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UltraDNS -> Neustar (xoxoxo)
by Martin Hannigan 20 Apr '06

20 Apr '06

Hello Neustar: http://www.tradingmarkets.com/tm.site/news/BREAKING%20NEWS/227044/ -M< -- Martin Hannigan (c) 617-388-2663 Renesys Corporation (w) 617-395-8574 Member of Technical Staff Network Operations hannigan(a)renesys.com

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Cisco Security Advisory: Cisco IOS XR MPLS Vulnerabilities
by Cisco Systems Product Security Incident Response Team 19 Apr '06

19 Apr '06

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Cisco Security Advisory: Cisco IOS XR MPLS Vulnerabilities Advisory ID: cisco-sa-20060419-xr http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20060419-xr.shtml Revision 1.0 For Public Release 2006 April 19 1500 UTC (GMT) - --------------------------------------------------------------------- Contents ======== Summary Affected Products Details Impact Software Version and Fixes Workarounds Obtaining Fixed Software Exploitation and Public Announcements Status of this Notice: FINAL Distribution Revision History Cisco Security Procedures - --------------------------------------------------------------------- Summary ======= Multiple Multi Protocol Label Switching (MPLS) related vulnerabilities exist on Cisco IOS XR. Only systems that are running Cisco IOS XR and configured for MPLS are affected by these vulnerabilities. Upon successful exploitation a Modular Services Card (MSC) on a Cisco Carrier Routing System 1 (CRS-1) or a Line Card (LC) on a Cisco 12000 series router may reload affecting switched traffic. Cisco has made free software available to address this vulnerability for affected customers. This advisory is posted at http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20060419-xr.shtml. Affected Products ================= Vulnerable Products +------------------ Only systems that are running Cisco IOS XR and configured for MPLS are affected by this vulnerability. Systems that are running Cisco IOS XR and configured for MPLS can be identified by the show mpls interfaces command. A sample output of this command on a CRS-1 that is configured for MPLS is given below. RP/0/RP1/CPU0:crs1#show mpls interfaces Interface LDP Tunnel Enabled -------------------------- -------- -------- -------- POS0/2/0/0 Yes Yes Yes POS0/2/0/1 No Yes Yes POS0/2/0/2 Yes No Yes POS0/2/0/3 Yes Yes Yes GigabitEthernet0/3/1/0 Yes No Yes GigabitEthernet0/3/1/3 Yes No Yes POS0/3/0/1 Yes Yes Yes TenGigE0/6/0/0 Yes No Yes RP/0/RP1/CPU0:crs# In the above output, the fourth column labeled Enabled identifies MPLS enabled interfaces. Products Confirmed Not Vulnerable +-------------------------------- Cisco IOS XR only runs on CRS-1 or Cisco 12000 series routers. Other Cisco products, including systems that run Cisco IOS are not affected. Details ======= Cisco IOS XR Software is a member of the Cisco IOS Software Family that uses a microkernel based distributed operating system infrastructure. Cisco IOS XR runs both on Cisco CRS-1 and Cisco 12000 series routers. More information on Cisco IOS XR can be found at the following URL: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/ps5845/index.html Modular Services Cards (MSC), also called the line cards are Layer-3 forwarding engines on Cisco CRS-1. An MSC is paired with a physical layer interface module (PLIM) which provides layer-1 and layer-2 services. More information on Cisco CRS-1 architecture can be found at the following URL: http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/ps5763/index.html Specific MPLS packets that are switched by a Cisco CRS-1 or a 12000 series system will restart the NetIO process. If the NetIO process is restarted several times consecutively, the line card will reload causing a Denial of Service (DoS) condition for the traffic that is being switched on that line card. MPLS packets will be forwarded through the MPLS network. Therefore, packets that can trigger this vulnerability can be sent from remote systems that are in the MPLS network. Such packets can not be received on interfaces that are not configured for MPLS. This vulnerability is addressed by the following Cisco bug IDs: * CSCsd15970 -- MSC crash upon receipt of specific MPLS packets This bug only affects CRS-1 and does not affect Cisco 12000 series routers that are running Cisco IOS XR. * CSCsd55531 -- MPLS packet handling problems This bug only affects CRS-1 and does not affect Cisco 12000 series routers that are running Cisco IOS XR. * CSCsc77475 -- Line card crash upon receipt of specific MPLS packets This bug affects both CRS-1 and Cisco 12000 series routers that are running Cisco IOS XR. Impact ====== Successful exploitation of the vulnerability may result in a reload of the Modular Services Card (MSC) on a CRS-1 or the line cards on a Cisco 12000 series router. Repeated exploitation could result in a sustained DoS attack. Software Version and Fixes ========================== When considering software upgrades, also consult http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt and any subsequent advisories to determine exposure and a complete upgrade solution. In all cases, customers should exercise caution to be certain the devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported properly by the new release. If the information is not clear, contact the Cisco Technical Assistance Center ("TAC") or your contracted maintenance provider for assistance. +---------------------------------------+ | Cisco IOS XR | SMU ID | | Version | | |---------------+-----------------------| | 3.2.0 | AA01447 | |---------------+-----------------------| | 3.2.1 | AA01446 | |---------------+-----------------------| | 3.2.2 | AA01448 | |---------------+-----------------------| | 3.2.3 for | AA01444 | | CRS-1 | | |---------------+-----------------------| | 3.2.3 for PRP | AA01451 | |---------------+-----------------------| | 3.2.4 | AA01449 | |---------------+-----------------------| | 3.2.50 | AA01450 | |---------------+-----------------------| | 3.3 | Cisco IOS XR 3.3 is | | | not vulnerable | +---------------------------------------+ Workarounds =========== There is no workaround to mitigate the effects of these vulnerabilities. Obtaining Fixed Software ======================== Cisco will make free software available to address this vulnerability for affected customers. This advisory will be updated as fixed software becomes available. Prior to deploying software, customers should consult their maintenance provider or check the software for feature set compatibility and known issues specific to their environment. Customers may only install and expect support for the feature sets they have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing or otherwise using such software upgrades, customers agree to be bound by the terms of Cisco's software license terms found at http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-license-agreement.html , or as otherwise set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml. Do not contact either "psirt(a)cisco.com" or "security-alert(a)cisco.com" for software upgrades. Customers with Service Contracts +------------------------------- Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through their regular update channels. For most customers, this means that upgrades should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com . Customers using Third Party Support Organizations +------------------------------------------------ Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through prior or existing agreement with third-party support organizations such as Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers should contact that support organization for guidance and assistance with the appropriate course of action in regards to this advisory. The effectiveness of any workaround or fix is dependent on specific customer situations such as product mix, network topology, traffic behavior, and organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected products and releases, customers should consult with their service provider or support organization to ensure any applied workaround or fix is the most appropriate for use in the intended network before it is deployed. Customers without Service Contracts +---------------------------------- Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but who do not hold a Cisco service contract and customers who purchase through third-party vendors but are unsuccessful at obtaining fixed software through their point of sale should get their upgrades by contacting the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows. * +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America) * +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world) * e-mail: tac(a)cisco.com Have your product serial number available and give the URL of this notice as evidence of your entitlement to a free upgrade. Free upgrades for non-contract customers must be requested through the TAC. Refer to http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/687/Directory/DirTAC.shtml for additional TAC contact information, including special localized telephone numbers and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in various languages. Exploitation and Public Announcements ===================================== The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious use of the vulnerability described in this advisory. This vulnerability was reported to Cisco by a customer. Status of this Notice: FINAL ============================ THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME. A stand-alone copy or Paraphrase of the text of this document that omits the distribution URL in the following section is an uncontrolled copy, and may lack important information or contain factual errors. Distribution ============ This advisory is posted on Cisco's worldwide website at : http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20060419-xr.shtml In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice is clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the following e-mail and Usenet news recipients. * cust-security-announce(a)cisco.com * first-teams(a)first.org * bugtraq(a)securityfocus.com * vulnwatch(a)vulnwatch.org * cisco(a)spot.colorado.edu * cisco-nsp(a)puck.nether.net * full-disclosure(a)lists.grok.org.uk * comp.dcom.sys.cisco(a)newsgate.cisco.com Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are encouraged to check the above URL for any updates. Revision History ================ +---------------------------------------+ | Revision | | Initial | | 1.0 | 2006-April-19 | public | | | | release. | +---------------------------------------+ Cisco Security Procedures ========================= Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and registering to receive security information from Cisco, is available on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.…. This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt. - --------------------------------------------------------------------- -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.2.2 (GNU/Linux) iD8DBQFERlGr8NUAbBmDaxQRAppAAJ42LNGn372gHS9SfYlEN6jpBbmzGgCggNEj PP87m68j7oZ0Lf+Hk8aYM7k= =WdI4 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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RE: Determine difference between 2 BGP feeds
by Mike Walter 19 Apr '06

19 Apr '06

Sounds to me like one of your providers is not feeding you the full internet routing table. Have you checked with them to see if they are providing you that? Mike Walter Systems Administrator -----Original Message----- From: owner-nanog(a)merit.edu [mailto:owner-nanog@merit.edu] On Behalf Of Scott "Tuc" Ellentuch at T-B-O-H Sent: Tuesday, April 18, 2006 4:13 PM To: nanog(a)merit.edu Subject: Determine difference between 2 BGP feeds Hi, We receive a BGP feed from different providers on two different routers. While one seems to be a reasonable amount of feeds after reviewing the CIDR report, the other is anywhere from 3K to 10K more routes. Is there a utility that I can use that will pull the routes off each router (Foundry preferred), and then compare them as best it can to see why there is such a difference? I can understand a handful of routes over what CIDR says, but a minimum of 3K more? Thanks, Tuc/TBOH

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Determine difference between 2 BGP feeds
by Scott Tuc Ellentuch at T-B-O-H 18 Apr '06

18 Apr '06

Hi, We receive a BGP feed from different providers on two different routers. While one seems to be a reasonable amount of feeds after reviewing the CIDR report, the other is anywhere from 3K to 10K more routes. Is there a utility that I can use that will pull the routes off each router (Foundry preferred), and then compare them as best it can to see why there is such a difference? I can understand a handful of routes over what CIDR says, but a minimum of 3K more? Thanks, Tuc/TBOH

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RE: Determine difference between 2 BGP feeds
by Lasher, Donn 18 Apr '06

18 Apr '06

On Apr 18, Scott Tuc Ellentuch at T-B-O-H <ml(a)t-b-o-h.net> wrote: > Is there a utility that I can use that will pull the routes off each > router (Foundry preferred), and then compare them as best it can to > see why there is such a difference? I have one, but it's cisco-specific: > http://www.bofh.it/~md/software/cisco-tools-0.2.tgz (the dumppeers script) Actually, found here: http://www.linux.it/~md/software/cisco-tools-0.2.tgz

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RIPE @ Istanbul , Turkey
by Mehmet Akcin 18 Apr '06

18 Apr '06

Dear Nanogers, If you will be attending to RIPE Meeting @ Istanbul Next week, it would be really cool to meet with you and go around (I am going to be in the meeting) actually I am not living in Turkey, but I was born and raised there so, I can help you guys to go around, etc. I Know many EU folks read here so if you need help, let me know. Mehmet Akcin

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Re: Is your ISP Influenza-ready?
by Fergie 18 Apr '06

18 Apr '06

Oh, that _is_ rich. ;-) I think a lot of people would love to know just how they plan to make that happen. :-) - ferg -- "David W. Hankins" <David_Hankins(a)isc.org> wrote: In a www.washingtonpost.com article: http://tinyurl.com/s2jpz It is said: President Bush is expected to approve soon a national pandemic influenza response plan that identifies more than 300 specific tasks for federal agencies, including [some stuff and] expanding Internet capacity to handle what would probably be a flood of people working from their home computers. That's not a lot of detail, and the article only cites www.pandemicflu.gov as a reference. They don't appear to have published any detailed plan that Pres. Bush is evidently about to sign there. What is published there feels like background information, and is vaguer still. Anyone with more information on what they're talking about? [snip] -- "Fergie", a.k.a. Paul Ferguson Engineering Architecture for the Internet fergdawg(a)netzero.net or fergdawg(a)sbcglobal.net ferg's tech blog: http://fergdawg.blogspot.com/

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Fixing outside plant isn't an easy job
by Sean Donelan 18 Apr '06

18 Apr '06

Maintaining the physical plant we all depend on is the job of a lot of dedicated individuals. Its not an easy job, and sometimes it can be a dangerous job. http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/2006/04/16/worker_e… SHARON, Mass. --A repairman for Verizon Communications Inc. was electrocuted Sunday morning while fixing a damaged telephone pole in Sharon, a company official said. [...] The fire department responded to a report of the worker shocked at about 8:30 a.m. Buckman was transported to a local hospital, where he was pronounced dead.

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Survey about maintenance operations
by Olivier Bonaventure 17 Apr '06

17 Apr '06

Dear All, In the framework of research projects, we are working on techniques to reduce the impact of planned maintenance operations on the routing protocols and the packet forwarding (see e.g. discussions on ordered IGP convergence in RTGWG at IETF). Several studies of ISIS or OSPF data have shown that maintenance operations are very frequent in large ISP networks. We would like quantify the number of maintenance operations that occur in large networks and would appreciate if you could answer the following survey (please reply directly to me, I'll summarize to the list) : Network size : - approx # routers - approx # links - approx # eBGP sessions Maintenance operations : - How often do you need to completely reboot each of your routers ? [ once per day, once per week, once per month, never,...] - How often do you change the IGP metric of each of your links ? [ once per hour, once per day, once per week, once per month, never, ...] - How often do you manually shutdown each of your intradomain links ? [ once per hour, once per day, once per week, never, ...] - How often do you need to stop and restart each of your eBGP sessions ? [ once per hour, once per day, once per week, never ...] - Do you use special operational procedures to perform those maintenance operations to reduce their impact on routing and packet forwarding ? [ please provide comments if any ] Thanks for your help. Olivier Bonaventure -- CSE Dept. UCL, Belgium - http://www.info.ucl.ac.be/people/OBO/

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RE: Is your ISP Influenza-ready?
by Barry Greene (bgreene) 17 Apr '06

17 Apr '06

> (Back in the days of dial-up, I had a lot of trouble > connecting to Bell Labs on snow days. No rule, and the place > was officially open for business. But everyone just did the > rational thing.) I think the point is to start capacity and contingency planning now. Is your VPN infrastructure set up to have every employee connecting back to the office? Are your upstreams sized to take this load? Are you VPN concentrators sized to take this load?

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