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FCC ruling
by Moe Allen 27 Feb '99

27 Feb '99

Anyone got any thoughts on the FCC deal and how it can be handled. Morris Allen VidcomNet, Inc.

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The Cidr Report
by Tony Bates 27 Feb '99

27 Feb '99

This is an auto-generated mail on Fri Feb 26 12:00:00 PST 1999 It is not checked before it leaves my workstation. However, hopefully you will find this report interesting and will take the time to look through this to see if you can improve the amount of aggregation you perform. The report is split into sections: 0) General Status List the route table history for the last week, list any possibly bogus routes seen and give some status on ASes. 1) Gains by aggregating at the origin AS level This lists the "Top 30" players who if they decided to aggregate their announced classful prefixes at the origin AS level could make a significant difference in the reduction of the current size of the Internet routing table. This calculation does not take into account the inclusion of holes when forming an aggregate so it is possible even larger reduction should be possible. 2) Weekly Delta A summary of the last weeks changes in terms of withdrawn and added routes. Please note that this is only a snapshot but does give some indication of ASes participating in CIDR. Clearly, it is generally a good thing to see a large amont of withdrawls. 3) Interesting aggregates Interesting here means not an aggregate made as a set of classful routes. Thanks to xara.net for giving me access to their routing tables once a day. Please send any comments about this report directly to me. Check http://www.employees.org/~tbates/cidr-report.html for a daily update of this report. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ CIDR REPORT for 26Feb99 0) General Status Table History ------------- Date Prefixes 190299 56528 200299 56373 210299 56116 220299 56354 230299 56456 240299 56506 250299 56299 260299 56598 Check http://www.employees.org/~tbates/cidr.plot.html for a plot of the table history. Possible Bogus Routes --------------------- AS Summary ---------- Number of ASes in routing system: 4611 Number of ASes announcing only one prefix: 2304 (1234 cidr, 1070 classful) Largest number of cidr routes: 357 announced by AS701 Largest number of classful routes: 867 announced by AS701 1) Gains by aggregating at the origin AS level --- 26Feb99 --- ASnum NetsNow NetsCIDR NetGain % Gain Description AS271 355 144 211 59.4% BCnet Backbone AS2493 270 153 117 43.3% iSTAR Internet, Inc. AS174 641 529 112 17.5% Performance Systems International AS11305 116 8 108 93.1% UNKNOWN AS4755 158 78 80 50.6% Videsh Sanchar Nigam Ltd. India AS1267 107 29 78 72.9% IUNET-AS AS3749 140 63 77 55.0% TECNET AS4293 218 144 74 33.9% IMCI AS7545 112 48 64 57.1% TPG Internet Pty Ltd AS4200 165 101 64 38.8% AGIS (Apex Global Information Ser AS1221 423 360 63 14.9% AARNET-AS AS4740 385 324 61 15.8% Ozemail Pty Ltd (ASN-OZEMAIL) AS7046 258 200 58 22.5% UUNET-CUSTOMER AS1239 529 471 58 11.0% SprintLink Backbone AS72 89 37 52 58.4% Schlumberger Information Network AS10928 102 50 52 51.0% UNKNOWN AS577 222 172 50 22.5% Bell Canada Backbone AS7657 142 93 49 34.5% The Internet Group Limited AS7496 78 29 49 62.8% Power Up AS719 460 414 46 10.0% LANLINK autonomous system AS803 78 34 44 56.4% SaskNet Backbone AS852 177 137 40 22.6% AGT Advance Communication AS701 867 828 39 4.5% Alternet AS5674 64 27 37 57.8% PBI-NET-BLK AS7745 39 4 35 89.7% BIGSKY-AS AS7122 112 77 35 31.2% MTS ADVANCED Network Policy AS1785 249 217 32 12.9% NYSERNet Backbone AS1 505 473 32 6.3% BBNPLANET AS6332 94 63 31 33.0% TELNOR AS549 163 132 31 19.0% ONet Backbone For the rest of the previous weeks gain information please see http://www.employees.org:80/~tbates/cidr-report.html 2) Weekly Delta Please see http://www.employees.org:80/~tbates/cidr-report.html for this part of the report 3) Interesting aggregates Please see http://www.employees.org:80/~tbates/cidr-report.html for this part of the report

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Re: Suggestion: Add contact entry to whois
by Dean Anderson 27 Feb '99

27 Feb '99

Well, he has a point. In this case, you can always 'ring up' his upstream provider, who can either turn off the whole connection or block the offending host(s). Or your upstream provider. I don't see this as being much different from "no-support" dialin services. They may not be manned at all. Most ISP's are planning for unmanned POP's. It might not be all that long before we have providers with near total lights out except for bean counters and maintenance people who replace failed parts in fault tolerant equipment now and then. Some might say we have that now ;-) Many places aren't 24 hour, and 24 hour staff doesn't really buy all that much if the Noc operators can't make changes anyway. So what use is a phone number? Indeed, I recall that not so long ago people talked about taking contacts away completely to prevent them from being used 'inappropriately', which I think they meant as 'contact info is public to other NOC's only, and only for NOC use, not customer support or anything else' What people should really start thinking about is automated systems to do these things, and authentication/trust relationships for other Nocs to make changes and some kind of penalty for abuse of that system. --Dean At 02:27 PM 2/26/1999 -0800, Dan Hollis wrote: >On Fri, 26 Feb 1999, Bob Allisat wrote: >> FCN gives no contacts for the Domain names >> registered here. It is no-one's business who >> registers with us. We are not in the business >> of acting as snitches for overly snoopy and >> prying computer system administrators. If any- >> one has a problem they can contact the police >> and, accompanied with an appropriate court >> order we will be happy to comply with any real, >> legitimate investigation. Otherwise fork off, >> nosey nerds, it's none of your darned business. > >So in other words if an fcn host is found to be originating denial of >service attacks, you suggest we contact the local police and FBI rather >than ringing you up and asking you to disable their ongoing attacks. > >And in the time it takes to process a court order you will continue to >allow those hosts to originate smurf/pingfloods etc. > >Gotcha. So noted. > >So we now know that when an fcn host is conducting denial of service >attacks, we should immediately start the paperwork filing for criminal >negligence and punitive damages ahead of time. > >-Dan > > > > ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ Plain Aviation, Inc dean(a)av8.com LAN/WAN/UNIX/NT/TCPIP http://www.av8.com ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

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Re: Mail "HACKs"
by Martin Cooper 27 Feb '99

27 Feb '99

Piete Brookes <piete.brookes(a)cl.cam.ac.uk> writes: > It appears that once again you seem to have b*ggered things up with your > mail HACKs, it that you sent messages to "teaching-research(a)cl.cam.ac.uk" > but the RFC 822 headers had: > > From: Martin Cooper <mjc(a)cooper.org.uk> > To: janet-ip(a)warwick.ac.uk > Cc: anne.campbell.mp(a)dial.pipex.com, rpa(a)insnet.net > Subject: Re: relevance of MTCP email to janet-ip > Message-Id: <E10GWjP-0000aI-00(a)nmg2.csi.cam.ac.uk> > Sender: Martin Cooper <mjc64(a)ucs.cam.ac.uk> > > and > > From: Martin Cooper <mjc(a)cooper.org.uk> > To: John.Dyer(a)ukerna.ac.uk > Cc: janet-ip(a)warwick.ac.uk, rpa(a)insnet.net > Message-Id: <E10GWgV-0000aG-00(a)nmg2.csi.cam.ac.uk> > Sender: Martin Cooper <mjc64(a)ucs.cam.ac.uk> > > i.e. no reason at all to go to *every* member of T&R. > > Can you pelase explain what is going on, and what steps you are going to > take to avoid any recurrances ? > > I would have thought after the last incident, you would have taken somewhat > more care ! Piete, I would have thought (and would like to believe) that you (of all people) would recognise the basic absolute human-right to freedom of speech. Distressingly, or so it would seem, you appear unprepared to grant me this basic right (albeit that my emails will attract unwelcome attention, and cause much political weight to be brought to bear upon my head come Monday morning). RFC 822 (as extensively documented by the late Dr. Jonathan Postel founder of the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) specifies the "Bcc:", also widely known as the "Blind Carbon Copy" header, intended to allow the (E)SMTP mail sender to specify priviledged recipients to whom an email may be sent, with a view to keeping the nature of such primary recipients of a message unaware of the extent of the distribution of the message, for whatever, tactful, political, or otherwise reasons unknown. If I am required to resign because I express unpopular, or politically non-expedient views, by whatever means, then so be it. I feel that it would not be unreasonable to hope that the wider Internet community would sympathise with me, and permit me to earn my living through my desire to further the goals of that community, by working with whoever may feel minded to give me house room. Martin Cooper Taking much care to express my views, as ever, for myself...

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Re: relevance of MTCP email to janet-ip
by Martin Cooper 27 Feb '99

27 Feb '99

David Roberts of Leicester seems to have implied that my "Mark Thomas Comedy Product" email of earlier this week was not relevant to the list. As no-one has formerly asked the question, I shall ask and answer it myself. Martin - Why are you posting this drivel to this serious academic and research networking forum? Although the JANET community does not generally consist of profit- making organisations, many Universities and Colleges in the community do collaborate with commerce and industry, often in the European as well as the transatlantic regions. Since the end of the Cold War, Menwith Hill's functions have allegedly been moving into commercial spying as part of the UKUSA agreement in the extended national interests of the two countries. Clearly this is in itself of serious concern, however... The likely appearence of the government's Electronic Commerce Bill draft bill by Easter of this year, possibly and probably containing wide-reaching proposals for outlawing strong-crypto, increasing law enforcement agencies powers of interception of communications without a warrant from the Home Secretary, and mandatory crypto key-escrow with so called Trusted Third Parties. The Confederation of British Industry (CBI) and Sun Microsystems have both made formal representations to Stephen Byers, the new secretary of state for Trade and Industry following Peter Mandelson's departure earlier in the year, opposing the key-escrow element of the expected draft bill, and possibly the strong-crypto element(s) as well. As I have said before, any freedom of speech is hard won, particularly academic freedom of speech. Without getting too party political here, the present government does appear to have rather worrying control as well as media manipulation for propaganda tendencies, and I do not wish to see this bill go through without proper debate, in view of the many Members of Parliament struggling to understand the issues involved. I understand that there is a rather good web site recommending the "adoption" of your MP to help them understand these issues if they do not already. It can be found at http://www.stand.org.uk/ I hope the above goes some way towards explaining the context for my earlier email. Martin Cooper Speaking for myself...

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None
by Martin Cooper 27 Feb '99

27 Feb '99

In your white paper "UK Academic Network Architecture" (p27 of 42) at http://www.ja.net/documents/net_arch.html I find the following: 11.2 Commercial Sector The commercial sector has to date shown very little interest in the provision of a pervasive educational network on a national basis. This was a clear outcome from the market test in 1996 and is thought by most to still be the case even though the market has changed considerably with many new Internet Service Providers. The Deloitte Touche value for money study, commissioned by the JISC and delivered in October 1996 made a very clear statement that the benefits arising from JANET heavily outweigh the costs. Some of the Deloitte Touche assumptions now seem a little exaggerated, but there is general acceptance in the community that JANET is good value for money, a view frequently voiced by those in other educational sectors who have attempted to buy similar services on the open market. Most people involved in UK Academic Networking believe that the provision and co-ordination of national service by a not for profit organisation is the right approach. Might I ask what is at the following URL, if not a concrete proposal indicating significant interest from a commercial organisation? I wonder, if UKERNA did not stand to gain quite so much by ruling out collaborating with commercial organisations in meeting UK academic and research community networking requirements, would you perhaps have made reference to it? http://www.edex.net.uk/whitepaper/nen.htm The board of INSnet has a considerable history of service to the UK academic and research networking community through past association with the University of Kent in Canterbury and UKnet (subsequently EUnet GB). Martin Cooper Speaking for myself...

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Re: Suggestion: Add contact entry to whois
by owen＠DeLong.SJ.CA.US 27 Feb '99

27 Feb '99

> The only problem is your collegues want detailed > Administrative, Billing, Technical and now Abuse > and security and who knows what other private data > for be globally available. And how many other people > will use this information, even our phone numbers, > for their own, negative purposes? So while your call > may be benign there are many more callers or mail > advertisers, bulk e-mailers and so on who abuse the > heck out of what should be confidential data. > We want it to be possible for people who choose to to publish this information. Noone was proposing requiring additional data. Owen

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Re: Suggestion: Add contact entry to whois
by Tim Wolfe 26 Feb '99

26 Feb '99

On Fri, 26 Feb 1999, Bob Allisat wrote: > How about this astro... FCN, in protecting the > privacy of it's law-abiding clients, keeps all > information provided PRIVATE and CONFIDENTIAL. > As per our Terms of Service. In the event of > the rare abuse of our services those aflicted > contact the appropriate authorities who, in > term, begin investigating like they would any > other complaint from the public. If the need > arises they seek a court order for information > which is otherwise confidential. The investigation > continues to what is, hopefully, an appropriate > conclusion. All with public oversight, civilian > control and legal safeguards. > How utopian. The only problem with that argument is that stopping a DOS attack does not require that a provider to divulge confidential information about a customer anyways... Unless of course, someone is trying to bring legal action after the fact, which is normally accompanied by the court orders, subpoenas, etc that you cherish so much. Maybe I'm just doing something extraordinary, but if someone calls me up and says, "I'm seeing a massive smurf attack originating from X.Y.Z.A and we see that you own X.Y.Z.A-X.Y.Z.F. Can you verify and take action according to your AUP/TOS?", I can't think of why I would need to divulge client info to accede to that request.. I can just verify the veracity of the accuser's info, and take action. I'm just not following your logic, do you think that if someone calls and says "X.Y.Z.A is (insert DOS)ing me!", you must reply, "Oh yes, it's company XYZ.Net, they are so naughty!" Tim ---------------------------------------------------- Timothy M. Wolfe | Why surf when you can Sail? tim(a)clipper.net | Join Oregon's Premier Sr. Network Engineer | Wireless Internet Provider! ClipperNet Corporation | http://www.clipper.net/ ----------------------------------------------------

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Re: Suggestion: Add contact entry to whois
by owen＠dixon.DeLong.SJ.CA.US 26 Feb '99

26 Feb '99

OK, perhaps, then, we should consider two contacts: Complaints contact (the destination for complaints about SPAMMERS and such) (SPAM) Enforcement contact (the destination for people who can respond to real-time hacking concerns) (SMURF, FLOOD, HACKING) Tech contact would still be my bet for Bad BGP, as this is usually accidental and not malicious. Bottom line, the Tech. contact for alot of these providers is an address that gets reviewed once a day or such and doesn't provide anything more effective than a secretary putting a post-it on the door. The Admin contact is supposed to be just that, and usually is. The billing contact, as I see it would only be used by InterNIC and possibly people who want to seek reparations for SPAM. I don't pretend that the names I chose above are necessarily the best terms that can be applied, and I am flexible about what to call them. However, I do think they are needed at this point. Owen > Owen DeLong wrote: > > > We already have Admin, Tech, and Billing. Would it be possible to consider > > the addition of an Abuse contact in whois? > > The existing contacts serve that function. If someone at some place is > smurfing you, you don't want to talk to some secretary who is going to > stick a post-it on some manager's door about it. You want the NOC and > you want the person in the NOC who can initiate immediate investigation > and correct the problem. Well, at least I do. > > Define "abuse". It comes in a lot of categories, anyway. Which category > do you think an abuse contact should be getting them for? Smurf? Flood? > Spam? Bad BGP? Hacking? > > -- > -- *-----------------------------* Phil Howard KA9WGN * -- > -- | Inturnet, Inc. | Director of Internet Services | -- > -- | Business Internet Solutions | eng at intur.net | -- > -- *-----------------------------* phil at intur.net * -- >

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Re: Suggestion: Add contact entry to whois
by Dan Hollis 26 Feb '99

26 Feb '99

On Fri, 26 Feb 1999, Bob Allisat wrote: > FCN gives no contacts for the Domain names > registered here. It is no-one's business who > registers with us. We are not in the business > of acting as snitches for overly snoopy and > prying computer system administrators. If any- > one has a problem they can contact the police > and, accompanied with an appropriate court > order we will be happy to comply with any real, > legitimate investigation. Otherwise fork off, > nosey nerds, it's none of your darned business. So in other words if an fcn host is found to be originating denial of service attacks, you suggest we contact the local police and FBI rather than ringing you up and asking you to disable their ongoing attacks. And in the time it takes to process a court order you will continue to allow those hosts to originate smurf/pingfloods etc. Gotcha. So noted. So we now know that when an fcn host is conducting denial of service attacks, we should immediately start the paperwork filing for criminal negligence and punitive damages ahead of time. -Dan

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