Re: [#135346] Unauthorized BGP Announcements (follow up to Hijacked
Where is Milo Medin when we need him?
how would he be helping?
He would have pulled the plug. The story is from the very early days of the internet, probably long before NANOG existed. Milo worked at NASA and found a cracker from Finland on one of NASAs machines. The link from Finland to the rest of the world went through Norway to NASA. (That's THE link, there was only one link connecting all of Scandinavia to the rest of the net.) So Milo called the guy in Finland and said "Please fix it". The reply was "We can't do anything. We respect civil liberties." Soon he got the message because he wasn't connected to the net any more. If anybody has a good URL for the story, please let me know. I found one reference in google-books that said 1988. Hmm, is this how people talk about you after you are dead? J Dave Burstein dropped me a note about this thread – I don’t usually follow NANOG much these days. So I figured I should respond to make sure all the facts were straight. Let me clarify what happened in the case of the Finnish idiot. At the time, I worked for NASA and among other things ran the root nameserver at Ames (ns.nasa.gov). We managed systems very tightly, and the root was instrumented well and was notifying that someone at one of the larger Finnish universities was trying the usual measures to break into the machine. We saw these all the time – people tried the usual tftp or other tricks, and moved on when they didn’t get satisfaction. But this particular individual just kept on trying different things over the course of a couple days, and distinguished himself as being a real pain. So I figured I needed to take some action. I went to the NIC database, and called up the University’s POC for the address block, saying that one of their students was attempting to break into a US Government computing resource (a criminal offense) and violating the AUP of the networks that connected them. They refused to act – basically saying that they didn’t feel bound by US law, blah blah, etc… So then I called up the Nordunet guys in Stockholm, who connected all Scandinavian countries together via a 128 Kbps link to the JVNC supercomputer center in Princeton. As I recall, no one returned my call or my emails, though Mats and company usually were quite on the ball. The probing was continuing on the root, so I decided to call my friend Elise Gerich at the NSFnet, and ask her if she wouldn’t put in a null route to the university in Finland in the core backbone network, figuring that cutting off the connectivity to the university would get someone’s attention. She said that she would really prefer I call Sergio Heker at Princeton, who managed the link and could install a null route there where the link came in as a more targeted solution. When I told Sergio what was happening (one of the root’s being attacked), and that no one was doing anything about it, he said he would take care of it. Instead of installing a null route, he walked into the machine room where the main JVNC nodes were located, walked to the satellite DSU that connected JVNC to Stockholm, and pushed the loopback button. So it is really Sergio who deserves credit for this story, not me. No more probes on the root server. J I am told the following morning the grad student responsible for this was met by a group of angry system administrators as he entered his office. The conversation went like something this according to one of the people there: IT admin: Did you notice that the Internet is down today? Student: I noticed that – is something broken with our connection? IT admin: In fact, not only our university can’t talk to the Internet, but no one in Finland can. Student: Oh, really? IT admin: In fact, no one in all of Scandinavia can reach the Internet today. Student: Wow, that is a big problem. Why are talking to me about it? IT admin: Because it is all YOUR fault! Stop messing around with those NASA servers! The connection was restored later that day, and no one from Finland tried breaking into the root anymore, at least not while I was still there at Ames. I don’t believe the grad student was ever jailed, though I suspect he may have needed a fresh set of underwear that day. This is the story as best as I can remember it, and it was around 1990 as opposed to 1988 as I recall. Back in the old days, people cared about policing bad behavior. I could tell you tons of stories where people had to take action to keep the routing system safe from abuse. If there was routing braindamage, people would just fix it. The old AUP served as the enforcement vehicle. Now of course things are much more complicated, and folks are less concerned with “public health” than honoring contracts, etc… But it was not always this way. Thanks, Milo
Back in the old days, people cared about policing bad behavior.
And I believe that is all that is needed today. We simply, as a community, need to decide that we aren't going to tolerate such behavior. It really is that simple. The problem seems to be getting people to act. In fact, as this demonstrations, actions don't have to be taken often. Generally, once the big hammer is used, it gets the point across. Thank you, Milo, for being part of the solution.
On Thu, Feb 02, 2012 at 07:53:53AM +0000, George Bonser wrote:
Back in the old days, people cared about policing bad behavior.
And I believe that is all that is needed today. We simply, as a community, need to decide that we aren't going to tolerate such behavior. It really is that simple. The problem seems to be getting people to act. In fact, as this demonstrations, actions don't have to be taken often. Generally, once the big hammer is used, it gets the point across.
The suits won, and many nerds either threw in with them or revealed their affinity for the easy life and gave up. Being principled and turning away dirty money or exercising the "fire the customer" clause tends to be disliked by corporate officers. -- RSUC / GweepNet / Spunk / FnB / Usenix / SAGE / NewNOG
On Thu, 2 Feb 2012, Joe Provo wrote:
The suits won, and many nerds either threw in with them or revealed their affinity for the easy life and gave up. Being principled and turning away dirty money or exercising the "fire the customer" clause tends to be disliked by corporate officers.
bottom line -- the only way to fix this problem is for bad behavior to become more expensive than good behavior. it's the only thing the pointy hairs will understand. -Dan
The suits won, and many nerds either threw in with them or revealed their affinity for the easy life and gave up. Being principled and turning away dirty money or exercising the "fire the customer" clause tends to be disliked by corporate officers. bottom line -- the only way to fix this problem is for bad behavior to become more expensive than good behavior. it's the only thing the pointy hairs will understand.
i just love to read geeks discussing legal and financial solutions. just about as educational as watching lawyers and cfos discussing engineering. seeing as we are purportedly engineers, perhaps we could discuss a technical engineering approach to prefix misorigination? randy
On 2/2/12 21:59 , Randy Bush wrote:
The suits won, and many nerds either threw in with them or revealed their affinity for the easy life and gave up. Being principled and turning away dirty money or exercising the "fire the customer" clause tends to be disliked by corporate officers. bottom line -- the only way to fix this problem is for bad behavior to become more expensive than good behavior. it's the only thing the pointy hairs will understand.
i just love to read geeks discussing legal and financial solutions. just about as educational as watching lawyers and cfos discussing engineering.
seeing as we are purportedly engineers, perhaps we could discuss a technical engineering approach to prefix misorigination?
I hear there's this thing called RPKI that does origin validation, it's a shame that TCP MD5 shared secrets are already considered to hard to manage in this community.
randy
I hear there's this thing called RPKI that does origin validation
<pedantic> well, not exactly. to quote myself from the other week in another forum -- Just to be clear, as people keep calling BGP security 'RPKI' In the current taxonomy, there are three pieces, the RPKI, RPKI-based origin validation, and then path validation. RPKI is the X.509 based hierarchy with is congruent with the internet IP address allocation administration, the IANA, RIRS, ISPs, ... It is the substrate on which the next two are based. It is currently deployed in four of the five administrative regions, ARIN in North America being the sad and embarrassing exception. RPKI-based origin validation uses some of the RPKI data to allow a router to verify that the autonomous system announcing an IP address prefix is in fact authorized to do so. This is not crypto checked so can be violated. But it prevents the vast majority of accidental 'hijackings' on the internet today, e.g. the famous Pakastani accidental announcement of YouTube's address space. RPKI-based origin validation is in shipping code from Cisco, and will be shipping by Juniper in q2. Path validation uses the full crypto information of the RPKI to make up for the embarrassing mistake that, like much of the internet BGP was designed with no thought to securing the BGP protocol itself from being gamed/violated. It allows a receiver of a BGP announcement to formally cryptographically validate that the originating autonomous system was truely authorized to announce the IP address prefix, and that the systems through which the announcement passed were indeed those which the sender/forwarder at each hop intended. Sorry to drone on, but these three really need to be differentiated. randy
Randy Bush <randy@psg.com> writes:
well, not exactly. to quote myself from the other week in another forum
[ 30 lines deleted ]
Sorry to drone on, but these three really need to be differentiated.
The truly wonderful thing about the evolution of BGP security is its elegant simplicity. It is good to know that the barriers to entry for the IRR system (templates, objects, "Dear Colleague" emails from the auto-dbm robot, etc) have been eradicated in favor of simple, easy-to-understand and maintain maintain digital certificate chains. I predict epic uptake the likes of which we haven't seen since I filed my last NACR. -r
participants (7)
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George Bonser
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goemon@anime.net
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Joe Provo
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Joel jaeggli
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Milo Medin
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Randy Bush
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Robert E. Seastrom