On Mon, Jul 09, 2007 at 01:23:46PM -0500, Borchers, Mark M. wrote:
Jared Mauch wrote:
The simple truth is that prefix lists ARE hard to manage.
Medium-hard IMHO. Adding prefixes is relatively easy to implement. Tracking and removing outdated information significantly more challenging.
Some people lack tools and automation to make it work or to manage their networks.
Best I can tell, even the largest transit providers handle prefix list updates manually.
Some have automated systems, but they're dependent on IRR data being correct. There are even tools to automate population of IRR data.
At this stage of history, a human interface is probably necessary in making a reasonable assessment about the legitimacy of an update request.
I think here is one of the cruxes of the problem. If it requires a human, there's a few things that will happen: 1) prefix-list volume will be too much to be dealt with. I see some per-asn prefix lists that would be 255k routes and include all sorts of unreasonable junk like /32's 2) even taking a reasonable network, (in this case, i picked AS286) I see 4425 routes. Either you check these all manually (at least once), or come up with some way to model it. I currently see 250 routes in the table with as-path _286_ from my view. Either there's a lot of cruft there, or there's a lot of multihomed folks where i see a better path. Which is it? Do I have the time to crunch this myself? 3) What about those unique customer relationships? (this is made up) Like where ATT buys transit from Cogent for those few prefixes in New Zealand they care about? There's always some compelling business case to do something wonky. Does this mean that ATT needs to register their prefixes in the cogent IRR? How do you keep it 'quiet' that this is happening, instead of an object saying 'att priority customer route'? How do you validate these? Even the 'big guys' will make policy mistakes once in awhile. There needs to be some 'better-way' IMHO, but my ideas on this topic have not gotten far enough along for me to put code behind them. Perhaps I'll need to reprioritize those efforts. It seems to me like someone could do a cool system that churns through the route-views data, or if necessary just duplicate part of it by getting lots of bgp feeds and trying to parse the data. Too bad there's not a good way to do something like dampening on routes where depending on the age of the announcement and some 'trust' factor you can assign a series of local-preferences. I'd really like to see something like this exist. ie: "dampen" the "new" path (even if the prefix is a longer one) until some timer has ticked (unless some policy criteria are satisfied, such as same as-path, etc..). There's also the issue of how to implement this in the existing router(s), some of them with slower cpus. There's a lot of folks using older hardware to to bgp that just might melt if they had to evaluate some huge routing policy. - Jared -- Jared Mauch | pgp key available via finger from jared@puck.nether.net clue++; | http://puck.nether.net/~jared/ My statements are only mine.
On 9-Jul-2007, at 16:13, Jared Mauch wrote:
Some have automated systems, but they're dependent on IRR data being correct. There are even tools to automate population of IRR data.
Building customer filters from the IRR seems like it should fall in the "easy" bucket, given how long people have been doing it, and for how long. It's the lack of a way to trust the data that's published in the IRR that always seems to be the stumbling block. Various ops-aware people have been attacking the correctness issue in the SIDR working group. The work seems fairly well-cooked to me, and I seem to think that Geoff Huston has wrapped some proof-of-concept tools around the crypto. SIDR is only of any widespread use if it is coupled with policy/ procedures at the RIRs to provide certificates for resources that are assigned/allocated. However, this seems like less of a hurdle than you'd think when you look at how many RIR staff are involved in working on it. So, if you consider some future world where there are suitably machine-readable repositories of number resources (e.g. IRRs) are combined with machine-verifiable certificates affirming a customer's right to use them, how far out of the woods are we? Or are we going to find out that the real problem is some fundamental unwillingness to automate this stuff, or something else? Joe
On Mon, Jul 09, 2007 at 04:50:56PM -0400, Joe Abley wrote:
On 9-Jul-2007, at 16:13, Jared Mauch wrote:
Some have automated systems, but they're dependent on IRR data being correct. There are even tools to automate population of IRR data.
Building customer filters from the IRR seems like it should fall in the "easy" bucket, given how long people have been doing it, and for how long. It's the lack of a way to trust the data that's published in the IRR that always seems to be the stumbling block.
-- snip --
So, if you consider some future world where there are suitably machine-readable repositories of number resources (e.g. IRRs) are combined with machine-verifiable certificates affirming a customer's right to use them, how far out of the woods are we? Or are we going to find out that the real problem is some fundamental unwillingness to automate this stuff, or something else?
It's that some folks feel entitled to announce routes without registering them. Take ANS vs Sprintlink as the classic example. Not much has changed since then. Nor have the tools evolved significantly. Some vendors still don't get router configuration from tools yet. Try to automate something and it's not easy or impossible. Even the best solutions on the market have some problems when you feed it a 8+Meg config. It takes a lot of cpu time to process that much. There really need to be some (ick, ignore that I suggested this) Web 2.0 IRR tools. Something that can smartly populate an IRR or IRR-like dataset. Something that can be taught to 'learn' what is reasonable. I've seen some cool things that show promise (eg: pretty good bgp), but there's always some interesting drawback. Plus, as Patrick said earlier, (and i generally agree), these types of "attacks" are rare and usually short lived. Even those like the panix situation didn't last very long. Perhaps it's not as important to think about now. - Jared -- Jared Mauch | pgp key available via finger from jared@puck.nether.net clue++; | http://puck.nether.net/~jared/ My statements are only mine.
On Mon, Jul 09, 2007 at 04:50:56PM -0400, Joe Abley wrote:
SIDR is only of any widespread use if it is coupled with policy/ procedures at the RIRs to provide certificates for resources that are assigned/allocated. However, this seems like less of a hurdle than you'd think when you look at how many RIR staff are involved in working on it.
So, if you consider some future world where there are suitably machine-readable repositories of number resources (e.g. IRRs) are combined with machine-verifiable certificates affirming a customer's right to use them, how far out of the woods are we? Or are we going to find out that the real problem is some fundamental unwillingness to automate this stuff, or something else?
Going to a model with reasonable and well-defined policies and procedures is a good thing. However, it renders all the existing IRR information suspect. Even the RRs run by RIRs are worthless as they stand. For instance ARIN runs an RR but does no validation of what goes in there today. A reasonable approach might be to pick up with tools based on the new SIDR work and leave the existing IRR info behind. Tony
participants (3)
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Jared Mauch
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Joe Abley
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Tony Tauber