jumping in with a plug that the IRR and the route servers could help facilitate this.... *grin* -abha <ducking behind eric so he gets hit first..> On Fri, 20 Feb 1998, Eric Sobocinski wrote:

They could, that is, unless everyone to whom the hacker attached was doing ingress BGP filtering for all peers/downstreams. I'm sure my Merit RA comrades would be glad to jump in with a plug that IRR and route servers could help facilitate this, as would the varied groups that are working on authenticating network allocations of incoming routes. But that of course was your point. :-)

--eric <ducking in case he started a religious war>

On Fri, 20 Feb 1998 at 09:29 PST, Michael Dillon <michael@memra.com> wrote:

...

Here's a quote from this story http://www.techweb.com/wire/story/TWB19980220S0001

Both Bellovin and his AT&T colleague Matt Blaze cited the vulnerability of the Net's decentralized routing system, .... This routing information has been accidentally corrupted several times, they said, resulting in massive traffic flows being rerouted through single slow machines or blocked altogether.

They said a hacker could also cause this kind of corruption.

-- Michael Dillon - Internet & ISP Consulting http://www.memra.com - E-mail: michael@memra.com

__________________________________________________________________________ -------------------------------------------------------------------------- abha ahuja ahuja@merit.edu Merit Network, Inc. 313.764.0294 new area code:734