Hello, Does anyone know why I get inbound packets from 10.x.x.x coming from my ISP, UUNet? They're just headed for a webserver, so it's not likely that they're up to no good. This seems to violate rfc 1918. Am I crazy? Feb 22 15:29:48 computerjobs-gw 353094: Feb 22 20:30:10.439 UTC: %SEC-6-IPACCESSLOGP: list 135 denied tcp 10.10.5.18(62438) -> 63.67.217.184(80), 1 packet Feb 22 15:30:02 computerjobs-gw 353095: Feb 22 20:30:24.024 UTC: %SEC-6-IPACCESSLOGP: list 135 denied tcp 10.10.5.18(62440) -> 63.67.217.184(80), 1 packet Feb 22 15:30:06 computerjobs-gw 353096: Feb 22 20:30:28.168 UTC: %SEC-6-IPACCESSLOGP: list 135 denied tcp 10.10.5.18(62455) -> 63.67.217.184(80), 1 packet
On Thu, 22 Feb 2001 15:38:56 EST, Chris Davis <chris.davis@computerjobs.com> said:
Does anyone know why I get inbound packets from 10.x.x.x coming from my ISP, UUNet? They're just headed for a webserver, so it's not likely that they're up to no good. This seems to violate rfc 1918. Am I crazy?
You're not crazy, and UUNet should be filtering them. Most likely, some poor Windows user behind a NAT is leaking the packets and nobody's filtering them. -- Valdis Kletnieks Operating Systems Analyst Virginia Tech
Does anyone know why I get inbound packets from 10.x.x.x coming from my ISP, UUNet? They're just headed for a webserver, so it's not likely that they're up to no good. This seems to violate rfc 1918. Am I crazy?
You're not crazy, and UUNet should be filtering them.
This is, again, not a foregone conclusion. There are good reasons to want to get those packets (traceroutes from people who have numbered their networks in rfc1918 networks, f'rinstance). Not everyone agrees whether it is better to filter or not to filter, but there are good arguments on both sides. --jhawk
On Thu, 22 Feb 2001 16:12:16 EST, John Hawkinson said:
There are good reasons to want to get those packets (traceroutes from people who have numbered their networks in rfc1918 networks, f'rinstance).
The original note specifically showed them as being TCP packets from a 10.x.x.x address going to port 80. Does that qualify as a good reason?
Not everyone agrees whether it is better to filter or not to filter, but there are good arguments on both sides.
Does anybody in the house think that these packets actually have a snowball's chance in Hades of getting a reply back sucessfully? -- Valdis Kletnieks Operating Systems Analyst Virginia Tech
There are good reasons to want to get those packets (traceroutes from people who have numbered their networks in rfc1918 networks, f'rinstance).
The original note specifically showed them as being TCP packets from a 10.x.x.x address going to port 80. Does that qualify as a good reason?
Err, no, but I don't think it's reasonable to expect people to filter rfc1918 packets based on specific protocols.
Not everyone agrees whether it is better to filter or not to filter, but there are good arguments on both sides.
Does anybody in the house think that these packets actually have a snowball's chance in Hades of getting a reply back sucessfully?
No, but that's really a thoroughly orthogonal question. --jhawk
You're not crazy, and UUNet should be filtering them.
There are good reasons to want to get those packets (traceroutes from people who have numbered their networks in rfc1918 networks,
That's not a good reason. Nobody should be generating public traffic from those addresses, "making them work" is not an Internet-friendly decision. -- Eric A. Hall http://www.ehsco.com/ Internet Core Protocols http://www.oreilly.com/catalog/coreprot/
You're not crazy, and UUNet should be filtering them.
No Chris, you're not crazy...
There are good reasons to want to get those packets (traceroutes from people who have numbered their networks in rfc1918 networks,
No John, there are exactly zero reasons, good or otherwise, for allowing any traffic with RFC-1918 source addresses to traverse any part of the public Internet. Period! :-) [ On Thursday, February 22, 2001 at 13:22:27 (-0800), Eric A. Hall wrote: ]
Subject: Re: rfc 1918?
That's not a good reason. Nobody should be generating public traffic from those addresses, "making them work" is not an Internet-friendly decision.
Precisely. The sooner RFC-1918-sourced packets get filtered (i.e. the closer to source they get filtered, *and* the quicker that *EVERYONE* introduces such filters), then the sooner (i.e. the quicker) the people (and that's the politely and politically correct way of speaking of them) who think they can use private addresses in public networks will hopefully get clue-by-4'ed into changing their errant ways. Now if only I could find some magic way to let all those trigger happy people running lame IDS to complain to the true source of such packets. If the relatively few complaints I see from such people when accidental ftp or http connections are attempted to their workstations are any indication, then the mere volume of complaints alone would probably be sufficient reason for anyone to stop using RFC-1918 addressing. Too bad the Internet's not just one big large bridged Ethernet and then we could just look up the MAC address (on our border bridges, of course) of any offender and then go beat them over the head directly with the magnled packets! :-) Thankfully there are now devices that can do such filtering effectively even at very high core speeds.... Now we only have to convince the manufacturers of such devices to supply them with default configurations that do such filtering (and not to make the stupid mistake that they need to leave their factory configurations as if they will only ever live in a lab environment)! -- Greg A. Woods +1 416 218-0098 VE3TCP <gwoods@acm.org> <robohack!woods> Planix, Inc. <woods@planix.com>; Secrets of the Weird <woods@weird.com>
On Thu, 22 Feb 2001, Greg A. Woods wrote: This gets us back to the discussin we had here about 3-4 months ago about what should be done in order to create a friendly internet environment, that is, where every Internet connected entity actually gives a damn about everyone else. --Ariel
You're not crazy, and UUNet should be filtering them.
No Chris, you're not crazy...
There are good reasons to want to get those packets (traceroutes from people who have numbered their networks in rfc1918 networks,
No John, there are exactly zero reasons, good or otherwise, for allowing any traffic with RFC-1918 source addresses to traverse any part of the public Internet.Period! :-)
[ On Thursday, February 22, 2001 at 13:22:27 (-0800), Eric A. Hall wrote: ]
Subject: Re: rfc 1918?
That's not a good reason. Nobody should be generating public traffic from those addresses, "making them work" is not an Internet-friendly decision.
Precisely.
The sooner RFC-1918-sourced packets get filtered (i.e. the closer to source they get filtered, *and* the quicker that *EVERYONE* introduces such filters), then the sooner (i.e. the quicker) the people (and that's the politely and politically correct way of speaking of them) who think they can use private addresses inpublic networks will hopefully get clue-by-4'ed into changing their errant ways.
Now if only I could find some magic way to let all those trigger happy people running lame IDS to complain to the true source of such packets. If the relatively few complaints I see from such people when accidental ftp or http connections are attempted to their workstations are any indication, then the mere volume of complaints alone would probably be sufficient reason for anyone to stop using RFC-1918 addressing.Too bad the Internet's not just one big large bridged Ethernet and then we could just look up the MAC address (on our border bridges, of course) of any offender and then go beat them over the head directly with the magnled packets!:-)
Thankfully there are now devices that can do such filtering effectively even at very high core speeds....Now we only have to convince the manufacturers of such devices to supply them with default configurations that do such filtering (and not to make the stupidmistake that they need to leave their factory configurations as if they will only ever live in a lab environment)!
-- Greg A. Woods
+1 416 218-0098 VE3TCP <gwoods@acm.org> <robohack!woods> Planix, Inc. <woods@planix.com>;Secrets of the Weird <woods@weird.com>
-- Ariel Biener e-mail: ariel@post.tau.ac.il PGP(6.5.8) public key http://www.tau.ac.il/~ariel/pgp.html
There are good reasons to want to get those packets (traceroutes from people who have numbered their networks in rfc1918 networks,
No John, there are exactly zero reasons, good or otherwise, for allowing any traffic with RFC-1918 source addresses to traverse any part of the public Internet. Period! :-)
You are being religious, and I shall not descend into this sort of discussion with you. It is simply non productive nor professional. I disagree, and believe that other reasonable people do so as well, and there is therefore argument over this issue. People should not assert canonicity upon it. End of story. --jhawk
John Hawkinson wrote:
No John, there are exactly zero reasons, good or otherwise
I disagree, and believe that other reasonable people do so as well, and there is therefore argument over this issue.
Some people believe the earth is flat, so that issue is undecided? hehe RFC1918 addresses are not "free addresses" they are private-use ONLY addresses which must not appear in public networking space. It cannot be made much clearer than that. Science has spoken. RFC1918 addresses on public interfaces are bad. Doesn't matter who disagrees with it or how convenient it is to adopt. There is consensus on this issue. "Stephen J. Wilcox" wrote:
Altho Path MTU from RFC1918 P2P links will arrive and if you block them you'll find strange things occur on transfering data so you cant say nothing should come on 1918 space.
Exactly why they should be expunged from ISP backbones. What if an ICMP-DU message had to go the other way, from ISP space out to the Internet? -- Eric A. Hall http://www.ehsco.com/ Internet Core Protocols http://www.oreilly.com/catalog/coreprot/
[ On Thursday, February 22, 2001 at 17:33:53 (-0500), John Hawkinson wrote: ]
Subject: Re: rfc 1918?
There are good reasons to want to get those packets (traceroutes from people who have numbered their networks in rfc1918 networks,
No John, there are exactly zero reasons, good or otherwise, for allowing any traffic with RFC-1918 source addresses to traverse any part of the public Internet. Period! :-)
You are being religious, and I shall not descend into this sort of discussion with you. It is simply non productive nor professional.
OK, sorry, let me qualify that: No John, there are exactly zero TECHNICAL reasons, good or otherwise, for allowing any traffic with RFC-1918 source addresses to traverse any part of the public Internet. Period! :-)
I disagree, and believe that other reasonable people do so as well, and there is therefore argument over this issue. People should not assert canonicity upon it. End of story.
In all of the past discussions on this issue there have never been any presentations of technical reasons for allowing RFC-1918 addresses (in either the source *or* destination fields) to traverse the public Internet. (At least none have been presented while I've been watching, not anywhere.) Yes those who have the misunderstanding that they can use such addresses are going to fail to filter them lest they block their own uses, but that's circular reasoning, even if it is technically correct within the microcosms of those people's own minds. However in public there is no possible valid technical argument, by mere definition of the way RFC-1918 defines the fact that such addresses are solely for PRIVATE use, and private use ONLY. Unfortunately RFC-1918 is not also a STD-* document, but even as it is just a Best Current Practice, it can only ever really succeed even as a BCP if everyone co-operates completely, and since people are eager to use PRIVATE addresses that pretty much forces the rest of you to co-operate since we're going to filter the heck out of your "mis-uses". RFC-1918 also clearly suggests that non-unique PRIVATE addresses are really only useful where external connectivity is not used -- i.e. for private networks that are never in any way connected to the public Internet. I.e. use of private addresses on public devices, with or without filtering at network borders, is still "wrong". One might even go so far as to argue that use of PRIVATE addresses behind a proper NAT is similarly "wrong", though of course with a proper NAT you'd never know! :-) Note that any part of the Internet which joins any two independently controlled and operated nodes is, by definition, public. That means that even an ISP with just direct customers must still never allow RFC-1918 addresses to appear at either their customer sites, or on their back-haul(s) to the rest of the Internet. Their customers have just as much right to make private use of RFC-1918 addresses as does any other participant on the public Internet. Any use by any ISP of any RFC-1918 addressing violates that right. The only other technical option is to forget about allocating private address space, deprecate RFC-1918, and open up the address space to full and proper routing. Though I do find private address space handy, I wouldn't mind making all that space publicly available too. So, do we want RFC-1918 promoted to a full standard, or deleted? You choose. -- Greg A. Woods +1 416 218-0098 VE3TCP <gwoods@acm.org> <robohack!woods> Planix, Inc. <woods@planix.com>; Secrets of the Weird <woods@weird.com>
It is my intention to avoid having 1918 addresses leaving my network. At our egress points the filters are fairly short -- they allow only traffic with our IP source addresses to leave. This was my interpretation of the RFC's. Some in this discussion seem to be saying that we should also filter for RFC1918 destinations. Am I reading this correctly? I can see that packets destined for RFC1918 addresses will leave our network (due to default routes) but are promptly dropped at the first BGP speaking router they encounter. Is it worth the extra router processing time to check all outgoing packet destinations as well? I can't see where this extra filtering is worth the trouble. Mark Radabaugh VP, Amplex (419)833-3635 mark@amplex.net
[ On Thursday, February 22, 2001 at 19:12:14 (-0500), Mark Radabaugh wrote: ]
Subject: RE: rfc 1918?
I can see that packets destined for RFC1918 addresses will leave our network (due to default routes) but are promptly dropped at the first BGP speaking router they encounter. Is it worth the extra router processing time to check all outgoing packet destinations as well? I can't see where this extra filtering is worth the trouble.
I suppose that depends on just how far away the first BGP speaking router is from your network border(s), and how properly configured it is. In practical terms I suppose it also depends on just exactly what filtering technology you've deployed, and just exactly how close it is to being overloaded. If you are already pushing your router's CPU too hard (and if your filters are done by your router's CPU rather than an ASIC) then obviously reducing your filter load will be in your own best interests and not filtering destination addresses against RFC-1918 will be one relatively benign way of reducing the filter load. However if your router's CPU is only partially utilised now (even if you push your pipe to capacity), then adding such destination filters won't hurt anyone. -- Greg A. Woods +1 416 218-0098 VE3TCP <gwoods@acm.org> <robohack!woods> Planix, Inc. <woods@planix.com>; Secrets of the Weird <woods@weird.com>
woods@weird.com (Greg A. Woods) tapped some keys and produced:
In practical terms I suppose it also depends on just exactly what filtering technology you've deployed, and just exactly how close it is to being overloaded. If you are already pushing your router's CPU too hard (and if your filters are done by your router's CPU rather than an ASIC) then obviously reducing your filter load will be in your own best interests and not filtering destination addresses against RFC-1918 will be one relatively benign way of reducing the filter load. However if your router's CPU is only partially utilised now (even if you push your pipe to capacity), then adding such destination filters won't hurt anyone.
Would routing them to Null0 not be more optimal? Pi -- conf t no ip-directed marketing drivel ^Z wr mem
Pim van Riezen <pi@vuurwerk.nl> tapped some keys and produced:
Would routing them to Null0 not be more optimal?
Never mind I'm thinking ass-backwards, must be something in the air. *Revokes own posting privs* Pi -- conf t no ip-directed marketing drivel ^Z wr mem
On Thu, 22 Feb 2001 19:12:14 EST, Mark Radabaugh <mark@amplex.net> said:
At our egress points the filters are fairly short -- they allow only traffic with our IP source addresses to leave. This was my interpretation of the RFC's.
Thank you. The rest of the network appreciates you doing your part.
Some in this discussion seem to be saying that we should also filter for RFC1918 destinations. Am I reading this correctly?
That's probably optional. But if you have the router resources to do it. every little bit helps. You probably should filter and log it, to find out why one of your hosts is trying to send to a 1918 address outside your site - if you're not using 1918 space, it shouldn't happen, and if you ARE using it, the packet should have ended up inside your net, not on your border router. In either case, if a packet is trying to leave your net bound for a 1918 destination, something is probably seriously wrong(*). (*) I'll leave ICMP replies from 1918-addressed P2P links out for the moment ;)
I can see that packets destined for RFC1918 addresses will leave our network (due to default routes) but are promptly dropped at the first BGP speaking router they encounter. Is it worth the extra router processing time to check all outgoing packet destinations as well? I can't see where this extra filtering is worth the trouble.
There's 2 main classes of "next router": 1) You don't filter, but it goes to the OTHER end of the link and promptly gets stomped by a fascist filter that refuses to accept any source address that's outside the adddress block that's supposed to be at your end. 2) You don't filter, they don't filter either, because they actually USE 1918 space for their own stuff, so your packets wtih 1918 source addresses and real destination addresses manage to go a LONG way before hitting anything that will stop them (as the original poster showed, the packets could actually *arrive* at the destination, with no way to reply). Remember - this filtering often can't be done on core routers due to performance issues, so if it doesn't get done at the border routers it probably won't happen... Valdis Kletnieks Operating Systems Analyst Virginia Tech
This only can apply to small networks, specifically stub networks, if you're carrying transit or have multiple connections out you'll find filters which only allow your own ips in and out start dropping a whole lot else! But i think you have the right idea, filters should be applied at the provider edge to such stub networks and then no nasty ips will get through to the provider network and hence the internet. Oh, and I dont think I showed my opinion on my last mail, i think use of 1918 on p2p is wrong! But.. as so many large networks do it you cant just filter it out and assume everything will work. Steve On Thu, 22 Feb 2001, Mark Radabaugh wrote:
It is my intention to avoid having 1918 addresses leaving my network.
At our egress points the filters are fairly short -- they allow only traffic with our IP source addresses to leave. This was my interpretation of the RFC's. Some in this discussion seem to be saying that we should also filter for RFC1918 destinations. Am I reading this correctly?
I can see that packets destined for RFC1918 addresses will leave our network (due to default routes) but are promptly dropped at the first BGP speaking router they encounter. Is it worth the extra router processing time to check all outgoing packet destinations as well? I can't see where this extra filtering is worth the trouble.
Mark Radabaugh VP, Amplex (419)833-3635 mark@amplex.net
No John, there are exactly zero reasons, good or otherwise, for allowing any traffic with RFC-1918 source addresses to traverse any part of the public Internet. Period! :-)
Altho Path MTU from RFC1918 P2P links will arrive and if you block them you'll find strange things occur on transfering data so you cant say nothing should come on 1918 space.
That's not a good reason. Nobody should be generating public traffic from those addresses, "making them work" is not an Internet-friendly decision.
I agree, altho a lot of people do use 1918 for their p2p.
The sooner RFC-1918-sourced packets get filtered (i.e. the closer to
until the previous item is fixed tho you'll break things if you do this. Steve
[ On Thursday, February 22, 2001 at 22:40:11 (+0000), Stephen J. Wilcox wrote: ]
Subject: Re: rfc 1918?
Altho Path MTU from RFC1918 P2P links will arrive and if you block them you'll find strange things occur on transfering data so you cant say nothing should come on 1918 space.
Even more reason to filter RFC-1918 src/dest addresses comletely and utterly. Such broken implemenations deserve to be cut off from the public Interent as they cause nothing but problems. Note that anyone using PRIVATE addresses within their own networks, and with an even half decent security policy, is forced to filter all such junk at their borders anyway, so they could never "win" with such broken implementations. I.e. the only "fair" thing to do is to filter all RFC-1918 addresses early and often from all public Internet links.
That's not a good reason. Nobody should be generating public traffic from those addresses, "making them work" is not an Internet-friendly decision.
I agree, altho a lot of people do use 1918 for their p2p.
That's not necessarily quite the same issue, so long as no packets ever traverse the rest of the public Internet with RFC-1918 source or destination addresses. (Un)Fortunately it's difficult, or even impossible in some cases, to prevent packets with PRIVATE addresses from being generated and so it's still extremely bad practice to use PRIVATE addresses for any point-to- point links with transit PUBLIC traffic "in the raw" (i.e. not in a tunnel that would have PUBLIC end-point addresses).
The sooner RFC-1918-sourced packets get filtered (i.e. the closer to
until the previous item is fixed tho you'll break things if you do this.
Indeed -- but the sooner and more often such things are "broken", the sooner they'll get fixed properly! "Tough love", and "you've got to be good to be bad", etc., etc., etc.... -- Greg A. Woods +1 416 218-0098 VE3TCP <gwoods@acm.org> <robohack!woods> Planix, Inc. <woods@planix.com>; Secrets of the Weird <woods@weird.com>
[ On Thursday, February 22, 2001 at 16:12:16 (-0500), John Hawkinson wrote: ]
Subject: Re: rfc 1918?
Not everyone agrees whether it is better to filter or not to filter, but there are good arguments on both sides.
Man oh man, but do you ever sound like a broken record. There are still, even including this most recent thread, no technical arguments, good or otherwise, on the side of not filtering RFC-1918 addresses, yet there's a mountain of widely accepted and generally authoriative documentation, not to mention good common sense, that strongly advises to do the filtering everywhere possible. All we've seen so far are poor excuses for perpetuating other people's poor configurations. Can you please try to find at least one even minor technical argument for not filtering RFC-1918 addresses before you try again to give this idea any more credit? (I might sound like I'm repeating myself too, but I don't think my record is broken.... :-) -- Greg A. Woods +1 416 218-0098 VE3TCP <gwoods@acm.org> <robohack!woods> Planix, Inc. <woods@planix.com>; Secrets of the Weird <woods@weird.com>
On Thu, Feb 22, 2001 at 06:05:12PM -0500, Shawn McMahon wrote:
On Thu, Feb 22, 2001 at 03:38:56PM -0500, Chris Davis wrote:
Does anyone know why I get inbound packets from 10.x.x.x coming from my ISP, UUNet?
Because they aren't filtering properly.
You can solve it by filtering yourself.
indeed. i fought with uunet a couple of years ago about this. after about a dozen phone calls, countless emails (including a few megabytes of packet dumps), and who knows how many people, i finally reached someone at uunet who was willing to say "no, we don't filter that stuff and no, we aren't going to". *sigh* -- |-----< "CODE WARRIOR" >-----| codewarrior@daemon.org * "ah! i see you have the internet twofsonet@graffiti.com (Andrew Brown) that goes *ping*!" andrew@crossbar.com * "information is power -- share the wealth."
[ On Friday, February 23, 2001 at 02:28:07 (-0500), Andrew Brown wrote: ]
Subject: Re: rfc 1918?
indeed. i fought with uunet a couple of years ago about this. after about a dozen phone calls, countless emails (including a few megabytes of packet dumps), and who knows how many people, i finally reached someone at uunet who was willing to say "no, we don't filter that stuff and no, we aren't going to".
Well, to give them a wee bit of credit, they're not going to break their own network operations by shooting themselves in the foot over this issue! ;-) Same goes for @Home (and many of the larger cable operators who did their own thing before they were sucked into the @Home vacuum, such as Rogers here in Ontario), and several other large providers. Someday, maybe, they'll eventually renumber out of RFC-1918 space and then be able to properly filter it. Meanwhile every large provider simply acts as if they own the entire works (and some more so than others to judge from the number of leaked BGP annoucments that are continually reported everywhere). Clearly if RFC-1918 is ever to fully succeed and to migrate into being a proper standard everyone will have to renumber their public uses of any private addressing and install full filters for all private address space. On the other hand if IPv4 space does ever get really and truly tight and if IANA and ARIN et al are put between a very large rock and a very hard place, and given perpetuation of the current state of affairs, that they might not just consider allocating at least some RFC-1918 address space publicly. Heaven help the poor suckers that get stuck with it, at least for the first year or two, unless of course they happen to be the likes of UUNET or @Home, etc. :-) I know several largish organisations, and at least a couple of providers of some note, who are still using non-RFC-1918 space as if it's private, and some of these are even still using space that's now allocated publicly. Their users obviously can't see the public users, and vice versa, but at least in those cases its rarely more than a /16 each and you can still almost get buy with blaming such problems on the instability of the Internet if any of your users complain! :-) -- Greg A. Woods +1 416 218-0098 VE3TCP <gwoods@acm.org> <robohack!woods> Planix, Inc. <woods@planix.com>; Secrets of the Weird <woods@weird.com>
On Fri, Feb 23, 2001 at 02:28:07AM -0500, Andrew Brown wrote:
indeed. i fought with uunet a couple of years ago about this. after about a dozen phone calls, countless emails (including a few megabytes of packet dumps), and who knows how many people, i finally reached someone at uunet who was willing to say "no, we don't filter that stuff and no, we aren't going to".
I'm tempted to buy one share of stock, then show up a shareholders' meeting and complain about the (probable) fact that they spend more money arguing with people about this than it would cost them to start filtering it at the borders.
participants (11)
-
Andrew Brown
-
Ariel Biener
-
Chris Davis
-
Eric A. Hall
-
John Hawkinson
-
Mark Radabaugh
-
Pim van Riezen
-
Shawn McMahon
-
Stephen J. Wilcox
-
Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu
-
woods@weird.com