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Google IP Engineering Contact
by Corey Touchet 02 Dec '14

02 Dec '14

Can someone at Google that has some control over how Google’s system that says an IP is suddenly in Iran please contact me off list ASAP. We can not wait a month for your tool to remove this. Also in the future that tool needs to ping the ip and check the RTT time and compare to well established GEOIP databases before flagging ip’s as not belonging to the country they’re actually in. We had to change our office firewall ip because suddenly Google thought it was in China instead of Georgia a few months back. Corey Touchet Manager Enterprise Infrastructure Total Server Solutions

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Publix Super Markets, Inc. PUBLIX-S51-11
by Meshier, Brent 02 Dec '14

02 Dec '14

Can someone from Publix contact me off list? You're dropping traffic from legitimate networks. Brent Meshier | Amherst Holdings, LLC | 5001 Plaza on the Lake, Suite 200, Austin, TX 78746 | T: 512-342-3010 --- Please refer to http://www.amherst.com/amherst-email-disclaimer/ for important disclosures regarding this electronic communication.

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Equinix Virginia - Ethernet OOB suggestions
by Ruairi Carroll 01 Dec '14

01 Dec '14

Dear List, I've got an upcoming deployment in Equinix (DC10) and I'm struggling to find a provider who can give me a 100Mbit port (With a commit of about 5-10Mbit) with a /23 or /24 of public space , for OOB purposes. We had hoped to use Equinixs services, however they're limiting us to a single public IP. I'm also open to other solutions - xDSL or similar, but emphasis is on cheap and on-net. Cheers /Ruairi

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Postmaster @ charter.net
by Tim Donahue 01 Dec '14

01 Dec '14

Hi all, Sorry for the noise, but my emails to postmaster(a)charter.net are getting rejected. Our mail server is being rejected by charter.net for not having a reverse DNS PTR record, but all the publicly available DNS servers I am able to query are resolving the PTR without any errors. If anyone has a direct contact within Charter that they could put me in contact with it would be greatly appreciated. Thanks, Tim Donahue

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Re: PeeringDB missing NOC role option?
by Greg Estabrooks 01 Dec '14

01 Dec '14

And to answer myself. If you select "Ops." it will display NOC as the role on the regular display page. On 14-12-01 10:20 AM, Greg Estabrooks wrote: > > > Hey All, > > > Has anyone else notice the NOC option missing from their PeeringDB contacts? > > > I went to update our contact to add a NOC contact and it's not in the drop-down of > available roles and I'm wondering if this is a problem with the site or if maybe it's Dependant on another > option I haven't selected? > > Any insight would be most appreciated. > > > > Thanks! >

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ISPs Behaving Badly: GIGLINX slime was Re: ARIN WHOIS for leads
by Dave Temkin 01 Dec '14

01 Dec '14

Ressurecting this thread: GIGLINX is still at it. They contacted me on an email that was only ever used for registering an ASN with ARIN. On Wed, Jul 31, 2013 at 9:14 PM, John Curran <jcurran(a)arin.net> wrote: > On Jul 31, 2013, at 1:17 PM, Barry Shein <bzs(a)world.std.com> wrote: > > > The usual method is to insert "ringers" which would be info which > > points back at non-existant people with valid-looking contact > > information. > > > > If for example they called a phone number, or several, owned by ARIN > > (or a service they employed) asking for James T Kirk or Diana Prince > > then that would be a problem and should be logged. > > There are some interesting non-obvious elements in the database for > such purposes and we do take action when they are triggered. > > FYI, > /John > > John Curran > President and CEO > ARIN > > > >

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Multi-homing with multiple ASNs
by Curtis L. Parish 30 Nov '14

30 Nov '14

Greetings, We have recently added a second ISP (third if you count I2). Our first "ISP" is actually a private state network that peers with two Tier 1 providers. We own an AS number and our IP space but at the last minute learned our state network is advertising our network using two different ASNs (neither ours) so they can load balance their connections. If you hit the right looking glass server you can see our network advertised by three different ASNs. We were told by the new ISP that this is a problem but the state network says it is not. Looking for opinions and words of wisdom on this split advertising issue. Thanks curtis Curtis Parish Senior Network Engineer Middle Tennessee State University

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Re: Low-numbered ASes being hijacked? [Re: BGP Update Report]
by Scott Weeks 30 Nov '14

30 Nov '14

> ----- Original Message ----- >>> Do these people never check what exactly they end up originating >>> outbound due to a config change, if that's really the case? >> >> Of course not because their neighbors are allowing it to >> pass; so as with all hijacks, deaggregation, and other >> unfiltered noise, the only care is traffic going in and >> out. QA (let alone automated sanity checks) are alien >> concepts to many, and "well it works" is the answer from >> some when contacted. > > That's sort of the BGP equivalent to BCP38 filtering, isn't it? --- jason(a)rice.edu wrote: From: Jason Bothe <jason(a)rice.edu> I’m not new here but the thread caught my eye, as I am one of the lower ASs being mentioned. I guess there isn’t really anything one can do to prevent these things other than listening to route servers, etc. I guess it’s all on what the upstream decides to allow-in and re-advertise. ---------------------------------------------------------------- First, obviously, set BGP filters to allow only what you expect to send upstream. Then, look at what your routers are advertising to your upstreams using 'sho bgp advertised routes' type commands to make sure it's exactly what you're expecting to send. Last, look on route servers at various places around the internet to make sure everything is advertised to expectations . You can find a lot here: http://www.traceroute.org/#Route%20Servers Also, of course, all of this can be done on a regular basis using programs instead of being done manually. scott

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BGP Update Report
by cidr-report＠potaroo.net 30 Nov '14

30 Nov '14

BGP Update Report Interval: 20-Nov-14 -to- 27-Nov-14 (7 days) Observation Point: BGP Peering with AS131072 TOP 20 Unstable Origin AS Rank ASN Upds % Upds/Pfx AS-Name 1 - AS12897 1394574 20.6% 199224.9 -- HEAGMEDIANET HSE Medianet GmbH,DE 2 - AS23752 300478 4.4% 2659.1 -- NPTELECOM-NP-AS Nepal Telecommunications Corporation, Internet Services,NP 3 - AS9829 266609 3.9% 169.1 -- BSNL-NIB National Internet Backbone,IN 4 - AS53249 78168 1.2% 39084.0 -- LAWA-AS - Los Angeles World Airport,US 5 - AS28642 63900 0.9% 1879.4 -- Contato Internet Ltda EPP,BR 6 - AS14840 60699 0.9% 1785.3 -- COMMCORP COMUNICACOES LTDA,BR 7 - AS20940 49912 0.7% 102.9 -- AKAMAI-ASN1 Akamai International B.V.,US 8 - AS23688 44891 0.7% 760.9 -- LINK3-TECH-AS-BD-AP Link3 Technologies Ltd.,BD 9 - AS52828 44476 0.7% 1482.5 -- Netpal Internet Palmares Ltda.,BR 10 - AS8402 43028 0.6% 29.3 -- CORBINA-AS OJSC "Vimpelcom",RU 11 - AS5 38861 0.6% 7.0 -- SYMBOLICS - Symbolics, Inc.,US 12 - AS28573 37224 0.6% 27.0 -- NET Serviços de Comunicação S.A.,BR 13 - AS46573 36961 0.6% 82.1 -- GLOBAL-FRAG-SERVERS - Global Frag Networks,US 14 - AS7545 32539 0.5% 13.4 -- TPG-INTERNET-AP TPG Telecom Limited,AU 15 - AS35819 32391 0.5% 60.3 -- MOBILY-AS Etihad Etisalat Company (Mobily),SA 16 - AS45271 31119 0.5% 103.4 -- ICLNET-AS-AP Idea Cellular Limited,IN 17 - AS3 30043 0.4% 3185.0 -- MIT-GATEWAYS - Massachusetts Institute of Technology,US 18 - AS53175 30030 0.4% 968.7 -- Unetvale Servicos e Equipamentos LTDA,BR 19 - AS38197 28599 0.4% 27.4 -- SUNHK-DATA-AS-AP Sun Network (Hong Kong) Limited,HK 20 - AS39891 27349 0.4% 98.0 -- ALJAWWALSTC-AS Saudi Telecom Company JSC,SA TOP 20 Unstable Origin AS (Updates per announced prefix) Rank ASN Upds % Upds/Pfx AS-Name 1 - AS12897 1394574 20.6% 199224.9 -- HEAGMEDIANET HSE Medianet GmbH,DE 2 - AS53249 78168 1.2% 39084.0 -- LAWA-AS - Los Angeles World Airport,US 3 - AS23342 22191 0.3% 22191.0 -- UNITEDLAYER - Unitedlayer, Inc.,US 4 - AS3181 10938 0.2% 10938.0 -- ASN-MATRIXMOBILE CJSC "Matrix Mobile",RU 5 - AS18135 9065 0.1% 9065.0 -- BTV BTV Cable television,JP 6 - AS3 23868 0.3% 1306.0 -- MIT-GATEWAYS - Massachusetts Institute of Technology,US 7 - AS37425 15898 0.2% 7949.0 -- Somcable,SO 8 - AS60725 22790 0.3% 7596.7 -- O3B-AS O3b Limited,JE 9 - AS62174 4824 0.1% 4824.0 -- INTERPAN-AS INTERPAN LTD.,BG 10 - AS25003 19994 0.3% 3998.8 -- INTERNET_BINAT Internet Binat Ltd,IL 11 - AS16065 2702 0.0% 2702.0 -- AS16065 Redimi AS,NL 12 - AS23752 300478 4.4% 2659.1 -- NPTELECOM-NP-AS Nepal Telecommunications Corporation, Internet Services,NP 13 - AS5 38861 0.6% 7.0 -- SYMBOLICS - Symbolics, Inc.,US 14 - AS55657 2147 0.0% 2147.0 -- XNS-AS-ID Xtreme Network System, PT,ID 15 - AS4 21237 0.3% 871.0 -- ISI-AS - University of Southern California,US 16 - AS28642 63900 0.9% 1879.4 -- Contato Internet Ltda EPP,BR 17 - AS58599 5559 0.1% 1853.0 -- CYBERGATE-BD Cybergate Limited,BD 18 - AS14840 60699 0.9% 1785.3 -- COMMCORP COMUNICACOES LTDA,BR 19 - AS4 5345 0.1% 1437.0 -- ISI-AS - University of Southern California,US 20 - AS4 8784 0.1% 2303.0 -- ISI-AS - University of Southern California,US TOP 20 Unstable Prefixes Rank Prefix Upds % Origin AS -- AS Name 1 - 94.16.72.0/21 200960 2.9% AS12897 -- HEAGMEDIANET HSE Medianet GmbH,DE 2 - 94.16.64.0/21 200914 2.9% AS12897 -- HEAGMEDIANET HSE Medianet GmbH,DE 3 - 94.16.80.0/20 200901 2.9% AS12897 -- HEAGMEDIANET HSE Medianet GmbH,DE 4 - 194.99.108.0/23 199280 2.9% AS12897 -- HEAGMEDIANET HSE Medianet GmbH,DE 5 - 194.127.204.0/23 199121 2.9% AS12897 -- HEAGMEDIANET HSE Medianet GmbH,DE 6 - 194.45.104.0/23 197850 2.9% AS12897 -- HEAGMEDIANET HSE Medianet GmbH,DE 7 - 185.9.28.0/22 195548 2.8% AS12897 -- HEAGMEDIANET HSE Medianet GmbH,DE 8 - 202.70.88.0/21 150476 2.2% AS23752 -- NPTELECOM-NP-AS Nepal Telecommunications Corporation, Internet Services,NP 9 - 202.70.64.0/21 146967 2.1% AS23752 -- NPTELECOM-NP-AS Nepal Telecommunications Corporation, Internet Services,NP 10 - 198.140.114.0/24 39116 0.6% AS53249 -- LAWA-AS - Los Angeles World Airport,US 11 - 198.140.115.0/24 39052 0.6% AS53249 -- LAWA-AS - Los Angeles World Airport,US 12 - 196.43.157.0/24 38349 0.6% AS5 -- SYMBOLICS - Symbolics, Inc.,US 13 - 130.0.192.0/21 23862 0.3% AS3 -- MIT-GATEWAYS - Massachusetts Institute of Technology,US 14 - 64.29.130.0/24 22191 0.3% AS23342 -- UNITEDLAYER - Unitedlayer, Inc.,US 15 - 192.115.44.0/22 19986 0.3% AS25003 -- INTERNET_BINAT Internet Binat Ltd,IL 16 - 162.249.183.0/24 11921 0.2% AS60725 -- O3B-AS O3b Limited,JE 17 - 5.8.168.0/23 10938 0.2% AS3181 -- ASN-MATRIXMOBILE CJSC "Matrix Mobile",RU 18 - 185.26.155.0/24 10851 0.2% AS60725 -- O3B-AS O3b Limited,JE 19 - 14.0.59.0/24 10546 0.1% AS36408 -- CDNETWORKSUS-02 - CDNetworks Inc.,US 20 - 192.58.232.0/24 10407 0.1% AS6629 -- NOAA-AS - NOAA,US Details at http://bgpupdates.potaroo.net ------------------------------------ Copies of this report are mailed to: nanog(a)nanog.org eof-list(a)ripe.net apops(a)apops.net routing-wg(a)ripe.net afnog(a)afnog.org

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Re: Low-numbered ASes being hijacked? [Re: BGP Update Report]
by Harry Hoffman 30 Nov '14

30 Nov '14

I'm currently looking into AS3 in an attempt to figure out what's going on. Always interested to hear what others have found out. Cheers, Harry On Nov 30, 2014 8:57 AM, Simon Leinen <simon.leinen(a)switch.ch> wrote: > > cidr-report writes: > > BGP Update Report > > Interval: 20-Nov-14 -to- 27-Nov-14 (7 days) > > Observation Point: BGP Peering with AS131072 > > > TOP 20 Unstable Origin AS > > Rank ASN Upds % Upds/Pfx AS-Name > [...] > > 11 - AS5 38861 0.6% 7.0 -- SYMBOLICS - Symbolics, Inc.,US > > Disappointing to see Symbolics (AS5) on this list. I would expect these > Lisp Machines to have very stable BGP implementations, especially given > the leisurely release rhythm for Genera for the past few decades. Has > the size of the IPv4 unicast table started triggering global GCs? > > Seriously, all these low-numbered ASes in the report look fishy. I > would have liked this to be an artifact of the reporting software (maybe > an issue with 4-byte ASes?), but I do see some strange paths in the BGP > table that make it look like (accidental or malicious) hi-hacking of > these low-numbered ASes. > > Now the fact that these AS numbers are low makes me curious. If I > wanted to hijack other folks' ASes deliberately, I would probably avoid > such numbers because they stand out. Maybe these are just non-standard > "private-use" ASes that are leaked? > > Some suspicious paths I'm seeing right now: > > 133439 5 > 197945 4 > > Hm, maybe 32-bit ASes do have something to do with this... > > Any ideas? > -- > Simon. (Just curious) > > [...] > > 17 - AS3 30043 0.4% 3185.0 -- MIT-GATEWAYS - Massachusetts Institute of Technology,US > [...] > > > TOP 20 Unstable Origin AS (Updates per announced prefix) > > Rank ASN Upds % Upds/Pfx AS-Name > [...] > > 13 - AS5 38861 0.6% 7.0 -- SYMBOLICS - Symbolics, Inc.,US > [...] > > 15 - AS4 21237 0.3% 871.0 -- ISI-AS - University of Southern California,US > [...] > > 19 - AS4 5345 0.1% 1437.0 -- ISI-AS - University of Southern California,US > > 20 - AS4 8784 0.1% 2303.0 -- ISI-AS - University of Southern California,US

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