John- This is little consolation, but at AS3128, I see the same thing to our downstream at times, claiming to come from both 13335 and 15169 often simultaneously at the tune of 25Kpps , "assuming it's not spoofed", which is pragmatically impossible to prove for me given our indirect relationships with these companies. When I see these events, I typically also see a wide variety of country codes participating simultaneously. Again, assuming it's not spoofed. To me it just looks like effective harassment with 13335/15169 helping out. I pine for the internet of the 1990s. Recent events in GMT for us were the following, curious if you see the same ~ Nov 26 05:40 ~ Nov 30 00:40 ~ Nov 30 05:55 Application agnostic, on the low $ end for "fixes", if it's either do something or face an outage, I've found some utility in short term automated DSCP coloring on ingress paired with light touch policing as close to the end host as possible, which at least keeps things mostly working during times of conformance. Cheap/fast and working ... most of the time. Definitely not great or complete at all, and a role I'd rather not play as an educational ISP/enterprise. So what are most folks doing to survive crap like this? Nothing/waiting it out? Oursourcing DNS? Scrubbing appliance? Poormans stuff like I mention above? -Michael

-----Original Message----- From: NANOG <nanog-bounces+michael.hare=wisc.edu@nanog.org> On Behalf Of John R. Levine Sent: Sunday, December 3, 2023 1:18 PM To: Peter Potvin <peter.potvin@accuristechnologies.ca> Cc: nanog@nanog.org Subject: Re: What are these Google IPs hammering on my DNS server?

...

Did a bit of digging on Google's developer site and came across this: https://developers.google.com/speed/public- dns/faq#locations_of_ip_address_ranges_google_public_dns_uses_to_send_ queries

Looks like the IPs you mentioned belong to Google's public DNS resolver based on that list on their site. They could also be spoofed though from a DNS AMP attack, so keep that in mind.

Per my recent message, the replies are tiny so if it's an amplification attack, it's a very incompetent one. The queries are case randomized so I guess it's really Google. Sigh.

If anyone is wondering, I have a passive aggressive countermeasure against some overqueriers that returns ten NS referral names, and then 25 random IP addresses for each of those names, but I don't do that to Google.

R's, John

...

------------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Accuris Technologies Ltd.*

On Sun, Dec 3, 2023 at 1:51 PM John Levine <johnl@iecc.com> wrote:

...

At contacts.abuse.net, I have a little stunt DNS server that provides domain contact info, e.g.:

$ host -t txt comcast.net.contacts.abuse.net comcast.net.contacts.abuse.net descriptive text "abuse@comcast.net"

$ host -t hinfo comcast.net.contacts.abuse.net comcast.net.contacts.abuse.net host information "lookup" "comcast.net"

Every once in a while someone decides to look up every domain in the world and DoS'es it until I update my packet filters. This week it's been this set of IPs that belong to Google. I don't think they're 8.8.8.8. Any idea what they are? Random Google Cloud customers? A secret DNS mapping project?

172.253.1.133 172.253.206.36 172.253.1.130 172.253.206.37 172.253.13.196 172.253.255.36 172.253.13.197 172.253.1.131 172.253.255.35 172.253.255.37 172.253.1.132 172.253.13.193 172.253.1.129 172.253.255.33 172.253.206.35 172.253.255.34 172.253.206.33 172.253.206.34 172.253.13.194 172.253.13.195 172.71.125.63 172.71.117.60 172.71.133.51

R's, John

Regards, John Levine, johnl@taugh.com, Primary Perpetrator of "The Internet for Dummies", Please consider the environment before reading this e-mail. https://jl.ly

On 4 Dec 2023, at 08:21, Michael Hare via NANOG <nanog@nanog.org> wrote:

John-

This is little consolation, but at AS3128, I see the same thing to our downstream at times, claiming to come from both 13335 and 15169 often simultaneously at the tune of 25Kpps , "assuming it's not spoofed", which is pragmatically impossible to prove for me given our indirect relationships with these companies. When I see these events, I typically also see a wide variety of country codes participating simultaneously. Again, assuming it's not spoofed. To me it just looks like effective harassment with 13335/15169 helping out. I pine for the internet of the 1990s.

Just set TC=1 for those clients. If you get queries over TCP then they where not spoofed. If they are using DNS COOKIE (RFC 7873) you can send back BADCOOKIE to the initial (client cookie only) UDP request with your server cookie. Identifying real DNS clients has been possible for years now. It’s not hard. -- Mark Andrews, ISC 1 Seymour St., Dundas Valley, NSW 2117, Australia PHONE: +61 2 9871 4742 INTERNET: marka@isc.org

Google Public DNS (8.8.8.8) attempts to identify and filter abuse, and while we think we're fairly effective for large attacks (eg, those above 1Mpps), it gets more challenging (due to risk of false positives) to adequately filter small attacks. I should note that we generally see the attack traffic coming from botnets, or forwarding resolvers that blend the attack traffic with legitimate traffic. Based on ISC BIND load-tests [0], a single DNS server can handle O(1Mpps). Also, no domain should be served by a single DNS server, so O(1Mpps) seems like a safe lower-bound for small administrative domains (larger ones will have more redundancy/capacity). Based on these estimates, we haven't treated mitigation of small attacks as a high priority. If O(25Kpps) attacks are causing real problems for the community, I'd appreciate that feedback and some hints as to why your experience differs from the ISC BIND load-tests. With a better understanding of the pain-points, we may be able to improve our filtering a bit, though I suspect we're nearing the limits of what is attainable. Since it was mentioned up-thread, I'd caution against dropping queries from likely-legitimate recursives, as that will lead to a retry storm that you won't like (based on a few reports of authoritatives who suffered outages, the retry storm increased demand by 30x and they initially misdiagnosed the root cause as a DDoS). The technically correct (if not entirely practical) mitigation for a DNS cache-busting attack laundered through open recursives is to deploy DNSSEC and issue NSEC/NSEC3 responses to allow the recursives to cache the non-existence of the randomized labels. [0] https://www.isc.org/blogs/bind-performance-september-2023/ Damian -- Damian Menscher :: Security Reliability Engineer :: Google :: AS15169 On Sun, Dec 3, 2023 at 1:22 PM Michael Hare via NANOG <nanog@nanog.org> wrote:

John-

This is little consolation, but at AS3128, I see the same thing to our downstream at times, claiming to come from both 13335 and 15169 often simultaneously at the tune of 25Kpps , "assuming it's not spoofed", which is pragmatically impossible to prove for me given our indirect relationships with these companies. When I see these events, I typically also see a wide variety of country codes participating simultaneously. Again, assuming it's not spoofed. To me it just looks like effective harassment with 13335/15169 helping out. I pine for the internet of the 1990s.

Recent events in GMT for us were the following, curious if you see the same ~ Nov 26 05:40 ~ Nov 30 00:40 ~ Nov 30 05:55

Application agnostic, on the low $ end for "fixes", if it's either do something or face an outage, I've found some utility in short term automated DSCP coloring on ingress paired with light touch policing as close to the end host as possible, which at least keeps things mostly working during times of conformance. Cheap/fast and working ... most of the time. Definitely not great or complete at all, and a role I'd rather not play as an educational ISP/enterprise.

So what are most folks doing to survive crap like this? Nothing/waiting it out? Oursourcing DNS? Scrubbing appliance? Poormans stuff like I mention above?

-Michael

...

-----Original Message----- From: NANOG <nanog-bounces+michael.hare=wisc.edu@nanog.org> On Behalf Of John R. Levine Sent: Sunday, December 3, 2023 1:18 PM To: Peter Potvin <peter.potvin@accuristechnologies.ca> Cc: nanog@nanog.org Subject: Re: What are these Google IPs hammering on my DNS server?

...

Did a bit of digging on Google's developer site and came across this: https://developers.google.com/speed/public- dns/faq#locations_of_ip_address_ranges_google_public_dns_uses_to_send_ queries

Looks like the IPs you mentioned belong to Google's public DNS resolver based on that list on their site. They could also be spoofed though from a DNS AMP attack, so keep that in mind.

Per my recent message, the replies are tiny so if it's an amplification attack, it's a very incompetent one. The queries are case randomized so I guess it's really Google. Sigh.

If anyone is wondering, I have a passive aggressive countermeasure against some overqueriers that returns ten NS referral names, and then 25 random IP addresses for each of those names, but I don't do that to Google.

R's, John

...

---

...

...

*Accuris Technologies Ltd.*

On Sun, Dec 3, 2023 at 1:51 PM John Levine <johnl@iecc.com> wrote:

...

At contacts.abuse.net, I have a little stunt DNS server that provides domain contact info, e.g.:

$ host -t txt comcast.net.contacts.abuse.net comcast.net.contacts.abuse.net descriptive text "abuse@comcast.net"

$ host -t hinfo comcast.net.contacts.abuse.net comcast.net.contacts.abuse.net host information "lookup" "comcast.net "

Every once in a while someone decides to look up every domain in the world and DoS'es it until I update my packet filters. This week it's been this set of IPs that belong to Google. I don't think they're 8.8.8.8. Any idea what they are? Random Google Cloud customers? A secret DNS mapping project?

172.253.1.133 172.253.206.36 172.253.1.130 172.253.206.37 172.253.13.196 172.253.255.36 172.253.13.197 172.253.1.131 172.253.255.35 172.253.255.37 172.253.1.132 172.253.13.193 172.253.1.129 172.253.255.33 172.253.206.35 172.253.255.34 172.253.206.33 172.253.206.34 172.253.13.194 172.253.13.195 172.71.125.63 172.71.117.60 172.71.133.51

R's, John

Regards, John Levine, johnl@taugh.com, Primary Perpetrator of "The Internet for Dummies", Please consider the environment before reading this e-mail. https://jl.ly

Damian- Not Google or ISCs fault, our customers have made some decisions that have exasperated the issues. By and away the biggest problem facing my customers is that they have chosen a stateful border firewall that collapses due to session exhaustion and they put everything, including aDNS, behind said firewall. “If it hurts, don’t do it” comes to mind, but out of my hands. At quick glance following the ISC link I didn’t see the compute infrastructure [core count] needed to get 1Mpps. There is an obvious difference between 99% load of ~500rps and 1M, so we can maybe advise to not undersize ADNS if that's an issue. I'm an ISP engineer and am generally not the directly affected party, so I don't get to pick these implementation details for my customers. I appreciate the background and suggestions from you and others on this thread like Mark. That's an interesting comment about DNSSEC that I hadn't considered. -Michael From: Damian Menscher <damian@google.com> Sent: Monday, December 4, 2023 12:21 PM To: Michael Hare <michael.hare@wisc.edu> Cc: John R. Levine <johnl@iecc.com>; nanog@nanog.org Subject: Re: What are these Google IPs hammering on my DNS server? Google Public DNS (8.8.8.8) attempts to identify and filter abuse, and while we think we're fairly effective for large attacks (eg, those above 1Mpps), it gets more challenging (due to risk of false positives) to adequately filter small attacks. I should note that we generally see the attack traffic coming from botnets, or forwarding resolvers that blend the attack traffic with legitimate traffic. Based on ISC BIND load-tests [0], a single DNS server can handle O(1Mpps). Also, no domain should be served by a single DNS server, so O(1Mpps) seems like a safe lower-bound for small administrative domains (larger ones will have more redundancy/capacity). Based on these estimates, we haven't treated mitigation of small attacks as a high priority. If O(25Kpps) attacks are causing real problems for the community, I'd appreciate that feedback and some hints as to why your experience differs from the ISC BIND load-tests. With a better understanding of the pain-points, we may be able to improve our filtering a bit, though I suspect we're nearing the limits of what is attainable. Since it was mentioned up-thread, I'd caution against dropping queries from likely-legitimate recursives, as that will lead to a retry storm that you won't like (based on a few reports of authoritatives who suffered outages, the retry storm increased demand by 30x and they initially misdiagnosed the root cause as a DDoS). The technically correct (if not entirely practical) mitigation for a DNS cache-busting attack laundered through open recursives is to deploy DNSSEC and issue NSEC/NSEC3 responses to allow the recursives to cache the non-existence of the randomized labels. [0] https://www.isc.org/blogs/bind-performance-september-2023/ Damian -- Damian Menscher :: Security Reliability Engineer :: Google :: AS15169 On Sun, Dec 3, 2023 at 1:22 PM Michael Hare via NANOG <nanog@nanog.org<mailto:nanog@nanog.org>> wrote: John- This is little consolation, but at AS3128, I see the same thing to our downstream at times, claiming to come from both 13335 and 15169 often simultaneously at the tune of 25Kpps , "assuming it's not spoofed", which is pragmatically impossible to prove for me given our indirect relationships with these companies. When I see these events, I typically also see a wide variety of country codes participating simultaneously. Again, assuming it's not spoofed. To me it just looks like effective harassment with 13335/15169 helping out. I pine for the internet of the 1990s. Recent events in GMT for us were the following, curious if you see the same ~ Nov 26 05:40 ~ Nov 30 00:40 ~ Nov 30 05:55 Application agnostic, on the low $ end for "fixes", if it's either do something or face an outage, I've found some utility in short term automated DSCP coloring on ingress paired with light touch policing as close to the end host as possible, which at least keeps things mostly working during times of conformance. Cheap/fast and working ... most of the time. Definitely not great or complete at all, and a role I'd rather not play as an educational ISP/enterprise. So what are most folks doing to survive crap like this? Nothing/waiting it out? Oursourcing DNS? Scrubbing appliance? Poormans stuff like I mention above? -Michael

-----Original Message----- From: NANOG <nanog-bounces+michael.hare=wisc.edu@nanog.org<mailto:wisc.edu@nanog.org>> On Behalf Of John R. Levine Sent: Sunday, December 3, 2023 1:18 PM To: Peter Potvin <peter.potvin@accuristechnologies.ca<mailto:peter.potvin@accuristechnologies.ca>> Cc: nanog@nanog.org<mailto:nanog@nanog.org> Subject: Re: What are these Google IPs hammering on my DNS server?

...

Did a bit of digging on Google's developer site and came across this: https://developers.google.com/speed/public- dns/faq#locations_of_ip_address_ranges_google_public_dns_uses_to_send_ queries

Looks like the IPs you mentioned belong to Google's public DNS resolver based on that list on their site. They could also be spoofed though from a DNS AMP attack, so keep that in mind.

Per my recent message, the replies are tiny so if it's an amplification attack, it's a very incompetent one. The queries are case randomized so I guess it's really Google. Sigh.

If anyone is wondering, I have a passive aggressive countermeasure against some overqueriers that returns ten NS referral names, and then 25 random IP addresses for each of those names, but I don't do that to Google.

R's, John

...

------------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Accuris Technologies Ltd.*

On Sun, Dec 3, 2023 at 1:51 PM John Levine <johnl@iecc.com<mailto:johnl@iecc.com>> wrote:

...

At contacts.abuse.net<http://contacts.abuse.net>, I have a little stunt DNS server that provides domain contact info, e.g.:

$ host -t txt comcast.net.contacts.abuse.net<http://comcast.net.contacts.abuse.net> comcast.net.contacts.abuse.net<http://comcast.net.contacts.abuse.net> descriptive text "abuse@comcast.net<mailto:abuse@comcast.net>"

$ host -t hinfo comcast.net.contacts.abuse.net<http://comcast.net.contacts.abuse.net> comcast.net.contacts.abuse.net<http://comcast.net.contacts.abuse.net> host information "lookup" "comcast.net<http://comcast.net>"

Every once in a while someone decides to look up every domain in the world and DoS'es it until I update my packet filters. This week it's been this set of IPs that belong to Google. I don't think they're 8.8.8.8. Any idea what they are? Random Google Cloud customers? A secret DNS mapping project?

172.253.1.133 172.253.206.36 172.253.1.130 172.253.206.37 172.253.13.196 172.253.255.36 172.253.13.197 172.253.1.131 172.253.255.35 172.253.255.37 172.253.1.132 172.253.13.193 172.253.1.129 172.253.255.33 172.253.206.35 172.253.255.34 172.253.206.33 172.253.206.34 172.253.13.194 172.253.13.195 172.71.125.63 172.71.117.60 172.71.133.51

R's, John

Regards, John Levine, johnl@taugh.com<mailto:johnl@taugh.com>, Primary Perpetrator of "The Internet for Dummies", Please consider the environment before reading this e-mail. https://jl.ly

On Tue, Dec 5, 2023 at 10:17 AM Ray Bellis <ray@bellis.me.uk> wrote:

On 05/12/2023 12:29, Michael Hare via NANOG wrote:

...

At quick glance following the ISC link I didn’t see the compute infrastructure [core count] needed to get 1Mpps. There is an obvious difference between 99% load of ~500rps and 1M, so we can maybe advise to not undersize ADNS if that's an issue.

The system under test in ISC's perflab is a 12-core Dell R430 of 2016 vintage.

is the test framework documented where others could setup/run the test(s)? :) (perhaps for mr hare I mean, or me! :) ) Are the tests for authoritative or cache resolvers? -chris