Contacted HE NOC earlier regarding these announcements, they are "legitimate". Filip On 11/03/2021 14:56, Javier Henderson wrote:

...

On Mar 11, 2021, at 8:43 AM, Eric Dugas via NANOG <nanog@nanog.org> wrote:

I would be really curious to see the LOA presented to AS6939 to announce 54 million IPs out of government IP space and what type of verification was done because it doesn't seem legit at all. Did you try calling the number on the WHOIS for AS8003, or maybe HE’s NOC to follow up?

-jav

So this company (Global Resource Systems, LLC) was formed on 2020-10-13 and ARIN assigned AS8003 to them even earlier than it. Here's a simple timeline in case anyone want to have a check: 9/8/2020 GLOBAL RESOURCE SYSTEMS, LLC registered in Delaware 9/10/2020 Nameserver of grscorp.com was changed from AfterNIC (a website to sell premium / expired domains) to UltraDNS 9/11/2020 GLOBAL RESOURCE SYSTEMS, LLC (FL) registered their organization in ARIN 9/14/2020 GLOBAL RESOURCE SYSTEMS, LLC (FL) got AS8003 from ARIN 9/21/2020 MAINT-GRSL-AS8003 is registered in RADB 10/13/2020 GLOBAL RESOURCE SYSTEMS, LLC registered in Florida Around 21/01/2021, AS8003 registered numerous route objects in RADB and started announcing DOD space. In addition to AS8003, they also added AS95 to their AS-set and registered some objects under AS95. Based on RIPEstats, Last seen of AS8003 before 2021 is around 2003. And there's another GLOBAL RESOURCE SYSTEMS, LLC in FL which has been inactive since 2013. On Thu, Mar 11, 2021 at 10:31 PM Alain Hebert <ahebert@pubnix.net> wrote:

I scratch it out to hiding in plain sight...

----- Alain Hebert ahebert@pubnix.net PubNIX Inc. 50 boul. St-Charles P.O. Box 26770 Beaconsfield, Quebec H9W 6G7 Tel: 514-990-5911 http://www.pubnix.net Fax: 514-990-9443

On 3/11/21 9:14 AM, Filip Hruska wrote:

Contacted HE NOC earlier regarding these announcements, they are "legitimate".

Filip

On 11/03/2021 14:56, Javier Henderson wrote:

On Mar 11, 2021, at 8:43 AM, Eric Dugas via NANOG <nanog@nanog.org> <nanog@nanog.org> wrote:

I would be really curious to see the LOA presented to AS6939 to announce 54 million IPs out of government IP space and what type of verification was done because it doesn't seem legit at all.

Did you try calling the number on the WHOIS for AS8003, or maybe HE’s NOC to follow up?

-jav

Hi John, My biggest concern is why the AS8003 was assigned to the company (GLOBAL RESOURCE SYSTEMS, LLC) even before its existence. When we were requesting resources or transfers, ARIN always asked us to provide a Certificate of Good Standing and we had to pay the state to order it. However, it appears that a Certificate of Good Standing is not required or ARIN didn't validate it in this case. Regards, Siyuan On Fri, Mar 12, 2021 at 7:17 PM John Curran <jcurran@arin.net> wrote:

On 11 Mar 2021, at 7:56 AM, Siyuan Miao <aveline@misaka.io> wrote:

Hi Folks,

Just noticed that almost all DOD prefixes (7.0.0.0/8,11.0.0.0/8,22.0.0.0/8 and bunch of /22s) are now announced under AS8003 (GRSCORP) which was just formed a few months ago.

It looks so suspicious. Does anyone know if it's authorized?

Siyuan -

If you have concerns, you can confirm whether these IP address blocks are being routed as intended by verification with their listed technical contacts - e.g. https://search.arin.net/rdap/?query=22.0.0.0

As I noted on this list several weeks back - "lack of routing history is not at all a reliable indicator of the potential for valid routing of a given IPv4 block in the future, so best practice suggest that allocated address space should not be blocked by others without specific cause. Doing otherwise opens one up to unexpected surprises when issued space suddenly becomes more active in routing and is yet is inexplicably unreachable for some destinations."

Thanks! /John

John Curran President and CEO American Registry for Internet Numbers

Siyuan Miao wrote on 12/03/2021 11:34:

My biggest concern is why the AS8003 was assigned to the company (GLOBAL RESOURCE SYSTEMS, LLC) even before its existence.

GRS LLC seems to have been around since 2006.

https://opencorporates.com/companies/us_fl/M06000001699

AS8003 was registered to them in Sep 2020:

ASNumber: 8003 ASName: GRS-DOD ASHandle: AS8003 RegDate: 2020-09-14 Updated: 2020-09-14 Ref: https://rdap.arin.net/registry/autnum/8003

No doubt there is more information about the history of 8003 in WhoWas. Nick

However, it appears that a Certificate of Good Standing is not required or ARIN didn't validate it in this case.

You don't know what ARIN did or did not do, or really anything about the circumstances surrounding this other than what is gleanable from public records. It's not a good look to chuck rocks at them like this. Mr. Curran has helpfully provided the link to report suspected fraud. That's the best place to take this discussion. On Fri, Mar 12, 2021 at 6:36 AM Siyuan Miao <aveline@misaka.io> wrote:

Hi John,

My biggest concern is why the AS8003 was assigned to the company (GLOBAL RESOURCE SYSTEMS, LLC) even before its existence.

When we were requesting resources or transfers, ARIN always asked us to provide a Certificate of Good Standing and we had to pay the state to order it.

However, it appears that a Certificate of Good Standing is not required or ARIN didn't validate it in this case.

Regards, Siyuan

On Fri, Mar 12, 2021 at 7:17 PM John Curran <jcurran@arin.net> wrote:

...

On 11 Mar 2021, at 7:56 AM, Siyuan Miao <aveline@misaka.io> wrote:

Hi Folks,

Just noticed that almost all DOD prefixes ( 7.0.0.0/8,11.0.0.0/8,22.0.0.0/8 and bunch of /22s) are now announced under AS8003 (GRSCORP) which was just formed a few months ago.

It looks so suspicious. Does anyone know if it's authorized?

Siyuan -

If you have concerns, you can confirm whether these IP address blocks are being routed as intended by verification with their listed technical contacts - e.g. https://search.arin.net/rdap/?query=22.0.0.0

As I noted on this list several weeks back - "lack of routing history is not at all a reliable indicator of the potential for valid routing of a given IPv4 block in the future, so best practice suggest that allocated address space should not be blocked by others without specific cause. Doing otherwise opens one up to unexpected surprises when issued space suddenly becomes more active in routing and is yet is inexplicably unreachable for some destinations."

Thanks! /John

John Curran President and CEO American Registry for Internet Numbers

Owen, I think one cause for concern is why “almost all DOD prefixes (7.0.0.0/8,11.0.0.0/8,22.0.0.0/8<http://7.0.0.0/8,11.0.0.0/8,22.0.0.0/8> and bunch of /22s) are now announced under AS8003<x-apple-data-detectors://11> (GRSCORP) which was just formed a few months ago,” which, according to ARIN WHOIS, had a source registry of “DoD Network Information Center”. I think it’s a general matter of public interest how this reassignment of a massive government-owned block of well over sixteen million IP addresses happened. Even if not fraudulent, the public has a right to know who is behind this huge transfer of wealth. Don’t you? -mel beckman On Mar 15, 2021, at 12:23 PM, Owen DeLong via NANOG <nanog@nanog.org> wrote:  According to the timeline posted to this list (by you, Siyuan), Globl Resource Systems, LLC was registered in Delaware on September 8, 2020. Your timeline also shows the resources being issued to GRS by ARIN on September 11, september 14, 2020 It looks to me like they subsequently registered the corporation in Florida and moved the company address there. I don’t see anything suspicious here based on your own statements, so I’m a bit confused what you are on about. Owen On Mar 12, 2021, at 03:34 , Siyuan Miao <aveline@misaka.io<mailto:aveline@misaka.io>> wrote: Hi John, My biggest concern is why the AS8003 was assigned to the company (GLOBAL RESOURCE SYSTEMS, LLC) even before its existence. When we were requesting resources or transfers, ARIN always asked us to provide a Certificate of Good Standing and we had to pay the state to order it. However, it appears that a Certificate of Good Standing is not required or ARIN didn't validate it in this case. Regards, Siyuan On Fri, Mar 12, 2021 at 7:17 PM John Curran <jcurran@arin.net<mailto:jcurran@arin.net>> wrote: On 11 Mar 2021, at 7:56 AM, Siyuan Miao <aveline@misaka.io<mailto:aveline@misaka.io>> wrote: Hi Folks, Just noticed that almost all DOD prefixes (7.0.0.0/8,11.0.0.0/8,22.0.0.0/8<http://7.0.0.0/8,11.0.0.0/8,22.0.0.0/8> and bunch of /22s) are now announced under AS8003 (GRSCORP) which was just formed a few months ago. It looks so suspicious. Does anyone know if it's authorized? Siyuan - If you have concerns, you can confirm whether these IP address blocks are being routed as intended by verification with their listed technical contacts - e.g. https://search.arin.net/rdap/?query=22.0.0.0 As I noted on this list several weeks back - "lack of routing history is not at all a reliable indicator of the potential for valid routing of a given IPv4 block in the future, so best practice suggest that allocated address space should not be blocked by others without specific cause. Doing otherwise opens one up to unexpected surprises when issued space suddenly becomes more active in routing and is yet is inexplicably unreachable for some destinations." Thanks! /John John Curran President and CEO American Registry for Internet Numbers

On Mon, Mar 15, 2021 at 3:38 PM Mel Beckman <mel@beckman.org> wrote:

I also note that this reassignment isn’t reflected in ARIN’s Whois database.

where is it reflected?

-mel

On Mar 15, 2021, at 12:36 PM, Mel Beckman <mel@beckman.org> wrote:

 Owen,

I think one cause for concern is why “almost all DOD prefixes (7.0.0.0/8,11.0.0.0/8,22.0.0.0/8 and bunch of /22s) are now announced under AS8003 (GRSCORP) which was just formed a few months ago,” which, according to ARIN WHOIS, had a source registry of “DoD Network Information Center”.

I think it’s a general matter of public interest how this reassignment of a massive government-owned block of well over sixteen million IP addresses happened. Even if not fraudulent, the public has a right to know who is behind this huge transfer of wealth.

is it possible that the DoD: 1) signed a lRSA (or really just an RSA) 2) asked AS8003 to announce these prefixes (in certain sized blocks, maybe) under normal actions that arin does all the time for people? If these were /24's and not parts/whole of /8's would anyone have noticed? it's entirely possible that 8003 is just a holding tank for the prefixes while DoD/etc find a method to xfer the space to those that may be willing to pay pesos per ip, right?

Don’t you?

-mel beckman

On Mar 15, 2021, at 12:23 PM, Owen DeLong via NANOG <nanog@nanog.org> wrote:

 According to the timeline posted to this list (by you, Siyuan), Globl Resource Systems, LLC was registered in Delaware on September 8, 2020. Your timeline also shows the resources being issued to GRS by ARIN on September 11, september 14, 2020 It looks to me like they subsequently registered the corporation in Florida and moved the company address there.

I don’t see anything suspicious here based on your own statements, so I’m a bit confused what you are on about.

Owen

On Mar 12, 2021, at 03:34 , Siyuan Miao <aveline@misaka.io> wrote:

Hi John,

My biggest concern is why the AS8003 was assigned to the company (GLOBAL RESOURCE SYSTEMS, LLC) even before its existence.

When we were requesting resources or transfers, ARIN always asked us to provide a Certificate of Good Standing and we had to pay the state to order it.

However, it appears that a Certificate of Good Standing is not required or ARIN didn't validate it in this case.

Regards, Siyuan

On Fri, Mar 12, 2021 at 7:17 PM John Curran <jcurran@arin.net> wrote:

...

On 11 Mar 2021, at 7:56 AM, Siyuan Miao <aveline@misaka.io> wrote:

Hi Folks,

Just noticed that almost all DOD prefixes (7.0.0.0/8,11.0.0.0/8,22.0.0.0/8 and bunch of /22s) are now announced under AS8003 (GRSCORP) which was just formed a few months ago.

It looks so suspicious. Does anyone know if it's authorized?

Siyuan -

If you have concerns, you can confirm whether these IP address blocks are being routed as intended by verification with their listed technical contacts - e.g. https://search.arin.net/rdap/?query=22.0.0.0

As I noted on this list several weeks back - "lack of routing history is not at all a reliable indicator of the potential for valid routing of a given IPv4 block in the future, so best practice suggest that allocated address space should not be blocked by others without specific cause. Doing otherwise opens one up to unexpected surprises when issued space suddenly becomes more active in routing and is yet is inexplicably unreachable for some destinations."

Thanks! /John

John Curran President and CEO American Registry for Internet Numbers

On Mon, Mar 15, 2021 at 4:04 PM Mel Beckman <mel@beckman.org> wrote:

As I said, “DOD Network Information Center”:

Source Registry ARIN Kind Org Full Name DoD Network Information Center Handle DNIC Address 3990 E. Broad Street Columbus OH 43218 United States Roles Registrant Last Changed Wed, 17 Aug 2011 14:45:37 GMT (Wed Aug 17 2011 local time) Self https://rdap.arin.net/registry/entity/DNIC Alternate https://whois.arin.net/rest/org/DNIC Port 43 Whois whois.arin.net -mel

NetRange: 7.0.0.0 - 7.255.255.255 CIDR: 7.0.0.0/8 NetName: DISANET7 NetHandle: NET-7-0-0-0-1 Parent: () NetType: Direct Allocation OriginAS: Organization: DoD Network Information Center (DNIC) RegDate: 1997-11-24 Updated: 2006-04-28 Ref: https://rdap.arin.net/registry/ip/7.0.0.0 OrgName: DoD Network Information Center OrgId: DNIC Address: 3990 E. Broad Street City: Columbus StateProv: OH it seems to still say that... This looks like any other sort of: "have my ISP announce my prefixes because I can't bgp" (or whatever other reason)

On Mar 15, 2021, at 1:01 PM, Christopher Morrow <morrowc.lists@gmail.com> wrote:

On Mon, Mar 15, 2021 at 3:38 PM Mel Beckman <mel@beckman.org> wrote:

I also note that this reassignment isn’t reflected in ARIN’s Whois database.

where is it reflected?

-mel

On Mar 15, 2021, at 12:36 PM, Mel Beckman <mel@beckman.org> wrote:

 Owen,

I think one cause for concern is why “almost all DOD prefixes (7.0.0.0/8,11.0.0.0/8,22.0.0.0/8 and bunch of /22s) are now announced under AS8003 (GRSCORP) which was just formed a few months ago,” which, according to ARIN WHOIS, had a source registry of “DoD Network Information Center”.

I think it’s a general matter of public interest how this reassignment of a massive government-owned block of well over sixteen million IP addresses happened. Even if not fraudulent, the public has a right to know who is behind this huge transfer of wealth.

is it possible that the DoD: 1) signed a lRSA (or really just an RSA) 2) asked AS8003 to announce these prefixes (in certain sized blocks, maybe)

under normal actions that arin does all the time for people? If these were /24's and not parts/whole of /8's would anyone have noticed?

it's entirely possible that 8003 is just a holding tank for the prefixes while DoD/etc find a method to xfer the space to those that may be willing to pay pesos per ip, right?

Don’t you?

-mel beckman

On Mar 15, 2021, at 12:23 PM, Owen DeLong via NANOG <nanog@nanog.org> wrote:

 According to the timeline posted to this list (by you, Siyuan), Globl Resource Systems, LLC was registered in Delaware on September 8, 2020.

Your timeline also shows the resources being issued to GRS by ARIN on September 11, september 14, 2020

It looks to me like they subsequently registered the corporation in Florida and moved the company address there.

I don’t see anything suspicious here based on your own statements, so I’m a bit confused what you are on about.

Owen

On Mar 12, 2021, at 03:34 , Siyuan Miao <aveline@misaka.io> wrote:

Hi John,

My biggest concern is why the AS8003 was assigned to the company (GLOBAL RESOURCE SYSTEMS, LLC) even before its existence.

When we were requesting resources or transfers, ARIN always asked us to provide a Certificate of Good Standing and we had to pay the state to order it.

However, it appears that a Certificate of Good Standing is not required or ARIN didn't validate it in this case.

Regards,

Siyuan

On Fri, Mar 12, 2021 at 7:17 PM John Curran <jcurran@arin.net> wrote:

On 11 Mar 2021, at 7:56 AM, Siyuan Miao <aveline@misaka.io> wrote:

Hi Folks,

Just noticed that almost all DOD prefixes (7.0.0.0/8,11.0.0.0/8,22.0.0.0/8 and bunch of /22s) are now announced under AS8003 (GRSCORP) which was just formed a few months ago.

It looks so suspicious. Does anyone know if it's authorized?

Siyuan -

If you have concerns, you can confirm whether these IP address blocks are being routed as intended by verification with their listed technical contacts - e.g. https://search.arin.net/rdap/?query=22.0.0.0

As I noted on this list several weeks back - "lack of routing history is not at all a reliable indicator of the potential for valid routing of a given IPv4 block in the future, so best practice suggest that allocated address space should not be blocked by others without specific cause. Doing otherwise opens one up to unexpected surprises when issued space suddenly becomes more active in routing and is yet is inexplicably unreachable for some destinations."

Thanks!

/John

John Curran

President and CEO

American Registry for Internet Numbers

On 15 Mar 2021, at 4:17 PM, Mel Beckman <mel@beckman.org> wrote:

Like any other announcement, except DOD and what looks suspiciously like a shell corporation. Either the DOD doesn’t know about it (and I’ve called DISA and opened a ticket), which is scary, or the DOD is creating a private shell corporation to move all it’s IP space out of government purview, which sounds even more scary.

Mr. Beckman - The number resources remain assigned to the DoD – please note that the routing of an IP address block does not make for the transfer of the resources, but rather is the normal activity that ISPs often provide to their customers. Questions about routing of an address block should be referred to the registrant organization in the ARIN database (which you indicate that you have already done), and they can elucidate to you as they determine most appropriate. Thanks, /John John Curran President and CEO American Registry for Internet Numbers

Considering threads about DOD address squatters, it would be a useful beaconing-and-cleaning project before putting to market. I guess it'd be north of $10B and even for the USG that's not small potatos... -- Posted from my personal account - see X-Disclaimer header. Joe Provo / Gweep / Earthling

On Mon, Apr 26, 2021 at 10:19 AM Bryan Fields <Bryan@bryanfields.net> wrote:

On 3/15/21 4:01 PM, Christopher Morrow wrote:

...

is it possible that the DoD: 1) signed a lRSA (or really just an RSA)

Just re-read this; I don't think the Federal Government is required to sign the standard ARIN agreement. I believe they have a different agreement with ARIN. I did some searching, but can't find this easily on their website.

Unrelated to DoD, but as the member representative for a different Federal agency with both an LRSA and an RSA, I can definitely say that's not the case. There are no special rules for the US Federal Government. Scott

On 26 Apr 2021, at 12:32 PM, John Curran <jcurran@arin.net<mailto:jcurran@arin.net>> wrote: On 26 Apr 2021, at 11:27 AM, Scott Morizot <tmorizot@gmail.com<mailto:tmorizot@gmail.com>> wrote: On Mon, Apr 26, 2021 at 10:19 AM Bryan Fields <Bryan@bryanfields.net<mailto:Bryan@bryanfields.net>> wrote: On 3/15/21 4:01 PM, Christopher Morrow wrote:

is it possible that the DoD: 1) signed a lRSA (or really just an RSA)

Just re-read this; I don't think the Federal Government is required to sign the standard ARIN agreement. I believe they have a different agreement with ARIN. I did some searching, but can't find this easily on their website. Unrelated to DoD, but as the member representative for a different Federal agency with both an LRSA and an RSA, I can definitely say that's not the case. There are no special rules for the US Federal Government. Correct (but I will elaborate separately in reply to Bryan’s posted question since the community is entitled to as much transparency as possible.) Scott - In summary, you are correct that US Federal agencies have the same RSA as everyone else (aside from certain provisions for government-required indemnification, bankruptcy, governing law, and/or binding arbitration.) As noted in my reply to Bryan, the US DoD sought and received an additional provision in their RSA providing reassurance that they may transfer unused IPv4 address space with the USG rather than returning to ARIN. FYI, /John John Curran President and CEO American Registry for Internet Numbers

On Mon, Apr 26, 2021 at 12:19 PM John Curran <jcurran@arin.net> wrote:

I provide all of the above in the spirit of maximal transparency, but there are indeed some practical limits to what can be provided. The community should know that there was no special deal – only a clarification that the USG sought that was both appropriate under the circumstances and comparable to our handling other organizations that wished to move address space around internally.

Thanks for that expanded clarification about the DoD agreement, John. I'll note that although my agency did not go so far as an additional signed agreement, we did confirm we retained the ability to move portions of our IPv4 networks, including networks we had not previously used publicly, as required to contracted services acting on our behalf or other bureaus in our department as operationally needed. I understand the DoD desire for clarification. Thanks again, Scott

On Mar 15, 2021, at 15:07 , Tom Beecher <beecher@beecher.cc> wrote:

I think it’s a general matter of public interest how this reassignment of a massive government-owned block of well over sixteen million IP addresses happened. Even if not fraudulent, the public has a right to know who is behind this huge transfer of wealth.

Don’t you?

On Mon, Mar 15, 2021 at 3:35 PM Mel Beckman <mel@beckman.org <mailto:mel@beckman.org>> wrote: Owen,

I think one cause for concern is why “almost all DOD prefixes (7.0.0.0/8,11.0.0.0/8,22.0.0.0/8 <http://7.0.0.0/8,11.0.0.0/8,22.0.0.0/8> and bunch of /22s) are now announced under AS8003 <> (GRSCORP) which was just formed a few months ago,” which, according to ARIN WHOIS, had a source registry of “DoD Network Information Center”.

Somehow, I’m of the impression that DoD is quite capable of defending their own property if necessary. I’m also not of the same belief as you that GRSCORP was just formed a few months ago. It seems to have bounced back and forth between Florida and Delaware one or more times, but that’s not all that uncommon for a corporation physically located in Florida. Corporations change their state of incorporation somewhat regularly for a variety of legal forum shopping purposes, including but not limited to tax advantages, court jurisdictional advantages, etc.

I think it’s a general matter of public interest how this reassignment of a massive government-owned block of well over sixteen million IP addresses happened. Even if not fraudulent, the public has a right to know who is behind this huge transfer of wealth.

I don’t see a transfer of wealth. I see DOD finally having a contractor originate their prefixes in order to make life more difficult for squatters, hijackers, and other miscreants. About time, if you ask me. I mean, I’m sure that in order to provide that level of sink-hole, GRSCORP is having to pay some hefty transit bills and maintain some significant infrastructure and likely passing all that cost along to DoD at a hefty markup, so I suppose that’s some level of transfer of wealth, but as DoD contracts go, I somehow don’t think this one would be regarded as “significant”. Owen

Don’t you?

-mel beckman

...

On Mar 15, 2021, at 12:23 PM, Owen DeLong via NANOG <nanog@nanog.org <mailto:nanog@nanog.org>> wrote:

 According to the timeline posted to this list (by you, Siyuan), Globl Resource Systems, LLC was registered in Delaware on September 8, 2020. Your timeline also shows the resources being issued to GRS by ARIN on September 11, september 14, 2020 It looks to me like they subsequently registered the corporation in Florida and moved the company address there.

I don’t see anything suspicious here based on your own statements, so I’m a bit confused what you are on about.

Owen

...

On Mar 12, 2021, at 03:34 , Siyuan Miao <aveline@misaka.io <mailto:aveline@misaka.io>> wrote:

Hi John,

My biggest concern is why the AS8003 was assigned to the company (GLOBAL RESOURCE SYSTEMS, LLC) even before its existence.

When we were requesting resources or transfers, ARIN always asked us to provide a Certificate of Good Standing and we had to pay the state to order it.

However, it appears that a Certificate of Good Standing is not required or ARIN didn't validate it in this case.

Regards, Siyuan

On Fri, Mar 12, 2021 at 7:17 PM John Curran <jcurran@arin.net <mailto:jcurran@arin.net>> wrote: On 11 Mar 2021, at 7:56 AM, Siyuan Miao <aveline@misaka.io <mailto:aveline@misaka.io>> wrote:

...

Hi Folks,

Just noticed that almost all DOD prefixes (7.0.0.0/8,11.0.0.0/8,22.0.0.0/8 <http://7.0.0.0/8,11.0.0.0/8,22.0.0.0/8> and bunch of /22s) are now announced under AS8003 (GRSCORP) which was just formed a few months ago.

It looks so suspicious. Does anyone know if it's authorized?

Siyuan -

If you have concerns, you can confirm whether these IP address blocks are being routed as intended by verification with their listed technical contacts - e.g. https://search.arin.net/rdap/?query=22.0.0.0 <https://search.arin.net/rdap/?query=22.0.0.0>

As I noted on this list several weeks back - "lack of routing history is not at all a reliable indicator of the potential for valid routing of a given IPv4 block in the future, so best practice suggest that allocated address space should not be blocked by others without specific cause. Doing otherwise opens one up to unexpected surprises when issued space suddenly becomes more active in routing and is yet is inexplicably unreachable for some destinations."

Thanks! /John

John Curran President and CEO American Registry for Internet Numbers

Here's an article that's not paywalled: https://apnews.com/article/technology-business-government-and-politics-b26ab... ----- Mike Hammett Intelligent Computing Solutions Midwest Internet Exchange The Brothers WISP ----- Original Message ----- From: "cosmo" <clinton.mielke@gmail.com> To: "Owen DeLong" <owen@delong.com> Cc: "North American Network Operators' Group" <nanog@nanog.org>, "John Curran" <jcurran@arin.net> Sent: Sunday, April 25, 2021 4:55:06 PM Subject: Re: DOD prefixes and AS8003 / GRSCORP Looks like the press picked this up. Paywalled though! https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2021/04/24/pentagon-internet-addre... On Tue, Mar 16, 2021 at 3:03 AM Owen DeLong via NANOG < nanog@nanog.org > wrote: <blockquote> On Mar 15, 2021, at 15:07 , Tom Beecher < beecher@beecher.cc > wrote: <blockquote> I think it’s a general matter of public interest how this reassignment of a massive government-owned block of well over sixteen million IP addresses happened. Even if not fraudulent, the public has a right to know who is behind this huge transfer of wealth. Don’t you? </blockquote> <blockquote> On Mon, Mar 15, 2021 at 3:35 PM Mel Beckman < mel@beckman.org > wrote: <blockquote> Owen, I think one cause for concern is why “almost all DOD prefixes ( 7.0.0.0/8,11.0.0.0/8,22.0.0.0/8 and bunch of /22s) are now announced under AS8003 (GRSCORP) which was just formed a few months ago,” which, according to ARIN WHOIS, had a source registry of “DoD Network Information Center”. </blockquote> </blockquote> Somehow, I’m of the impression that DoD is quite capable of defending their own property if necessary. I’m also not of the same belief as you that GRSCORP was just formed a few months ago. It seems to have bounced back and forth between Florida and Delaware one or more times, but that’s not all that uncommon for a corporation physically located in Florida. Corporations change their state of incorporation somewhat regularly for a variety of legal forum shopping purposes, including but not limited to tax advantages, court jurisdictional advantages, etc. <blockquote> <blockquote> I think it’s a general matter of public interest how this reassignment of a massive government-owned block of well over sixteen million IP addresses happened. Even if not fraudulent, the public has a right to know who is behind this huge transfer of wealth. </blockquote> </blockquote> I don’t see a transfer of wealth. I see DOD finally having a contractor originate their prefixes in order to make life more difficult for squatters, hijackers, and other miscreants. About time, if you ask me. I mean, I’m sure that in order to provide that level of sink-hole, GRSCORP is having to pay some hefty transit bills and maintain some significant infrastructure and likely passing all that cost along to DoD at a hefty markup, so I suppose that’s some level of transfer of wealth, but as DoD contracts go, I somehow don’t think this one would be regarded as “significant”. Owen <blockquote> <blockquote> Don’t you? -mel beckman <blockquote> On Mar 15, 2021, at 12:23 PM, Owen DeLong via NANOG < nanog@nanog.org > wrote: </blockquote> <blockquote> According to the timeline posted to this list (by you, Siyuan), Globl Resource Systems, LLC was registered in Delaware on September 8, 2020. Your timeline also shows the resources being issued to GRS by ARIN on September 11, september 14, 2020 It looks to me like they subsequently registered the corporation in Florida and moved the company address there. I don’t see anything suspicious here based on your own statements, so I’m a bit confused what you are on about. Owen <blockquote> On Mar 12, 2021, at 03:34 , Siyuan Miao < aveline@misaka.io > wrote: Hi John, My biggest concern is why the AS8003 was assigned to the company (GLOBAL RESOURCE SYSTEMS, LLC) even before its existence. When we were requesting resources or transfers, ARIN always asked us to provide a Certificate of Good Standing and we had to pay the state to order it. However, it appears that a Certificate of Good Standing is not required or ARIN didn't validate it in this case. Regards, Siyuan On Fri, Mar 12, 2021 at 7:17 PM John Curran < jcurran@arin.net > wrote: <blockquote> On 11 Mar 2021, at 7:56 AM, Siyuan Miao < aveline@misaka.io > wrote: <blockquote> Hi Folks, Just noticed that almost all DOD prefixes ( 7.0.0.0/8,11.0.0.0/8,22.0.0.0/8 and bunch of /22s) are now announced under AS8003 (GRSCORP) which was just formed a few months ago. It looks so suspicious. Does anyone know if it's authorized? </blockquote> Siyuan - If you have concerns, you can confirm whether these IP address blocks are being routed as intended by verification with their listed technical contacts - e.g. https://search.arin.net/rdap/?query=22.0.0.0 As I noted on this list several weeks back - "lack of routing history is not at all a reliable indicator of the potential for valid routing of a given IPv4 block in the future, so best practice suggest that allocated address space should not be blocked by others without specific cause. Doing otherwise opens one up to unexpected surprises when issued space suddenly becomes more active in routing and is yet is inexplicably unreachable for some destinations." Thanks! /John John Curran President and CEO American Registry for Internet Numbers </blockquote> </blockquote> </blockquote> </blockquote> </blockquote> </blockquote>