On Thu, Feb 4, 2010 at 5:49 PM, Steven Bellovin <smb@cs.columbia.edu> wrote:
On Feb 4, 2010, at 5:42 PM, Christopher Morrow wrote:
On Thu, Feb 4, 2010 at 5:26 PM, Crist Clark <Crist.Clark@globalstar.com> wrote:
this seems like much more work that matt blaze's work that said: "Just send more than 10mbps toward what you want to sneak around... the LEA's pipe is saturated so nothing of use gets to them"
The Cross/XForce/IBM talk appears more to be about unauthorized access to communications via LI rather than evading them,
"...there is a risk that [LI tools] could be hijacked by third parties and used to perform surveillance without authorization."
Of course, this has already happened,
right... plus the management (for cisco) is via snmp(v3), from (mostly) windows servers as the mediation devices (sad)... and the traffic is simply tunneled from device -> mediation -> lea .... not necessarily IPSEC'd from mediation -> LEA, and udp-encapped from device -> mediation server.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greek_telephone_tapping_case_2004-2005
yea, good times... that's really just re-use of the normal LEA hooks in all telco phone switch gear though... not 'calea features' in particular.
There's a difference? CALEA is just the US goverment profile of the generic international concept of lawful intercept.
hrm, I always equate 'calea' with 'ip intercept', because I (thankfully) never had to see a phone switch (dms type thingy). You are, I believe, correct in that CALEA was first 'telephone' intercept implemented in phone-switch-thingies in ~94?? and was later applied (may 2007ish?) to IP things as well. -Chris