Russian diplomats lingering near fiber optic cables
There must be a perfectly logical explanation.... Yes, people in the industry know where the choke points are. But the choke points aren't always the most obvious places. Its kinda a weird for diplomats to show up there. On the other hand, I've been a fiber optic tourist. I've visited many critical choke points in the USA and other countries, and even took selfies :-) http://www.politico.com/story/2017/06/01/russia-spies-espionage-trump-239003 In the throes of the 2016 campaign, the FBI found itself with an escalating problem: Russian diplomats, whose travel was supposed to be tracked by the State Department, were going missing. The diplomats, widely assumed to be intelligence operatives, would eventually turn up in odd places, often in middle-of-nowhere USA. One was found on a beach, nowhere near where he was supposed to be. In one particularly bizarre case, relayed by a U.S. intelligence official, another turned up wandering around in the middle of the desert. Interestingly, both seemed to be lingering where underground fiber-optic cables tend to run. According to another U.S. intelligence official, “They find these guys driving around in circles in Kansas. It’s a pretty aggressive effort.” It’s a trend that has led intelligence officials to conclude that the Kremlin is waging a quiet effort to map the United States’ telecommunications infrastructure, perhaps preparing for an opportunity to disrupt it.
On Jun 1, 2017, at 2:02 PM, Sean Donelan <sean@donelan.com> wrote:
There must be a perfectly logical explanation.... Yes, people in the industry know where the choke points are. But the choke points aren't always the most obvious places. Its kinda a weird for diplomats to show up there.
On the other hand, I've been a fiber optic tourist. I've visited many critical choke points in the USA and other countries, and even took selfies :-)
http://www.politico.com/story/2017/06/01/russia-spies-espionage-trump-239003
In the throes of the 2016 campaign, the FBI found itself with an escalating problem: Russian diplomats, whose travel was supposed to be tracked by the State Department, were going missing.
The diplomats, widely assumed to be intelligence operatives, would eventually turn up in odd places, often in middle-of-nowhere USA. One was found on a beach, nowhere near where he was supposed to be. In one particularly bizarre case, relayed by a U.S. intelligence official, another turned up wandering around in the middle of the desert. Interestingly, both seemed to be lingering where underground fiber-optic cables tend to run.
According to another U.S. intelligence official, “They find these guys driving around in circles in Kansas. It’s a pretty aggressive effort.”
It’s a trend that has led intelligence officials to conclude that the Kremlin is waging a quiet effort to map the United States’ telecommunications infrastructure, perhaps preparing for an opportunity to disrupt it.
Seems it would be easier to just pay for a subscription to a service like FiberLocator or similar. They could just dial 811 as well and request the locates happen. - Jared
DO NOT ANCHOR OR DREDGE is a pretty good indicator. On Thu, Jun 1, 2017 at 11:05 AM, Jared Mauch <jared@puck.nether.net> wrote:
On Jun 1, 2017, at 2:02 PM, Sean Donelan <sean@donelan.com> wrote:
There must be a perfectly logical explanation.... Yes, people in the industry know where the choke points are. But the choke points aren't always the most obvious places. Its kinda a weird for diplomats to show up there.
On the other hand, I've been a fiber optic tourist. I've visited many critical choke points in the USA and other countries, and even took selfies :-)
http://www.politico.com/story/2017/06/01/russia-spies-espionage-trump-239003
In the throes of the 2016 campaign, the FBI found itself with an escalating problem: Russian diplomats, whose travel was supposed to be tracked by the State Department, were going missing.
The diplomats, widely assumed to be intelligence operatives, would eventually turn up in odd places, often in middle-of-nowhere USA. One was found on a beach, nowhere near where he was supposed to be. In one particularly bizarre case, relayed by a U.S. intelligence official, another turned up wandering around in the middle of the desert. Interestingly, both seemed to be lingering where underground fiber-optic cables tend to run.
According to another U.S. intelligence official, “They find these guys driving around in circles in Kansas. It’s a pretty aggressive effort.”
It’s a trend that has led intelligence officials to conclude that the Kremlin is waging a quiet effort to map the United States’ telecommunications infrastructure, perhaps preparing for an opportunity to disrupt it.
Seems it would be easier to just pay for a subscription to a service like FiberLocator or similar.
They could just dial 811 as well and request the locates happen.
- Jared
That's how we found the Russian's fiber cables: "According to “Blind Man’s Bluff,” Bradley, in his predawn stupor, recalled from his youth written signs that had been posted along the Mississippi River to mark undersea cables. The signs, posted along the shore, were meant to prevent passing from hooking the cables with their anchors. With this in mind, Bradley reasoned that there had to be similar signs near the shallower points on the Sea of Okhotsk." https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2015/10/26/as-russia-scope... -mel beckman
On Jun 1, 2017, at 11:33 AM, Brandon Vincent <Brandon.Vincent@asu.edu> wrote:
DO NOT ANCHOR OR DREDGE is a pretty good indicator.
On Thu, Jun 1, 2017 at 11:05 AM, Jared Mauch <jared@puck.nether.net> wrote:
On Jun 1, 2017, at 2:02 PM, Sean Donelan <sean@donelan.com> wrote:
There must be a perfectly logical explanation.... Yes, people in the industry know where the choke points are. But the choke points aren't always the most obvious places. Its kinda a weird for diplomats to show up there.
On the other hand, I've been a fiber optic tourist. I've visited many critical choke points in the USA and other countries, and even took selfies :-)
http://www.politico.com/story/2017/06/01/russia-spies-espionage-trump-239003
In the throes of the 2016 campaign, the FBI found itself with an escalating problem: Russian diplomats, whose travel was supposed to be tracked by the State Department, were going missing.
The diplomats, widely assumed to be intelligence operatives, would eventually turn up in odd places, often in middle-of-nowhere USA. One was found on a beach, nowhere near where he was supposed to be. In one particularly bizarre case, relayed by a U.S. intelligence official, another turned up wandering around in the middle of the desert. Interestingly, both seemed to be lingering where underground fiber-optic cables tend to run.
According to another U.S. intelligence official, “They find these guys driving around in circles in Kansas. It’s a pretty aggressive effort.”
It’s a trend that has led intelligence officials to conclude that the Kremlin is waging a quiet effort to map the United States’ telecommunications infrastructure, perhaps preparing for an opportunity to disrupt it.
Seems it would be easier to just pay for a subscription to a service like FiberLocator or similar.
They could just dial 811 as well and request the locates happen.
- Jared
It's not like the locations of any of the transatlantic or transpacific cable landing stations are a big secret. They're published in the FCC's digest reports for international authorization and whenever ownership of a cable changes hands or is restructured. Additionally it is pretty hard to hide from modern imagery intelligence analysis any sort of building that has 1+1 or N+1 200kW diesel generators and the cooling required for a medium sized telecom facility. Locations of cables are published specifically for the purpose of helping trawlers and ships avoid damaging them, for example: http://bandoncable.org/cables.asp That said, a pretty quick way to get on some homeland security watch lists would be to hang around a cable landing station beach location with a big DSLR camera, and appear uninterested in the beach... On Thu, Jun 1, 2017 at 11:02 AM, Sean Donelan <sean@donelan.com> wrote:
There must be a perfectly logical explanation.... Yes, people in the industry know where the choke points are. But the choke points aren't always the most obvious places. Its kinda a weird for diplomats to show up there.
On the other hand, I've been a fiber optic tourist. I've visited many critical choke points in the USA and other countries, and even took selfies :-)
http://www.politico.com/story/2017/06/01/russia-spies-espion age-trump-239003
In the throes of the 2016 campaign, the FBI found itself with an escalating problem: Russian diplomats, whose travel was supposed to be tracked by the State Department, were going missing.
The diplomats, widely assumed to be intelligence operatives, would eventually turn up in odd places, often in middle-of-nowhere USA. One was found on a beach, nowhere near where he was supposed to be. In one particularly bizarre case, relayed by a U.S. intelligence official, another turned up wandering around in the middle of the desert. Interestingly, both seemed to be lingering where underground fiber-optic cables tend to run.
According to another U.S. intelligence official, “They find these guys driving around in circles in Kansas. It’s a pretty aggressive effort.”
It’s a trend that has led intelligence officials to conclude that the Kremlin is waging a quiet effort to map the United States’ telecommunications infrastructure, perhaps preparing for an opportunity to disrupt it.
As someone who has sold a lot of capacity on Hibernia Atlantic, I must concur. There is a website showing where most of the Trans-Atlantic cables land on the West Coast of Britain at towns like Bude in Wales. Hiding is not an option. http://www.kis-orca.eu/ Regards, Roderick. ________________________________ From: NANOG <nanog-bounces@nanog.org> on behalf of Eric Kuhnke <eric.kuhnke@gmail.com> Sent: Thursday, June 1, 2017 9:20 PM To: nanog@nanog.org list Subject: Re: Russian diplomats lingering near fiber optic cables It's not like the locations of any of the transatlantic or transpacific cable landing stations are a big secret. They're published in the FCC's digest reports for international authorization and whenever ownership of a cable changes hands or is restructured. Additionally it is pretty hard to hide from modern imagery intelligence analysis any sort of building that has 1+1 or N+1 200kW diesel generators and the cooling required for a medium sized telecom facility. Locations of cables are published specifically for the purpose of helping trawlers and ships avoid damaging them, for example: http://bandoncable.org/cables.asp [http://bandoncable.org/images/cable01.jpg]<http://bandoncable.org/cables.asp> Bandon Submarine Cable Council - Cable Locations<http://bandoncable.org/cables.asp> bandoncable.org Be advised of the location if two submarine cables in the North Pacific located off the coast of Bandon, Oregon. The TPC-5 cable system consists of ... That said, a pretty quick way to get on some homeland security watch lists would be to hang around a cable landing station beach location with a big DSLR camera, and appear uninterested in the beach... On Thu, Jun 1, 2017 at 11:02 AM, Sean Donelan <sean@donelan.com> wrote:
There must be a perfectly logical explanation.... Yes, people in the industry know where the choke points are. But the choke points aren't always the most obvious places. Its kinda a weird for diplomats to show up there.
On the other hand, I've been a fiber optic tourist. I've visited many critical choke points in the USA and other countries, and even took selfies :-)
http://www.politico.com/story/2017/06/01/russia-spies-espion age-trump-239003
In the throes of the 2016 campaign, the FBI found itself with an escalating problem: Russian diplomats, whose travel was supposed to be tracked by the State Department, were going missing.
The diplomats, widely assumed to be intelligence operatives, would eventually turn up in odd places, often in middle-of-nowhere USA. One was found on a beach, nowhere near where he was supposed to be. In one particularly bizarre case, relayed by a U.S. intelligence official, another turned up wandering around in the middle of the desert. Interestingly, both seemed to be lingering where underground fiber-optic cables tend to run.
According to another U.S. intelligence official, “They find these guys driving around in circles in Kansas. It’s a pretty aggressive effort.”
It’s a trend that has led intelligence officials to conclude that the Kremlin is waging a quiet effort to map the United States’ telecommunications infrastructure, perhaps preparing for an opportunity to disrupt it.
On Thu, 1 Jun 2017, Rod Beck wrote:
As someone who has sold a lot of capacity on Hibernia Atlantic, I must concur. There is a website showing where most of the Trans-Atlantic cables land on the West Coast of Britain at towns like Bude in Wales. Hiding is not an option.
As far as I know, there are no cable landing stations in Kansas. Has US geography changed recently?
Last time I checked satellite imagery, existing fiber maps, as well as signs saying "Fiber Optic Cables" lead to the same outcome: Very little can be hidden. Nice try, Sean. You can try out next year. ________________________________ From: Sean Donelan <sean@donelan.com> Sent: Thursday, June 1, 2017 9:54 PM To: Rod Beck Cc: Eric Kuhnke; nanog@nanog.org list Subject: Re: Russian diplomats lingering near fiber optic cables On Thu, 1 Jun 2017, Rod Beck wrote:
As someone who has sold a lot of capacity on Hibernia Atlantic, I must concur. There is a website showing where most of the Trans-Atlantic cables land on the West Coast of Britain at towns like Bude in Wales. Hiding is not an option.
As far as I know, there are no cable landing stations in Kansas. Has US geography changed recently?
Sea levels rose pretty quickly On Thu, Jun 1, 2017 at 12:54 PM, Sean Donelan <sean@donelan.com> wrote:
On Thu, 1 Jun 2017, Rod Beck wrote:
As someone who has sold a lot of capacity on Hibernia Atlantic, I must concur. There is a website showing where most of the Trans-Atlantic cables land on the West Coast of Britain at towns like Bude in Wales. Hiding is not an option.
As far as I know, there are no cable landing stations in Kansas.
Has US geography changed recently?
And even in Kansas most fiber optic cables are probably next to roads, gas pipelines, and railways. Pretty easy to find. ________________________________ From: Sean Donelan <sean@donelan.com> Sent: Thursday, June 1, 2017 9:54:32 PM To: Rod Beck Cc: Eric Kuhnke; nanog@nanog.org list Subject: Re: Russian diplomats lingering near fiber optic cables On Thu, 1 Jun 2017, Rod Beck wrote:
As someone who has sold a lot of capacity on Hibernia Atlantic, I must concur. There is a website showing where most of the Trans-Atlantic cables land on the West Coast of Britain at towns like Bude in Wales. Hiding is not an option.
As far as I know, there are no cable landing stations in Kansas. Has US geography changed recently?
On 2017-06-01 16:04, Rod Beck wrote:
And even in Kansas most fiber optic cables are probably next to roads, gas pipelines, and railways. Pretty easy to find.
Yep, with those orange-and-white plastic pipe markers sticking up that say "CAUTION! Buried Fiber Optic Cable!" on 'em. -- ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Bruce H. McIntosh Senior Network Engineer University of Florida IT ICT Networking and Telecommunication Services bhm@ufl.edu 352-273-1066
On Thu, 1 Jun 2017, Rod Beck wrote:
And even in Kansas most fiber optic cables are probably next to roads, gas pipelines, and railways. Pretty easy to find.
Unlike cable landing stations and satellite earth stations, which are documented in public FCC licenses, usually to 6 decimal points of longitude & latitude; and and included in navigation maps.... Finding the exact cable routes in the middle of the country requires on the ground surveying and locating cable markers. Piecemeal maps exist at the local level, and high-level maps are available from various providers. But as anyone familar with cable accidents or network planning knows, those marketing maps are aspirational. I had real estate people try to convince me that "fiber was available" at specific sites because there was a railroad across the road, and everyone "knew" that fiber was always next to railroads. Yes, its fairly simple to find a cable marker, if you put people (i.e. diplomats) on the ground in remote areas across the country. But, its odd to send diplomats to remote areas of the country, if you are not trying to survey geographic infrastructure in the middle of the country.
Sean Donelan wrote:
But, its odd to send diplomats to remote areas of the country, if you are not trying to survey geographic infrastructure in the middle of the country.
It's just "for show." If they really wanted to be invisible, they could do so without using diplomats - a group that is always assumed to be under location surveillance. -- Regards, S.C.
On Fri, 2 Jun 2017, Scott Christopher wrote:
But, its odd to send diplomats to remote areas of the country, if you are not trying to survey geographic infrastructure in the middle of the country.
It's just "for show."
If they really wanted to be invisible, they could do so without using diplomats - a group that is always assumed to be under location surveillance.
Yep, which is why its odd. It would be much easier to hire one of the construction companies which lay fiber routes to prepare a nation-wide survey for them. Or hack their computer servers containing GIS maps. Maybe diplomats get bored, and like yanking the FBI's chain for sport. They have diplomatic immunity, so the risk is very low. I'll admit, I did visit the Geographic Center of the U.S. (lower 48-states) in Lebanon, Kansas. It was very nerdy, but something to check off the list. I only have 6 U.S. states left to visit for another item to check off the list. Maybe Russian diplomats have a bucket list too?
Sean said: "Unlike cable landing stations and satellite earth stations, which are documented in public FCC licenses, usually to 6 decimal points of longitude & latitude; and and included in navigation maps...." Or you just follow the manhole covers that say Global Crossings. -- Joe Hamelin, W7COM, Tulalip, WA, +1 (360) 474-7474 On Thu, Jun 1, 2017 at 1:57 PM, Sean Donelan <sean@donelan.com> wrote:
On Thu, 1 Jun 2017, Rod Beck wrote:
And even in Kansas most fiber optic cables are probably next to roads, gas pipelines, and railways. Pretty easy to find.
Unlike cable landing stations and satellite earth stations, which are documented in public FCC licenses, usually to 6 decimal points of longitude & latitude; and and included in navigation maps....
Finding the exact cable routes in the middle of the country requires on the ground surveying and locating cable markers. Piecemeal maps exist at the local level, and high-level maps are available from various providers. But as anyone familar with cable accidents or network planning knows, those marketing maps are aspirational. I had real estate people try to convince me that "fiber was available" at specific sites because there was a railroad across the road, and everyone "knew" that fiber was always next to railroads.
Yes, its fairly simple to find a cable marker, if you put people (i.e. diplomats) on the ground in remote areas across the country.
But, its odd to send diplomats to remote areas of the country, if you are not trying to survey geographic infrastructure in the middle of the country.
It will if the Ocean level change drastically. Which with this week news cycle... might not be that far fetched =D> ----- Alain Hebert ahebert@pubnix.net PubNIX Inc. 50 boul. St-Charles P.O. Box 26770 Beaconsfield, Quebec H9W 6G7 Tel: 514-990-5911 http://www.pubnix.net Fax: 514-990-9443 On 06/01/17 15:54, Sean Donelan wrote:
On Thu, 1 Jun 2017, Rod Beck wrote:
As someone who has sold a lot of capacity on Hibernia Atlantic, I must concur. There is a website showing where most of the Trans-Atlantic cables land on the West Coast of Britain at towns like Bude in Wales. Hiding is not an option.
As far as I know, there are no cable landing stations in Kansas.
Has US geography changed recently?
On Fri, 02 Jun 2017 10:14:12 -0400, Alain Hebert said:
It will if the Ocean level change drastically.
Raising the question - how well protected against sea level rise *is* the average cable landing/termination station, given that most landing stations in particular are probably fairly near the beach and not very high above sea level? Are there any in particular that we need to worry if another Hurricane Sandy or local equivalent wanders by?
Landing stations can be 10 to 30 kilometers from the beach manhole. I don't think it is big concern. Hibernia Atlantic dublin landing station is a good example. ________________________________ From: NANOG <nanog-bounces@nanog.org> on behalf of valdis.kletnieks@vt.edu <valdis.kletnieks@vt.edu> Sent: Friday, June 2, 2017 5:04 PM To: ahebert@pubnix.net Cc: nanog@nanog.org Subject: Re: Russian diplomats lingering near fiber optic cables On Fri, 02 Jun 2017 10:14:12 -0400, Alain Hebert said:
It will if the Ocean level change drastically.
Raising the question - how well protected against sea level rise *is* the average cable landing/termination station, given that most landing stations in particular are probably fairly near the beach and not very high above sea level? Are there any in particular that we need to worry if another Hurricane Sandy or local equivalent wanders by?
On Fri, 02 Jun 2017 15:11:36 -0000, Rod Beck said:
Landing stations can be 10 to 30 kilometers from the beach manhole. I don't think it is big concern. Hibernia Atlantic dublin landing station is a good example.
So 100% of those beach manholes are watertight and safe from flooding, and don't contain any gear that will get upset if it does in fact end up with salt water in there? This listing for landing points in Japan seems to call out a hell of a lot of specific buildings that are nowhere near 10 to 30 km inland: https://www.google.com/maps/d/viewer?mid=1Siy5qBMoFyBUlSFNHdHDpGAkIR0 Singapore: Right on the water. http://www.streetdirectory.com/sg/singapore-cable-landing-station/1-changi-n... Hong Kong: More of same (though with its hills, some of the 8 sites may actually be a bit above sea level even though they're 2 blocks from water) http://www.ofca.gov.hk/en/industry_focus/telecommunications/facility_based/i... Cryptome has a bunch of older images that tend to indicate that a lot of buildings right on the water in New Jersey and Long Island are involved: https://cryptome.org/eyeball/cable/cable-eyeball.htm And that's just in the first 3 pages returned by Google for "cable landing station map". The experience of the Manhattan phone system when the conduits and basements flooded during Sandy tends to indicate that we *are* in for similar surprises over the coming decades.
On Fri, Jun 2, 2017 at 12:46 PM, <valdis.kletnieks@vt.edu> wrote:
On Fri, 02 Jun 2017 15:11:36 -0000, Rod Beck said:
Landing stations can be 10 to 30 kilometers from the beach manhole. I don't think it is big concern. Hibernia Atlantic dublin landing station is a good example.
So 100% of those beach manholes are watertight and safe from flooding, and don't contain any gear that will get upset if it does in fact end up with salt water in there?
This listing for landing points in Japan seems to call out a hell of a lot of specific buildings that are nowhere near 10 to 30 km inland: https://www.google.com/maps/d/viewer?mid=1Siy5qBMoFyBUlSFNHdHDpGAkIR0
Singapore: Right on the water. http://www.streetdirectory.com/sg/singapore-cable- landing-station/1-changi-north-rise-498817/8118_79569.html
Hong Kong: More of same (though with its hills, some of the 8 sites may actually be a bit above sea level even though they're 2 blocks from water) http://www.ofca.gov.hk/en/industry_focus/telecommunications/facility_ based/infrastructures/submarine_cables/index.html
Cryptome has a bunch of older images that tend to indicate that a lot of buildings right on the water in New Jersey and Long Island are involved: https://cryptome.org/eyeball/cable/cable-eyeball.htm
is this a case of 'wherer the cable gets dry' vs 'where the electronics doing cable things lives' ? aren't (normally) the dry equipment locations a bit inland and then have last-mile services from the consortium members headed inland to their respective network pops?
And that's just in the first 3 pages returned by Google for "cable landing station map".
The experience of the Manhattan phone system when the conduits and basements flooded during Sandy tends to indicate that we *are* in for similar surprises over the coming decades.
On Fri, 02 Jun 2017 13:23:26 -0400, Christopher Morrow said:
is this a case of 'wherer the cable gets dry' vs 'where the electronics doing cable things lives' ? aren't (normally) the dry equipment locations a bit inland and then have last-mile services from the consortium members headed inland to their respective network pops?
Well, I'd be willing to buy that logic, except the specific buildings called out look pretty damned big for just drying off a cable. For example, this is claimed to be the US landing point for TAT-14 - looks around 4K square feet? http://virtualglobetrotting.com/map/tuckerton-cable-landing-station/view/goo... Though I admit I'm foggy on how much gear is needed to stuff however many amps at 4,000 volts down the cable core to power the repeaters. But again - if there's gear stuffing that many amps at that many volts down a cable, salt water could be the start of a bad day... (And note - I'm not saying that *everybody* who built a cable landing station managed to get it wrong. I'm saying that with the number of landing stations in existence, the chance that *somebody* got it wrong is probably scarily high. Telco and internet experiences in New Orleans during Katrina and NYC during Sandy suggest there's a lot of infrastructure built with "we never had storm surge in this building before so it can't happen" planning....)
The plan is to decommission TAT-14 in 2024. That is long before the next Biblical Flood due the ice caps melting. The Trans-Atlantic systems have a life span at best of 30 years. When the next set of systems is built rising waters will be taken into account. ________________________________ From: Valdis Kletnieks <valdis@vt.edu> on behalf of valdis.kletnieks@vt.edu <valdis.kletnieks@vt.edu> Sent: Friday, June 2, 2017 8:40 PM To: Christopher Morrow Cc: Rod Beck; nanog@nanog.org Subject: Re: Russian diplomats lingering near fiber optic cables On Fri, 02 Jun 2017 13:23:26 -0400, Christopher Morrow said:
is this a case of 'wherer the cable gets dry' vs 'where the electronics doing cable things lives' ? aren't (normally) the dry equipment locations a bit inland and then have last-mile services from the consortium members headed inland to their respective network pops?
Well, I'd be willing to buy that logic, except the specific buildings called out look pretty damned big for just drying off a cable. For example, this is claimed to be the US landing point for TAT-14 - looks around 4K square feet? http://virtualglobetrotting.com/map/tuckerton-cable-landing-station/view/goo... [http://khm0.googleapis.com/kh?v=726&hl=en-US&x=307790&y=398428&z=20]<http://virtualglobetrotting.com/map/tuckerton-cable-landing-station/view/google/> Tuckerton Cable Landing Station in Tuckerton, NJ (Google ...<http://virtualglobetrotting.com/map/tuckerton-cable-landing-station/view/google/> virtualglobetrotting.com Tuckerton Cable Landing Station (Google Maps). Tuckerton Cable Landing Station hosts the TAT-14 fibre cable which runs 15,000km to... Though I admit I'm foggy on how much gear is needed to stuff however many amps at 4,000 volts down the cable core to power the repeaters. But again - if there's gear stuffing that many amps at that many volts down a cable, salt water could be the start of a bad day... (And note - I'm not saying that *everybody* who built a cable landing station managed to get it wrong. I'm saying that with the number of landing stations in existence, the chance that *somebody* got it wrong is probably scarily high. Telco and internet experiences in New Orleans during Katrina and NYC during Sandy suggest there's a lot of infrastructure built with "we never had storm surge in this building before so it can't happen" planning....)
On Fri, Jun 2, 2017 at 11:40 AM, <valdis.kletnieks@vt.edu> wrote: [...]
Well, I'd be willing to buy that logic, except the specific buildings called out look pretty damned big for just drying off a cable. For example, this is claimed to be the US landing point for TAT-14 - looks around 4K square feet?
I think you might be off by an order of magnitude or two on that. 4,000 sq ft is about the size of the guest bathroom in Snowhorn's new house, isn't it? (well, OK, maybe a slight exaggeration... ;) Matt
On 02/06/2017 19:46, valdis.kletnieks@vt.edu wrote:
On Fri, 02 Jun 2017 15:11:36 -0000, Rod Beck said:
Landing stations can be 10 to 30 kilometers from the beach manhole. I don't think it is big concern. Hibernia Atlantic dublin landing station is a good example. So 100% of those beach manholes are watertight and safe from flooding, and don't contain any gear that will get upset if it does in fact end up with salt water in there?
This listing for landing points in Japan seems to call out a hell of a lot of specific buildings that are nowhere near 10 to 30 km inland: https://www.google.com/maps/d/viewer?mid=1Siy5qBMoFyBUlSFNHdHDpGAkIR0
Singapore: Right on the water. http://www.streetdirectory.com/sg/singapore-cable-landing-station/1-changi-n...
Hong Kong: More of same (though with its hills, some of the 8 sites may actually be a bit above sea level even though they're 2 blocks from water) http://www.ofca.gov.hk/en/industry_focus/telecommunications/facility_based/i...
Cryptome has a bunch of older images that tend to indicate that a lot of buildings right on the water in New Jersey and Long Island are involved: https://cryptome.org/eyeball/cable/cable-eyeball.htm
And that's just in the first 3 pages returned by Google for "cable landing station map".
The experience of the Manhattan phone system when the conduits and basements flooded during Sandy tends to indicate that we *are* in for similar surprises over the coming decades.
I think you are missing the point. The issue is not the actual landing station but the actual *exact *path the cable takes from 100meter out at sea to the landing station. For that you need GPS coordinates down to a 3' level as the fiber snakes its way from shore into the city. I do not believe that is available on the Internet and is only available to the actual company that laid the cable. One can try to deduce the path by looking for manhole covers but that would require opening and physically inspecting. -Hank
Perfectly irrelevant, Tom. 😊 ________________________________ From: NANOG <nanog-bounces@nanog.org> on behalf of Tom Hill <tom@ninjabadger.net> Sent: Monday, June 5, 2017 12:22:54 AM To: nanog@nanog.org Subject: Re: Russian diplomats lingering near fiber optic cables On 01/06/17 20:44, Rod Beck wrote:
There is a website showing where most of the Trans-Atlantic cables land on the West Coast of Britain at towns like Bude in Wales. Hiding is not an option.
Bude is in Cornwall, a county of England. It's not in Wales. -- Tom
And when you get over trying to score cheap points, you can view the map: http://www.kis-orca.eu/map#.WTSKGG4lHIU. ________________________________ From: NANOG <nanog-bounces@nanog.org> on behalf of Tom Hill <tom@ninjabadger.net> Sent: Monday, June 5, 2017 12:22:54 AM To: nanog@nanog.org Subject: Re: Russian diplomats lingering near fiber optic cables On 01/06/17 20:44, Rod Beck wrote:
There is a website showing where most of the Trans-Atlantic cables land on the West Coast of Britain at towns like Bude in Wales. Hiding is not an option.
Bude is in Cornwall, a county of England. It's not in Wales. -- Tom
On Thu, Jun 01, 2017 at 12:20:54PM -0700, Eric Kuhnke wrote:
That said, a pretty quick way to get on some homeland security watch lists would be to hang around a cable landing station beach location with a big DSLR camera, and appear uninterested in the beach...
I think regardless of what you appear to be interested in, hanging around a beach with a big DSLR is likely to get you on one list or another. - Matt
On Thu, Jun 1, 2017 at 6:07 PM, Matt Palmer <mpalmer@hezmatt.org> wrote:
I think regardless of what you appear to be interested in, hanging around a beach with a big DSLR is likely to get you on one list or another.
"Excuse me, sir! Can you direct us to the naval base in Alameda? It's where they keep the nuclear wessels."
The Seattle Russian Embassy is in the Westin Building just 4 floors above the fiber meet-me-room and five floors above the NRO tap room. They use to come ask us (an ISP) for IT help back in '96 when they would drag an icon too far off the screen in Windows 3.11. We were on the same floor. -- Joe Hamelin, W7COM, Tulalip, WA, +1 (360) 474-7474 On Thu, Jun 1, 2017 at 6:08 PM, Brandon Vincent <Brandon.Vincent@asu.edu> wrote:
On Thu, Jun 1, 2017 at 6:07 PM, Matt Palmer <mpalmer@hezmatt.org> wrote:
I think regardless of what you appear to be interested in, hanging around a beach with a big DSLR is likely to get you on one list or another.
"Excuse me, sir! Can you direct us to the naval base in Alameda? It's where they keep the nuclear wessels."
On Thu, Jun 01, 2017 at 07:15:12PM -0700, Joe Hamelin wrote:
The Seattle Russian Embassy is in the Westin Building just 4 floors above the fiber meet-me-room and five floors above the NRO tap room. They use to come ask us (an ISP) for IT help back in '96 when they would drag an icon too far off the screen in Windows 3.11. We were on the same floor.
So when Flynn & Friends in the Trump Transition Team were trying to establish that back channel link to Vladimir Putin they should've just wandered into the nearest colo facility ... okay, then. I guess they did it the other way because they wanted the trench coats. Regards, Ben
On Thu, Jun 01, 2017 at 07:15:12PM -0700, Joe Hamelin wrote:
The Seattle Russian Embassy is in the Westin Building just 4 floors above the fiber meet-me-room and five floors above the NRO tap room. They use to come ask us (an ISP) for IT help back in '96 when they would drag an icon too far off the screen in Windows 3.11. We were on the same floor.
So when Flynn & Friends in the Trump Transition Team were trying to establish that back channel link to Vladimir Putin they should've just wandered into the nearest colo facility ... okay, then. I guess they did it the other way because they wanted the trench coats.
Regards, Ben American diplomats are doing also all sort of nasty stuff in Russia(and not only), but that's a concern of the equivalent of FBI/NSA/etc, not operators
On 2017-06-02 05:42, Ben McGinnes wrote: public discussion places, unless it really affect operators anyhow. Just amazing, how NANOG slipped into pure politics.
On Fri, Jun 02, 2017 at 10:28:38AM +0300, Denys Fedoryshchenko wrote:
American diplomats are doing also all sort of nasty stuff in Russia(and not only),
Yes they have and for a very long time.
but that's a concern of the equivalent of FBI/NSA/etc, not operators public discussion places, unless it really affect operators anyhow. Just amazing, how NANOG slipped into pure politics.
The network(s) have been political for a very long time and will only become more so as time passes. Remember, the engineers wishing for the purity of technical discussion are usually the same ones crying that, "information wants to be free." Well, no matter. You want purely technical, okay, let's start with authorised mail hosts. You need to add 144.76.183.226/32 to the SPF record for visp.net.lb, which is currently triggering softfails everywhere. It might be wise to explicitly state whether or not it is just 144.76.183.226/32 in the SPF record for nuclearcat.com given the deny all instruction for that domain. Regards, Ben -- | GPG Made Easy (GPGME) Python 3 API Maintainer, GNU Privacy Guard | | GPG key: 0x321E4E2373590E5D http://www.adversary.org/ben-key.asc | | GPG key fpr: DB47 24E6 FA42 86C9 2B4E 55C4 321E 4E23 7359 0E5D | | https://www.gnupg.org/ https://securetheinternet.org/ | | ----------------------------------------------------------------- |
On Fri, Jun 02, 2017 at 10:28:38AM +0300, Denys Fedoryshchenko wrote:
American diplomats are doing also all sort of nasty stuff in Russia(and not only),
Yes they have and for a very long time.
but that's a concern of the equivalent of FBI/NSA/etc, not operators public discussion places, unless it really affect operators anyhow. Just amazing, how NANOG slipped into pure politics.
The network(s) have been political for a very long time and will only become more so as time passes. Remember, the engineers wishing for the purity of technical discussion are usually the same ones crying that, "information wants to be free." https://www.nanog.org/list
On 2017-06-02 12:19, Ben McGinnes wrote: 6. Postings of political, philosophical, and legal nature are prohibited. It is quite clear. I do not deny networks sometimes are deeply affected by political factors, but current discussion is pure FUD, based on very questionable MSM source. IMHO any sane person wont like to receive this trash in his mailbox in list, that supposed to be politics-free, as there is enough of this garbage in internet. I do discuss such things too, when i have mood for that, but in designated places only.
Well, no matter. You want purely technical, okay, let's start with authorised mail hosts.
You need to add 144.76.183.226/32 to the SPF record for visp.net.lb, which is currently triggering softfails everywhere. It might be wise to explicitly state whether or not it is just 144.76.183.226/32 in the SPF record for nuclearcat.com given the deny all instruction for that domain.
Thanks for the hint, fixed, i use this domain only for old maillist subscriptions, so i missed that, after i migrated SMTP to my private server.
On Fri, Jun 02, 2017 at 05:52:43PM +0300, Denys Fedoryshchenko wrote:
https://www.nanog.org/list 6. Postings of political, philosophical, and legal nature are prohibited. It is quite clear.
That's a fair point. The crypto dev world does have a tendency to veer into two of those three (political and legal) with a little more regularity, usually by necessity. So I do tend to weave in and out of those "off" topics without getting too hung up on the creeping FUD in some quarters. At times they'll even have practical requirements which need addressing; which is why somewhere in one of my GPGME branches there's a completed ITAR questionairre - definitely political, very legal and absolutely required in order to continue the technical work at all. I'd be surprised if there were not similar types of issues affecting some aspects of various networks. Most likely pertaining to international routes and even more likely subject to confidentiality agreements of various types (not just everyone's favourite bugbear of national security).
I do not deny networks sometimes are deeply affected by political factors, but current discussion is pure FUD, based on very questionable MSM source. IMHO any sane person wont like to receive this trash in his mailbox in list, that supposed to be politics-free, as there is enough of this garbage in internet.
And it's the role of NANOG to make sure all that FUD gets where the conspiracists intended it to go. Isn't it great ... :)
Thanks for the hint, fixed, i use this domain only for old maillist subscriptions, so i missed that, after i migrated SMTP to my private server.
I entirely understand, I've been tweaking mine a fair bit recently, weighing up the local Postfix instance vs. not having as great a control over the network as I'd like and ultimately deciding to run it all through the MX. I noticed it because I was double-checking return headers to be sure my own systems are doing, more or less, what they're supposed to. Especially since the current MX is set the way it is for technical, legal and political reasons (basically the mail server is in a jurisdiction with *far* greater privacy protections than my own country). Regards, Ben
Christopher asks: 'nro tap room' ... what's the expansion of NRO here? https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Reconnaissance_Office -- Joe Hamelin, W7COM, Tulalip, WA, +1 (360) 474-7474
On Fri, Jun 2, 2017 at 12:49 AM, Joe Hamelin <joe@nethead.com> wrote:
Christopher asks: 'nro tap room' ... what's the expansion of NRO here?
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Reconnaissance_Office
I'm unsure why the NRO would have a room doing tap things in anyone's network. that is not their remit. Certianly we can FUD all day long about black helicopters, but in this case the NRO is a red herring. perhaps you meant NSA? and something akin to the ATT SF room-2<whatever> thing? -chris
On Thu, Jun 1, 2017 at 10:15 PM, Joe Hamelin <joe@nethead.com> wrote:
The Seattle Russian Embassy is in the Westin Building just 4 floors above the fiber meet-me-room ...
The only real Russian Embassy in the US is in Washington where their Ambassador is stationed, although arguably their UN Office in NYC has the status of am Embassy. Embassies have to do with international diplomacy. Their Seattle office is a consulate, which is what most people deal with for passports, visas, import/export permits, and similar personal/commercial stuff rather than diplomatic stuff. Commonly the Embassy of a country is also a consulate or, as it is sometimes described, has a consular affairs branch. See http://www.russianembassy.org/page/russian-consulates-in-the-u-s Thanks, Donald ============================= Donald E. Eastlake 3rd +1-508-333-2270 (cell) 155 Beaver Street, Milford, MA 01757 USA d3e3e3@gmail.com
-- Joe Hamelin, W7COM, Tulalip, WA, +1 (360) 474-7474
It is no longer in the Westin, or if they've kept an office space it is not the public facing consulate. The security desk at the lobby frequently has to deal with confused Russian consular-service seeking people who don't want to take "no" for an answer when they're told that the consulate has moved. new address: 600 University St #2510, Seattle, WA 98101 On Thu, Jun 1, 2017 at 7:15 PM, Joe Hamelin <joe@nethead.com> wrote:
The Seattle Russian Embassy is in the Westin Building just 4 floors above the fiber meet-me-room and five floors above the NRO tap room. They use to come ask us (an ISP) for IT help back in '96 when they would drag an icon too far off the screen in Windows 3.11. We were on the same floor.
-- Joe Hamelin, W7COM, Tulalip, WA, +1 (360) 474-7474
On Thu, Jun 1, 2017 at 6:08 PM, Brandon Vincent <Brandon.Vincent@asu.edu> wrote:
On Thu, Jun 1, 2017 at 6:07 PM, Matt Palmer <mpalmer@hezmatt.org> wrote:
I think regardless of what you appear to be interested in, hanging around a beach with a big DSLR is likely to get you on one list or another.
"Excuse me, sir! Can you direct us to the naval base in Alameda? It's where they keep the nuclear wessels."
On Thu, Jun 01, 2017 at 02:02:46PM -0400, Sean Donelan wrote:
There must be a perfectly logical explanation.... Yes, people in the industry know where the choke points are. But the choke points aren't always the most obvious places. Its kinda a weird for diplomats to show up there.
Maybe they're not *actually* Russian diplomats, but instead undercover backhoes using Russian diplomatic credentials. - Matt
Hi Sean You and I first met when i was at OIA about 1992 LOONG TIME ago Always thought of you as brilliant collector of info as well as analyst there of this question of yours is absolutely brilliant look at the responses (more) than 45!!!
On Jun 1, 2017, at 2:02 PM, Sean Donelan <sean@donelan.com> wrote:
There must be a perfectly logical explanation.... Yes, people in the industry know where the choke points are. But the choke points aren't always the most obvious places. Its kinda a weird for diplomats to show up there.
On the other hand, I've been a fiber optic tourist. I've visited many critical choke points in the USA and other countries, and even took selfies :-)
http://www.politico.com/story/2017/06/01/russia-spies-espionage-trump-239003
In the throes of the 2016 campaign, the FBI found itself with an escalating problem: Russian diplomats, whose travel was supposed to be tracked by the State Department, were going missing.
The diplomats, widely assumed to be intelligence operatives, would eventually turn up in odd places, often in middle-of-nowhere USA. One was found on a beach, nowhere near where he was supposed to be. In one particularly bizarre case, relayed by a U.S. intelligence official, another turned up wandering around in the middle of the desert. Interestingly, both seemed to be lingering where underground fiber-optic cables tend to run.
According to another U.S. intelligence official, “They find these guys driving around in circles in Kansas. It’s a pretty aggressive effort.”
It’s a trend that has led intelligence officials to conclude that the Kremlin is waging a quiet effort to map the United States’ telecommunications infrastructure, perhaps preparing for an opportunity to disrupt it.
I have just scanned this whole thread - it is the most amazing analysis of technical details I have e ver seen national security also sean I am taking this in the sense of what the hell could these russian diplomats be doing? I have been a nanog reader since this list began in the spring of 1995 i believe remember i am parsing comments from the russian side as well i met aleksei soldatov at the kurchatov institute for the first time in april 1992. about 3 days earlier i met the demos guys who told soldatov suggested to soldatov that he should met me at kurchatov I followed the development of the russian internet very closely between April 1992 and 1999 not much after that. meanwhile i am well aware of international fiber optic cables geographic issues of same — see telegeography for example, His coordinates etc interception of cable via submarine etc see the US Sub named Jimmy carter I visited Russia for the first time in 1964 my dissertation completed in 1972 dis on site work for the Phd in Russia for 2 months summer of 1970 including pushkinskii Dom Thanks to steve Goldstein of NSF I received an invite to attend the second Nato sponsored conference on the future e of the russian internet met larry land weber there at Golitsyno - the conf was sept 30 to Oct 2 1994 The point? I have long experience with my Cook Report on Internet Protocol in April 1992 issue #1 and an even lon\ger experience with russian history language and culture I am also well aware this message will be readable by a ver large number of people both here and abroad. even visited the westin bldg In i think 1994. take a bow Sean!! :-)
On Jun 11, 2017, at 11:38 AM, Gordon Cook <cook@cookreport.com> wrote:
Hi Sean
You and I first met when i was at OIA about 1992 LOONG TIME ago
Always thought of you as brilliant collector of info as well as analyst there of
this question of yours is absolutely brilliant
look at the responses (more) than 45!!!
On Jun 1, 2017, at 2:02 PM, Sean Donelan <sean@donelan.com> wrote:
There must be a perfectly logical explanation.... Yes, people in the industry know where the choke points are. But the choke points aren't always the most obvious places. Its kinda a weird for diplomats to show up there.
On the other hand, I've been a fiber optic tourist. I've visited many critical choke points in the USA and other countries, and even took selfies :-)
http://www.politico.com/story/2017/06/01/russia-spies-espionage-trump-239003
In the throes of the 2016 campaign, the FBI found itself with an escalating problem: Russian diplomats, whose travel was supposed to be tracked by the State Department, were going missing.
The diplomats, widely assumed to be intelligence operatives, would eventually turn up in odd places, often in middle-of-nowhere USA. One was found on a beach, nowhere near where he was supposed to be. In one particularly bizarre case, relayed by a U.S. intelligence official, another turned up wandering around in the middle of the desert. Interestingly, both seemed to be lingering where underground fiber-optic cables tend to run.
According to another U.S. intelligence official, “They find these guys driving around in circles in Kansas. It’s a pretty aggressive effort.”
It’s a trend that has led intelligence officials to conclude that the Kremlin is waging a quiet effort to map the United States’ telecommunications infrastructure, perhaps preparing for an opportunity to disrupt it.
participants (21)
-
Alain Hebert -
Ben McGinnes -
Brandon Vincent -
Bruce H McIntosh -
Christopher Morrow -
clinton mielke -
Denys Fedoryshchenko -
Donald Eastlake -
Eric Kuhnke -
Gordon Cook -
Hank Nussbacher -
Jared Mauch -
Joe Hamelin -
Matt Palmer -
Matthew Petach -
Mel Beckman -
Rod Beck -
Scott Christopher -
Sean Donelan -
Tom Hill -
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