+1, I fully agree. And not only concerning the "domestic" use by country, but also with regards to "information peering" with neighbors, and such.  Enjoy '14!  mh -------- Message d'origine -------- De : Ray Soucy <rps@maine.edu> Date : A : Blair Trosper <blair.trosper@gmail.com> Cc : "nanog@nanog.org list" <nanog@nanog.org> Objet : Re: NSA able to compromise Cisco, Juniper, Huawei switches I think there needs to be some clarification on how these tools get used, how often they're used, and if they're ever cleaned up when no longer part of an active operation.  Of course we'll never get that. The amount of apologists with the attitude "this isn't a big deal, nothing to see here, the NSA does this kind of thing" is kind of shocking for this community; especially with the information that's been released over the past few months. This whole backdoor business is a very, very, dangerous game. On Tue, Dec 31, 2013 at 12:19 AM, Blair Trosper <blair.trosper@gmail.com>wrote:

To supplement and amend what I said:

These are the KINDS of things we want the NSA to do; however, the institutional oversight necessary to make sure it's Constitutional, warranted, and kept "in bounds" is woefully lacking (if any exists at all).   Even FISA is unsatisfactory.

At any rate, I agree that the current disposition of the NSA (or, at least, what's been leaking the last few months) is simply unacceptable and cannot be allowed.  I say that last part from the perspective of a US citizen, though I'd imagine most people of other nationalities would agree with me, but probably for different reasons.

On Mon, Dec 30, 2013 at 11:08 PM, Jimmy Hess <mysidia@gmail.com> wrote:

...

On Mon, Dec 30, 2013 at 10:41 PM, Blair Trosper <blair.trosper@gmail.com wrote:

...

I'm torn on this.  On one hand, it seems sinister.  On the other, it's not only what the NSA is tasked with doing, but it's what you'd EXPECT them to be doing in the role as the NSA.

[snip]

The NSA's role is not supposed to include subterfuge and undermining the integrity or security of domestic enterprise infrastructure

With any luck, we'll hopefully find absolutely nothing, or that it was "targetted" backdooring against specific targets only.

And people have a need to know that the security agencies haven't left a trail of artificially inserted bugs and backdoors in common IT equipment providing critical infrastructures services,  and that the agencies haven't prepared a collection of instant-root 0days,  that are no more protected then the agencies' other poorly guarded "secrets".

There would be a risk that any 'backdoors' are ready to be exploited by other unintended nefarious actors! Because the NSA are apparently  great at prepping the flammables and setting fires,    but  totally incapable of  keeping the fires contained, once they  (or someone else)  lights it.

It is not the least bit necessary for the NSA itself to be a nefarious actor  exploiting things or even complicit;  for the mere presence of   any backdoor or surreptitious code to eventually have the potential for serious damage.

It could well be a rogue ex-employee of the NSA, such as Snowden,  or others,  that happened to be aware of technical details, hackers, or members of a foreign nation state,  who will just happen to have the time and energy to track down open doors waiting for the taking,  AND  figure out how to abuse them  for evil purposes.

There are enough potential 0day risks, without intentional ones,  waiting for bad guys to co-opt!

-- -JH

-- Ray Patrick Soucy Network Engineer University of Maine System T: 207-561-3526 F: 207-561-3531 MaineREN, Maine's Research and Education Network www.maineren.net