On Mon, Feb 3, 2014 at 7:40 PM, Glen Turner <gdt@gdt.id.au> wrote:
On 4 Feb 2014, at 9:28 am, Christopher Morrow <morrowc.lists@gmail.com> wrote:
wait, so the whole of the thread is about stopping participants in the attack, and you're suggesting that removing/changing end-system switch/routing gear and doing something more complex than: deny udp any 123 any deny udp any 123 any 123 permit ip any any
Which just pushes NTP to some other port, making control harder. We've already pushed all 'interesting' traffic to port 80 on TCP, which has made traffic control very expensive. Let's not repeat that history.
I think in the case of 'oh crap, customer is getting 100gbps of ntp...' the above (a third party notes that the 2nd line is redundant) is a fine answer, till the flood abates. I wouldn't recommend wholesale blocking of anything across an ISP edge, but for the specific case paul was getting at: "ntp reflection attack target is your customer" ... it's going to solve the problem.