In response to feedback from operational security communities, CAIDA's source address validation measurement project (https://spoofer.caida.org) is automatically generating monthly reports of ASes originating prefixes in BGP for systems from which we received packets with a spoofed source address. We are publishing these reports to network and security operations lists in order to ensure this information reaches operational contacts in these ASes. This report summarises tests conducted within usa, can. Inferred improvements during Aug 2022: ASN Name Fixed-By 54825 PACKET 2022-08-15 Further information for the inferred remediation is available at: https://spoofer.caida.org/remedy.php Source Address Validation issues inferred during Aug 2022: ASN Name First-Spoofed Last-Spoofed 40285 NORTHLAND-CABLE 2016-07-17 2022-08-06 209 CENTURYLINK-US-LEGACY-QWEST 2016-08-16 2022-08-27 6128 CABLE-NET-1 2016-09-03 2022-08-02 27364 ACS-INTERNET 2016-09-27 2022-08-09 20412 CLARITY-TELECOM 2016-09-30 2022-08-31 271 BCNET 2016-10-24 2022-08-11 22898 ATLINK 2016-12-16 2022-08-22 1246 TLL-WEST 2017-04-20 2022-08-08 701 UUNET 2017-06-14 2022-08-25 26253 SCINTERNET 2017-06-30 2022-08-10 63296 AWBROADBAND 2017-09-01 2022-08-10 31863 DACEN-2 2018-04-26 2022-08-07 33452 RW 2018-09-19 2022-08-29 21804 ACCESS-SK 2019-06-09 2022-08-31 398836 NP-NETWORKS 2021-03-12 2022-08-27 22773 ASN-CXA-ALL-CCI-22773-RDC 2021-10-24 2022-08-28 394414 E2WS 2022-05-08 2022-08-06 397086 LAYER-HOST-HOUSTON 2022-06-16 2022-08-27 399486 2022-06-18 2022-08-25 Further information for these tests where we received spoofed packets is available at: https://spoofer.caida.org/recent_tests.php?country_include=usa,can&no_block=1 Please send any feedback or suggestions to spoofer-info@caida.org