In response to feedback from operational security communities, CAIDA's source address validation measurement project (https://spoofer.caida.org) is automatically generating monthly reports of ASes originating prefixes in BGP for systems from which we received packets with a spoofed source address. We are publishing these reports to network and security operations lists in order to ensure this information reaches operational contacts in these ASes. This report summarises tests conducted within usa, can. Inferred improvements during Nov 2023: ASN Name Fixed-By 14031 SCXY 2023-11-11 Further information for the inferred remediation is available at: https://spoofer.caida.org/remedy.php Source Address Validation issues inferred during Nov 2023: ASN Name First-Spoofed Last-Spoofed 209 CENTURYLINK-US-LEGACY-QWEST 2016-08-16 2023-11-30 20412 CLARITY-TELECOM 2016-09-30 2023-11-30 25787 ROWE-NETWORKS 2016-10-21 2023-11-26 271 BCNET 2016-10-24 2023-11-26 3549 LVLT-3549 2016-11-16 2023-11-17 14031 SCXY 2018-10-18 2023-11-14 22883 CONDENAST 2019-05-29 2023-11-28 55016 IMPER-AS-1 2021-05-18 2023-11-18 46997 2021-12-22 2023-11-30 394414 E2WS 2022-05-08 2023-11-09 12183 TALKIE-COMMUNICATIONS 2022-12-10 2023-11-28 3701 NERONET 2023-04-18 2023-11-30 400282 2023-04-27 2023-11-25 46690 SNET-FCC 2023-05-20 2023-11-25 20119 ARROW 2023-10-19 2023-11-27 396356 MAXIHOST 2023-11-11 2023-11-11 Further information for these tests where we received spoofed packets is available at: https://spoofer.caida.org/recent_tests.php?country_include=usa,can&no_block=1 Please send any feedback or suggestions to spoofer-info@caida.org