- NANOG - lists.nanog.org

"it appears a beaver picked it up and chewed it in half"
by Scot Bryhan 09 Jul '04

09 Jul '04

> Scot, > > Here's what we received from the Assocaited Press. > > > -- > Kendall P. Stanley > Managing editor > Petoskey News-Review > (231) 439-9349 > (231) 881-4349 (cell) > > > By JOHN FLESHER > Associated Press Writer > TRAVERSE CITY, Mich. _ Northeastern Michigan had a problem to chew on: > Long-distance phone service was interrupted for more than six hours after a > beaver apparently gnawed through a fiber optic cable. > > "In my 33 years with the company I've never heard of this happening," said > John VanWyck, spokesman for Verizon Communications. "I've heard of squirrels > chewing aerial cable, but not this." > > The outage began shortly after 8 a.m. Thursday [July 1st]. Service was completely > restored by 2:35 p.m. Some 62,000 customers were affected, including > long-distance, dial-up Internet and some cellular phone services, as well as > credit card and ATM machines. > > "This has had a huge impact on our business," Doug Morrison, owner of a > grocery store in Hillman, told The Alpena News. "Seventy percent of our > business pays by credit card. Because of this stupid thing, our machines > won't work. We've had a lot of customers leave $100 in groceries because > they couldn't pay for them." > > The affected area extended from Roscommon County north to Gaylord and east > to Alpena and Rogers City, VanWyck said. > > It took crews a while to locate the source of the problem because the cable > was stretched across a wetland area north of Houghton Lake, near the > headwaters of the Muskegon River, he said. > > The state Department of Natural Resources had lowered the water level in the > wetland by several feet because of heavy rain in recent months, VanWyck > said. The wetland drains into the lake and the river. > > "The lower water levels exposed the fiber optic cable," VanWyck said. "From > all indications, it appears a beaver picked it up and chewed it in half. By > the looks of the ends of the cable, it was obviously chewed." > > The outage was ill-timed for businesses in the area, particularly motels > taking reservations for the Fourth of July weekend. > > "It wasn't as bad as it could have been, because we were able to get some > incoming calls for some reason," said Tom Zamoyski, general manager of Best > Western Alpine Lodge in Gaylord. "But we couldn't call any of our customers > or suppliers, and we couldn't use e-mail. We had a lot of guests in house > and they were frustrated that they couldn't call out." > > Emergency dispatch centers in Alcona, Alpena, Montmorency and Presque Isle > counties maintained radio contact until long distance service was restored, > said Bruce Wozniak, 911 emergency services coordinator for Alpena County. > >

2 1

WTF ---
by bmanning＠vacation.karoshi.com 09 Jul '04

09 Jul '04

stuff under the floor: wildlife: common in TX, fireants/bees/arachnids in the vaults cruft: the nite-shift dirty laundry (clothes & other stuff) and my personal fave: worked in a shop w/ MGs and a flywheel/genset -in the machine room-. One of the power leads was not properly mounted and had to be repaired. The electrician did -not- remove all his rings (guess he was still junior) and was knocked out - called the EMTs and he was transported & revivied. we found his finger (desicated) w/ the ring a year later when we pulled out the 3033's. not exactly under the floor: The most excitment was the bearings on the flywheel seizing up and the flywheel tearing loose, punching a hole in the wall and into the adjacent clean room. ah... the bad ol'days. :) --bill

2 1

The Cidr Report
by cidr-report＠potaroo.net 09 Jul '04

09 Jul '04

This report has been generated at Fri Jul 9 21:43:38 2004 AEST. The report analyses the BGP Routing Table of an AS4637 (Reach) router and generates a report on aggregation potential within the table. Check http://www.cidr-report.org/as4637 for a current version of this report. Recent Table History Date Prefixes CIDR Agg 02-07-04 138157 95253 03-07-04 137906 95421 04-07-04 138230 95430 05-07-04 138351 95418 06-07-04 138246 95439 07-07-04 138312 95533 08-07-04 138436 95569 09-07-04 138898 95503 AS Summary 17473 Number of ASes in routing system 7117 Number of ASes announcing only one prefix 1414 Largest number of prefixes announced by an AS AS7018 : ATTW AT&T WorldNet Services 54247168 Largest address span announced by an AS (/32s) AS721 : DNIC DoD Network Information Center Aggregation Summary The algorithm used in this report proposes aggregation only when there is a precise match using the AS path, so as to preserve traffic transit policies. Aggregation is also proposed across non-advertised address space ('holes'). --- 09Jul04 --- ASnum NetsNow NetsAggr NetGain % Gain Description Table 138776 95525 43251 31.2% All ASes AS6347 975 201 774 79.4% SAVV SAVVIS Communications Corporation AS18566 725 8 717 98.9% CVAD Covad Communications AS4134 754 160 594 78.8% CHINANET-BACKBONE No.31,Jin-rong Street AS4323 737 206 531 72.0% TWTC Time Warner Telecom AS7018 1414 971 443 31.3% ATTW AT&T WorldNet Services AS2548 548 130 418 76.3% ATCW Allegiance Telecom Companies Worldwide AS7843 515 130 385 74.8% ADELPH-13 Adelphia Corp. AS6197 707 326 381 53.9% BNS-14 BellSouth Network Solutions, Inc AS22909 398 30 368 92.5% CMCS Comcast Cable Communications, Inc. AS701 1282 923 359 28.0% UU UUNET Technologies, Inc. AS9583 486 136 350 72.0% SATYAMNET-AS Satyam Infoway Ltd., AS27364 377 38 339 89.9% ARMC Armstrong Cable Services AS22773 383 60 323 84.3% CXAB Cox Communications Inc. Atlanta AS1239 945 637 308 32.6% SPRN Sprint AS6467 334 33 301 90.1% ACSI e.spire Communications, Inc. AS11172 351 55 296 84.3% Servicios Alestra S.A de C.V AS17676 339 50 289 85.3% JPNIC-JP-ASN-BLOCK Japan Network Information Center AS9929 320 32 288 90.0% CNCNET-CN China Netcom Corp. AS6198 508 223 285 56.1% BNS-14 BellSouth Network Solutions, Inc AS4355 381 99 282 74.0% ERSD EARTHLINK, INC AS6478 328 57 271 82.6% ATTW AT&T WorldNet Services AS14654 238 5 233 97.9% WAYPOR-3 Wayport AS25844 243 16 227 93.4% SASMFL-2 Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP AS4766 486 265 221 45.5% KIXS-AS-KR Korea Telecom AS3356 890 672 218 24.5% LEVEL3 Level 3 Communications AS6140 369 157 212 57.5% IMPSA ImpSat AS9443 349 143 206 59.0% INTERNETPRIMUS-AS-AP Primus Telecommunications AS6327 231 32 199 86.1% SHAWC-2 Shaw Communications Inc. AS5668 380 196 184 48.4% CIH-12 CenturyTel Internet Holdings, Inc. AS2386 406 227 179 44.1% ADCS-1 AT&T Data Communications Services Total 16399 6218 10181 62.1% Top 30 total Possible Bogus Routes 24.138.80.0/20 AS11260 AHSICHCL Andara High Speed Internet c/o Halifax Cable Ltd. 24.246.0.0/17 AS7018 ATTW AT&T WorldNet Services 24.246.128.0/18 AS7018 ATTW AT&T WorldNet Services 64.46.4.0/22 AS11711 TULARO TULAROSA COMMUNICATIONS 64.46.12.0/24 AS7850 IHIGHW iHighway.net, Inc. 64.46.27.0/24 AS8674 NETNOD-IX Netnod Internet Exchange Sverige AB 64.46.34.0/24 AS3408 64.46.63.0/24 AS7850 IHIGHW iHighway.net, Inc. 66.114.0.0/19 AS16526 BIRCHT Birch Telecom, Inc. 69.26.32.0/19 AS17307 VIRTEL-15 Virtela Communications 132.0.0.0/10 AS568 DISOUN DISO-UNRRA 137.0.0.0/13 AS721 DNIC DoD Network Information Center 138.136.0.0/13 AS721 DNIC DoD Network Information Center 158.0.0.0/13 AS721 DNIC DoD Network Information Center 192.30.93.0/24 AS17757 HPAUS-AP HP Australia 192.30.94.0/24 AS17757 HPAUS-AP HP Australia 192.30.127.0/24 AS719 LANLINK Elisa Oyj 192.40.105.0/24 AS5515 SONERA-GLOBAL-IP Sonera Solution Autonomous System 192.43.230.0/24 AS4738 SAARDNET-AS South Australian Academic Research and Development Network 192.44.0.0/19 AS702 AS702 MCI EMEA - Commercial IP service provider in Europe 192.81.182.0/24 AS719 LANLINK Elisa Oyj 192.81.183.0/24 AS719 LANLINK Elisa Oyj 192.81.184.0/24 AS719 LANLINK Elisa Oyj 192.119.135.0/24 AS270 NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration 192.124.252.0/22 AS680 DFN-IP service G-WiN 192.133.6.0/24 AS4004 GLOBALONE-EQUANT-UK Equant UK & Greece Autonomous System 192.135.50.0/24 AS7018 ATTW AT&T WorldNet Services 192.136.71.0/24 AS719 LANLINK Elisa Oyj 192.136.79.0/24 AS719 LANLINK Elisa Oyj 192.153.144.0/21 AS721 DNIC DoD Network Information Center 192.172.0.0/19 AS568 DISOUN DISO-UNRRA 192.188.208.0/20 AS721 DNIC DoD Network Information Center 192.243.32.0/23 AS2044 PALINA Palin Aquisitions Inc. 198.23.26.0/24 AS4390 BELLAT-7 Bell Atlantic, Inc. 198.97.72.0/21 AS568 DISOUN DISO-UNRRA 198.97.80.0/20 AS568 DISOUN DISO-UNRRA 198.97.88.0/24 AS89 NUSC-1 Naval Underwater Systems Center 198.97.240.0/20 AS568 DISOUN DISO-UNRRA 198.97.247.0/24 AS3475 DEPART-52 Department of the Navy 198.101.4.0/22 AS568 DISOUN DISO-UNRRA 198.136.32.0/20 AS19329 MCBCC Martin County Board of County Commissioners 198.144.32.0/19 AS3998 CITY CityNet, Inc. 198.161.87.0/24 AS6539 GTGR GT Group Telecom Services Corp. 198.161.165.0/24 AS852 AGTA Telus Advanced Communications 198.163.155.0/24 AS684 MRN Manitoba Regional Network 198.167.0.0/16 AS7456 INS-51 Interhop Network SERVICES Inc. 198.167.163.0/24 AS15290 ACCA-2 Allstream Corp. Corporation Allstream 198.168.0.0/16 AS701 UU UUNET Technologies, Inc. 198.169.0.0/16 AS803 SASK SaskTel 198.232.133.0/24 AS23075 SKOTOS Skotos Tech, Inc 199.10.0.0/16 AS568 DISOUN DISO-UNRRA 199.60.0.0/20 AS271 UBC-3 University of British Columbia 199.114.0.0/18 AS568 DISOUN DISO-UNRRA 199.114.0.0/21 AS568 DISOUN DISO-UNRRA 199.114.128.0/18 AS568 DISOUN DISO-UNRRA 199.114.130.0/24 AS721 DNIC DoD Network Information Center 199.114.132.0/24 AS721 DNIC DoD Network Information Center 199.114.136.0/24 AS1913 DLA-8 Defense Logistics Agency 199.114.138.0/24 AS721 DNIC DoD Network Information Center 199.114.140.0/24 AS3544 DISAUN DISA/UNRRA 199.114.142.0/24 AS721 DNIC DoD Network Information Center 199.114.144.0/24 AS721 DNIC DoD Network Information Center 199.114.148.0/24 AS721 DNIC DoD Network Information Center 199.114.150.0/24 AS721 DNIC DoD Network Information Center 199.114.152.0/24 AS1913 DLA-8 Defense Logistics Agency 199.114.154.0/24 AS1733 ADP-41 AF DDN PMO 199.114.156.0/24 AS1913 DLA-8 Defense Logistics Agency 199.114.160.0/24 AS1733 ADP-41 AF DDN PMO 199.120.32.0/19 AS16582 NXLI NEXTLEVEL INTERNET, INC. 199.121.0.0/16 AS568 DISOUN DISO-UNRRA 199.123.0.0/18 AS568 DISOUN DISO-UNRRA 199.123.16.0/20 AS568 DISOUN DISO-UNRRA 199.123.80.0/21 AS568 DISOUN DISO-UNRRA 199.189.32.0/19 AS7332 IQUEST IQuest Internet 199.197.8.0/22 AS21814 PARSON-18 Parsons Corp. 199.202.0.0/16 AS701 UU UUNET Technologies, Inc. 202.47.1.0/24 AS7491 PI-PH-AS-AP PI-PHILIPINES 202.56.160.0/20 AS10199 DISHNET-AS-AP DishnetDSL Limited 202.70.0.0/20 AS4658 NETFRONT-AS NETFRONT I.T. LIMITED (HONG KONG) 202.70.28.0/24 AS4515 ERX-STAR Star Internet Services Ltd. 202.73.128.0/22 AS4058 LINKAGENET-AP CPCNet Hong Kong Ltd. 202.81.96.0/19 AS10113 DATAFAST-AP DATAFAST TELECOMMUNICATIONS LTD 202.81.109.0/24 AS7657 TIG-US-PAS-AP The Internet Group Limited 202.81.121.0/24 AS10113 DATAFAST-AP DATAFAST TELECOMMUNICATIONS LTD 202.93.0.0/20 AS4134 CHINANET-BACKBONE No.31,Jin-rong Street 202.123.96.0/20 AS9288 COMCEN-AS-AP Com-Cen Pty Ltd 202.133.3.0/24 AS9335 CIP-JAPAN-AS-AP ATT IPlus 202.136.128.0/20 AS10199 DISHNET-AS-AP DishnetDSL Limited 202.141.160.0/24 AS9237 HUTCHCA-AS BTN Access Limited 202.164.224.0/19 AS7599 IPXC-AS-AP IP Exchange 203.32.4.0/23 AS7617 203.62.0.0/17 AS7572 AARNET-ACT-RNO Australian Academic and Reasearch Network (AARNet) 203.84.145.0/24 AS4637 REACH Reach Network Border AS 203.84.146.0/24 AS4637 REACH Reach Network Border AS 203.188.16.0/21 AS4755 VSNL-AS Videsh Sanchar Nigam Ltd. Autonomous System 203.210.69.0/24 AS17536 PRODIGY-AS-AP Prodidgy Telecommunications 204.154.125.0/24 AS3952 TELLAB-1 TELLABS Operations, Inc. 204.154.126.0/24 AS3952 TELLAB-1 TELLABS Operations, Inc. 204.154.127.0/24 AS3952 TELLAB-1 TELLABS Operations, Inc. 204.194.110.0/23 AS30653 EXOBI Exobit Networks Inc. 205.150.0.0/15 AS701 UU UUNET Technologies, Inc. 205.159.72.0/24 AS1660 ANSCOM-5 ANS Communications 206.81.187.0/24 AS19194 SNL-8 Sentris Network LLC 206.167.57.0/24 AS376 RISQR-3 Reseau Interordinateurs Scientique Quebecois (RISQ) 206.191.64.0/18 AS15290 ACCA-2 Allstream Corp. Corporation Allstream 206.251.69.0/24 AS27429 TIL-33 Telesat International Ltd. 206.253.190.0/23 AS8123 POLYBA Polybase 207.231.96.0/19 AS11194 NUNETI NuNet Inc 208.81.187.0/24 AS19194 SNL-8 Sentris Network LLC 209.172.0.0/18 AS7770 TRTI Triton Technologies, Inc. 209.205.69.0/24 AS21578 Universidad autonoma de Bucaramanga 209.205.70.0/24 AS21578 Universidad autonoma de Bucaramanga 209.205.81.0/24 AS15066 SkyNet de Colombia S.A. 209.205.82.0/24 AS15066 SkyNet de Colombia S.A. 209.205.84.0/24 AS15066 SkyNet de Colombia S.A. 209.213.32.0/19 AS10629 INS-52 Inter-Pacific Network Services 209.213.50.0/24 AS10629 INS-52 Inter-Pacific Network Services 209.213.51.0/24 AS10629 INS-52 Inter-Pacific Network Services 209.213.55.0/24 AS10629 INS-52 Inter-Pacific Network Services 209.213.56.0/24 AS10629 INS-52 Inter-Pacific Network Services 209.251.0.0/19 AS11036 SISCOM-1 SISCOM, Inc 216.37.110.0/23 AS4264 CERFN California Education and Research Federation Network 216.96.128.0/18 AS7018 ATTW AT&T WorldNet Services 216.145.130.0/24 AS11937 TRXI TRX Inc. 216.145.132.0/24 AS11937 TRXI TRX Inc. 216.145.133.0/24 AS11937 TRXI TRX Inc. 216.145.134.0/24 AS11937 TRXI TRX Inc. 216.145.135.0/24 AS11937 TRXI TRX Inc. 216.145.156.0/24 AS20304 JIS-32 JVLNET Internet Services 216.145.158.0/24 AS20304 JIS-32 JVLNET Internet Services 216.145.176.0/21 AS20304 JIS-32 JVLNET Internet Services 216.145.177.0/24 AS20304 JIS-32 JVLNET Internet Services 216.145.178.0/24 AS20304 JIS-32 JVLNET Internet Services 216.145.184.0/21 AS10758 INWAVE INWave Internet, Inc 216.145.200.0/21 AS20304 JIS-32 JVLNET Internet Services 216.186.151.0/24 AS3356 LEVEL3 Level 3 Communications 216.186.152.0/21 AS3356 LEVEL3 Level 3 Communications 216.186.160.0/23 AS3356 LEVEL3 Level 3 Communications 216.186.164.0/22 AS3356 LEVEL3 Level 3 Communications 216.186.192.0/22 AS3356 LEVEL3 Level 3 Communications 216.186.198.0/23 AS3356 LEVEL3 Level 3 Communications 216.186.248.0/23 AS3356 LEVEL3 Level 3 Communications Please see http://www.cidr-report.org for the full report ------------------------------------ Copies of this report are mailed to: nanog(a)merit.edu eof-list(a)ripe.net apops(a)apops.net routing-wg(a)ripe.net afnog(a)afnog.org swinog(a)swinog.ch

1 0

Barrages of Packet Errors
by webmagician＠altern.org 09 Jul '04

09 Jul '04

Hopefully this is not an off-topic posting. I've scanned a variety of groups looking to see if anyone else has encountered a similar problem, to no avail, and I simply thought this might be the most appropriate place to post an inquiry. I'm not a service provider, simply a small business operator with a few servers, providing business clients with mostly standard web and email type services. A couple of nights ago my systems started experiencing a sharp increase in DNS traffic generating a new flavor of error messages. I'd like to know if anyone else out there noticed similar DNS errors in the past couple of days. The barrage first hit at roughly 9:15pm (Mountain Std Time) on June 28th and lasted only a few minutes. It repeated again at 9:25pm, and then again at roughly 9:38pm, and a 4th round at 10:06pm. I fired up ethereal shortly after the 4th battery in the hopes of capturing additional data, but there was no further activity, and I shut ethereal down the next morning (June 29th). However, later in the morning of the 29th the problem resurfaced, first at roughly 10am, then at 11:00am, 11:30am, and a final blast at 11:45am. Unfortunately I wasn't around during those barrages, so again I missed the opportunity to collect additional information - I only noticed it had happened while reviewing the server logs later that afternoon. The errors haven't re-occurred since. The error messages are all the same (other than the inbound IP address causing the errors). The error message is as follows: "DNS Server encountered bad packet from 192.5.6.30. Packet processing leads beyond packet length." After extracting and sorting the error messages from the server log, I noticed the errors were associated with about 3 dozen IP addresses. The list of IP's associated with the packets that were generating the errors is as follows: 128.63.2.53 = h.root-servers.net 128.9.0.107 = ns1.isi.edu 152.163.159.234 = dns-01.icq.net 192.112.36.4 = g.root-servers.net 192.12.94.32 = aloe.arin.net 192.203.230.10 = e.root-servers.net 192.228.79.201 = b.root-servers.net 192.26.92.30 = c.gtld-servers.net 192.33.14.30 = b.gtld-servers.net 192.33.4.12 = c.root-servers.net 192.35.51.32 = dill.arin.net 192.36.148.17 = i.root-servers.net 192.42.93.30 = g.gtld-servers.net 192.5.5.241 = f.root-servers.net 192.5.6.30 = a.gtld-servers.net 192.5.6.32 = a3.nstld.com 192.54.112.30 = h.gtld-servers.net 192.58.128.30 = j.root-servers.net 193.0.14.129 = k.root-servers.net 193.205.245.8 = dns2.nic.it 198.32.64.12 = l.root-servers.net 198.41.0.4 = a.root-servers.net 198.96.180.33 = ns1.bmo.com 198.96.183.6 = ns2.bmo.com 199.191.128.105 = cbru.br.ns.els-gms.att.net 199.191.145.136 = macu.ma.mt.np.els-gms.att.net 202.12.27.33 = m.root-servers.net 204.152.185.196 = west-pub.mail-abuse.org 205.188.157.232 = dns-02.ns.aol.com 205.188.157.234 = dns-02.icq.net 209.182.216.75 = ns1.gnac.net 209.237.237.10 = dns1-public.alexa.com 209.47.26.190 = ns.uunet.ca 216.239.34.10 = ns2.google.com 216.239.38.10 = ns4.google.com 35.9.116.13 = serv1.cl.msu.edu 64.4.240.70 = ns1.nix.paypal.com 64.4.240.71 = ns2.nix.paypal.com 64.4.244.70 = ns1.sc5.paypal.com 64.4.244.71 = ns2.sc5.paypal.com I never assume anything happens "by chance" when it comes to anomalies in any of my systems log files, particularly when it's something brand new (I've never encountered this particular error in the past 7 years or so, so it set bells ringing to examine the problem more closely) (and there was nothing different or non-normal in the way of user activity or other processing, etc. at any time prior to or during these 'events'). My initial guess is it's someone trying out some new attack vector attempting to exploit yet another buffer overflow problem in windoze, but the strange thing is that the IP's are all (with the exception of a couple) associated with top-level domain servers (or am I mistaken in that assessment?). I'm not a network specialist by any stretch of the imagination, my skill-sets are in other areas, so I'm afraid I haven't much else to add in the way of information about this problem. I'm just looking to bring it to the attention of those who do have the knowledge/experience in this area in case it's a problem of some significance where forewarning may prove useful to others. Thank you. Brian Pederson Chief Technology Officer TeamWorx Productions Ltd.

3 2

Re: "it appears a beaver picked it up and chewed it in half"
by Robert Bonomi 09 Jul '04

09 Jul '04

> From owner-nanog(a)merit.edu Thu Jul 8 23:42:27 2004 > From: "Scot Bryhan" <dsbryhan(a)chartermi.net> > To: <nanog(a)merit.edu> > Subject: "it appears a beaver picked it up and chewed it in half" > Date: Fri, 9 Jul 2004 00:38:50 -0400 > > > > Scot, > > > > Here's what we received from the Assocaited Press. > > > > > > -- > > Kendall P. Stanley > > Managing editor > > Petoskey News-Review > > (231) 439-9349 > > (231) 881-4349 (cell) > > > > > > By JOHN FLESHER > > Associated Press Writer > > TRAVERSE CITY, Mich. _ Northeastern Michigan had a problem to chew > on: > > Long-distance phone service was interrupted for more than six hours after > a > > beaver apparently gnawed through a fiber optic cable. > > > > "In my 33 years with the company I've never heard of this happening," said > > John VanWyck, spokesman for Verizon Communications. "I've heard of > squirrels > > chewing aerial cable, but not this." John apparently leads a rather sheltered life. <grin> Northwestern University, in Evanston, IL, has a substantial squirrel population on/near the campus. One which apparently does _not_ 'learn from experience', I might add. All the campus utilities are underground, including the (dual, redundant, diversely routed) main feeds from the local electric utility. At about 2 year intervals, the livestock manages to find a way into one or the other of the electric feed tunnels. 'whatever it is' that the cable manufacturers use to insulate high-voltage high-ampacity wiring with, the local squirrel population finds it to be irresistable. "Pretty soon there was a 'squirrel boom'", and all the 'non-critical' stuff on half the campus goes dark. Note: the 'squirrel boom' is rather impressive -- sounds like the big brother of an M-80 firecracker/simulated morter round. The fault does tend to be self-clearing -- the only physical evidence of the perpetrator is a grease stain for several feet surrounding. plus a distinctive stink. > From owner-nanog(a)merit.edu Thu Jul 8 23:17:23 2004 > From: "John Ferriby" <john(a)ferriby.com> > To: <nanog(a)merit.edu> > Subject: RE: concern over public peering points [WAS: Peering point speed publicly available?] > Date: Fri, 9 Jul 2004 00:14:39 -0400 > > > On Wednesday 07 July 2004 02:43 am, Valdis.Kletnieks(a)vt.edu wrote: > > Which almost begs the question - what's the oddest "WTF??" anybody's > > willing to admit finding under a raised floor, or up in a ceiling or cable > > chase or similar location? (Feel free to change names to protect the > guilty > > if need be....:) > > Raccoons. Came in late one night and heard noises that I didn't > really expect. Turns out the facility had diverse entrances and > multiple conduits - and one of them had been exposed outside due > to some erosion and had been damaged. We found little surprises > for quite awhile after that. > > Undergarments and shoes. His and hers, but no other clothing. Not 'raised-floor', but qualifies for retelling due to the manner in which the situation was dealt with -- When: 50+ years ago. Locale: An urban newspaper, the office of the (personally quite conservative, but not moralizing) editor-in-chief. Found: A brassiere, under the cushions of the couch in his office. Result: Memo to _all_ staff, announcing the 'find', and requesting that the 'rightful owner thereof' please reclaim their property. Follow-up memo, a couple of days later, when there had been no results from the first one -- again requesting the owner to claim their property, and an announcement that if _not_ claimed, the boss was considering 'holding fittings', to ensure that the lost property WOULD be returned to its rightful owner. [And that is where the story ends -- except to note that "fittings" were _not_ held; there was never any identifiable 'fallout' from the event, in any way.)

1 0

RE: 802.17 RPR and L2 Ethernet interoperablity (Ethernet over RPR)
by Vinay Bannai 09 Jul '04

09 Jul '04

>Hi, > >This is probably a fairly simply question, I'm probably just not quite >groking the layers involved here. > >If I had the following setup: > >Endstation A -- Switch A === RPR Ring === Switch B -- Endstation B > >could there be a VLAN setup such that Endstations A and B are both in it, >and can communicate as if they are on the same LAN segment? (And I mean >natively. ie. not using an MPLS VPN). ie. Will the switches involved >tranlate the different framing formats in use? Is this vendor dependent? > >Sam According to the IEEE 802.17 PAR five criteria, RPR is supposed to satisfy the bridging requirements. In other words, a RPR node on a RPR ring connected to a ethernet switch as shown in your diagram should work transparently. There should be no reason to require MPLS VPNs to make this happen. Having said that your mileage varies depending on the vendor. Most RPR systems are targeted towards the metro space and the core and tend not to use transparent bridging. MAC-in-MAC is one of the mechanisms being used to "bridge" the network between 802.17 and 802.3 networks. Vinay Bannai Luminous Networks

1 0

RE: [WAY OT]: concern over public peering points...
by Stewart, William C (Bill), RTSLS 08 Jul '04

08 Jul '04

Steve wrote: > water - 8" of it Scary stuff - was that at Murray Hill? My department at Holmdel inherited a computer lab with various Vaxen, and more obvious problem under the raised floor was too much cable to get all the tiles to stay down. The less obvious problems had to do with unbalanced grounding on the power feeds, but at least it was dry. Edward Lewis wrote: > [Secure building with a Mac FOIRL'd to unsecured building with thinwire; > security officer said it was ok] And it probably was ok, at least if you're allowed to have the Mac with a networking connection to outside at all. The fiber connection means that it's not going to act as an antenna and leak out data that didn't get there from in or very near the Mac. We used printers inside and OCR outside as our data network for nonsensitive data; I tried to buy a paper tape punch and reader but by the late 80s DEC wasn't making those any more :-) Bill Stewart

2 1

Source of dictionary MTA attacks
by Jon R. Kibler 08 Jul '04

08 Jul '04

Greetings, In the past 10 hours, we have had over 5,000 dictionary MTA attacks originate from IPs in the 67.234.73.0/24 netblock, which appear to be uu.net (MCI) dial access IPs in the Dallas-Ft. Worth area. We have notified MCI and blocked this netblock at the border. Something interesting about this attack... the attacking software generates dictionary addresses in groups ranging from 16 to 29 addresses. We have seen an almost identical number of dictionary probes for each count of dictionary addresses (i.e., X occurrences of 16 addresses/connection, X occurrences of 17...). Just a heads up... you may want to look out for these patterns. Jon Kibler -- Jon R. Kibler Chief Technical Officer A.S.E.T., Inc. Charleston, SC USA (843) 849-8214 ================================================== Filtered by: TRUSTEM.COM's Email Filtering Service http://www.trustem.com/ No Spam. No Viruses. Just Good Clean Email.

1 1

RE: [WAY OT]: concern over public peering points [WAS: Peering po int speed publicly available?]
by Williams, Jeff 08 Jul '04

08 Jul '04

Not really a "WTF" on my part, but... Many years ago I was hand tracing a cable in a data center due to the usual lack of docs and ensuing spaghetti factory. Said cable went under the three foot raised floor, so I dove in. I'd been going for a while and was getting concerned that I'd accidentally gotten hold of the wrong cable, so I called back to my co-worker to give it a tug. No response. I decided to come up for air and try again. I had crawled under two equipment rows and into the operator area and I can only imagine what that operator thought was happening when I just popped up through the floor next to her. Judging by the yelp and the look I got it was probably not good. Still gives me a chuckle thinking about it. Jeff -----Original Message----- From: owner-nanog(a)merit.edu [mailto:owner-nanog@merit.edu] On Behalf Of Valdis.Kletnieks(a)vt.edu Sent: Wednesday, July 07, 2004 12:43 AM To: Leo Bicknell Cc: nanog(a)merit.edu Subject: Re: concern over public peering points [WAS: Peering point speed publicly available?] On Tue, 06 Jul 2004 08:46:49 EDT, Leo Bicknell <bicknell(a)ufp.org> said: > Everyone running their cable wherever they want with no controls, and > abandoning it all in place makes a huge mess, and is one way to think > about it. While clearing out the space that eventually ended up being repurposed for a supercomputer, we encountered a small run of Ethernet Classic - the thickwire stuff. We never did figure out how or why it got there (I doubt that anybody stashed it down there just for storage stretched straight out, with 3 vampire taps still attached), as the location in question was still cow pasture when we decided that all new cable would be thinwire (and we certainly had plenty of THAT under the floor, buried under all the cat-5...) And we're a small enough shop with low enough personnel turnover that rounding up *all* the possible co-conspirators and getting somebody to admit "Ahh... now there's a story attached to that wire..." usually doesn't take more than 3 or 4 pitchers of Guinness... ;) Which almost begs the question - what's the oddest "WTF??" anybody's willing to admit finding under a raised floor, or up in a ceiling or cable chase or similar location? (Feel free to change names to protect the guilty if need be....:) ************************************************************** This message, including any attachments, contains confidential information intended for a specific individual and purpose, and is protected by law. If you are not the intended recipient, please contact sender immediately by reply e-mail and destroy all copies. You are hereby notified that any disclosure, copying, or distribution of this message, or the taking of any action based on it, is strictly prohibited. TIAA-CREF **************************************************************

2 1

[OT] Layer 2 Trace
by Vicky 08 Jul '04

08 Jul '04

Hi there, Just wondering if there's anyone who can recommend a layer 2 trace utility similar to "l2trace" on a cisco switch but one that runs on a linux box? Any help will be appreciated. regards, /vicky

1 0