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RE: Cisco Router best for full BGP on a sub 5K bidget 7500 7200orother vendor ?
by sthaug＠nethelp.no 25 Apr '04

25 Apr '04

> It is a great box. But I need BGP. I notice Cisco does not support 7505 > with Software Advisor but does 7507 whats the deal with that ? There are no differences between the 7505 and the 7507 when it comes to BGP. As for the 3550, it'll do BGP just fine - but it can't handle a full routing table. Same with the 3750. Steinar Haug, Nethelp consulting, sthaug(a)nethelp.no

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RE: Lazy network operators
by Michel Py 25 Apr '04

25 Apr '04

> Paul Jakma wrote: > Hmmm, or rather, there just wont be any demand for > IPv6 deployment, at least from the edges (consumers, > small/medium networks). Oh oh I see another one taking the path that leads to the dark side. _.-'~~~~~~`-._ / || \ / || \ | || | | _______||_______ | |/ ----- \/ ----- \| / ( ) ( ) \ / \ ----- () ----- / \ / \ /||\ / \ / \ /||||\ / \ / \ /||||||\ / \ /_ \o========o/ _\ `--...__|`-._ _.-'|__...--' | `' |

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Re: Cisco Router best for full BGP on a sub 5K bidget 7500 7200 orother vendor ?
by sthaug＠nethelp.no 25 Apr '04

25 Apr '04

> > I bought a Riverstone Rs-3000 for BGP with a single upstream provider. > > Great Deal. > > Yeah, it might be a Great Deal (tm), but you're in for some surprises. > I've seen an RS-8600 (with CM3 and 512MB on board) nearly melt under > 13Mbps of Nachi, to the point that I had to set the CM failover > keepalive timer to >30 seconds. This should come as no surprise - the Riverstone boxes are flow-based. Steinar Haug, Nethelp consulting, sthaug(a)nethelp.no

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Re: Juniper failes to change keys (More MD5 fun: Cisco uses wrong MD5key for old session after key change)
by sthaug＠nethelp.no 24 Apr '04

24 Apr '04

> > After a while I decided to change the MD5 key. The session with the new > > key came up and looked fine, but the old session didn't close properly. > > Notice the close is initiated from the Juniper side, and the first > > packet from the Cisco side is now sent with an invalid MD5 digest - it > > turns out that the packet is actually sent with an MD5 digest based on > > the *new* key: > > This is a feature, and hopefully Juniper will also add the same feature > soon. The feature allows you to change the MD5 key without flapping the > BGP session which is very important on large peering sessions. There is > no requirement that MD5 keys must remain constant throughout an entire TCP > session, or to terminate a TCP session when the key changes. As long as > both sides agree, the key can be changed at any time including in the > middle of a TCP session. New packets after the key change are sent with > message digests based on the new key. But as long as the session *is* reset anyway, the current situation is extremely confusing - the log messages (on both Cisco and Juniper) give no indication that the invalid key in question is for an *old* BGP session, no longer active! Steinar Haug, Nethelp consulting, sthaug(a)nethelp.no

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Re: TCP/BGP vulnerability - easier than you think
by Iljitsch van Beijnum 23 Apr '04

23 Apr '04

On 21-apr-04, at 22:00, Paul Jakma wrote: >>> Why would MD5 be more of a crypto DoS risk with IPSec AH headers than >>> with bgp tcp-md5? >> Beats me. But why do you bring up IPsec? > The paragraph is quoted is your advice against using IPSec, Unless I was really sleep-typing I didn't say anything about IPsec, just about "crypto", which as far as I'm concerned includes MD5, which we were talking about. > I dont > see why an MD5 auth header IPSec protected sessions would have more > risk of crypto DoS than compared to the simple BGP TCP MD5 hack. The > risk is due to MD5, not IPSec :). As Crist Clark just pointed out: the presence of the SPI and replay counter actually makes it harder to do a crypto DoS against IPsec than the TCP MD5 option (assuming the traffic can't be sniffed). Makes you wonder if those TDM guys weren't on to something with out of band signalling, doesn't it? >> Anyway, what needs to happen is a form of crypto where the >> expensive algorithms are only executed for good packets and not for >> all packets. > So configure ipsec to authenticate packets between the peers allowing > only md5 or somesuch. I dont know about other IOS, but other > implementations do allow one to specify security associations on a > per port basis. Another advantage of IPsec is that it allows for key changes in a sane way. I'm not sure I'd want my routers to run IKE, though. However, note that even a relatively light-weight check such as an HMAC-MD5 can blow away a typical router CPU at orders of magnitude below line rate, so it is essential that attackers don't get to bypass the non-crypto checks for than a tiny fraction of the packets they spoof.

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RE: Backbone IP network Economics - peering and transit
by Michel Py 23 Apr '04

23 Apr '04

> Deepak Jain wrote: > But that structure doesn't vary vastly if you'd traffic out > that gig via transit vs direct connect. It does vary (and > add lots of infrastructure) if you don't aggregate your > traffic at IXes and instead use loops to bring transit to > you instead of going to it. (say a few 100Mb/s or OC3s in > a few places instead of a GigE at an IX). Indeed. > Perhaps we should (for technical reasons) describe > peering as "direct connecting". This makes a lot of sense to me (although I would suggest a different name later). Since the beginning I have been trying to make the point that "direct connecting" was typically a no-brainer in terms of money. Peering when you have to buy the local loop is not such a slam dunk. > Business reasons aside, technically the difference is > that with transit you are expecting access via indirect > connections to networks. I'm not so sure about this. There are lots of people that buy transit and are directly connected to their provider in an IX for example. > With peering you expect direct connections into a network. If "direct connecting" != peering then definitely. Maybe we need to say differentiate between: - Connected transit - Remote transit - Connected peering - Remote peering And agree that, by default, transit ~= remote transit peering ~= direct peering Michel.

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Alternate and/or hidden infrastructure addresses (BGP/TCP RST/SYN vulnerability)
by Lane Patterson 23 Apr '04

23 Apr '04

Although someone mentioned using non-routable /30 or /31's on private eBGP peers, there hasn't been much broad-ranging discussion of keeping internal infrastructure addresses non-routable. I am thinking of a couple different things here: 1. Backbone addresses: ISPs that hide interface addresses and/or primary loopback addresses, and best practices for doing so? (e.g. traceroutes don't break, but the router uses say Loopback1 address to respond to them, while iBGP uses Loopback0. All Loopback0 address blocks can be filtered at borders.) 2. Public IX addresses: ISPs that do not redistribute the IX prefix into their iBGP or IGP and do not use external next-hops (except local to the connected border router), but instead use the loopback of the border router when propogating these routes within their iBGP mesh. This should not break traceroutes "through" the exchange, but will break any traffic such as ping, spoofed packets, etc. to the exchange from a non-connected router. Can anyone provide pro/con, better description of config templates for doing this, and/or discussion of major networks that choose to do this, or not do this? Cheers, -Lane

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Re: Alternate and/or hidden infrastructure addresses (BGP/TCP RST/SYNvulnerability)
by sthaug＠nethelp.no 23 Apr '04

23 Apr '04

> > (TTL should only be decremented when _forwarding_, and I don't think > > you could argue that you need to _forward_ a packet from your ingress > > interface to your _loopback_ interface..) > > Well, if that were the case, then you wouldn't need multi-hop to do > loopback peering. Different issue (directly connected interfaces vs not directly connected). Easy test: Connect two routers (I used Ciscos) to the same Ethernet switch, sniff the traffic between them. Ping from one router to the other on the directly connected interfaces, observe TTL with sniffer. Ping from loopback on one router to loopback on the other, observe TTL again. I see the *same* TTL in both cases, which means that at least for the IOS version I was testing, TTL is not decremented when sending from the loopback interface. Steinar Haug, Nethelp consulting, sthaug(a)nethelp.no

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Point and click tools released for RST/SYN vulnerability
by Mike Tancsa 23 Apr '04

23 Apr '04

http://lists.netsys.com/pipermail/full-disclosure/2004-April/020458.html The full original paper is at http://www.osvdb.org/4030 ---Mike -------------------------------------------------------------------- Mike Tancsa, tel +1 519 651 3400 Sentex Communications, mike(a)sentex.net Providing Internet since 1994 www.sentex.net Cambridge, Ontario Canada www.sentex.net/mike

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The Cidr Report
by cidr-report＠potaroo.net 23 Apr '04

23 Apr '04

This report has been generated at Fri Apr 23 21:43:46 2004 AEST. The report analyses the BGP Routing Table of an AS4637 (Reach) router and generates a report on aggregation potential within the table. Check http://www.cidr-report.org/as4637 for a current version of this report. Recent Table History Date Prefixes CIDR Agg 16-04-04 133338 93532 17-04-04 133459 93509 18-04-04 133358 93567 19-04-04 133352 93577 20-04-04 133521 93727 21-04-04 133676 93739 22-04-04 133763 93752 23-04-04 133783 93829 AS Summary 16996 Number of ASes in routing system 6845 Number of ASes announcing only one prefix 1408 Largest number of prefixes announced by an AS AS7018 : ATTW AT&T WorldNet Services 73610240 Largest address span announced by an AS (/32s) AS568 : DISOUN DISO-UNRRA Aggregation Summary The algorithm used in this report proposes aggregation only when there is a precise match using the AS path, so as to preserve traffic transit policies. Aggregation is also proposed across non-advertised address space ('holes'). --- 23Apr04 --- ASnum NetsNow NetsAggr NetGain % Gain Description Table 133912 93842 40070 29.9% All ASes AS4134 706 140 566 80.2% CHINANET-BACKBONE No.31,Jin-rong Street AS4323 718 202 516 71.9% TWTC Time Warner Telecom AS7018 1408 981 427 30.3% ATTW AT&T WorldNet Services AS6197 691 305 386 55.9% BNS-14 BellSouth Network Solutions, Inc AS7843 497 112 385 77.5% ADELPH-13 Adelphia Corp. AS701 1296 932 364 28.1% UU UUNET Technologies, Inc. AS22909 384 31 353 91.9% CMCS Comcast Cable Communications, Inc. AS27364 405 70 335 82.7% ARMC Armstrong Cable Services AS6198 561 229 332 59.2% BNS-14 BellSouth Network Solutions, Inc AS9583 438 116 322 73.5% SATYAMNET-AS Satyam Infoway Ltd., AS22773 361 42 319 88.4% CXAB Cox Communications Inc. Atlanta AS9929 339 31 308 90.9% CNCNET-CN China Netcom Corp. AS1239 948 644 304 32.1% SPRN Sprint AS17676 339 37 302 89.1% JPNIC-JP-ASN-BLOCK Japan Network Information Center AS4355 381 99 282 74.0% ERSD EARTHLINK, INC AS6140 379 105 274 72.3% IMPSA ImpSat AS6478 300 47 253 84.3% ATTW AT&T WorldNet Services AS209 759 520 239 31.5% QWEST-4 Qwest AS1221 860 628 232 27.0% ASN-TELSTRA Telstra Pty Ltd AS25844 243 16 227 93.4% SASMFL-2 Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP AS14654 227 4 223 98.2% WAYPOR-3 Wayport AS11305 241 31 210 87.1% INTERL-80 Interland Incorporated AS4766 462 254 208 45.0% KIX Korea Internet Exchange for "96 World Internet Exposition AS3356 898 693 205 22.8% LEVEL3 Level 3 Communications AS9443 359 170 189 52.6% INTERNETPRIMUS-AS-AP Primus Telecommunications AS2386 431 244 187 43.4% ADCS-1 AT&T Data Communications Services AS6347 377 195 182 48.3% SAVV SAVVIS Communications Corporation AS6327 206 28 178 86.4% SHAWC-2 Shaw Communications Inc. AS14824 275 108 167 60.7% NCC-105 NewSouth Communications Corp. AS15270 208 42 166 79.8% PDP-14 PaeTec.net -a division of PaeTecCommunications, Inc. Total 15697 7056 8641 55.0% Top 30 total Possible Bogus Routes 24.138.80.0/20 AS11260 AHSICHCL Andara High Speed Internet c/o Halifax Cable Ltd. 24.246.0.0/17 AS7018 ATTW AT&T WorldNet Services 24.246.128.0/18 AS7018 ATTW AT&T WorldNet Services 60.254.0.0/20 AS23889 MAURITIUS-TELECOM-AS-AP MAURITIUS TELECOM 64.22.0.0/18 AS3561 CWU Cable & Wireless USA 64.46.0.0/18 AS7850 IHIGHW iHighway.net, Inc. 64.46.4.0/22 AS11711 TULARO TULAROSA COMMUNICATIONS 64.46.12.0/24 AS7850 IHIGHW iHighway.net, Inc. 64.46.27.0/24 AS8674 NETNOD-IX Netnod Internet Exchange Sverige AB 64.46.34.0/24 AS3408 64.46.60.0/24 AS7850 IHIGHW iHighway.net, Inc. 64.46.63.0/24 AS7850 IHIGHW iHighway.net, Inc. 66.51.128.0/20 AS23401 NAC Net Access Corporation 66.51.140.0/24 AS23401 NAC Net Access Corporation 66.114.0.0/19 AS16526 BIRCHT Birch Telecom, Inc. 69.26.32.0/19 AS17307 VIRTEL-15 Virtela Communications 132.0.0.0/10 AS568 DISOUN DISO-UNRRA 137.0.0.0/13 AS568 DISOUN DISO-UNRRA 138.136.0.0/13 AS568 DISOUN DISO-UNRRA 158.0.0.0/13 AS568 DISOUN DISO-UNRRA 160.213.112.0/20 AS25440 INFONET-NESTLE Nestle European Data Center 160.213.240.0/20 AS25440 INFONET-NESTLE Nestle European Data Center 164.234.0.0/16 AS721 DNIC DoD Network Information Center 164.234.0.0/18 AS721 DNIC DoD Network Information Center 192.30.93.0/24 AS17757 HPAUS-AP HP Australia 192.30.94.0/24 AS17757 HPAUS-AP HP Australia 192.30.127.0/24 AS719 LANLINK Elisa Oyj 192.40.105.0/24 AS5515 SONERA-GLOBAL-IP Sonera Solution Autonomous System 192.43.230.0/24 AS4738 SAARDNET-AS South Australian Academic Research and Development Network 192.44.0.0/19 AS702 AS702 MCI EMEA 192.81.182.0/24 AS719 LANLINK Elisa Oyj 192.81.183.0/24 AS719 LANLINK Elisa Oyj 192.81.184.0/24 AS719 LANLINK Elisa Oyj 192.119.135.0/24 AS270 NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration 192.124.252.0/22 AS680 DFN-IP service G-WiN 192.133.6.0/24 AS4004 GLOBALONE-EQUANT-UK Equant UK Autonomous System 192.135.50.0/24 AS7018 ATTW AT&T WorldNet Services 192.136.71.0/24 AS719 LANLINK Elisa Oyj 192.136.79.0/24 AS719 LANLINK Elisa Oyj 192.153.144.0/21 AS568 DISOUN DISO-UNRRA 192.172.0.0/19 AS568 DISOUN DISO-UNRRA 192.188.208.0/20 AS568 DISOUN DISO-UNRRA 192.243.32.0/23 AS2044 PALINA Palin Aquisitions Inc. 198.23.26.0/24 AS4390 BELLAT-7 Bell Atlantic, Inc. 198.97.72.0/21 AS568 DISOUN DISO-UNRRA 198.97.80.0/20 AS568 DISOUN DISO-UNRRA 198.97.88.0/24 AS89 NUSC-1 Naval Underwater Systems Center 198.97.192.0/20 AS568 DISOUN DISO-UNRRA 198.97.240.0/20 AS568 DISOUN DISO-UNRRA 198.97.247.0/24 AS3475 DEPART-52 Department of the Navy 198.101.4.0/22 AS568 DISOUN DISO-UNRRA 198.136.32.0/20 AS19329 MCBCC Martin County Board of County Commissioners 198.144.32.0/19 AS3998 CITY CityNet, Inc. 198.161.87.0/24 AS6539 GTGR GT Group Telecom Services Corp. 198.161.165.0/24 AS852 AGTA Telus Advanced Communications 198.163.155.0/24 AS684 MRN Manitoba Regional Network 198.167.0.0/16 AS7456 INS-51 Interhop Network SERVICES Inc. 198.167.163.0/24 AS15290 ACCA-2 Allstream Corp. Corporation Allstream 198.168.0.0/16 AS701 UU UUNET Technologies, Inc. 198.169.0.0/16 AS803 SASK SaskTel 198.232.133.0/24 AS23075 SKOTOS Skotos Tech, Inc 199.10.0.0/16 AS568 DISOUN DISO-UNRRA 199.60.0.0/20 AS271 UBC-3 University of British Columbia 199.84.0.0/16 AS701 UU UUNET Technologies, Inc. 199.114.0.0/18 AS568 DISOUN DISO-UNRRA 199.114.0.0/21 AS568 DISOUN DISO-UNRRA 199.114.128.0/18 AS568 DISOUN DISO-UNRRA 199.114.130.0/24 AS721 DNIC DoD Network Information Center 199.114.132.0/24 AS721 DNIC DoD Network Information Center 199.114.136.0/24 AS1913 DLA-8 Defense Logistics Agency 199.114.138.0/24 AS721 DNIC DoD Network Information Center 199.114.140.0/24 AS3544 DISAUN DISA/UNRRA 199.114.142.0/24 AS721 DNIC DoD Network Information Center 199.114.144.0/24 AS721 DNIC DoD Network Information Center 199.114.148.0/24 AS721 DNIC DoD Network Information Center 199.114.150.0/24 AS721 DNIC DoD Network Information Center 199.114.152.0/24 AS1913 DLA-8 Defense Logistics Agency 199.114.154.0/24 AS1733 ADP-41 AF DDN PMO 199.114.156.0/24 AS1913 DLA-8 Defense Logistics Agency 199.114.160.0/24 AS1733 ADP-41 AF DDN PMO 199.120.32.0/19 AS16582 NXLI NEXTLEVEL INTERNET, INC. 199.121.0.0/16 AS568 DISOUN DISO-UNRRA 199.123.0.0/18 AS568 DISOUN DISO-UNRRA 199.123.16.0/20 AS568 DISOUN DISO-UNRRA 199.123.80.0/21 AS568 DISOUN DISO-UNRRA 199.189.32.0/19 AS7332 IQUEST IQuest Internet 199.197.8.0/22 AS21814 PARSON-18 Parsons Corp. 199.202.0.0/16 AS701 UU UUNET Technologies, Inc. 202.2.64.0/20 AS9729 IS-AP iAdvantage Limited 202.47.1.0/24 AS7491 PI-PH-AS-AP PI-PHILIPINES 202.70.0.0/20 AS4658 NETFRONT-AS NETFRONT I.T. LIMITED (HONG KONG) 202.70.28.0/24 AS4515 ERX-STAR Star Internet Services Ltd. 202.70.240.0/20 AS4058 LINKAGENET-AP CPCNet Hong Kong Ltd. 202.73.128.0/22 AS4058 LINKAGENET-AP CPCNet Hong Kong Ltd. 202.86.142.0/24 AS30362 HAWAI-1 Hawaii-Pacific Teleport 202.93.0.0/20 AS4134 CHINANET-BACKBONE No.31,Jin-rong Street 202.122.76.0/24 AS17553 TIMELESS-AP System Integration provider 202.123.96.0/20 AS9288 COMCEN-AS-AP Com-Cen Pty Ltd 202.133.3.0/24 AS9335 CIP-JAPAN-AS-AP ATT IPlus 202.155.243.0/24 AS4795 INDOSAT2-ID-AP INDOSATNET-ASN 202.164.224.0/19 AS7599 IPXC-AS-AP IP Exchange 203.32.4.0/23 AS7617 203.62.0.0/17 AS7572 AARNET-ACT-RNO Australian Academic and Reasearch Network (AARNet) 203.132.107.0/24 AS10236 FOXGOLD-NET-AU-AP FOXGOLD COMMUNICATIONS 203.132.108.0/24 AS10236 FOXGOLD-NET-AU-AP FOXGOLD COMMUNICATIONS 203.174.96.0/24 AS15412 FLAG-AS Flag Telecom Global Internet AS 204.69.144.0/22 AS5668 CIH-12 CenturyTel Internet Holdings, Inc. 204.154.125.0/24 AS3952 TELLAB-1 TELLABS Operations, Inc. 204.154.126.0/24 AS3952 TELLAB-1 TELLABS Operations, Inc. 204.154.127.0/24 AS3952 TELLAB-1 TELLABS Operations, Inc. 204.194.110.0/23 AS30653 EXOBI Exobit Networks Inc. 205.150.0.0/15 AS701 UU UUNET Technologies, Inc. 205.159.72.0/24 AS1660 ANSCOM-5 ANS Communications 206.41.32.0/19 AS14824 NCC-105 NewSouth Communications Corp. 206.81.187.0/24 AS19194 SNL-8 Sentris Network LLC 206.167.57.0/24 AS376 RISQR-3 Reseau Interordinateurs Scientique Quebecois (RISQ) 206.191.64.0/18 AS15290 ACCA-2 Allstream Corp. Corporation Allstream 206.251.69.0/24 AS27429 TIL-33 Telesat International Ltd. 206.253.190.0/23 AS8123 POLYBA Polybase 207.231.96.0/19 AS11194 NUNETI NuNet Inc 208.81.187.0/24 AS19194 SNL-8 Sentris Network LLC 209.169.219.0/24 AS189 GNTY Genuity 209.169.223.0/24 AS189 GNTY Genuity 209.172.0.0/18 AS7770 TRTI Triton Technologies, Inc. 209.205.69.0/24 AS21578 Universidad autonoma de Bucaramanga 209.205.70.0/24 AS21578 Universidad autonoma de Bucaramanga 209.205.81.0/24 AS15066 SkyNet de Colombia S.A. 209.205.82.0/24 AS15066 SkyNet de Colombia S.A. 209.205.84.0/24 AS15066 SkyNet de Colombia S.A. 209.213.32.0/19 AS10629 INS-52 Inter-Pacific Network Services 209.213.50.0/24 AS10629 INS-52 Inter-Pacific Network Services 209.213.51.0/24 AS10629 INS-52 Inter-Pacific Network Services 209.213.55.0/24 AS10629 INS-52 Inter-Pacific Network Services 209.213.56.0/24 AS10629 INS-52 Inter-Pacific Network Services 209.222.137.0/24 AS27429 TIL-33 Telesat International Ltd. 209.251.0.0/19 AS11036 SISCOM-1 SISCOM, Inc 209.251.64.0/19 AS10266 MDCN MDC, Inc. 210.213.0.0/19 AS6453 GLOBEINTERNET Teleglobe America Inc. 216.18.224.0/21 AS11458 IMBRIS-1 IMBRIS, INC. 216.18.224.0/22 AS11458 IMBRIS-1 IMBRIS, INC. 216.18.228.0/22 AS11458 IMBRIS-1 IMBRIS, INC. 216.96.128.0/18 AS7018 ATTW AT&T WorldNet Services 216.145.130.0/24 AS11937 TRXI TRX Inc. 216.145.132.0/24 AS11937 TRXI TRX Inc. 216.145.133.0/24 AS11937 TRXI TRX Inc. 216.145.134.0/24 AS11937 TRXI TRX Inc. 216.145.135.0/24 AS11937 TRXI TRX Inc. 216.145.152.0/24 AS10758 INWAVE INWave Internet, Inc 216.145.156.0/24 AS20304 JIS-32 JVLNET Internet Services 216.145.158.0/24 AS20304 JIS-32 JVLNET Internet Services 216.145.176.0/21 AS20304 JIS-32 JVLNET Internet Services 216.145.177.0/24 AS20304 JIS-32 JVLNET Internet Services 216.145.178.0/24 AS20304 JIS-32 JVLNET Internet Services 216.145.184.0/21 AS10758 INWAVE INWave Internet, Inc 216.145.200.0/21 AS20304 JIS-32 JVLNET Internet Services 216.186.151.0/24 AS3356 LEVEL3 Level 3 Communications 216.186.152.0/21 AS3356 LEVEL3 Level 3 Communications 216.186.160.0/23 AS3356 LEVEL3 Level 3 Communications 216.186.164.0/22 AS3356 LEVEL3 Level 3 Communications 216.186.192.0/19 AS3561 CWU Cable & Wireless USA 216.186.192.0/22 AS3356 LEVEL3 Level 3 Communications 216.186.198.0/23 AS3356 LEVEL3 Level 3 Communications 216.186.248.0/23 AS3356 LEVEL3 Level 3 Communications Please see http://www.cidr-report.org for the full report ------------------------------------ Copies of this report are mailed to: nanog(a)merit.edu eof-list(a)ripe.net apops(a)apops.net routing-wg(a)ripe.net afnog(a)afnog.org

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