U.S. Plans Cyber Shield for Utilities, Companies
andrew.wallace wrote:
Article: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704545004575352983850463108.ht...
Why does it cost $100 million to install and configure OpenBSD on a bunch of old systems? --Patrick
On Wed, 7 Jul 2010, Patrick Giagnocavo wrote:
andrew.wallace wrote:
Article: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704545004575352983850463108.ht...
Why does it cost $100 million to install and configure OpenBSD on a bunch of old systems?
A) it's being done for the government B) it's being done by a defense contractor C) regardless of what they install, somebody's got to manage it and be managed by multiple layers of managers D) other Pick three or more answers. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Jon Lewis | I route Senior Network Engineer | therefore you are Atlantic Net | _________ http://www.lewis.org/~jlewis/pgp for PGP public key_________
ROFL You forgot E) Oversight by a committee and F) All of the above On 7/7/10 9:14 PM, "Jon Lewis" <jlewis@lewis.org> wrote:
On Wed, 7 Jul 2010, Patrick Giagnocavo wrote:
andrew.wallace wrote:
Article: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704545004575352983850463108.ht ml
Why does it cost $100 million to install and configure OpenBSD on a bunch of old systems?
A) it's being done for the government B) it's being done by a defense contractor C) regardless of what they install, somebody's got to manage it and be managed by multiple layers of managers D) other
Pick three or more answers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------- Jon Lewis | I route Senior Network Engineer | therefore you are Atlantic Net | _________ http://www.lewis.org/~jlewis/pgp for PGP public key_________
You forgot -It is carrier grade, ISO certified and other certification program not worth the paper it is printed on. ----- Original Message ----- From: "Jon Lewis" <jlewis@lewis.org> To: "Patrick Giagnocavo" <patrick@zill.net> Cc: nanog@nanog.org Sent: Thursday, 8 July, 2010 2:14:53 PM Subject: Re: U.S. Plans Cyber Shield for Utilities, Companies On Wed, 7 Jul 2010, Patrick Giagnocavo wrote:
andrew.wallace wrote:
Article: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704545004575352983850463108.ht...
Why does it cost $100 million to install and configure OpenBSD on a bunch of old systems?
A) it's being done for the government B) it's being done by a defense contractor C) regardless of what they install, somebody's got to manage it and be managed by multiple layers of managers D) other
On 2010-07-07 19:14, Jon Lewis wrote:
On Wed, 7 Jul 2010, Patrick Giagnocavo wrote:
andrew.wallace wrote:
Article: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704545004575352983850463108.ht...
Why does it cost $100 million to install and configure OpenBSD on a bunch of old systems?
Having supported contractors deploying of all things firewall rulesets for scada systems I can only imagine that $100 million is only getting started.
A) it's being done for the government B) it's being done by a defense contractor C) regardless of what they install, somebody's got to manage it and be managed by multiple layers of managers D) other
Pick three or more answers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------- Jon Lewis | I route Senior Network Engineer | therefore you are Atlantic Net | _________ http://www.lewis.org/~jlewis/pgp for PGP public key_________
On Wed, 07 Jul 2010 22:02:24 EDT, Patrick Giagnocavo said:
andrew.wallace wrote:
Article: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704545004575352983850463108.ht...
Why does it cost $100 million to install and configure OpenBSD on a bunch of old systems?
That's the first $3M. The other $97M is actually turning it into a functional system - which is the hard part that nobody really understands. And I see you smirking in the back row - no, you don't understand it either, or you would have already figured out a way to monetize your understanding. ;)
Because no-one who could do it for less can afford to respond to government contracts, and make sure they comply with all the applicable laws and regulations, and keep the sort of records, and be prepared for the audits of said records, required. As soon as you do business with the govt, the overhead goes through the roof.
-----Original Message----- From: Patrick Giagnocavo [mailto:patrick@zill.net] Sent: Wednesday, July 07, 2010 7:02 PM To: nanog@nanog.org Subject: Re: U.S. Plans Cyber Shield for Utilities, Companies
andrew.wallace wrote:
Article:
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527487045450045753529838504631 08.html
Why does it cost $100 million to install and configure OpenBSD on a bunch of old systems?
--Patrick
$100M is for the first phase, which I would think would be the initial deployment of intrusions sensors with out of band data feeds, and the building of a baseline traffic model. The real question is why do any critical control networks ever touch anything remotely connected to a public network? Laziness - that's why. Tomas L. Byrnes wrote:
Because no-one who could do it for less can afford to respond to government contracts, and make sure they comply with all the applicable laws and regulations, and keep the sort of records, and be prepared for the audits of said records, required.
As soon as you do business with the govt, the overhead goes through the roof.
-----Original Message----- From: Patrick Giagnocavo [mailto:patrick@zill.net] Sent: Wednesday, July 07, 2010 7:02 PM To: nanog@nanog.org Subject: Re: U.S. Plans Cyber Shield for Utilities, Companies
andrew.wallace wrote:
Article:
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527487045450045753529838504631 08.html Why does it cost $100 million to install and configure OpenBSD on a bunch of old systems?
--Patrick
andrew.wallace wrote:
Article: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704545004575352983850463108.ht...
My opinion: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704545004575352983850463108.ht...
"Perfect Citizen will look at large, typically older computer control systems that were often designed without Internet connectivity or security in mind. Many of those systems—which run everything from subway systems to air-traffic control networks—have since been linked to the Internet, making them more efficient but also exposing them to cyber attack." Have we all gone mad? I find it hard to understand that a nuclear power plant, air-traffic control network, or electrical grid would be 'linked' to the Internet in the interest of 'efficiency'. Air gap them all and let them apply for "Inefficiency Relief" from the $100 million relief fund.
On Thu, Jul 8, 2010 at 1:16 AM, Michael Painter <tvhawaii@shaka.com> wrote:
Have we all gone mad? I find it hard to understand that a nuclear power plant, air-traffic control network, or electrical grid would be 'linked' to the Internet in the interest of 'efficiency'. Air gap them all and let them apply for "Inefficiency Relief" from the $100 million relief fund.
Efficiency in this context refers to the nuke plant operator checking his email and playing games online. It is not efficient to have him use one computer for the power plant and one for his personal use. </sarcasm>
On Wed, 7 Jul 2010, Michael Painter wrote:
Have we all gone mad? I find it hard to understand that a nuclear power plant, air-traffic control network, or electrical grid would be 'linked' to the Internet in the interest of 'efficiency'. Air gap them all and let them apply for "Inefficiency Relief" from the $100 million relief fund.
Absolutely! For example, those thousands of flight plans filed every day by airlines across the globe, not to mention private flights, should be done manually the old fashioned way, with a paper form and stopping by your local FAA office where a human keys them into the ATC computer. Oh wait, we closed all of those offices when we moved all of those functions to the Internet. I guess we'll just have to re-open them. And flight tracking data that airlines and freight companies use to track their aircraft, yea, let's cut those off too. If they want to know where their plane is, just have them call the FAA. Surely the government can staff some huge call centers to handle the load of each airline calling about each flight every few minutes. Heck, removing all of these functions from the Internet will create jobs, too, right? And no one would mind paying for all of this out of their airline tickets, it should only increase fares by a third or so. -- Brandon Ross AIM: BrandonNRoss ICQ: 2269442 Skype: brandonross Yahoo: BrandonNRoss
On Wed, 7 Jul 2010, Michael Painter wrote:
Have we all gone mad? I find it hard to understand that a nuclear power plant, air-traffic control network, or electrical grid would be 'linked' to the Internet in the interest of 'efficiency'. Air gap them all and let them apply for "Inefficiency Relief" from the $100 million relief fund.
Absolutely! For example, those thousands of flight plans filed every day by airlines across the globe, not to mention private flights, should be done manually the old fashioned way, with a paper form and stopping by your local FAA office where a human keys them into the ATC computer. Oh wait, we closed all of those offices when we moved all of those functions to the Internet. I guess we'll just have to re-open them.
And flight tracking data that airlines and freight companies use to track their aircraft, yea, let's cut those off too. If they want to know where their plane is, just have them call the FAA. Surely the government can staff some huge call centers to handle the load of each airline calling about each flight every few minutes.
Heck, removing all of these functions from the Internet will create jobs, too, right? And no one would mind paying for all of this out of their airline tickets, it should only increase fares by a third or so.
There's a happy medium in there somewhere; it's not clear that having (to use the examples given) air traffic control computers directly on the Internet has sufficient value to outweigh the risks. However, it seems that being able to securely gateway appropriate information between the two networks should be manageable, certainly a lot more manageable than the NxM complexity involved if you try to do it by securing each and every Internet-connected ATC PC individually. It sucks in some ways, but providing a limited number of pathways in that are under tight, secure control is a desirable goal. If you give the PC that allows control of the power grid access to the Internet so that the operator can "efficiently" update his Facebook while he's simultaneously controlling the power grid, that's hazardous, and no amount of snide remarks about job creation will change that reality. These networks ought to be air gapped to the maximum reasonable extent possible; all pathways in ought to be defended as though they were the gateway to the kingdom. ... JG -- Joe Greco - sol.net Network Services - Milwaukee, WI - http://www.sol.net "We call it the 'one bite at the apple' rule. Give me one chance [and] then I won't contact you again." - Direct Marketing Ass'n position on e-mail spam(CNN) With 24 million small businesses in the US alone, that's way too many apples.
On Thu, 8 Jul 2010, Joe Greco wrote:
There's a happy medium in there somewhere; it's not clear that having (to use the examples given) air traffic control computers directly on the Internet has sufficient value to outweigh the risks. However, it seems that being able to securely gateway appropriate information between the two networks should be manageable, certainly a lot more manageable than the NxM complexity involved if you try to do it by securing each and every Internet-connected ATC PC individually.
What makes you think that isn't exactly what this "Cyber Shield" project is supposed to do? Heck, what makes you think that's not the way most of these systems already work today? Do people really think the guy in the airport control tower is really surfing Facebook while he's controlling aircraft on the same computer, or that capability is even what is under consideration? -- Brandon Ross AIM: BrandonNRoss ICQ: 2269442 Skype: brandonross Yahoo: BrandonNRoss
Brandon Ross wrote:
Do people really think the guy in the airport control tower is really surfing Facebook while he's controlling aircraft on the same computer, or that capability is even what is under consideration?
"Air traffic controller suspended for allowing son to radio instructions to pilots at New York's Kennedy Airport" http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/dn/latestnews/stories/030410dnna... "Air traffic controller suspended, was chatting on phone with girlfriend during Hudson River crash" http://www.nydailynews.com/ny_local/2009/08/13/2009-08-13_air_traffic_contro... Huh? ... Scary isn't it: "Pilots were working on laptops when plane overflew Minneapolis destination" http://www.japantoday.com/category/world/view/wayward-pilots-were-working-on... There is that capability however, you may be looking at it from a different perspective. It's easy enough to plop open an iPhone for Internet usage. I'm almost positive there are no "smart phone" policies in an Air Traffic Control tower. -- =+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+ J. Oquendo SGFA, SGFE, C|EH, CNDA, CHFI, OSCP, CPT "It takes 20 years to build a reputation and five minutes to ruin it. If you think about that, you'll do things differently." - Warren Buffett 227C 5D35 7DCB 0893 95AA 4771 1DCE 1FD1 5CCD 6B5E http://pgp.mit.edu:11371/pks/lookup?op=get&search=0x5CCD6B5E
On Thu, 8 Jul 2010, J. Oquendo wrote:
Brandon Ross wrote:
Do people really think the guy in the airport control tower is really surfing Facebook while he's controlling aircraft on the same computer, or that capability is even what is under consideration?
"Air traffic controller suspended for allowing son to radio instructions to pilots at New York's Kennedy Airport" http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/dn/latestnews/stories/030410dnna...
Please read critically before replying. My exact quote included the words "on the same computer". The article that started this thread is about protecting critical systems, not preventing people from making stupid mistakes. If you want to talk about ATC procedures or the misbehavior of controllers using unapproved devices, there's a whole separate mailing list for that. -- Brandon Ross AIM: BrandonNRoss ICQ: 2269442 Skype: brandonross Yahoo: BrandonNRoss
On Jul 8, 2010, at 9:00 AM, Brandon Ross wrote:
On Thu, 8 Jul 2010, Joe Greco wrote:
There's a happy medium in there somewhere; it's not clear that having (to use the examples given) air traffic control computers directly on the Internet has sufficient value to outweigh the risks. However, it seems that being able to securely gateway appropriate information between the two networks should be manageable, certainly a lot more manageable than the NxM complexity involved if you try to do it by securing each and every Internet-connected ATC PC individually.
What makes you think that isn't exactly what this "Cyber Shield" project is supposed to do? Heck, what makes you think that's not the way most of these systems already work today?
Do people really think the guy in the airport control tower is really surfing Facebook while he's controlling aircraft on the same computer, or that capability is even what is under consideration?
In fact, I know he isn't. For one thing, the guys in the towers generally do not use computers at all. Yes, some towers have RADAR displays that are actually generated by computer, but, they are essentially read-only and they are not general purpose computers with web browsers, internet connectivity, or even a keyboard for that matter. However, the guys in the tower primarily use binoculars, mark 1 eyeballs, flight progress strips, and a lot of ingenuity to control aircraft within the class D/C/B airspace immediately surrounding their airport (the local controller) and the aircraft on the ground (the ground controller). In some cases, clearance delivery is using a computer, but, technically, he's not controlling aircraft, just in the tower for communication convenience. Now, if you wanted to talk about a TRACON or ARTCC, we might (MIGHT) get into a different realm. In the TRACON, mostly not. Those controllers are generally also working specialized scopes to control aircraft within the airspace around some of the busier airports below about 12,000 feet. In the ARTCC (commonly referred to as "Center") case, mostly they are using similar equipment to the TRACON, but, have wider areas of coverage with lower traffic densities and coverage up to 60,000 feet (Flight level 600). The exception would be the guys working some of the oceanic sectors who depend on email (yes, email) to receive position reports and other data from pilots via ARINC, and, to send instructions to AIRINC to relay to pilots. However, to the best of my knowledge, even that email based system is not connected to the internet and the controllers that are doing that are not doing anything else while they are doing that. I know this from being a pilot, and, also from having toured the following ATC facilities: Towers: CCR PAO SFO TRACONs: SOCAL Bay -- Now defunct, rolled into NORCAL NORCAL Monterey -- Now defunct, rolled into NORCAL Stockton -- Now defunct, rolled into NORCAL ARTCCs: ZOA (Oakland Center) Owen
Owen DeLong wrote: [snip]
I know this from being a pilot, and, also from having toured the following ATC facilities:
Towers: TRACONs: ARTCCs:
Ditto to absolutely EVERYTHING that Owen said, and I can guarantee this further, having had experience with various east coast and southeastern Towers, TRACONs, and ARTCCs (and having fond memories of it all). Personally, I'm more concerned about "Cisco Security Advisory: Hard-Coded SNMP Community Names in Cisco Industrial Ethernet 3000 Series Switches Vulnerability" than worrying about whatever the latest scary headline from n3td3v (aka andrew wallace) is. -- All men whilst they are awake are in one common world: but each of them, when he is asleep, is in a world of his own. Plutarch
On Thu, 8 Jul 2010, Joe Greco wrote:
There's a happy medium in there somewhere; it's not clear that having (to use the examples given) air traffic control computers directly on the Internet has sufficient value to outweigh the risks. However, it seems that being able to securely gateway appropriate information between the two networks should be manageable, certainly a lot more manageable than the NxM complexity involved if you try to do it by securing each and every Internet-connected ATC PC individually.
What makes you think that isn't exactly what this "Cyber Shield" project is supposed to do?
Because I'm cynical and I know how the real world works, and even if it's supposed to do that, by the time all is said and done, it probably won't.
Heck, what makes you think that's not the way most of these systems already work today?
Because we've all been told by those in the know that there are real vulnerabilities in these systems.
Do people really think the guy in the airport control tower is really surfing Facebook while he's controlling aircraft on the same computer, or that capability is even what is under consideration?
The reality of what's actually going on can be debated pointlessly until we're blue in the face; none of us are in a position to know, I suspect. On the other hand, it takes a few milliseconds to recall an air traffic controller letting his kid land planes. http://tinyurl.com/2dzvooc So let's not be too naive here. Anything you expect can't happen - can and probably will at some point. The point is that we want to forcibly separate networks and technology so that an air traffic controller CANNOT possibly be surfing Facebook on a computer that's being used for critical work. ... JG -- Joe Greco - sol.net Network Services - Milwaukee, WI - http://www.sol.net "We call it the 'one bite at the apple' rule. Give me one chance [and] then I won't contact you again." - Direct Marketing Ass'n position on e-mail spam(CNN) With 24 million small businesses in the US alone, that's way too many apples.
On Thu, Jul 08, 2010 at 09:51:52AM -0400, Brandon Ross wrote:
On Wed, 7 Jul 2010, Michael Painter wrote:
Have we all gone mad?
Absolutely! For example, those thousands of flight plans filed every day by airlines across the globe, not to mention private flights, should be done manually the old fashioned way, with a paper form and stopping by your local FAA office where a human keys them into the ATC computer. Oh wait, we closed all of those offices when we moved all of those functions to the Internet. I guess we'll just have to re-open them.
yeah! jobs for americans! actually, the interesting questions raised are along the lines of "what is your contingency plan?" ... the big EMP is coming.
Heck, removing all of these functions from the Internet will create jobs, too, right? And no one would mind paying for all of this out of their airline tickets, it should only increase fares by a third or so.
-- Brandon Ross AIM: BrandonNRoss ICQ: 2269442 Skype: brandonross Yahoo: BrandonNRoss
-----Original Message----- From: Brandon Ross Sent: Thursday, July 08, 2010 6:52 AM To: Michael Painter Cc: nanog@nanog.org Subject: Re: U.S. Plans Cyber Shield for Utilities, Companies
On Wed, 7 Jul 2010, Michael Painter wrote:
Have we all gone mad? I find it hard to understand that a nuclear power plant, air-traffic control network, or electrical grid would be 'linked' to the Internet in the interest of 'efficiency'. Air gap them all and let them apply for "Inefficiency Relief" from the $100 million relief fund.
Absolutely! For example, those thousands of flight plans filed every day by airlines across the globe, not to mention private flights, should be done manually the old fashioned way, with a paper form and stopping by your local FAA office where a human keys them into the ATC computer. Oh wait, we closed all of those offices when we moved all of those functions to the Internet. I guess we'll just have to re-open them.
I believe the point was in response to: "control systems that were often designed without Internet connectivity or security in mind. Many of those systems-which run everything from subway systems to air-traffic control networks-have since been linked to the Internet" If something was designed without network security "in mind" and then connected to the internet as-is, then yeah, that pretty much is not only "madness" but is just asking for trouble. So I am torn between this being another exercise in treating the symptoms while ignoring the underlying cause and at least having SOMEONE watching the front door if the owners aren't paying any attention themselves. But I would think the cost of the program could be scaled back somewhat if certain basic security practices were mandated prior to the system being installed.
On Jul 8, 2010, at 10:13 AM, George Bonser wrote:
-----Original Message----- From: Brandon Ross Sent: Thursday, July 08, 2010 6:52 AM To: Michael Painter Cc: nanog@nanog.org Subject: Re: U.S. Plans Cyber Shield for Utilities, Companies
On Wed, 7 Jul 2010, Michael Painter wrote:
Have we all gone mad? I find it hard to understand that a nuclear power plant, air-traffic control network, or electrical grid would be 'linked' to the Internet in the interest of 'efficiency'. Air gap them all and let them apply for "Inefficiency Relief" from the $100 million relief fund.
Absolutely! For example, those thousands of flight plans filed every day by airlines across the globe, not to mention private flights, should be done manually the old fashioned way, with a paper form and stopping by your local FAA office where a human keys them into the ATC computer. Oh wait, we closed all of those offices when we moved all of those functions to the Internet. I guess we'll just have to re-open them.
I believe the point was in response to:
"control systems that were often designed without Internet connectivity or security in mind. Many of those systems-which run everything from subway systems to air-traffic control networks-have since been linked to the Internet"
If something was designed without network security "in mind" and then connected to the internet as-is, then yeah, that pretty much is not only "madness" but is just asking for trouble. So I am torn between this being another exercise in treating the symptoms while ignoring the underlying cause and at least having SOMEONE watching the front door if the owners aren't paying any attention themselves. But I would think the cost of the program could be scaled back somewhat if certain basic security practices were mandated prior to the system being installed.
I think part of the problem comes from interrelationships between the transitive property of trust (if A trusts B and B trusts C, then A trusts C whether A knows it or not) and the perceived vs. actual nature of linkage. For example, it would seem madness to put an HTTP server directly on the primary Air Traffic Scheduling System at "FAA Central" and have it collect flight plans directly from the internet. However, what happens is that FAA contracts Lockheed out to run several Automated Flight Service Stations and also contracts two other companies (GTE and CONTEL last I looked at who had the contracts) to run a service known as "Direct User Access Terminals" or DUATS. Lockheed runs their own systems and interacts with pilots by telephone and radio. Flight Plans and Pilot Reports collected by Lockheed are put into Lockheed systems which are then linked into the FAA systems. I do not know if any of those links involve internet connectivity or not. LIkely some do. The DUATS systems also link into the FAA computers for uploading flight plans and pilot reports and for getting weather and NOTAM information from the FAA. As such, at least on some level, the FAA systems are linked to systems that are linked to the internet and there definitely isn't an air-gap. I suspect it is a full enough form of proxy that only data can traverse from one to the other. I think the design of the systems is probably relatively sane on that level. However, I doubt anyone on this list really knows for sure how the systems were designed or the exact nature of their linkages and I suspect there are many many other examples of such indirect linkages that have grown organically over time as the internet has moved from scientific novelty to a place to distribute web access and now starts to become the fundamental basis for communication among humans, machines, and others throughout the world. There used to be a clear line between telecom and datacom. It used to be that the internet was clearly datacom. Today, it's almost as if telecom as a separate discipline is going away and instead voice is becoming an application on the datacom network. It used to be that datacom was many disparate specialized networks each serving a particular datacom purpose. Today, the internet has become the generic low-level building block upon which virtually every datacom application, including the new telecom (voice as an application on a data network) is being built. With these changes and their relationships to legacy systems come new security concerns. Some known, many likely not even noticed as things move forward. Owen
On 7/8/2010 9:51 AM, Brandon Ross wrote:
On Wed, 7 Jul 2010, Michael Painter wrote:
Have we all gone mad? I find it hard to understand that a nuclear power plant, air-traffic control network, or electrical grid would be 'linked' to the Internet in the interest of 'efficiency'. Air gap them all and let them apply for "Inefficiency Relief" from the $100 million relief fund.
Heck, removing all of these functions from the Internet will create jobs, too, right? And no one would mind paying for all of this out of their airline tickets, it should only increase fares by a third or so.
You know it is possible, mind you, possible to have control systems for things like the power grid and nuclear power plants to live on a physically separate network within a building from a terminal that has the internet connected to it. --C
On Wed, 07 Jul 2010 19:16:27 -1000, Michael Painter said:
I find it hard to understand that a nuclear power plant, air-traffic control network, or electrical grid would be 'linked' to the Internet in the interest of 'efficiency'. Air gap them all and let them apply for "Inefficiency Relief" from the $100 million relief fund.
OK, so you airgap the whole thing, and apply for "Inefficiency Relief" to help pay for those 2,397 separate dark fiber dedicated links you need to contact your 2,397 remote sensing stations and control points. And of course, since you end up burning a *lot* of dark fiber pairs when every utility starts doing that, the provider gets to go back and put a whole lot more 96-pair or whatever alongside the previous bundle, driving prices back up after our long-term fiber glut. And then you discover that your actual network reliability goes *down*, because getting your provider to troubleshoot your measly 64K channel is a pain and takes a long time to get results - whereas if you went commodity Internet your packets are now mixed in with everybody else's on a important 10GE link. Sure, that 10GE link may be just 2 fibers over in the same bundle - but guess which one will probably be spliced first after the backhoe hits? (Plus of course, if 37 of those 2,397 links were in the bundle, it's going to take 37 splices to get you 100% back up, instead of just one splice....) What's the going rate these days that you have to pay to make sure your fiber gets spliced first rather than that other customer's 10GE? And what's it cost to do it for all 2,397 links? And if your electrical-grid fiber is in the same cable as the other customer's ATC cable, who gets spliced first? If you have a single point of failure in your design, you really want to make sure that the point is heavily fate-shared with enough other customers that the provider will feel *really* motivated to fix your problem. ;)
On Jul 8, 2010, at 10:12 AM, Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu wrote:
What's the going rate these days that you have to pay to make sure your fiber gets spliced first rather than that other customer's 10GE? And what's it cost to do it for all 2,397 links? And if your electrical-grid fiber is in the same cable as the other customer's ATC cable, who gets spliced first?
On Jul 8, 2010, at 10:12 AM, Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu wrote:
On Wed, 07 Jul 2010 19:16:27 -1000, Michael Painter said:
I find it hard to understand that a nuclear power plant, air- traffic control network, or electrical grid would be 'linked' to the Internet in the interest of 'efficiency'. Air gap them all and let them apply for "Inefficiency Relief" from the $100 million relief fund.
OK, so you airgap the whole thing, and apply for "Inefficiency Relief" to help pay for those 2,397 separate dark fiber dedicated links you need to contact your 2,397 remote sensing stations and control points. And of course, since you end up burning a *lot* of dark fiber pairs when every utility starts doing that, the provider gets to go back and put a whole lot more 96-pair or whatever alongside the previous bundle, driving prices back up after our long- term fiber glut.
I think that there needs to be a balance. There is no Internet access to certain military systems, for example, but that doesn't mean that the base housing them has no Internet access. I would expect the same to be true for, e.g., nuclear power systems. If this has never been thought through by someone, it would not be a bad idea to start now. On the other hand, my friends in military networking tend to be cynical about these kinds of exercises. They may or may not actually increase security, in fact they sometimes degrade it, but they tend to be very good at sending money to politically well connected contractors. Regards Marshall
And then you discover that your actual network reliability goes *down*, because getting your provider to troubleshoot your measly 64K channel is a pain and takes a long time to get results - whereas if you went commodity Internet your packets are now mixed in with everybody else's on a important 10GE link. Sure, that 10GE link may be just 2 fibers over in the same bundle - but guess which one will probably be spliced first after the backhoe hits? (Plus of course, if 37 of those 2,397 links were in the bundle, it's going to take 37 splices to get you 100% back up, instead of just one splice....)
What's the going rate these days that you have to pay to make sure your fiber gets spliced first rather than that other customer's 10GE? And what's it cost to do it for all 2,397 links? And if your electrical-grid fiber is in the same cable as the other customer's ATC cable, who gets spliced first?
If you have a single point of failure in your design, you really want to make sure that the point is heavily fate-shared with enough other customers that the provider will feel *really* motivated to fix your problem. ;)
On 7/8/2010 09:59, Marshall Eubanks wrote:
I think that there needs to be a balance.
I think it needs to be the purview of the custodian of the facility. Not some political wonk. -- Somebody should have said: A democracy is two wolves and a lamb voting on what to have for dinner. Freedom under a constitutional republic is a well armed lamb contesting the vote. Requiescas in pace o email Ex turpi causa non oritur actio Eppure si rinfresca ICBM Targeting Information: http://tinyurl.com/4sqczs http://tinyurl.com/7tp8ml
Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu wrote:
What's the going rate these days that you have to pay to make sure your fiber gets spliced first rather than that other customer's 10GE?
I'm not familiar with cable break splicing procedures, but is it even possible to pay extra to have your splice done first? I would think that the logistics of splicing are such that the guy down in the hole doesn't know whose traffic is on each strand in the bundle, and his job is just to splice them as he matches them (using color codes or similar on the sheaths of the individual strands) as fast as he can. Trying to identify a specific strand and then splicing it first would greatly slow down the task of splicing them all. If you have more than 1 strand that needs to get spliced "first" it would likely take longer to identify these "special" customers and get them done first than to just splice with no priority and get the whole bundle done. jc
On Thu, 08 Jul 2010 08:12:29 PDT, JC Dill said:
Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu wrote:
What's the going rate these days that you have to pay to make sure your fiber gets spliced first rather than that other customer's 10GE?
I'm not familiar with cable break splicing procedures, but is it even possible to pay extra to have your splice done first? I would think that the logistics of splicing are such that the guy down in the hole doesn't know whose traffic is on each strand in the bundle
Exactly - which is a case for just having everybody's traffic mingled on a very busy 12-pair rather than several 96-pair with lots of dedicated links, *everybody* ends up back in service a lot faster... And remember - this industry has more trouble with backhoes and would-be copper thieves than terrorists. Anybody who is defending against terrorists by increasing their vulnerability to backhoes is, well...
On Jul 8, 2010, at 9:26 AM, Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu wrote:
I'm not familiar with cable break splicing procedures, but is it even possible to pay extra to have your splice done first? I would think that the logistics of splicing are such that the guy down in the hole doesn't know whose traffic is on each strand in the bundle
Exactly - which is a case for just having everybody's traffic mingled on a very busy 12-pair rather than several 96-pair with lots of dedicated links, *everybody* ends up back in service a lot faster...
And remember - this industry has more trouble with backhoes and would-be copper thieves than terrorists. Anybody who is defending against terrorists by increasing their vulnerability to backhoes is, well...
Having done a good bit of manual copper and [old school fusion] fiber splicing for a few years as an outside plant monkey in the Army Signal Corp and a short stint thereafter as a contractor, I assure you that prioritization can make a significant different with large cable damage, in particular when single wire/pair splicing is done. Copper multi-pair splicing still allows specific bundles to be prioritized as well, sorta the same as fiber. Given that cuts and other damage usually requires splicing on two ends, some bit of coordination is required but mostly trivial, in particular with large copper cable (e.g., 2400 pair). Of course, in fairness to Valdis's comment, setup time on both ends is often the dominating factor, although bundle 1 to bundle 96 is an 2400 pair copper cable could be several hours or more. Of course, physical plant prioritization is only the dominating factor when last mile damage occurs. It's more useful and commonly employed when intermediate facility failures happen - prioritized regrooming of critical services is sometimes even automated, and often results in, err.. less critical services being booted until full restoration has occurred. -danny
In a message written on Thu, Jul 08, 2010 at 08:12:29AM -0700, JC Dill wrote:
I'm not familiar with cable break splicing procedures, but is it even possible to pay extra to have your splice done first? I would think that the logistics of splicing are such that the guy down in the hole doesn't know whose traffic is on each strand in the bundle, and his job is just to splice them as he matches them (using color codes or similar on the sheaths of the individual strands) as fast as he can. Trying to identify a specific strand and then splicing it first would greatly slow down the task of splicing them all. If you have more than 1 strand that needs to get spliced "first" it would likely take longer to identify these "special" customers and get them done first than to just splice with no priority and get the whole bundle done.
In the simple case of a fiber cut and repair (the proverbial errant backhoe) you're pretty much correct. The tech splices the cable in the obvious to fix order (typically by color code). I suspect you could try and be lower in the color code, but in practical terms once they get going there is not much time difference first to last. There are more complicated cases though; consider the Baltimore tunnel fire years ago. Restoration required running several km of new fiber on a temporary route, and most importantly troubleshooting if that did anything bad to anyone (e.g. put them over their distance budget). It is entirely possible to be moved to the front of the "I need help" queue in those situations. In most cases, if you care about paying lots of money to be first you have enough money to buy an actually physically diverse route, and it's a non-issue though.... -- Leo Bicknell - bicknell@ufp.org - CCIE 3440 PGP keys at http://www.ufp.org/~bicknell/
I find it hard to understand that a nuclear power plant, air-traffic control network, or electrical grid would be 'linked' to the Internet in the interest of 'efficiency'.
The Davis-Besse nuclear generating station computers were hit by the SQL Slammer / Saphire worm back in 2003. http://www.theregister.co.uk/2003/08/20/slammer_worm_crashed_ohio_nuke/ The utility claims that there was never a risk, but take that with a grain of salt since this is the same utility that conveniently managed to overlook a hole the size of a book in the reactor head for several years. Cheers, Michael Holstein Cleveland State University
Michael Painter wrote:
Have we all gone mad? I find it hard to understand that a nuclear power plant, air-traffic control network, or electrical grid would be 'linked' to the Internet in the interest of 'efficiency'. Air gap them all and let them apply for "Inefficiency Relief" from the $100 million relief fund.
What's hard to understand about mobility. Sure the HMI, RTU's etc are NOT connected to the public Internet however, they ARE networked. All a company needs is one client side attack to give an outsider the same level of access as an insider and it's checkmate. @Jared's TSP link... Wonder how this will affect VoIP ITSP's etal, e.g., how many local NS/EP's have swapped over to VoIP. Logically, anyone with a network running a managed VoIP service, trunk, etc., could qualify. @Fiber splicing ... Let the NSA handles this (http://www.zdnet.com/news/spy-agency-taps-into-undersea-cable/115877) -- =+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+ J. Oquendo SGFA, SGFE, C|EH, CNDA, CHFI, OSCP, CPT "It takes 20 years to build a reputation and five minutes to ruin it. If you think about that, you'll do things differently." - Warren Buffett 227C 5D35 7DCB 0893 95AA 4771 1DCE 1FD1 5CCD 6B5E http://pgp.mit.edu:11371/pks/lookup?op=get&search=0x5CCD6B5E
On Jul 8, 2010, at 11:56 AM, J. Oquendo wrote:
@Jared's TSP link... Wonder how this will affect VoIP ITSP's etal, e.g., how many local NS/EP's have swapped over to VoIP. Logically, anyone with a network running a managed VoIP service, trunk, etc., could qualify.
This certainly is a frequent discussion point in some circles. A lot of carriers take your POTS/PRI and turn them into VoIP internally so they get the advantages of multiplexing the data on IP. This isn't universal, but a good question to ask your carrier. If you care about your call going through, you may actually want to pay a bit more and be on that more expensive TDM gear. Of course, whomever you call may also need to be on that same carrier. Take some time and research and test things out so you don't end up having trouble when you need your communications the most. You may also want to find your local HAM operator and buddy up with them, or get your no-code license today :) - Jared
andrew.wallace wrote:
Article: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704545004575352983850463108.ht...
My opinion: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704545004575352983850463108.ht...
Politifact has an interesting article on the cyber police topic: http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2010/jul/06/andrew-napoli... Politifact says that
it is technologically possible for Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to significantly limit the flow of Internet traffic
because
the network operator community is fairly tight-knit, so "it is conceivable that (network operators) could coordinate a response to a major event and terminate basic connectivity within a matter of minutes." Network operators who maintain the Internet backbone share cell phone information, have regular meetings, and often work together through established channels in emergencies.
(The "have regular meetings" text is a link to nanog.org) jc **
participants (28)
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Adrian Chadd
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andrew.wallace
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bmanning@vacation.karoshi.com
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Brandon Ross
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bross@pobox.com
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Curtis Maurand
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Danny McPherson
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Franck Martin
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George Bonser
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J. Oquendo
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Jared Mauch
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Jason Lewis
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JC Dill
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Jimi Thompson
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Joe Greco
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joel jaeggli
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Jon Lewis
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Larry Sheldon
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Leo Bicknell
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Marshall Eubanks
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Michael Holstein
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Michael Painter
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Owen DeLong
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Patrick Giagnocavo
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Shrdlu
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sjk
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Tomas L. Byrnes
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Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu