Re: Update on mail bombing threats--not so funny
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- I told it many times already that the freedom of speech includes not only right to speak but also right not to listen. Internet is very good at the first part; and woefully indaequate at the second. Can it be fixed? Of course. But the first step in filtering out those who are trying to push their unwanted speech on us is to make sure they won't pretend to be somebody whose words we'd want to listen to. So -- the problem has two aspects: the first is authentication, the second is defense against flooding attacks. They are closely related, but not identical. The source address verification is powerful enough to get flood attacks stopped. It is still not enough to get rid of unwanted messages. The second line of defense should be digital signatures on messages, certified by some authorities (what is "authority" depends on your personal point of view -- you're free to choose whom to believe) which to a some extent make sure that signatures correspond to physical people. Then you can just stop accepting any unsigned mail (note that a reputable anonymous remailer would also check signatures on incoming messages; and substitute them with its own). There's no magic technology involved; this is just the problem of how to actually implement it. Until we do that we all live in danger of having our name smeared if some jerk decides he's pissed and posts some nazi propaganda, or threats, with a reputable person's e-mail address. I already was an antisemite, and an agent of KGB, thank you very much. Now, how about doing the right thing: make the NANOG list the first one to require signed messages? Somebody has to start. - --vadim -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6 iQCVAgUBMtaqSEDODjim2XUVAQFuBwP+N7JhLLT7yFcF8Se7XvfRd9DOPceAa0U5 vvnjbCCEZpq8xWh6H7cMyq3vZdQeFzYnCC6007PQt4AyodJ8DQC77RLL72YthHzz /ZWQdbS7xlJQxsUAFQiZprpeW6cAExRwIiPrKimjx96kvBvufFPeOtLjhV1Vpalo o4e+DHJRGbY= =EMOb -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- On Fri, 10 Jan 1997, Vadim Antonov wrote:
Can it be fixed? Of course. But the first step in filtering out those who are trying to push their unwanted speech on us is to make sure they won't pretend to be somebody whose words we'd want to listen to.
[ ...]
Now, how about doing the right thing: make the NANOG list the first one to require signed messages? Somebody has to start.
So in order to post to nanog you would have to have your PGP key signed by NANOG or the list operator or another entity trusted by all. How do you establish trust for that signing? The Usenix key signing is a good model for techie types, but we are the minority. How would the great unwashed have their keys signed? Besides, I like being able to post without having to attend a NANOG meeting though I could live with the restriction. I agree that both goals, authentication and flooding defense, are desirable. Source address verification is important and doable as long as everyone in a position to do so wants to. We have our filters in place, does everyone? There are 3000+ of us little guys and we are the ones who need to do it. The NSPs and regionals could possibly filter at customer gateways but with multi-homing how much human/CPU load would that present? Authentication is worse when looking at ubiquitous verification. Unless we give up on PGP and switch to PEM and RSA certs (using RSA as a trusted authority). And even then, for personal certs anyway, they don't seem very secure to me. I can get one for free and all they require is a valid e-mail address to send it to. Once I have it I can forge my e-mail address and use the cert to sign messages originating from another account. Of course the original "valid" e-mail address has long since disappeared. I haven't actually tried this, but I don't see how a signed message injected into an SMTP port could be distinguished from a "real" one. Sure, the IP address will be in the headers, but they aren't signed. Now the threat of RSA pursuing me for violation of their personal use restrictions *might* slow down some spammers, but probably not until a few have been caght and hung. This might be more on topic on cryptography@c2.net. Majordomo list. Low volume. Dan - -- Dan Busarow 714 443 4172 DPC Systems / Beach.Net dan@dpcsys.com Dana Point, California 83 09 EF 59 E0 11 89 B4 8D 09 DB FD E1 DD 0C 82 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMtcEWbWobIiO1AA9AQEENQP/dFcwDqVr5k02lVj3YVir81eyQr64gZ+6 m43R2mVSNSVkwSXaSwliK53JasQHdSFoC8Dj99m0vRqQOldiol2eQIEq66eG4Yby 2v45nJvrfinfo84wRWOzdyzvcHdRJaCUTRUUiYzOY/Ec1mbkG3NIGwvLJlN/GjCt qIRYb/hPid0= =yynD -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
participants (2)
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Dan Busarow -
Vadim Antonov