED SOLELY FOR THE USE OF THE INDIVIDUAL(S) ADDRESSED AND MAY > CONTAIN CONFIDENTIAL, PROPRIETARY OR PRIVILEGED INFORMATION. IF > YOU ARE NOT THE ADDRESSEE INDICATED IN THIS MESSAGE (OR > RESPONSIBLE FOR DELIVERY OF THIS MESSAGE TO SUCH PERSON) YOU MAY > NOT REVIEW, USE, DISCLOSE OR DISTRIBUTE THIS MESSAGE OR ANY FILES > TRANSMITTED HEREWITH. IF YOU RECEIVE THIS MESSAGE IN ERROR, > PLEASE CONTACT THE SENDER BY REPLY E-MAIL AND DELETE THIS MESSAGE > AND ALL COPIES OF IT FROM YOUR SYSTEM." > > > ==============================================================================> > > > >

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Re: Cost of Worm Attack Protection
by Jamie Reid 13 Nov '03

13 Nov '03

While I can't give you a fixed cost, I can confidently say that the value or cost/benefit over time resembled a bathtub curve. It starts high, drops sharply close to zero, then climbs slowly over time as the infection rate dissipates while a fixed mitigation strategy is applied, with diminishing results. For blaster/nachi, we are starting to encounter side effects of the filters put in place, which is slowly incurring support costs as exceptions are made. -- Jamie.Reid, CISSP, jamie.reid(a)mbs.gov.on.ca Senior Security Specialist, Information Protection Centre Corporate Security, MBS 416 327 2324 >>> <sgorman1(a)gmu.edu> 11/13/03 09:35am >>> I was hoping to get some estimates from folks on the costs of defending networks from various worm attacks. It is a pretty wide open question, but if anyone has some rough estimates of what it costs per edge, manpower vs. equipment costs, or any combination thereof it would be of great assistance. We are doing some simulations of attack and defense strategies and looking for some good metrics to plug into a cost benefit model. We'd be happy to share the results if anyone is interested as well. Thanks in advance, sean

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integrity ptp-10 modems
by Miguel Mata-Cardona 13 Nov '03

13 Nov '03

These are broadband, cablemodem point-to-point type. I have a couple of them that need to be fixed but the company seems to be disapeared. I would really appreciate if you know a lab or where can I send these for repair. Please contact me off-list, I don't want to increase noise. Thanks in advance. -- Miguel Mata-Cardona Intercom El Salvador mmata(a)intercom.com.sv voz: ++(503) 278-5068 fax: ++(503) 265-7024

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RE: FW: Cost of Worm Attack Protection
by Braun, Mike 13 Nov '03

13 Nov '03

You misunderstood me if you though I was saying the key to this problem is to throw money at it. You can spend a load of cash and accomplish nothing. In fact, you can do far worse damage this way by giving you a false sense of security than if you did nothing at all. There is a right way to view security and a wrong way. If you let a couple fast talking sales people sell you their "kitchen sink" solution without the full understanding on your part as to what you've just purchased, or the understanding on how to install and maintain the product, then you don't belong in your company's security group and should look for a new line of work. I think we can all think of security installations or practices we've seen in the past that we can find fault in, or ones that are so bad they need to fire the security staff and reevaluate the entire infrastructure. The point I was making in my original email was that you need to understand your network. This includes the users and how they interact. You can spend $0 in the way of new hardware and instead work to change the bad habits of users on the network and be in a much more secure position months from now. By understanding your network and the security risks associated in each element, as well as the options available to closing (or mitigating) those security risks, you will find yourself in a better position to spend allocated funds more wisely. You'll never be able to make a network hacker proof, but you can work to mitigate risk to varying degree. Here is where the money comes in. How wisely you spend is up to you. Mike Braun -----Original Message----- From: Rob Thomas [mailto:robt@cymru.com] Sent: Thursday, November 13, 2003 12:56 PM To: NANOG Subject: Re: FW: Cost of Worm Attack Protection Hi, NANOGers. ] The old saying of "you get what you pay for" seems to be well directed when ] it comes to this topic. If you're willing to allocate $100K more than you ] currently spend to mitigating the effects from Worms and Viruses, I'm sure ] you will have some increased success. If you allocate 1 mill more, your ] success will increase substantially. The true cost really boils down to This sort of thinking, unsupported by any data, runs rampant in the security industry. I have yet to see anyone document the ROI on security tools and services. Do they help at all? Does an increase in security spending result in a decrease in pain? In some cases, as already documented here, an increase in security measures can actually increases costs. Let's not fall into the trap that more $$$ equates to greater security or awareness. I've seen many sites that installed numerous pods of the latest IDS at their borders, only to be owned from within or owned by a method not yet in the ever-behind signature database of the IDS devices. One can waste money on security just as easily as one can waste money on anything else. Thanks, Rob. -- Rob Thomas http://www.cymru.com ASSERT(coffee != empty); "MMS <firstam.com>" made the following annotations on 11/13/2003 01:54:54 PM ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ "THIS E-MAIL MESSAGE AND ANY FILES TRANSMITTED HEREWITH, ARE INTENDED SOLELY FOR THE USE OF THE INDIVIDUAL(S) ADDRESSED AND MAY CONTAIN CONFIDENTIAL, PROPRIETARY OR PRIVILEGED INFORMATION. IF YOU ARE NOT THE ADDRESSEE INDICATED IN THIS MESSAGE (OR RESPONSIBLE FOR DELIVERY OF THIS MESSAGE TO SUCH PERSON) YOU MAY NOT REVIEW, USE, DISCLOSE OR DISTRIBUTE THIS MESSAGE OR ANY FILES TRANSMITTED HEREWITH. IF YOU RECEIVE THIS MESSAGE IN ERROR, PLEASE CONTACT THE SENDER BY REPLY E-MAIL AND DELETE THIS MESSAGE AND ALL COPIES OF IT FROM YOUR SYSTEM." ==============================================================================

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Re: Cost of Worm Attack Protection
by sgorman1＠gmu.edu 13 Nov '03

13 Nov '03

Good point - then what is the cost of attempting to mitigate or handle attacks vs. doing nothing? ----- Original Message ----- From: Joel Jaeggli <joelja(a)darkwing.uoregon.edu> Date: Thursday, November 13, 2003 10:14 am Subject: Re: Cost of Worm Attack Protection > I haven't seen any network or customer site that has protected > itself from > worms... only mitigated them. > > joelja > > On Thu, 13 Nov 2003 sgorman1(a)gmu.edu wrote: > > > > > > > I was hoping to get some estimates from folks on the costs of > defending> networks from various worm attacks. It is a pretty > wide open question, > > but if anyone has some rough estimates of what it costs per edge, > > manpower vs. equipment costs, or any combination thereof it > would be of > > great assistance. We are doing some simulations of attack and > defense> strategies and looking for some good metrics to plug into > a cost benefit > > model. We'd be happy to share the results if anyone is > interested as > > well. > > > > Thanks in advance, > > > > sean > > > > -- > ------------------------------------------------------------------- > ------- > Joel Jaeggli Unix Consulting > joelja(a)darkwing.uoregon.edu > GPG Key Fingerprint: 5C6E 0104 BAF0 40B0 5BD3 C38B F000 35AB > B67F 56B2 > > >

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