In addition to that, even if this is not good for many "honest" people that was using the DC, we need to take it in the positive side. In my own case, OVH is probably the cause of 80% of the abuse cases I report, and they never react. I'm convinced I'm not the only one, as I read in other ops mailing lists ... So, the positive side is a) during some days, we can see an interesting decrease in abuse cases, b) because the so many abuse cases, many OVH "honest" customers are often being filtered because they share addresses with the "bad guys", so it is an opportunity for them to move to alternative DCs that probably are more careful about "bad guys". A good topic for researchers :-) Regards, Jordi @jordipalet El 10/3/21 16:44, "NANOG en nombre de Andy Ringsmuth" <nanog-bounces+jordi.palet=consulintel.es@nanog.org en nombre de andy@andyring.com> escribió: > On Mar 10, 2021, at 3:23 AM, Fredy Kuenzler <kuenzler@init7.net> wrote: > > Very sad day for our colleagues at OVH AS16276 as they lost their datacenter SBG-2 in Strasbourg/France completly („everything is destroyed“) in a fire 🔥 and the neighboring SBG1/SBG3/SBG4 at least temporary. > > https://www.dna.fr/amp/faits-divers-justice/2021/03/10/strasbourg-important-... Sad to see of course, but also a little surprising that fire suppression systems didn’t, well, suppress the fire. Unless they didn’t exist? ---- Andy Ringsmuth 5609 Harding Drive Lincoln, NE 68521-5831 (402) 304-0083 andy@andyring.com “Better even die free, than to live slaves.” - Frederick Douglas, 1863 ********************************************** IPv4 is over Are you ready for the new Internet ? http://www.theipv6company.com The IPv6 Company This electronic message contains information which may be privileged or confidential. The information is intended to be for the exclusive use of the individual(s) named above and further non-explicilty authorized disclosure, copying, distribution or use of the contents of this information, even if partially, including attached files, is strictly prohibited and will be considered a criminal offense. If you are not the intended recipient be aware that any disclosure, copying, distribution or use of the contents of this information, even if partially, including attached files, is strictly prohibited, will be considered a criminal offense, so you must reply to the original sender to inform about this communication and delete it.

Was thinking the exact same thing; they and Digital Ocean seem to compete for the number two spot behind China as a malicious traffic source on all my public facing networks. From the pics, the place looked like it has had quite a few semi-trailer containers added around it, perhaps they were running a little too much equipment in the building and it required power / hvac augmenting but fire suppression was left as it was... On 3/10/21, 8:55 AM, "NANOG on behalf of JORDI PALET MARTINEZ via NANOG" <nanog-bounces+dhubbard=dino.hostasaurus.com@nanog.org on behalf of nanog@nanog.org> wrote: In addition to that, even if this is not good for many "honest" people that was using the DC, we need to take it in the positive side. In my own case, OVH is probably the cause of 80% of the abuse cases I report, and they never react. I'm convinced I'm not the only one, as I read in other ops mailing lists ... So, the positive side is a) during some days, we can see an interesting decrease in abuse cases, b) because the so many abuse cases, many OVH "honest" customers are often being filtered because they share addresses with the "bad guys", so it is an opportunity for them to move to alternative DCs that probably are more careful about "bad guys". A good topic for researchers :-) Regards, Jordi @jordipalet El 10/3/21 16:44, "NANOG en nombre de Andy Ringsmuth" <nanog-bounces+jordi.palet=consulintel.es@nanog.org en nombre de andy@andyring.com> escribió: > On Mar 10, 2021, at 3:23 AM, Fredy Kuenzler <kuenzler@init7.net> wrote: > > Very sad day for our colleagues at OVH AS16276 as they lost their datacenter SBG-2 in Strasbourg/France completly („everything is destroyed“) in a fire 🔥 and the neighboring SBG1/SBG3/SBG4 at least temporary. > > https://www.dna.fr/amp/faits-divers-justice/2021/03/10/strasbourg-important-... Sad to see of course, but also a little surprising that fire suppression systems didn’t, well, suppress the fire. Unless they didn’t exist? ---- Andy Ringsmuth 5609 Harding Drive Lincoln, NE 68521-5831 (402) 304-0083 andy@andyring.com “Better even die free, than to live slaves.” - Frederick Douglas, 1863 ********************************************** IPv4 is over Are you ready for the new Internet ? http://www.theipv6company.com The IPv6 Company This electronic message contains information which may be privileged or confidential. The information is intended to be for the exclusive use of the individual(s) named above and further non-explicilty authorized disclosure, copying, distribution or use of the contents of this information, even if partially, including attached files, is strictly prohibited and will be considered a criminal offense. If you are not the intended recipient be aware that any disclosure, copying, distribution or use of the contents of this information, even if partially, including attached files, is strictly prohibited, will be considered a criminal offense, so you must reply to the original sender to inform about this communication and delete it.

I'm sure this is just a coincidence: "OVHcloud has launched the process for a public offering (IPO) on the Paris stock exchange. The announcement came on Monday, two days before a fire destroyed one of the company's 32 global data centers in Strasbourg." Cheers, On Wed, Mar 10, 2021 at 4:03 PM David Hubbard <dhubbard@dino.hostasaurus.com> wrote:

Was thinking the exact same thing; they and Digital Ocean seem to compete for the number two spot behind China as a malicious traffic source on all my public facing networks.

From the pics, the place looked like it has had quite a few semi-trailer containers added around it, perhaps they were running a little too much equipment in the building and it required power / hvac augmenting but fire suppression was left as it was...

On 3/10/21, 8:55 AM, "NANOG on behalf of JORDI PALET MARTINEZ via NANOG" <nanog-bounces+dhubbard=dino.hostasaurus.com@nanog.org on behalf of nanog@nanog.org> wrote:

In addition to that, even if this is not good for many "honest" people that was using the DC, we need to take it in the positive side. In my own case, OVH is probably the cause of 80% of the abuse cases I report, and they never react. I'm convinced I'm not the only one, as I read in other ops mailing lists ...

So, the positive side is a) during some days, we can see an interesting decrease in abuse cases, b) because the so many abuse cases, many OVH "honest" customers are often being filtered because they share addresses with the "bad guys", so it is an opportunity for them to move to alternative DCs that probably are more careful about "bad guys".

A good topic for researchers :-)

Regards, Jordi @jordipalet

El 10/3/21 16:44, "NANOG en nombre de Andy Ringsmuth" <nanog-bounces+jordi.palet=consulintel.es@nanog.org en nombre de andy@andyring.com> escribió:

> On Mar 10, 2021, at 3:23 AM, Fredy Kuenzler <kuenzler@init7.net> wrote: > > Very sad day for our colleagues at OVH AS16276 as they lost their datacenter SBG-2 in Strasbourg/France completly („everything is destroyed“) in a fire 🔥 and the neighboring SBG1/SBG3/SBG4 at least temporary. > > https://www.dna.fr/amp/faits-divers-justice/2021/03/10/strasbourg-important-...

Sad to see of course, but also a little surprising that fire suppression systems didn’t, well, suppress the fire.

Unless they didn’t exist?

---- Andy Ringsmuth 5609 Harding Drive Lincoln, NE 68521-5831 (402) 304-0083 andy@andyring.com

“Better even die free, than to live slaves.” - Frederick Douglas, 1863

********************************************** IPv4 is over Are you ready for the new Internet ? http://www.theipv6company.com The IPv6 Company

This electronic message contains information which may be privileged or confidential. The information is intended to be for the exclusive use of the individual(s) named above and further non-explicilty authorized disclosure, copying, distribution or use of the contents of this information, even if partially, including attached files, is strictly prohibited and will be considered a criminal offense. If you are not the intended recipient be aware that any disclosure, copying, distribution or use of the contents of this information, even if partially, including attached files, is strictly prohibited, will be considered a criminal offense, so you must reply to the original sender to inform about this communication and delete it.

the conjecturbation is only surpassed by the vitrol

----- On Mar 10, 2021, at 11:28 AM, Bryan Holloway bryan@shout.net wrote: Hi,

Fire Department was there in under five minutes.

I assume your Enron DC was in the U.S.? The OVH datacenter is (was) in France. I bet you 10 bucks that the fire department was on strike. Thanks, Sabri

Report I saw had the fire department on site in 3 minutes of the call. They even had a German-manned fireboat "Europa 1" working the fire from the water side. On Wed, Mar 10, 2021 at 11:37 AM Sabri Berisha <sabri@cluecentral.net> wrote:

----- On Mar 10, 2021, at 11:28 AM, Bryan Holloway bryan@shout.net wrote:

Hi,

...

Fire Department was there in under five minutes.

I assume your Enron DC was in the U.S.?

The OVH datacenter is (was) in France. I bet you 10 bucks that the fire department was on strike.

Thanks,

Sabri

-- Jeff Shultz -- Like us on Social Media for News, Promotions, and other information!!    <https://www.facebook.com/SCTCWEB/>      <https://www.instagram.com/sctc_503/>      <https://www.yelp.com/biz/sctc-stayton-3>      <https://www.youtube.com/c/sctcvideos> _**** This message contains confidential information and is intended only for the individual named. If you are not the named addressee you should not disseminate, distribute or copy this e-mail. Please notify the sender immediately by e-mail if you have received this e-mail by mistake and delete this e-mail from your system. E-mail transmission cannot be guaranteed to be secure or error-free as information could be intercepted, corrupted, lost, destroyed, arrive late or incomplete, or contain viruses. The sender therefore does not accept liability for any errors or omissions in the contents of this message, which arise as a result of e-mail transmission. ****_

No, French Superheroes flew in from Le Café du Peintre near the Bastille in under 30 nanoseconds. However, it was still futile.

jingoism does not deter fires

That'll work. :-) On Wed, Mar 10, 2021 at 2:10 PM Sabri Berisha <sabri@cluecentral.net> wrote:

----- On Mar 10, 2021, at 1:41 PM, Jeff Shultz <jeffshultz@sctcweb.com> wrote:

The OVH datacenter is (was) in France. I bet you 10 bucks that the

...

fire department was on strike.

Report I saw had the fire department on site in 3 minutes of the call. They even had a German-manned fireboat "Europa 1" working the fire from the water side.

That's pretty impressive. It does make me wonder how long it took for them to be notified, and why on earth the fire spread so fast that the entire DC was lost...

And because, for once, the French were not on strike, I donated $10 to the American Red Cross.

Thanks,

Sabri

-- Jeff Shultz -- Like us on Social Media for News, Promotions, and other information!!    <https://www.facebook.com/SCTCWEB/>      <https://www.instagram.com/sctc_503/>      <https://www.yelp.com/biz/sctc-stayton-3>      <https://www.youtube.com/c/sctcvideos> _**** This message contains confidential information and is intended only for the individual named. If you are not the named addressee you should not disseminate, distribute or copy this e-mail. Please notify the sender immediately by e-mail if you have received this e-mail by mistake and delete this e-mail from your system. E-mail transmission cannot be guaranteed to be secure or error-free as information could be intercepted, corrupted, lost, destroyed, arrive late or incomplete, or contain viruses. The sender therefore does not accept liability for any errors or omissions in the contents of this message, which arise as a result of e-mail transmission. ****_

Sent from my iPhone

On Mar 10, 2021, at 7:45 AM, Andy Ringsmuth <andy@andyring.com> wrote:

Sad to see of course, but also a little surprising that fire suppression systems didn’t, well, suppress the fire.

Unless they didn’t exist?

I am assuming you haven’t had a real datacenter fire before. I’ve had one fire, seen another, and had an accidental system firing of the gas system. In the actual fire, caused by cooling system partial failure, there was no gas and it turned out the system to disable power on sprinkler discharge failed, then the power circuit breakers stayed live despite significant electrical short circuiting in the room as sprinklers fired, and then after 5 minutes the fire department arrived and sprayed water in for over 10 minutes without reducing arcing and fire before building power was successfully disabled and they could put the rest of the fire out. This one could easily have destroyed its building, also the building Palo Alto Frys was in. Fun fact: a rack of burning servers displaces sprinkler water around the rack, if it has a top on it, and even if not a vertical stack of burning servers pushes water down the front and back and slightly to the sides of burning servers, not through the systems themselves. Fun fact: motherboards burn, as does chip encapsulation epoxy and all the wiring, the fan frames, board standoffs, essentially all the RAM and PCI board slots, some capacitors and surface mount devices... hard drives melt and the aluminum casings burn, SSD plastic casings generally burn. GBICs and other laser diodes smell awful after they catch fire, though it can be hard to tell with everything else that smells. Fun fact: It does not necessarily take many burning servers to put the room integrity at risk, even with sprinklers going and the fire department spraying water in. Fun fact: All the servers that get wet but don’t burn will rust. And everything in the room near the sprinklers that are going off will get wet. This is very sad as you watch many millions of dollars of brand new 42U racks prestuffed with HP enterprise servers oxidizing away while you wait for the garbage truck. Fun fact: Combustion soot is conductive and even things that didn’t get wet probably are dead. Fun fact: late era Sun Microsystems server boxes were very nice waxed cardboard, very well made, apparently fire resistant more than anyone would have thought but that were also water resistant enough that you’d have a new in box server submerged in a box still full to the brim with water days later. Fun engineering advice: The window for critical data recovery from hard drives that are visibly corroding from water damage short of immersion is probably 48-72 hours, but run them outside any casing on a fire resistant table and have all of CO2 and dry chemical fire extinguishers ready... and a fire hose, and handy building fire alarm. Corroding water damaged SSDs are lower power draw and somewhat less likely to start another fire, but take the same precautions. The fire I saw but that wasn’t mine burned a building with halon and pre action sprinklers more or less to the steel columns and roof beams, despite the fire department arriving in 5 minutes and trying to actively suppress. Not enough openings for them to safely get to the fire before it was out of control, and not enough water flow available in all the sprinklers once it took off. That one had evidently burned aluminum rack posts by the time it was over, not just melted them... Systems and datacenters aren’t built to eliminate fire risk. They just aren’t. You can contain or control most office fires with sprinklers, and certainly evacuate. Datacenters with emergency power batteries in the envelope often have enough stored energy to set the room on fire despite sprinklers. If AC cutoffs fail and circuit breakers don’t trip mains power will as well. Too many systems and storage and networking hardware components can burn. -george

From: George Herbert <george.herbert@gmail.com> ...Interesting overview of fire damage. I remember many years ago spec'ing a machine room at BU and coming to loggerheads with the VP of building and grounds. He (well, their rules) wanted low-temp sprinkler triggers, I wanted the high-temp ones (I forget but I think 135F vs 175F.) Me: I'll have over $2M in electrical equipment in that room! Him: I have $20M in building surrounding your machine room, I win! -- -Barry Shein Software Tool & Die | bzs@TheWorld.com | http://www.TheWorld.com Purveyors to the Trade | Voice: +1 617-STD-WRLD | 800-THE-WRLD The World: Since 1989 | A Public Information Utility | *oo*

On 10 Mar 2021, at 16:42, Andy Ringsmuth wrote:

Sad to see of course, but also a little surprising that fire suppression systems didn’t, well, suppress the fire.

Maybe the innovative ‘green’ design had something to do with the rapid spread of the fire and the way fire suppression was engineered: https://us.ovhcloud.com/about/company/green-tech Further I conjecture that a halon system would not be feasible in such a structure. Daniel

Thus spake Matt Harris (matt@netfire.net) on Thu, Mar 11, 2021 at 05:06:46AM -0600:

There are plenty of effective options besides environmentally-destructive Halon, dangerous-to-equipment water sprinkler, or dangerous-to-personnel CO2 for fire suppression these days. Some of the most common today are foam systems like FM-200 or 3m's Novec.

Sadly, the foams are not without environmental impact either with respect to PFAS. Dale

If you pump 100s of megawatts of energy into a confined space (i.e. a large data center), and there is an uncontrolled release of that energy (i.e. a fire), that's a lot of energy which is going to go somewhere. Stored energy, batteries, backup fuel for generators, server plastic, etc. There is a lot of stuff that can burn in a data center, especially if you start over-stuffing it. China has the top 7 data centers over 100 megawatts. http://worldstopdatacenters.com/power/ Ok, an ISP may not have a mega datacenter. Even "small" data centers have a large fuel load. They are major industrial operations. Like other major industrial fires, often the firefighter response is to rescue any trapped people and then contain the fire until it burns itself out. The "cloud" is just someone else's physical data center. 1975 AT&T New York City fire, documentary how it recovered: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f_AWAmGi-g8

Statement (in French) from Octave Klaba, containing some discussion of the development of the fire (starts at ~ 4:30): https://www.ovh.com/fr/images/sbg/index-fr.html On Thu, Mar 11, 2021 at 10:57:00AM -0600, Andy Ringsmuth wrote:

...

On Mar 11, 2021, at 10:41 AM, Sean Donelan <sean@donelan.com> wrote:

If you pump 100s of megawatts of energy into a confined space (i.e. a large data center), and there is an uncontrolled release of that energy (i.e. a fire), that's a lot of energy which is going to go somewhere. Stored energy, batteries, backup fuel for generators, server plastic, etc. There is a lot of stuff that can burn in a data center, especially if you start over-stuffing it.

China has the top 7 data centers over 100 megawatts.

http://worldstopdatacenters.com/power/

Ok, an ISP may not have a mega datacenter. Even "small" data centers have a large fuel load. They are major industrial operations. Like other major industrial fires, often the firefighter response is to rescue any trapped people and then contain the fire until it burns itself out.

The "cloud" is just someone else's physical data center.

Obligatory:

https://xkcd.com/908/

---- Andy Ringsmuth 5609 Harding Drive Lincoln, NE 68521-5831 (402) 304-0083 andy@andyring.com

???Better even die free, than to live slaves.??? - Frederick Douglas, 1863

-- Enno Rey Cell: +49 173 6745902 Twitter: @Enno_Insinuator

...

Statement (in French) from Octave Klaba, containing some discussion of the development of the fire (starts at ~ 4:30): https://www.ovh.com/fr/images/sbg/index-fr.html English: https://www.ovh.com/fr/images/sbg/index-en.html

and a few hundred of us hoping we never have to stand in front of that camera to explain a similar incident a few things stood out: where backups are located, the ability to build a lot of new servers and the supporting infra, ... but in a week or two i hope he can tell us results of more analysis. randy --- randy@psg.com `gpg --locate-external-keys --auto-key-locate wkd randy@psg.com` signatures are back, thanks to dmarc header butchery

It is terrible timing with the company planning an IPO and also because the French government has heavily backed OVH. I think some government websites went down. France has a statist tradition that leads it to get involved in industries where has no expertise. ________________________________ From: NANOG <nanog-bounces+rod.beck=unitedcablecompany.com@nanog.org> on behalf of Randy Bush <randy@psg.com> Sent: Thursday, March 11, 2021 9:43 PM To: Lukas Tribus <lukas@ltri.eu> Cc: Eilers, Laura via NANOG <nanog@nanog.org> Subject: Re: OVH datacenter SBG2 in Strasbourg on fire ????

...

Statement (in French) from Octave Klaba, containing some discussion of the development of the fire (starts at ~ 4:30): https://www.ovh.com/fr/images/sbg/index-fr.html English: https://www.ovh.com/fr/images/sbg/index-en.html

and a few hundred of us hoping we never have to stand in front of that camera to explain a similar incident a few things stood out: where backups are located, the ability to build a lot of new servers and the supporting infra, ... but in a week or two i hope he can tell us results of more analysis. randy --- randy@psg.com `gpg --locate-external-keys --auto-key-locate wkd randy@psg.com` signatures are back, thanks to dmarc header butchery

There are plenty of websites still down: https://www.centrepompidou.fr/en/. It surprises that important sites don't do mirroring. -R. ________________________________ From: Johann <adofou@gmail.com> Sent: Friday, March 12, 2021 12:41 AM To: Rod Beck <rod.beck@unitedcablecompany.com> Cc: Randy Bush <randy@psg.com>; Lukas Tribus <lukas@ltri.eu>; Eilers, Laura via NANOG <nanog@nanog.org> Subject: Re: OVH datacenter SBG2 in Strasbourg on fire ???? Several government websites have been impacted by fire. But >90% was operationnel during the same day after the incident. There are DRP (seems to be working) and backups in other datacenters. There must remain exceptions or minor things broken. But I think it's a pretty good result. Johann Le ven. 12 mars 2021 à 00:24, Rod Beck <rod.beck@unitedcablecompany.com<mailto:rod.beck@unitedcablecompany.com>> a écrit : It is terrible timing with the company planning an IPO and also because the French government has heavily backed OVH. I think some government websites went down. France has a statist tradition that leads it to get involved in industries where has no expertise. ________________________________ From: NANOG <nanog-bounces+rod.beck=unitedcablecompany.com@nanog.org<mailto:unitedcablecompany.com@nanog.org>> on behalf of Randy Bush <randy@psg.com<mailto:randy@psg.com>> Sent: Thursday, March 11, 2021 9:43 PM To: Lukas Tribus <lukas@ltri.eu<mailto:lukas@ltri.eu>> Cc: Eilers, Laura via NANOG <nanog@nanog.org<mailto:nanog@nanog.org>> Subject: Re: OVH datacenter SBG2 in Strasbourg on fire ????

...

Statement (in French) from Octave Klaba, containing some discussion of the development of the fire (starts at ~ 4:30): https://www.ovh.com/fr/images/sbg/index-fr.html English: https://www.ovh.com/fr/images/sbg/index-en.html

and a few hundred of us hoping we never have to stand in front of that camera to explain a similar incident a few things stood out: where backups are located, the ability to build a lot of new servers and the supporting infra, ... but in a week or two i hope he can tell us results of more analysis. randy --- randy@psg.com<mailto:randy@psg.com> `gpg --locate-external-keys --auto-key-locate wkd randy@psg.com<mailto:randy@psg.com>` signatures are back, thanks to dmarc header butchery

On Thu, Mar 11, 2021 at 7:40 PM Randy Bush <randy@psg.com> wrote:

It surprises that important sites don't do mirroring.

depends on what you mean by 'mirroring.' think latency.

randy ------------------------------

Though a best effort to mirror would be acceptable. Maybe not up to the minute but at least a recovery.

On 11 Mar 2021, at 21:43, Randy Bush wrote:

... but in a week or two i hope he can tell us results of more analysis. …

Actually just *the way* in which OVH communicates about this gives hope that we will indeed hear a useful analysis. It may be fortunate that this happened before they went public and thus corporate communications were ‘professionalised’ and vetted by the legal department. And yes he looked tired! Still did it in two languages. Good man. Daniel

-----Original Message----- From: NANOG <nanog-bounces+eric-list=truenet.com@nanog.org> On Behalf Of David Hubbard Sent: Friday, March 12, 2021 9:47 AM To: nanog@nanog.org Subject: Re: OVH datacenter SBG2 in Strasbourg on fire ????

After sending them abuse reports for years with only an increase in malicious traffic, I have no expectation of anything they do getting better or being for the benefit of the internet as a > whole. Only reason this is probably getting any attention from them is in hopes they don’t irreparably damage their IPO; they seem to have no issues with their customers' compromised servers damaging the businesses of others on a continuous basis.

Based on previous outages, I wouldn't agree. http://status.ovh.net/?do=details&id=15162#comment18119 I will agree about the spam issues, but Octave Klaba has usually been pretty honest comparatively with what I'm used to from typical US based ILECs on outages. Sincerely, Eric Tykwinski TrueNet, Inc. P: 610-429-8300

    One hope that the IPO will bring more pressure to evaluate the gain/loss ratio of handling the abuses to the community satisfaction.     ( As for the the fire, I have to feel bad for all the staff working endless hours to get their customers back online ). ----- Alain Hebert ahebert@pubnix.net PubNIX Inc. 50 boul. St-Charles P.O. Box 26770 Beaconsfield, Quebec H9W 6G7 Tel: 514-990-5911 http://www.pubnix.net Fax: 514-990-9443 On 3/12/21 10:19 AM, keith@contoocook.net wrote:

That's the first mention of abuse I've seen. I've got huge blocks of OVH space blocked.. Lots of bad things coming from there. Not sure the fire will change things down the road as the sources are from all over the roadmap.

Sent from MailDroid <https://goo.gl/ODgwBb>

-----Original Message----- From: eric-list@truenet.com To: nanog@nanog.org Sent: Fri, 12 Mar 2021 9:54 Subject: RE: OVH datacenter SBG2 in Strasbourg on fire ????

...

-----Original Message----- From: NANOG <nanog-bounces+eric-list=truenet.com@nanog.org <mailto:truenet.com@nanog.org>> On Behalf Of David Hubbard Sent: Friday, March 12, 2021 9:47 AM To: nanog@nanog.org <mailto:nanog@nanog.org> Subject: Re: OVH datacenter SBG2 in Strasbourg on fire ????

After sending them abuse reports for years with only an increase in malicious traffic, I have no expectation of anything they do getting better or being for the benefit of the internet as a > whole.  Only reason this is probably getting any attention from them is in hopes they don’t irreparably damage their IPO; they seem to have no issues with their customers' compromised servers damaging the businesses of others on a continuous basis.

Based on previous outages, I wouldn't agree. http://status.ovh.net/?do=details&id=15162#comment18119 <http://status.ovh.net/?do=details&id=15162#comment18119> I will agree about the spam issues, but Octave Klaba has usually been pretty honest comparatively with what I'm used to from typical US based ILECs on outages.

Sincerely,

Eric Tykwinski TrueNet, Inc. P: 610-429-8300 <tel:6104298300>

https://us.ovhcloud.com/about/company/green-tech

Further I conjecture that a halon system would not be feasible in such a structure.

Daniel

There are plenty of effective options besides environmentally-destructive Halon, dangerous-to-equipment water sprinkler, or dangerous-to-personnel CO2 for fire suppression these days. Some of the most common today are foam systems like FM-200 or 3m's Novec.

- Matt

I suppose I could be wrong, but I would imagine any of the various fire prevention/mitigation systems are less environmentally damaging than an entire building burning to the ground. -Andy

On 11 Mar 2021, at 11:46, Daniel Karrenberg wrote:

… Further I conjecture that a halon system would not be feasible in such a structure. …

Several of you have pointed out to me at varying level of politeness that ‘halon’ is no longer used. Sometimes I cannot hep but reveal my age … ;-) I meant to say ‘Further I conjecture that the building could not have had a fire suppression system that requires reasonably airtight spaces.’. The between-the-lines there being that it may have been the very design of the building that lead to the rapid spreading of the fire. Again: all conjecture, which seems to be tolerated here. ;-) Daniel