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RE: Re: Secure Cabinets
by Rishi Singh 19 Aug '02

19 Aug '02

http://www.mtpartners.com/home.htm > -----Original Message----- > From: Benjamin J. Carrasco [mailto:carrasco@digitalrealm.net] > Sent: Monday, August 19, 2002 1:09 PM > To: nanog(a)merit.edu > Subject: RE: Re: Secure Cabinets > > > > Andrew, > > I am looking for a cabinet that I can install in my own > server room to > > protect my machines from prying fingers and other > illegal access. > This > > cabinet needs to have vault like qualities and not just > be some glass > and > > metal thrown together. Maybe something like two key opening > procedures, > > etc. > > I'd suggest looking at Metal-Tech Partners, we've had > pretty good experiences with their products. You will > probably be interested in their all metal seismic line of > cabinets. There is a pretty wide assortment of > industrial grade steel doors that surpass the strength of > cabinets like Chatsworth. They also offer dual locking > mechanisms that can consist of a center combination lock, > and top and bottom key-based locks. We have had them > customized in the past to alternate the top and bottom > key-base locks (by default, one key is necessary to open > both locks). A side from building a makeshift colo in an > abandoned missile silo, it should provide both a > comfortable level of physical security. I can not for the > life of me remember what their URL is. > > -Ben > > > >

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RE: Re: Secure Cabinets
by Benjamin J. Carrasco 19 Aug '02

19 Aug '02

Andrew, > I am looking for a cabinet that I can install in my own server room to > protect my machines from prying fingers and other illegal access. This > cabinet needs to have vault like qualities and not just be some glass and > metal thrown together. Maybe something like two key opening procedures, > etc. I'd suggest looking at Metal-Tech Partners, we've had pretty good experiences with their products. You will probably be interested in their all metal seismic line of cabinets. There is a pretty wide assortment of industrial grade steel doors that surpass the strength of cabinets like Chatsworth. They also offer dual locking mechanisms that can consist of a center combination lock, and top and bottom key-based locks. We have had them customized in the past to alternate the top and bottom key-base locks (by default, one key is necessary to open both locks). A side from building a makeshift colo in an abandoned missile silo, it should provide both a comfortable level of physical security. I can not for the life of me remember what their URL is. -Ben

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new reverse-DNS generation process at APNIC
by George Michaelson 19 Aug '02

19 Aug '02

Reverse-DNS changes for 61/8, 202/8, 203/8, 210/8, 211/8, 218/8, 219/8, 220/8, 221/8, 2001:0200::/23 and 2001:0C00::/23 APNIC has converted its DNS generation processes to a new system. This is in preparation for conversion to RPSL based whois services, as APNIC generates authoritative in-addr.arpa, ip6.arpa and ip6.int reverse-DNS records directly from whois information. This conversion will also improve reverse-DNS services for the IPv4 and IPv6 ranges APNIC has responsibility for, by providing faster resolution of reverse-DNS lookup, faster termination of lookup for non-existing domains, and a more stable DNS generation process. The reverse zone of a /8 for IPv4, or a pair of /24 for IPv6, now contain all children objects directly, and intermediate zones (which we used to assert down to the edge resource records in some cases) have been withdrawn. For all IPv4 and IPv6 ranges APNIC is authoritative for, the reverse DNS zones are now generated in a more efficient manner. Updates will propagate from whois domain objects to DNS more effectively. At present APNIC re-generates the reverse DNS zones on a 2 hour cycle, every day, and only increments the zone serial on changes to resource records. This is in line with the zonefiles asserted by RIPE NCC and ARIN, and will provide a more uniform global DNS service in respect of reverse-DNS. Kind regards, George Michaelson -- George Michaelson | APNIC Email: ggm(a)apnic.net | PO Box 2131 Milton QLD 4064 Phone: +61 7 3858 3100 | Australia Fax: +61 7 3858 3199 | http://www.apnic.net

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QWEST IP engineer please contact off list...
by Rich Sena 19 Aug '02

19 Aug '02

As subject says - having a problem with inconsistant views at 2 peering points and am tired of the phone que... -- Rich Sena - ras(a)thick.net ThickNET Consulting "On the way to understanding; you understand, and forget."

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Re: Echo
by Martin Hannigan 18 Aug '02

18 Aug '02

> Hi, Martin. > > What is an "echo mail reflector?" Is this something I could provide? > It basically allow you to "bounce" mail off of the address and returns a copy of your mail replete with headers. Useful for testing mail configuration, latency, etc. Someone just pinged me and said that echo(a)psi.net<- is still operational.

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Re: Dave Farber comments on Re: Major Labels v. Backbones
by Patrick W. Gilmore 18 Aug '02

18 Aug '02

At 03:07 PM 8/17/2002 -0700, Vadim Antonov wrote: >On 17 Aug 2002, Paul Vixie wrote: >> I want to know what the homeland security department is likely to do >> about all this, not what is good/bad for the citizens of hostile >> nations or even nonhostile nations. > >Likely nothing, unless they are complete incompetents. The point is: >there's no feasible way to achieve any gains by restricting access on >per-country basis. I doubt they are complete incompetents, but they are politicians. Sometimes people who are interested in a sound-bite or press-release do things which look, at least in retrospect, as stupid so they can garner some instant public reaction. IOW: They may know it will not do any good, but they may do it any way for a front-page headline. Or at least to look like they are doing something. At least that is my fear. -- TTFN, patrick

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Re: Dave Farber comments on Re: Major Labels v. Backbones
by smd＠clock.org 18 Aug '02

18 Aug '02

Hm, why stop with just backbone networks? Why shouldn't edge networks, corporate networks, and household networks chip in to uphold civil judgements against infringers? Surely I should not object if the RIAA insists that I block access of my small collection of computers to hosts which exist solely to distribute infringing material? Surely Dr Farber has already volunteered to adjust his own border filtering, since it is no great inconvenience to do so, the case is clear-cut, and this bad law is still on the books and therefore should continue to be followed. Sean.

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The Cidr Report
by CIDR Report 17 Aug '02

17 Aug '02

This is an auto-generated mail on Fri Aug 16 23:00:01 PDT 2002 It is not checked before it leaves my workstation. However, hopefully you will find this report interesting and will take the time to look through this to see if you can improve the amount of aggregation you perform. Check http://www.employees.org/~tbates/cidr-report.html for a daily update of this report. NEW: Check http://www.employees.org/~tbates/cidr-report-region.html for the regional version of this report. NEW: Check http://www.employees.org/~tbates/autnums.html for a complete list of autonomous system number to name mappings as used by the CIDR-Report. The report is split into sections: 0) General Status List the route table history for the last week, list any possibly bogus routes seen and give some status on ASes. 1) Gains by aggregating at the origin AS level This lists the "Top 30" players who if they decided to aggregate their announced classful prefixes at the origin AS level could make a significant difference in the reduction of the current size of the Internet routing table. This calculation does not take into account the inclusion of holes when forming an aggregate so it is possible even larger reduction should be possible. 2) Weekly Delta A summary of the last weeks changes in terms of withdrawn and added routes. Please note that this is only a snapshot but does give some indication of ASes participating in CIDR. Clearly, it is generally a good thing to see a large amount of withdrawls. 3) Interesting aggregates Interesting here means not an aggregate made as a set of classful routes. Thanks to GX Networks for giving me access to their routing tables once a day. Please send any comments about this report directly to CIDR Report <cidr-report(a)cisco.com>. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ CIDR REPORT for 16Aug02 0) General Status Table History ------------- Date Prefixes 090802 112833 100802 112990 110802 112840 120802 112791 130802 112534 140802 112650 150802 112454 160802 112263 Check http://www.employees.org/~tbates/cidr.plot.html for a plot of the table history. Possible Bogus Routes --------------------- AS Summary ---------- Number of ASes in routing system: 13432 Number of ASes announcing only one prefix: 8161 (4608 cidr, 3553 classful) Largest number of cidr routes: 715 announced by AS3908 Largest number of classful routes: 1192 announced by AS701 1) Gains by aggregating at the origin AS level --- 16Aug02 --- ASnum NetsNow NetsCIDR NetGain % Gain Description AS701 1192 962 230 19.3% UUNET Technologies, Inc. AS1221 1043 824 219 21.0% Telstra Pty Ltd AS17557 265 94 171 64.5% Pakistan Telecom AS6595 227 58 169 74.4% DoD Education Activity Network As AS852 515 378 137 26.6% Telus Advanced Communications AS7018 795 678 117 14.7% AT&T AS16473 178 73 105 59.0% Bell South AS4151 251 154 97 38.6% USDA AS19632 99 5 94 94.9% Metropolis Intercom S.A. AS12302 122 29 93 76.2% MobiFon S.A. AS16814 105 20 85 81.0% NSS, S.A. AS226 170 89 81 47.6% Los Nettos AS1239 500 419 81 16.2% Sprint AS577 268 194 74 27.6% Bell Advanced Communications Inc. AS7046 289 216 73 25.3% UUNET Technologies, Inc. AS4755 203 130 73 36.0% Videsh Sanchar Nigam Ltd. Autonom AS2048 179 106 73 40.8% State of Louisiana AS724 214 152 62 29.0% DLA Systems Automation Center AS19834 64 4 60 93.8% NetForce, Inc. AS10620 85 25 60 70.6% TVCABLE BOGOTA AS3464 161 103 58 36.0% Alabama SuperComputer Network AS5515 243 186 57 23.5% Sonera Finland Autonomous System AS16758 63 6 57 90.5% IKON Office Solutions AS3908 283 228 55 19.4% Supernet, Inc. AS9498 85 31 54 63.5% BHARTI BT INTERNET LTD. AS9051 82 28 54 65.9% INCONET Autonomous System AS209 286 232 54 18.9% Qwest AS6535 69 16 53 76.8% Chilesat Servicios Empresariales AS703 276 225 51 18.5% UUNET Technologies, Inc. AS4538 87 36 51 58.6% China Education and Research Netw Total 54945 42384 12561 22.9% For the rest of the previous weeks gain information please see http://www.employees.org:80/~tbates/cidr-report.html 2) Weekly Delta Please see http://www.employees.org:80/~tbates/cidr-report.html for this part of the report 3) Interesting aggregates Please see http://www.employees.org:80/~tbates/cidr-report.html for this part of the report

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Telus outage in Toronto, Ont Canada (AS852) ?
by Mike Tancsa 16 Aug '02

16 Aug '02

I cant get a hold of anyone in the NOC, but my local field tech says several large circuits got knocked out as a result of a broken pipe in their CO on University Ave. Does anyone else have any more details ? All the 1 800#s I have for them are still fast busy. ---Mike -------------------------------------------------------------------- Mike Tancsa, tel +1 519 651 3400 Sentex Communications, mike(a)sentex.net Providing Internet since 1994 www.sentex.net Cambridge, Ontario Canada www.sentex.net/mike

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Maybe just slightly operational Palladium information
by Kevin Oberman 16 Aug '02

16 Aug '02

OK. This is a bit beyond the charter, but there was a long and annoying thread on Microsoft Palladium last week and I just read an interesting article that seems to minimize the FUD I have been seeing. http://www.counterpane.com/crypto-gram-0208.html The author is Bruce Schneier, one of the best known crypto and security experts out there. He is also not a Microsoft fan (or hater) and that makes him one of the best sources for information on computer security issues. Over all, I found the article excellent. It might at least make some of the silly messages on the subject seem even sillier and point out the real concerns and possible benefits of Pd. R. Kevin Oberman, Network Engineer Energy Sciences Network (ESnet) Ernest O. Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (Berkeley Lab) E-mail: oberman(a)es.net Phone: +1 510 486-8634

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