Re: New Denial of Service Attack on Panix
At 11:52 PM 10/2/96 -0400, Dima Volodin wrote:
I.e. a single compromised host in the "permitted prefix filter range" can cause as much trouble as the current attacks. Granted, it's a bit easier to track down a host like this, but eliminating the majority of compromisable hosts is even more difficult than global implementation of the cited document. The bitter irony is that non-implementation of this draft will most probably corelate with presence of compromisable hosts.
Well, that's true, but it's a different facet of the same problem. The draft only attempts to solve what it is that we can solve be ingress filtering. Solutions using firewalls or proxy devices which defat this type of attack are a Good Thing, but if everyone does ingress filtering, a large percentage of this problem disappear. - paul
Thus host-(and firewall-)based solutions are at least as important as the ingress filtering.
As of the evidence of these attacks - they were evident long before the current talking.
Dima
And if everyone doesn't make any attacks we won't have any problems either. To rephrase - relying on ingress filtering is putting your security in someone other's hands, doing host-based stuff is protecting yourself with your own hands. To rephrase once again - doing ingress filtering is "being conservative with what you produce", being able to cope with SYN floods on the host level is "being liberal on what you accept." We need both, and overemphasising one side of the solution will do a lot of harm. Dima Paul Ferguson writes:
Well, that's true, but it's a different facet of the same problem. The draft only attempts to solve what it is that we can solve be ingress filtering. Solutions using firewalls or proxy devices which defat this type of attack are a Good Thing, but if everyone does ingress filtering, a large percentage of this problem disappear.
- paul
Thus host-(and firewall-)based solutions are at least as important as the ingress filtering.
As of the evidence of these attacks - they were evident long before the current talking.
Dima
participants (2)
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dvv＠sprint.net -
Paul Ferguson