On Sun, Aug 04, 2002 at 09:15:26PM -0700, Stephen Stuart wrote:
IMO, Commercial ISPs should never filter customer packets unless specifically requested to do so by the customer, or in response to a security/abuse incident.
Let's say the customer operates some big enterprise network, runs their infrastructure in RFC1918 space ("for security," hah), and spews a couple kilobits of DNS query from that RFC1918 space toward the root nameservers. Assume that either pride or ignorance will prevent the customer from ever asking you to filter what you know to be garbage traffic. Does your rule to "never filter customer packets" mean you're going to sit and watch those packets go by?
If yes, why?
Everyone should turn on either the equivalent of the Cisco 'ip verify unicast source reachable-via any' on their peer/upstream interfaces as well as to internal and bgp customer interfaces that may not be able to be checked with a stricter rpf. This will drop packets from people that you have no return path for in the cef path. I know other vendors either have or should have this feature. While it will not stem a true DoS based on real ip addresses, zombies, whatnot.. it will stop all the rfc1918 headed towards the roots or other space that is not in the global routing table. if your vendor doesn't have such a knob, i do suggest asking them :) i've seen a lot of traffic get dropped by using such a check on interfaces. it is not a large amount compared to the overall packets but does reduce what you end up transporting and customer support queries about why 10.* is sending them packets. - jared -- Jared Mauch | pgp key available via finger from jared@puck.nether.net clue++; | http://puck.nether.net/~jared/ My statements are only mine.