Network Solutions domain transfer lock policy?
I just became aware of an SOP at Network solutions. On a contact change to a domain, they automatically transfer lock the domain for 60 days. I am aware of ICANN-approved behaviors like 60 days lock on new or transfered registrations. This is a new curve ball and seems a little out-of-the-spirit of ICANN regulations (last I saw them). Is anyone aware of this as a kosher activity and is anyone aware of any other registrars doing it? Keep in mind, these are legitimate contact changes and not suspicious in anyway. Thanks in advance, DJ
On Mon, 19 Nov 2007 17:59:11 -0500 Deepak Jain <deepak@ai.net> wrote:
I just became aware of an SOP at Network solutions. On a contact change to a domain, they automatically transfer lock the domain for 60 days.
I am aware of ICANN-approved behaviors like 60 days lock on new or transfered registrations.
This is a new curve ball and seems a little out-of-the-spirit of ICANN regulations (last I saw them).
Is anyone aware of this as a kosher activity and is anyone aware of any other registrars doing it? Keep in mind, these are legitimate contact changes and not suspicious in anyway.
AFAIK the domain contact has nothing to do with the ICANN registration. The contact details are an attribute that is between yourself and the registrar. Reminds me of an old phrase, "friends don't let friends register with network solutions"? Best just complain at "them" until they change the lock, it's not a lock at ICANN its a registrar lock, from what I can tell from the description. -- The dirt trail to the Verizon Switch is screwed because of Shagy downloading MP3's. The Network Admin is planning a christmas party. :: http://www.s5h.net/ :: http://www.s5h.net/gpg.html
On Nov 19, 2007 5:59 PM, Deepak Jain <deepak@ai.net> wrote:
I just became aware of an SOP at Network solutions. On a contact change to a domain, they automatically transfer lock the domain for 60 days.
Is anyone aware of this as a kosher activity and is anyone aware of any other registrars doing it? Keep in mind, these are legitimate contact changes and not suspicious in anyway.
DJ, This saved my keyster when someone hacked one of my domains earlier this year (my fault; sloppy password). Because Netsol still held the domain, I was able to get things resolved and get the domain back under my control in about 36 hours. I can only imagine the nightmare if the hacker had been able to transfer it out to another registry. It'd be nice if Netsol could to better than 36 hours to restore a hacked domain but I'd like it a whole lot less if the hacker could transfer the domain out while waiting for me to notice and them to investigate. Regards, Bill Herrin -- William D. Herrin herrin@dirtside.com bill@herrin.us 3005 Crane Dr. Web: <http://bill.herrin.us/> Falls Church, VA 22042-3004
On Mon, 19 Nov 2007 17:59:11 -0500 Deepak Jain <deepak@ai.net> wrote:
Is anyone aware of this as a kosher activity and is anyone aware of any other registrars doing it? Keep in mind, these are legitimate contact changes and not suspicious in anyway.
I personally do not think it's kosher, but I do know that GoDaddy has been doing this for quite some time. It's one of the many reasons I no longer do business with them. -- Bill Thompson BillT@Mahagonny.com
On Mon, Nov 19, 2007 at 05:59:11PM -0500, Deepak Jain wrote:
I just became aware of an SOP at Network solutions. On a contact change to a domain, they automatically transfer lock the domain for 60 days.
You might want to ask them, but I'd bet lunch this is an anti-domain-theft policy. If one is engaged in taking other registrants' domains, a trick to it is to update the contact data and then transfer the registration to another registrar. In so-called "thin" registries (i.e. where the contact data isn't also supposed to be stored in the registry), this leaves the "history" of the domain at a registrar with whom the (ex hypothesi illegitimate) registrant does not have a relationship, and that makes getting the domain name back to its original registrant that much harder. I can see that this can have some unfortunate effects, particularly in large organisations where different people might be resonsible for data correctness and domain name registration management, but I think it probably is an effort to protect people from one kind of attack that's been seen. A -- ---- Andrew Sullivan 204-4141 Yonge Street Afilias Canada Toronto, Ontario Canada <andrew@ca.afilias.info> M2P 2A8 +1 416 646 3304 x4110
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