-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 All completely coincidental networking issues, not related to anything malicious. - - ferg On 7/8/2015 9:26 AM, Matthew Huff wrote:

Hmmm,

Wall Street Journal and NYSE both down….

WSJ has a static page up…

DDOS ???

...

On Jul 8, 2015, at 10:51 AM, Patrick W. Gilmore <patrick@ianai.net> wrote:

Lifted as of 0920 EDT.

<http://www.foxnews.com/us/2015/07/08/united-airlines-flights-in-us-g rounded-due-to-computer-issues/?intcmp=latestnews>

...

TTFN, patrick

...

On Jul 08, 2015, at 10:06 , Marshall Eubanks <marshall.eubanks@gmail.com> wrote:

http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/07/08/us-ual-flights-idUSKCN0PI1 IX20150708

At least, that's what I just heard on the radio. I know no other details .

...

Regards Marshall Eubanks

- -- Paul Ferguson PGP Public Key ID: 0x54DC85B2 Key fingerprint: 19EC 2945 FEE8 D6C8 58A1 CE53 2896 AC75 54DC 85B2 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2 iF4EAREIAAYFAlWdUZoACgkQKJasdVTchbK1vAD/Q9gFlefUn9rIzlaRUMHvU0Ku Nmv6PSUUUD9f5LRLxX0BAMvXl4G5YE/ZTiz9sB5i/x5BRgmVG9XxzY5nZd/0zNtj =Hpoz -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

Once is happenstance Twice is coincidence Three times is enemy action… Serious, could all be just everyone having a bad day. On the other hand, the WSJ has to deal with DOS/DDOS all the time, and usually if the NYSE has issues, it’s normally on a Monday.

On Jul 8, 2015, at 12:36 PM, Paul Ferguson <fergdawgster@mykolab.com> wrote:

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256

All completely coincidental networking issues, not related to anything malicious.

- - ferg

On 7/8/2015 9:26 AM, Matthew Huff wrote:

...

Hmmm,

Wall Street Journal and NYSE both down….

WSJ has a static page up…

DDOS ???

...

On Jul 8, 2015, at 10:51 AM, Patrick W. Gilmore <patrick@ianai.net> wrote:

Lifted as of 0920 EDT.

<http://www.foxnews.com/us/2015/07/08/united-airlines-flights-in-us-g rounded-due-to-computer-issues/?intcmp=latestnews>

---

...

...

TTFN, patrick

...

On Jul 08, 2015, at 10:06 , Marshall Eubanks <marshall.eubanks@gmail.com> wrote:

http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/07/08/us-ual-flights-idUSKCN0PI1 IX20150708

At least, that's what I just heard on the radio. I know no other details .

...

Regards Marshall Eubanks

- -- Paul Ferguson PGP Public Key ID: 0x54DC85B2 Key fingerprint: 19EC 2945 FEE8 D6C8 58A1 CE53 2896 AC75 54DC 85B2 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2

iF4EAREIAAYFAlWdUZoACgkQKJasdVTchbK1vAD/Q9gFlefUn9rIzlaRUMHvU0Ku Nmv6PSUUUD9f5LRLxX0BAMvXl4G5YE/ZTiz9sB5i/x5BRgmVG9XxzY5nZd/0zNtj =Hpoz -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 NYSE: "The issue we are experiencing is an internal technical issue and is not the result of a cyber breach." https://twitter.com/NYSE/status/618818929906085888 United Air statement CNBC: “An issue with a router degraded network connectivity for various applications. We fixed the router." https://twitter.com/barronstechblog/status/618816643821633536 - - ferg On 7/8/2015 9:36 AM, Paul Ferguson wrote:

All completely coincidental networking issues, not related to anything malicious.

- ferg

On 7/8/2015 9:26 AM, Matthew Huff wrote:

...

Hmmm,

...

Wall Street Journal and NYSE both down….

...

WSJ has a static page up…

...

DDOS ???

...

...

On Jul 8, 2015, at 10:51 AM, Patrick W. Gilmore <patrick@ianai.net> wrote:

Lifted as of 0920 EDT.

<http://www.foxnews.com/us/2015/07/08/united-airlines-flights-in-us- g

...

...

rounded-due-to-computer-issues/?intcmp=latestnews>

...

- -- Paul Ferguson PGP Public Key ID: 0x54DC85B2 Key fingerprint: 19EC 2945 FEE8 D6C8 58A1 CE53 2896 AC75 54DC 85B2 - -- Paul Ferguson PGP Public Key ID: 0x54DC85B2 Key fingerprint: 19EC 2945 FEE8 D6C8 58A1 CE53 2896 AC75 54DC 85B2 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2 iF4EAREIAAYFAlWdWH4ACgkQKJasdVTchbJ5igEAvN+3RUYSzrk1NBimcLe72CfB 9fPw1FfS6kApm0DvZTsA/Aj5h/qw75oNEeVwJhj/TI8txcjMhIuzQS1NG9Iboj3K =fcv/ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 Given that the Internet is held together with paper clips, bailing twine, and bubblegum, I'd prefer to take theses organizations' initial word for the fact that there is nothing obviously malicious in these outages. The mainstream press, on the other hand, seems to want it to be a hack or data breach or... something other than a "glitch". :-) - - ferg On 7/8/2015 10:15 AM, Mel Beckman wrote:

It's important to not form an opinion too early, especially anyone involved with forensic analysis of these systems. This is a classic fault in amateur investigation: an early opinion will lead you into confirmation bias, irrationally accepting data agreeing with your opinions and rejecting that disproving it.

-mel beckman

...

On Jul 8, 2015, at 10:07 AM, Paul Ferguson <fergdawgster@mykolab.com> wrote:

NYSE: "The issue we are experiencing is an internal technical issue and is not the result of a cyber breach."

https://twitter.com/NYSE/status/618818929906085888

United Air statement CNBC: “An issue with a router degraded network connectivity for various applications. We fixed the router."

https://twitter.com/barronstechblog/status/618816643821633536

- ferg

- -- Paul Ferguson PGP Public Key ID: 0x54DC85B2 Key fingerprint: 19EC 2945 FEE8 D6C8 58A1 CE53 2896 AC75 54DC 85B2 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2 iF4EAREIAAYFAlWdW3cACgkQKJasdVTchbLr/wD/aBNnLFv+MU+QI1ja7dd9LiSN Zkum4lSIutxFn1NmaYoBAIgO/Ig7FxD4vRzQK8bUturn4YGw9FXMT+EzVTKhIbVG =/yYp -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

I think you are over estimating the technical resources at NYSE. On Jul 8, 2015 1:44 PM, "Matthew Huff" <mhuff@ox.com> wrote:

Given that the technical resources at the NYSE are significant and the lengthy duration of the outage, I believe this is more serious than is being reported. OTOH, the fact that the market is now mostly decentralized and instruments are multiply listed, the impact of the NYSE is much less serious than it used to be.

...

On Jul 8, 2015, at 1:18 PM, Paul Ferguson <fergdawgster@mykolab.com> wrote:

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256

Given that the Internet is held together with paper clips, bailing twine, and bubblegum, I'd prefer to take theses organizations' initial word for the fact that there is nothing obviously malicious in these outages.

The mainstream press, on the other hand, seems to want it to be a hack or data breach or... something other than a "glitch". :-)

- - ferg

On 7/8/2015 10:15 AM, Mel Beckman wrote:

...

It's important to not form an opinion too early, especially anyone involved with forensic analysis of these systems. This is a classic fault in amateur investigation: an early opinion will lead you into confirmation bias, irrationally accepting data agreeing with your opinions and rejecting that disproving it.

-mel beckman

...

On Jul 8, 2015, at 10:07 AM, Paul Ferguson <fergdawgster@mykolab.com> wrote:

NYSE: "The issue we are experiencing is an internal technical issue and is not the result of a cyber breach."

https://twitter.com/NYSE/status/618818929906085888

United Air statement CNBC: “An issue with a router degraded network connectivity for various applications. We fixed the router."

https://twitter.com/barronstechblog/status/618816643821633536

- ferg

- -- Paul Ferguson PGP Public Key ID: 0x54DC85B2 Key fingerprint: 19EC 2945 FEE8 D6C8 58A1 CE53 2896 AC75 54DC 85B2 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2

iF4EAREIAAYFAlWdW3cACgkQKJasdVTchbLr/wD/aBNnLFv+MU+QI1ja7dd9LiSN Zkum4lSIutxFn1NmaYoBAIgO/Ig7FxD4vRzQK8bUturn4YGw9FXMT+EzVTKhIbVG =/yYp -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

On Wed, 08 Jul 2015 17:42:52 -0000, Matthew Huff said:

Given that the technical resources at the NYSE are significant and the lengthy duration of the outage, I believe this is more serious than is being reported.

My personal, totally zero-info suspicion: Some chuckleheaded NOC banana-eater made a typo, and discovered an entirely new class of wondrous BGP-wedgie style "We know how we got here, but how do we get back?" network misbehaviors.... (Such things have happened before - like the med school a few years ago that extended their ethernet spanning tree one hop too far, and discovered that merely removing the one hop too far wasn't sufficient to let it come back up...)

Traders on the floor are being told that it’s a software glitch from new software that was rolled out Tuesday night. Nothing official has been said. The only thing I know for sure is that if the NYSE was hacked, they wouldn’t tell anyone the details for a long time, if ever. The impact of the NYSE being down is much less significant than it used to be since most stocks are multiple-listed on other exchanges. The lack of information through official channels is unusual though. In previous situations, there has been at least a little hand-holding. So far, nada. In fact, other than financial service provider’s emails, there has been no emails so far today from the NYSE, including the announcement of resumption of service. According the the NYSE web page, trading will resume at 3:05pm EST today with primary specialist, and 3:10 for everyone.

On Jul 8, 2015, at 2:33 PM, Brett Frankenberger <rbf+nanog@panix.com> wrote:

On Wed, Jul 08, 2015 at 01:55:43PM -0400, Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu wrote:

...

On Wed, 08 Jul 2015 17:42:52 -0000, Matthew Huff said:

...

...

Given that the technical resources at the NYSE are significant and the lengthy duration of the outage, I believe this is more serious than is being reported.

My personal, totally zero-info suspicion:

Some chuckleheaded NOC banana-eater made a typo, and discovered an entirely new class of wondrous BGP-wedgie style "We know how we got here, but how do we get back?" network misbehaviors....

We don't know how long the underlying problem lasted, and how much of the continued outage time is dealing with the logistics of restarting trading mid-day. Completely stopping and then restarting trading mid-day is likely not a quick process even if the underlying technical issue is immediately resolved.

...

(Such things have happened before - like the med school a few years ago that extended their ethernet spanning tree one hop too far, and discovered that merely removing the one hop too far wasn't sufficient to let it come back up...)

No, but picking a bridge in the center, giving it priority sufficient for it to become root, and then configuring timers[1] that would support a much larger than default diameter, possibly followed by some reboots, probably would have.

From what has been publicly stated, they likely took a much longer and more complicated path to service restoration than was strictly necessary. (I have no non-public information on that event. There may be good reasons, technical or otherwise, why that wasn't the chosen solution.)

-- Brett

[1] You only have to configure them on the root; non-root bridges use what root sends out, not what they ahve configured.

Who roles out software in the middle of the week and not on weekends? People who have more business on the weekends than the week, such as retail. On Jul 8, 2015, at 4:40 PM, Dovid Bender <dovid@telecurve.com<mailto:dovid@telecurve.com>> wrote: Other than for an emergency repair who roles out a software update in middle of the week? We test, test and then test some more and only then roll out on weekends. Our maintenance window is 00:00 - 01:00 Sunday mornings for sw updates etc. On Wed, Jul 8, 2015 at 3:02 PM, Matthew Huff <mhuff@ox.com<mailto:mhuff@ox.com>> wrote: Traders on the floor are being told that it’s a software glitch from new software that was rolled out Tuesday night. Nothing official has been said. The only thing I know for sure is that if the NYSE was hacked, they wouldn’t tell anyone the details for a long time, if ever. The impact of the NYSE being down is much less significant than it used to be since most stocks are multiple-listed on other exchanges. The lack of information through official channels is unusual though. In previous situations, there has been at least a little hand-holding. So far, nada. In fact, other than financial service provider’s emails, there has been no emails so far today from the NYSE, including the announcement of resumption of service. According the the NYSE web page, trading will resume at 3:05pm EST today with primary specialist, and 3:10 for everyone. On Jul 8, 2015, at 2:33 PM, Brett Frankenberger <rbf+nanog@panix.com<mailto:rbf+nanog@panix.com>> wrote: On Wed, Jul 08, 2015 at 01:55:43PM -0400, Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu<mailto:Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu> wrote: On Wed, 08 Jul 2015 17:42:52 -0000, Matthew Huff said: Given that the technical resources at the NYSE are significant and the lengthy duration of the outage, I believe this is more serious than is being reported. My personal, totally zero-info suspicion: Some chuckleheaded NOC banana-eater made a typo, and discovered an entirely new class of wondrous BGP-wedgie style "We know how we got here, but how do we get back?" network misbehaviors.... We don't know how long the underlying problem lasted, and how much of the continued outage time is dealing with the logistics of restarting trading mid-day. Completely stopping and then restarting trading mid-day is likely not a quick process even if the underlying technical issue is immediately resolved. (Such things have happened before - like the med school a few years ago that extended their ethernet spanning tree one hop too far, and discovered that merely removing the one hop too far wasn't sufficient to let it come back up...) No, but picking a bridge in the center, giving it priority sufficient for it to become root, and then configuring timers[1] that would support a much larger than default diameter, possibly followed by some reboots, probably would have. From what has been publicly stated, they likely took a much longer and more complicated path to service restoration than was strictly necessary. (I have no non-public information on that event. There may be good reasons, technical or otherwise, why that wasn't the chosen solution.) -- Brett [1] You only have to configure them on the root; non-root bridges use what root sends out, not what they ahve configured. --- Keith Stokes

I've been working at a trading firm for the last 18 years. Most of the Market traditionally rolls out changes out over the weekends, making every Monday an adventure. It's unusual that they would roll out anything during the week, but they could have had something that failed and had to be undone last weekend, they rolled it out last night because they thought they had it fixed. They may have had a reason why they needed it out in a hurry. The summer is a big time for changes because it's so less busy.. We usually roll out changes on Thursday nights since Friday's are the least busy. Summer Friday's are completely dead. This puts NYSE in a double bad light. First the glitch and second the market traded close to normal without the NYSE. On Jul 8, 2015, at 5:49 PM, Dovid Bender <dovid@telecurve.com<mailto:dovid@telecurve.com>> wrote: Well that's a given. I am talking about organizations like the NYSE or MaBell, On Wed, Jul 8, 2015 at 5:44 PM, Keith Stokes <keiths@neilltech.com<mailto:keiths@neilltech.com>> wrote: Who roles out software in the middle of the week and not on weekends? People who have more business on the weekends than the week, such as retail. On Jul 8, 2015, at 4:40 PM, Dovid Bender <dovid@telecurve.com<mailto:dovid@telecurve.com>> wrote: Other than for an emergency repair who roles out a software update in middle of the week? We test, test and then test some more and only then roll out on weekends. Our maintenance window is 00:00 - 01:00 Sunday mornings for sw updates etc. On Wed, Jul 8, 2015 at 3:02 PM, Matthew Huff <mhuff@ox.com<mailto:mhuff@ox.com>> wrote: Traders on the floor are being told that it's a software glitch from new software that was rolled out Tuesday night. Nothing official has been said. The only thing I know for sure is that if the NYSE was hacked, they wouldn't tell anyone the details for a long time, if ever. The impact of the NYSE being down is much less significant than it used to be since most stocks are multiple-listed on other exchanges. The lack of information through official channels is unusual though. In previous situations, there has been at least a little hand-holding. So far, nada. In fact, other than financial service provider's emails, there has been no emails so far today from the NYSE, including the announcement of resumption of service. According the the NYSE web page, trading will resume at 3:05pm EST today with primary specialist, and 3:10 for everyone. On Jul 8, 2015, at 2:33 PM, Brett Frankenberger <rbf+nanog@panix.com<mailto:rbf+nanog@panix.com>> wrote: On Wed, Jul 08, 2015 at 01:55:43PM -0400, Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu<mailto:Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu> wrote: On Wed, 08 Jul 2015 17:42:52 -0000, Matthew Huff said: Given that the technical resources at the NYSE are significant and the lengthy duration of the outage, I believe this is more serious than is being reported. My personal, totally zero-info suspicion: Some chuckleheaded NOC banana-eater made a typo, and discovered an entirely new class of wondrous BGP-wedgie style "We know how we got here, but how do we get back?" network misbehaviors.... We don't know how long the underlying problem lasted, and how much of the continued outage time is dealing with the logistics of restarting trading mid-day. Completely stopping and then restarting trading mid-day is likely not a quick process even if the underlying technical issue is immediately resolved. (Such things have happened before - like the med school a few years ago that extended their ethernet spanning tree one hop too far, and discovered that merely removing the one hop too far wasn't sufficient to let it come back up...) No, but picking a bridge in the center, giving it priority sufficient for it to become root, and then configuring timers[1] that would support a much larger than default diameter, possibly followed by some reboots, probably would have.

From what has been publicly stated, they likely took a much longer and more complicated path to service restoration than was strictly necessary. (I have no non-public information on that event. There may be good reasons, technical or otherwise, why that wasn't the chosen solution.)

-- Brett [1] You only have to configure them on the root; non-root bridges use what root sends out, not what they ahve configured. --- Keith Stokes

I’m with Ferg-dog. I can’t tell you the number of times someone (yes, including me) has designed, purchased, and installed a system with multiple backups, failovers, redundancies, etc., and some vital piece fails in a weird way which sends the whole thing into a tailspin. Taking UA as an example, since we have the most information (FSVO “most”), namely it was a “bad router”. Let’s assume they had multiple routers configured with VRRP, BGP, OSPF, and an alphabet soup of other ways to detect and route-around failures. Now further assume one of those routers has a software or hardware bug which doesn’t take the router out of service, but leaves it up, replying to pings, answer SNMP polls, speaking BGP or OSPF, sending VRRP hellos, etc., etc. - but also eats half of all packets going _through_ the router. That can happen, I’ve seen it first hand. All those redundant systems do nothing, since the “bad router” is doing everything a good router would do. The systems designed to catch such problems all think things are fine, but they are not. Is it an attack? No, it’s bad luck. Now some will claim - and perhaps rightfully - that UA should have systems which monitor for exactly this type of failure as well. Perhaps they should have, or perhaps the problem was nothing like what I explained. Either way, the point still stands that a company can have had multiple redundancies in place, but still experienced a failure mode which caused exactly the problem described. At this point, we move on to: “All three simultaneously?!? NO WAY!!” To which I would point out they were not simultaneous. UA was back up before NYSE went down. But even if they were simultaneous, sometimes stuff happens. The human mind is very good at seeing connections, even when there are none. Absent other evidence, I’m going to believe the companies’ public statements that this was not a hack. Perhaps I am being naive, but as I said, absent other evidence, it is a perfectly plausible explanation. -- TTFN, patrick

On Jul 08, 2015, at 14:56 , Jay Ashworth <jra@baylink.com> wrote:

UA, WSJ /and/ NYSE all in the same day?

Once is an accident; twice is a coincidence...

Three times is enemy action.

On July 8, 2015 1:18:47 PM EDT, Paul Ferguson <fergdawgster@mykolab.com> wrote:

...

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256

Given that the Internet is held together with paper clips, bailing twine, and bubblegum, I'd prefer to take theses organizations' initial word for the fact that there is nothing obviously malicious in these outages.

The mainstream press, on the other hand, seems to want it to be a hack or data breach or... something other than a "glitch". :-)

- - ferg

On 7/8/2015 10:15 AM, Mel Beckman wrote:

...

It's important to not form an opinion too early, especially anyone involved with forensic analysis of these systems. This is a classic fault in amateur investigation: an early opinion will lead you into confirmation bias, irrationally accepting data agreeing with your opinions and rejecting that disproving it.

-mel beckman

...

On Jul 8, 2015, at 10:07 AM, Paul Ferguson <fergdawgster@mykolab.com> wrote:

NYSE: "The issue we are experiencing is an internal technical issue and is not the result of a cyber breach."

https://twitter.com/NYSE/status/618818929906085888

United Air statement CNBC: “An issue with a router degraded network connectivity for various applications. We fixed the router."

https://twitter.com/barronstechblog/status/618816643821633536

- ferg

- -- Paul Ferguson PGP Public Key ID: 0x54DC85B2 Key fingerprint: 19EC 2945 FEE8 D6C8 58A1 CE53 2896 AC75 54DC 85B2 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2

iF4EAREIAAYFAlWdW3cACgkQKJasdVTchbLr/wD/aBNnLFv+MU+QI1ja7dd9LiSN Zkum4lSIutxFn1NmaYoBAIgO/Ig7FxD4vRzQK8bUturn4YGw9FXMT+EzVTKhIbVG =/yYp -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

-- Sent from my Android phone with K-9 Mail. Please excuse my brevity.

I've been in UA's datacenter and while I'm no expert on their setup I can say with some confidence that it's most likely NOT related to anything else going on. I don't want to violate any NDA I may or may not have signed but I think I can safely say its all one big private network. Whatever's happening on the internet or with NYSE has got nothing to do with what is more than likely in this case a big fat BGP clusterfudge like most of these things are. I don't have any inside info or anything just a slightly more educated guess. On Wed, Jul 8, 2015 at 2:31 PM, Patrick W. Gilmore <patrick@ianai.net> wrote:

I’m with Ferg-dog.

I can’t tell you the number of times someone (yes, including me) has designed, purchased, and installed a system with multiple backups, failovers, redundancies, etc., and some vital piece fails in a weird way which sends the whole thing into a tailspin.

Taking UA as an example, since we have the most information (FSVO “most”), namely it was a “bad router”. Let’s assume they had multiple routers configured with VRRP, BGP, OSPF, and an alphabet soup of other ways to detect and route-around failures. Now further assume one of those routers has a software or hardware bug which doesn’t take the router out of service, but leaves it up, replying to pings, answer SNMP polls, speaking BGP or OSPF, sending VRRP hellos, etc., etc. - but also eats half of all packets going _through_ the router. That can happen, I’ve seen it first hand.

All those redundant systems do nothing, since the “bad router” is doing everything a good router would do. The systems designed to catch such problems all think things are fine, but they are not. Is it an attack? No, it’s bad luck.

Now some will claim - and perhaps rightfully - that UA should have systems which monitor for exactly this type of failure as well. Perhaps they should have, or perhaps the problem was nothing like what I explained. Either way, the point still stands that a company can have had multiple redundancies in place, but still experienced a failure mode which caused exactly the problem described.

At this point, we move on to: “All three simultaneously?!? NO WAY!!” To which I would point out they were not simultaneous. UA was back up before NYSE went down. But even if they were simultaneous, sometimes stuff happens. The human mind is very good at seeing connections, even when there are none. Absent other evidence, I’m going to believe the companies’ public statements that this was not a hack. Perhaps I am being naive, but as I said, absent other evidence, it is a perfectly plausible explanation.

-- TTFN, patrick

...

On Jul 08, 2015, at 14:56 , Jay Ashworth <jra@baylink.com> wrote:

UA, WSJ /and/ NYSE all in the same day?

Once is an accident; twice is a coincidence...

Three times is enemy action.

On July 8, 2015 1:18:47 PM EDT, Paul Ferguson <fergdawgster@mykolab.com> wrote:

...

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256

Given that the Internet is held together with paper clips, bailing twine, and bubblegum, I'd prefer to take theses organizations' initial word for the fact that there is nothing obviously malicious in these outages.

The mainstream press, on the other hand, seems to want it to be a hack or data breach or... something other than a "glitch". :-)

- - ferg

On 7/8/2015 10:15 AM, Mel Beckman wrote:

...

It's important to not form an opinion too early, especially anyone involved with forensic analysis of these systems. This is a classic fault in amateur investigation: an early opinion will lead you into confirmation bias, irrationally accepting data agreeing with your opinions and rejecting that disproving it.

-mel beckman

...

On Jul 8, 2015, at 10:07 AM, Paul Ferguson <fergdawgster@mykolab.com> wrote:

NYSE: "The issue we are experiencing is an internal technical issue and is not the result of a cyber breach."

https://twitter.com/NYSE/status/618818929906085888

United Air statement CNBC: “An issue with a router degraded network connectivity for various applications. We fixed the router."

https://twitter.com/barronstechblog/status/618816643821633536

- ferg

- -- Paul Ferguson PGP Public Key ID: 0x54DC85B2 Key fingerprint: 19EC 2945 FEE8 D6C8 58A1 CE53 2896 AC75 54DC 85B2 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2

iF4EAREIAAYFAlWdW3cACgkQKJasdVTchbLr/wD/aBNnLFv+MU+QI1ja7dd9LiSN Zkum4lSIutxFn1NmaYoBAIgO/Ig7FxD4vRzQK8bUturn4YGw9FXMT+EzVTKhIbVG =/yYp -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

-- Sent from my Android phone with K-9 Mail. Please excuse my brevity.