This email, right here? This is Exhibit 1 in my "not all the tradeoffs of outsourcing your $SERVICE are visible or trivial" list. Thanks. Cheers, -- jra ----- Original Message -----
From: "Maxim Khitrov" <max@mxcrypt.com> To: "Damian Menscher" <damian@google.com> Cc: nanog@nanog.org Sent: Thursday, January 3, 2013 9:01:09 AM Subject: Re: Gmail and SSL On Thu, Jan 3, 2013 at 12:14 AM, Damian Menscher <damian@google.com> wrote:
Back on topic: encryption without knowing who you're talking to is worse than useless (hence no self-signed certs which provide a false sense of security), and there are usability difficulties with exposing strong security to the average user (asking users to generate and upload a self-signed cert would be a customer-support disaster, not to mention all the outages that would occur when those certs expired). Real-world security is all about finding a reasonable balance and adapting to the current threats.
The most recent change to POP3 mail retrieval over SSL is not a reasonable balance. My organization uses Google Apps for mail hosting, but a number of users also have us.army.mil accounts. They used to pull mail from their .mil account into Google Apps via POP3. Army servers do not allow unencrypted connections and their root certificates are not part of the Mozilla Root CA list (and, as you can guess, I have no control over their servers).
Google didn't just block the use of self-signed certs; you broke communication with all servers using perfectly legitimate PKIs that are not part of the Mozilla Root CA list. Thus, instead of "self-signed certs = false sense of security," your argument is really "not on some arbitrary root CA list = false sense of security," which is absolute nonsense.
I talked to Google Apps support a few weeks ago, sent them a link to this discussion, but all they could do is file a feature request. IMHO, this change should never have been allowed to go into production until there is an interface for uploading our own root certificates. Of course, any root (i.e. self-signed) certificate can be used by the POP3 server directly, so this would also solve the problem for people trying to use self-signed certs not part of any PKI.
Finally, "asking users to generate and upload a self-signed cert would be a customer-support disaster," so you just block their access completely? Anyone who doesn't know how to generate and upload a certificate would probably avoid encryption altogether, don't you think? And as for "outages that would occur when those certs expired," what do you think people in my organization are dealing with right now? Only an expired cert can be renewed or replaced, whereas our access has been blocked and there is nothing we can do about it.
- Max
-- Jay R. Ashworth Baylink jra@baylink.com Designer The Things I Think RFC 2100 Ashworth & Associates http://baylink.pitas.com 2000 Land Rover DII St Petersburg FL USA #natog +1 727 647 1274