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Las Vegas Rolling Blackout
by Sean Donelan 03 Jul '01

03 Jul '01

Its not just California. Las Vegas Nevada had a rolling blackout on Monday. Nevada Power needed to shed approximately 100 Megawatts of power (10,000 customers) when heat and maintenance outages at power plants lead to power shortages. Casinos and other large power consumers were requested to shed 50 megawatts of load. In better news New York City believes it has added enough peaker plants, so NYC will not have power shortages this summer. However, as a representative of the Edison Institute pointed in 1999, no electricity consumer should assume power will never fail (double negative).

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RE: Common causes of performance problems and outages
by Roeland Meyer 03 Jul '01

03 Jul '01

> From: Maya [mailto:myajnik@research.telcordia.com] > Sent: Monday, July 02, 2001 10:31 AM > > Hello, > I want to find out the most common causes of > performance problems as well as outages in > networks today. Any information is welcome! In no particular order; 1:Peering polcies resulting in really bizarre business-dictated routes. 2:Over-booking on broadband links (cable-modems) 3:Over extended growth by DSL operators (w/ resultant business failures, ie NorthPoint). 4:RBOCs ... ALL of them. 5:Fixing what ain't broke. 6:Forgetting why you did something and then doing it "right" later. 7:ICANN for broken DNS (which BIZ you iz). 8:NewNet, for REALLY proving 7:. 9:The A**holes that write scripts for script-kiddies. 10: ...I'll stop while I'm behind.... Note that very little of the above had anything to do with technology and everything to do with people.

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RE: GRC rides again...
by Roeland Meyer 03 Jul '01

03 Jul '01

> From: Mike Batchelor [mailto:mikebat@tmcs.net] > Sent: Monday, July 02, 2001 11:25 AM > Roeland Meyer: > > ...As much as I hate to say it, I almost agree with MSFT > here. That said, > > Novell stated, decades ago, that MSFT never could > understand network > > security. At the time, I agreed with Novell. > > "Decades ago" implies more than one decade ago, which puts > this purported > statement by Novell sometime prior to 1981. That was a very prescient > statement, in light of the fact that networking on > Microsoft's then-current > OS (DOS 1.0) had not been developed yet. So we know that I can't type...duh! Besides, I was running a Davong Multilink arcnet at the time, before Novell took it over (when Davong turned turtle). We were eagerly awaiting the first IBM XT. Also, I was running PCDOS v2.11 about then. Network by Davong and disk drives by Tallgrass. We also had a PDP11/35 w/ RSX-11M, for POS development (TEC America, Torrance). I guess that places the time at about 1982... six (6) MONTHS short of two decades. Please excuse me for not being suitably anal-retentive. Advanced senility is hell on the old RAM isn't it?

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RE: GRC rides again...
by Roeland Meyer 03 Jul '01

03 Jul '01

> From: Ron Buchalski [mailto:rbuchals@hotmail.com] > Sent: Monday, July 02, 2001 7:52 AM > It may be possible for the features of qos to help limit the > extent of the > attack, but with no predictability of where the attack > sources or attack > destinations are, you'd either need to apply qos when the > attack occurs > (reactive), or deploy it EVERYWHERE, on ALL provider's > networks (intensely > proactive). I doubt that anyone has the time or effort to > deploy worldwide > qos in order to stop random (and small, compared to overall > traffic) dos > attacks. This WAS the idea, thanks for pointing out the weakness. Basically, yet another means to filter. But, too much work to implement. According to this, it wouldn't scale.

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hot/cold-potato routing
by Vandy Hamidi 03 Jul '01

03 Jul '01

I'm new to the world of high-end/ISP-level routing and traffic manipulation. I recently heard of "cold-potato and hot-potato routing" and have developed an understanding of what it means and why hot-potato is default because of BGPs very nature. My question is, How is Cold-Potato routing implemented, and how are ISPs like Above Net able to just switch over when a backbone connection is lost? Are MEDs involved? Thanks, -=Vandy=-

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RE: Cisco IOS Vulnerability
by Vandy Hamidi 02 Jul '01

02 Jul '01

Does this vulnerability affect CatOS as well? I was under the impression it was just IOS devices. -=Vandy=- -----Original Message----- From: up(a)3.am [mailto:up@3.am] Sent: Friday, June 29, 2001 6:03 PM To: Larry Diffey Cc: nanog(a)merit.edu Subject: Re: Cisco IOS Vulnerability On Fri, 29 Jun 2001, Larry Diffey wrote: > CERT and Cisco have issued a warning about a vulnerability in the > Cisco IOS starting at version 11.3 and affecting all later versions. > > If your Cisco equipment is HTTP enabled and you're not using TACACS+ > or RADIUS for authentication it is vulnerable to complete takeover. > The hack is very simple. Yeah, well who enables httpd on their Ciscos, anyway? Wait a sec, the Catalysts have this enabled by default... James Smallacombe PlantageNet, Inc. CEO and Janitor up(a)3.am http://3.am =========================================================================

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VPN Migration
by Troy Corbin 02 Jul '01

02 Jul '01

im looking for any operational experiences/references regarding large wan migrations from private frame-relay to extranet VPNs for remote office connectivity. specifically, what backbone provider(s) did you choose, what type of cost savings were realized in both telco charges as well as management overhead, and what performance increases/decreases did you experience? thanks, troy

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Re: So.. you want to track some DoS traffic?
by Christopher L. Morrow 02 Jul '01

02 Jul '01

On Mon, 2 Jul 2001, Alex Bligh wrote: > > Credit: Credit should go to those listed in the link, UUNET's TAC-Eng > > group, UUNET's Net-Sec group, UUNET's Customer Router Security Group, > > dies(a)pulltheplug.com and a few others I have forgotten. > > Slight sense of Deja Vu. > > Without wishing to blow my own trumpet, from NANOG in 1999: > > http://answerpointe.cctec.com/maillists/nanog/historical/9907/msg00083.html So basically you've proposed implementing black hole routing via a community... this is nice and COULD be used by customers, though I'd be worried about them blackholing something 'important' and not figuring it out... which is all too common a problem. We discussed this at implementation/design time and fell back on "we would rather do it manually, just in case...". Additionally, if someone messed up the customer's filter and didn't filter their routes they could accidently drop traffic another customer :( Manual and by a select few people was the end decision. Not that it's not a great idea, but BGP is 'hard' and customers (and providers) routinely screw it up :( Also, your paper doesn't hit the main thing I was getting at: Tracking the attack... dropping traffic is great and you can do it in 101 different ways, but the tough part was tracking it... (at least it was the tough thing we was trying to make less tough). -Chris

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Re: Common causes of performance problems and outages
by Jeff Weisberg 02 Jul '01

02 Jul '01

| I want to find out the most common causes of | performance problems as well as outages in | networks today. Any information is welcome! - The customer - A vendor - Another 3rd party - Came clear during testing --jeff

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More on SBC's new DSL contracts...
by Christopher A. Woodfield 02 Jul '01

02 Jul '01

...and what they intend to do with them. http://news.cnet.com/news/0-1004-200-6442646.html?tag=tp_pr -C --------------------------- Christopher A. Woodfield rekoil(a)semihuman.com PGP Public Key: http://pgp.mit.edu:11371/pks/lookup?op=get&search=0xB887618B

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