The issue here is people deliberately injecting bogus routing information. Any "chain of trust" systems break down if there's somebody abusing the trust. This means that tier-1 ISPs shouldn't trust routing information coming from tier-2 ISPs, etc. That leaves the only workable option - cryptographical authentication of routes, by the presense of signature by a trusted address space registry. --vadim Date: Wed, 7 Jan 1998 12:39:26 +0300 (MSK) From: "Alex P. Rudnev" <alex@Relcom.EU.net> To: Vadim Antonov <avg@pluris.com> I am sorry, but what for do you want it? Why is not efficient to use AS identification in conjuction to IP prefix filtering at the 1't level ISPs (and may be 2'nd level too), based on the NIC data base. On Tue, 6 Jan 1998, Vadim Antonov wrote:

Date: Tue, 06 Jan 1998 13:23:47 -0800 From: Vadim Antonov <avg@pluris.com> To: "Sean M. Doran" <smd@clock.org>, nanog@merit.edu Subject: Re: route ingress

Sean M. Doran wrote:

...

Vadim Antonov ?avg@pluris.com? writes:

? The only real solution is strong cryptographical authentication of ? the ownership of routing prefixes. For some reason i do not see ? any serious work in that direction being done.

This would be much easier if we had a bottom-up hierarchical addressing structure rather than the current top-down one.

I quite agree with that (though i'm not convinced that "bottom->top" allocation combined with recursive NATting is the best architecture).

However, this does not preclude doing authentication with the current routing system.

--vadim