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Google TiSP (BETA), new FREE in-home wireless broadband service
by Dennis Dayman 02 Apr '07

02 Apr '07

http://www.google.com/tisp/

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OT: yenzero.com: 216.12.200.18: ev1servers.com
by Matthew Walker 01 Apr '07

01 Apr '07

I hate having to post here, but I'm getting the lack of response from EV1servers. I tried e-mailing abuse, but they continue to keep the worm hosted on the servers. Can someone at Ev1Servers shutdown this worm, or will millions of sites have to be infected before some action is actually taken? http://www.google.com/serch?hl=en&q=yenzero http://yenzero.com/wp-admin/borek.txt http://yenzero.com/c.in??

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Re: On-going Internet Emergency and Domain Names
by Fergie 01 Apr '07

01 Apr '07

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 - -- Mattias Ahnberg <mattias(a)ahnberg.pp.se> wrote: >Fergie wrote: >> I would posit that it does when criminals are able to abuse the >> system. > >Almost any system can be abused by people with bad intentions. I >am a strong advocate to not holding back on features, tools, new >technologies or whatever merely because someone could abuse with >it. The problem is the abuser, not the tool. We need to stop the >abusers, not the tools. > >We should certainly always attempt to improve the tools, better >the routines and so forth but always keep in mind that no matter >what we do they will adapt and find another angle. > >If we add a 24h period to domain registrations, what harm will it >REALLY do to the abusers? They will just register a myriad of the >domains they want, have them stored and push them out when needed >instead of at once. > >If we add some checkups on who registers a domain name, they will >get middlemen to do it for them. Just look at the captcha stuff >added on various sites to prevent spammers that lead to spammers >paying people small amounts of money for each captcha solved, or >put up fake pr0n sites where the visitors got free images when >they solved a captcha (that was linked from the actual site). > >If we block low TTL from functioning we would break tools that >use the low TTL setting for fast changing environments, load >balancing or whatever and we would also block ourselves from a >quick merger from one system to another for our customers. > >I don't want to sound all negative to efforts suggested that we >may have use for in a _current_ problem; but we should consider >what they will do next when we make major changes to a general >system that will likely bother ourselves more than them. These are all very good, legitimate questions -- I do not profess to have answers to them all. The one thing that seems to be missing, however, is accountability and an ability to stem the abuses in the domain registry system. - - ferg -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP Desktop 9.6.0 (Build 214) wj8DBQFGD+flq1pz9mNUZTMRAtr7AJ9LCQi1B+BLPkVJQ5X76KXx9qTDLwCgx3nL tBYpzk7SoFgAr2ff/aYd5lI= =FElG -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- "Fergie", a.k.a. Paul Ferguson Engineering Architecture for the Internet fergdawg(at)netzero.net ferg's tech blog: http://fergdawg.blogspot.com/

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Re: On-going Internet Emergency and Domain Names
by Paul Vixie 01 Apr '07

01 Apr '07

> From: Dave Crocker <dcrocker(a)bbiw.net> > To: Paul Vixie <paul(a)vix.com>, nanog(a)merit.edu, Gadi Evron <ge(a)linuxbox.org> > Subject: Re: On-going Internet Emergency and Domain Names > > offlist. actually, not, according to the headers shown above. > Paul Vixie wrote: > > a push-pull. first, advance the current effort to get registrars and > > dynamic-dns providers to share information about bad CC#'s, bad customers, > > bad domains, whatever. arrange things so that a self-vetting society of > > both in-industry and ombudsmen have the communications fabric they need to > > behave responsibly. push hard on this, make sure everybody hears about it > > and that the newspapers are full of success stories about it. > > IP Address blacklists are a sufficiently solid staple of email anti-abuse > effort, that I suspect similar approaches, for other information tidbits, > would be quite useful. as the inventor of the internet's first ip address blackhole list (not "blacklist"), i agree that it's a solid staple, but i'm not sure it was the most effective 10-year plan we could have made at the time, had we been making 10-year plans. > This is less about "shaming" and more about filtering. In this case, > filtering at DNS registration time, ISP account setup, or the like. agreed. i'd be happy to see the DNS registration "front end" (one of its "edges") gain some kind of reputation filtering. i just don't want to see "core"-level filtering like we did in e-mail, unless it's at the customer- facing ("edge") level, like Trend ICSS offers. > The difficulties, here, are to a) establish a credible organization for > creating and maintaining the list(s), b) getting folks to submit data to > it, and c) getting folks to use it. those are Gadi's three areas of strength and i'd help him if he did this. > Since there is quite a lot of track-record on doing this -- both well and > poorly -- the challenge here is all about implementation, rather than > design, of the service. having designed a reputation system inadequately once upon a time, i think it's important to get both the design and implementation right.

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XSS April Fools
by Gadi Evron 01 Apr '07

01 Apr '07

http://www.securitylab.ru/news/extra/293608.php There are "two cross site scripting attacks on Cisco.s web site and Maria Sharapova's site to announce that she has passed the Cisco certification test and will now become a security engineer." Gadi.

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Re: PG&E on data centre cooling..
by Robert Bonomi 01 Apr '07

01 Apr '07

> Date: Sat, 31 Mar 2007 19:31:53 -0700 > From: Jay Hennigan <jay(a)west.net> > Subject: Re: PG&E on data centre cooling.. > > > John Kinsella wrote: > > > I sorta wonder why the default is lights on, actually...I used to always > > love walking into dark datacenters and seeing the banks of GSRs (always > > thought they had good Blink) and friends happily blinking away. > > Consider the power consumption per square foot of the gear in a typical > data center, then add in the power needed to keep it cool. I suspect > that the cost of energy to keep the lights on will be down in the noise. In addition, 1) if the lighting is 'already there', figure the cost of re-wiring to 'sensor-based' switching. The parts aren't terribly expensive, but consider the amount of labor required. Particularly if the desired switched lighting 'zones' don't match the existing circuit wiring. Don't forget the maintenance costs, either. You're probably going to have to replace bulbs more frequently -- on/off cycles _are_ added 'stress' on bulbs. 2) if it is new construction, figure the differential cost in parts, labor, *and* maintenance, of sensor-based lighting switching. This is lower than 1), but still 'non-trivial'. Now, estimate how much energy will be saved, and how long it will take for that savings to pay back the cost of the investment. "Secondary" savings from reduction in HVAC load? How many KW/sq.ft. does the gear eat? vs. how many watts/sq.ft for lighting? ['Office grade' lighting is under 2 watts/sq.ft. (and may be significantly less) using conventional fluorscents, high-intensity halogen can be lower. 'Residential level' general lighting can easily be under 1 watt/sq.ft.] It's not like you're going to reduce the load enough to shut down one of the chillers. :)

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RE: On-going Internet Emergency and Domain Names
by Fergie 01 Apr '07

01 Apr '07

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 - -- Douglas Otis <dotis(a)mail-abuse.org> wrote: >On Sat, 2007-03-31 at 16:47 -0500, Frank Bulk wrote: >> For some operations or situations 24 hours would be too long a time to >> wait. There would need to be some mechanism where the delay could be >> bypassed. > >What operation requires a new domain be published within 24 hours? Even >banks require several days before honoring checks as protection against >fraud. A slight delay allows preemptive enforcement measures. It seems >most if not all operations could factor in this delay into their planning. > Doug and I completely agree on this issue. So again, I ask: When does a policy breakdown become an operational issue? I would posit that it does when criminals are able to abuse the system. Would love to arguments to the contrary. - - ferg -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP Desktop 9.6.0 (Build 214) wj8DBQFGDvB3q1pz9mNUZTMRAo1VAJ9rOisFN1xm4PjJsqUOeuSIWjy+OwCgpLQm gU76B10LtNBWYrE9/JjiQ+U= =vxKU -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- "Fergie", a.k.a. Paul Ferguson Engineering Architecture for the Internet fergdawg(at)netzero.net ferg's tech blog: http://fergdawg.blogspot.com/

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RE: On-going Internet Emergency and Domain Names
by Fergie 01 Apr '07

01 Apr '07

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 - -- Douglas Otis <dotis(a)mail-abuse.org> wrote: >The financial damage caused by crime taking advantage of DNS features to >then dance rapidly over the globe should justify rather minor changes to >the current mode of registry operations. > Amen. The Registry policies, as they stand today, enable criminals. - - ferg -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP Desktop 9.6.0 (Build 214) wj4DBQFGDtNqq1pz9mNUZTMRAkcSAJd9o4g/6QjPciucwmDm+y3F03T1AJ0XCQyj X/n9+C6XfOfZi+f6M6IllQ== =IMb/ -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- "Fergie", a.k.a. Paul Ferguson Engineering Architecture for the Internet fergdawg(at)netzero.net ferg's tech blog: http://fergdawg.blogspot.com/

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Re: On-going Internet Emergency and Domain Names
by Fergie 01 Apr '07

01 Apr '07

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 - -- Stephen Satchell <list(a)satchell.net> wrote: >Gadi Evron wrote: >> >> Amen. Really. >> >> I'd honestly like more ideas. > >What did IETF and ICANN say when you approached them through their public-comment channels? > The IETF does not deal with registry policy issues. ICANN, from what I can tell, had this issue (doamin tasting) on their agenda as a discussion iten in Lisbon last week, but i am unaware of the discussion outcome. Having said that, if this particular policy issue can be measured by ICANN's proclivity with other domain policy issues, I think we're talking years here. And that's kind of sobering, from a policy perspective. - - ferg -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP Desktop 9.6.0 (Build 214) wj8DBQFGDtf3q1pz9mNUZTMRAvgoAKCRgrGta2dtbGCLowMMtJf4htwGqwCg3BXm nw7SEgMDEvMU3F4w8801Yos= =IPRQ -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- "Fergie", a.k.a. Paul Ferguson Engineering Architecture for the Internet fergdawg(at)netzero.net ferg's tech blog: http://fergdawg.blogspot.com/

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Re: On-going Internet Emergency and Domain Names
by Roland Dobbins 01 Apr '07

01 Apr '07

On Mar 31, 2007, at 5:16 PM, Eric Brunner-Williams in Portland Maine wrote: > The temporal value of a domain that sinks phish click stream has > some decay > property, that is, today's phish name of (check your inbox) > probably isn't > very useful to the authors of the present phish (etc) decades from > now, or > even days from now. Certainly, in a case where everything works according to plan. What about the inputs to the system, however, and the potential for abuse? Who decides the legigitmacy/reputational value of a particular domain? What about mistakes and collateral damage? ----------------------------------------------------------------------- Roland Dobbins <rdobbins(a)cisco.com> // 408.527.6376 voice Words that come from a machine have no soul. -- Duong Van Ngo

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