India cites security concerns, blocks Huawei bid to expand their indian ops
By K.C. Krishnadas, EE Times Aug. 16, 2005 URL: http://www.informationweek.com/story/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=168602118 BANGALORE, India — Chinese telecom equipment maker Huawei Technologies' expansion plans here have again drawn the attention of Indian security agencies. For the second time in the last five years, Indian security agencies have moved to slow Huawei's expansion plans out of concern for India's strategic telecom network. In 2001, U.S. intelligence sources reportedly tipped off the Indian government about Huawei's activities here. Huawei has been embroiled in several high-profile intellectual property disputes with telecom rivals in recent years. Indian authorities are also concerned about Chinese links to India's neighbor and long-time adversary Pakistan. According to a report in The Times of India on Tuesday (August 16), the Indian government has put on hold Huawei's plans to use $60 million in new equity for its Indian subsidiary, Huawei Technologies India Pvt. Ltd. The report quoted the Research and Analysis Wing, an Indian intelligence agency, as saying Huawei "has been responsible for sweeping and debugging operations in the Chinese embassy [in India]. In view of China's focus on cyber warfare, there is a risk in exposing our strategic telecom network to the Chinese." The report said senior officials from Indian intelligence agencies recently discussed the matter and formed a committee to review guidelines for foreign companies involved in projects in sensitive industries. The committee will submit a report in September, when Huawei's case for increasing its equity is likely to be decided. The report quoted officials in the Indian Ministry of External Affairs as saying that Huawei attracted "adverse notice" from India's security agencies which expressed "reservations regarding the company's links with the Chinese military." A Huawei spokesperson here could not be reached for comment. Huawei launched a small Indian software development operation in 1999, but formally opened a development center in 2001. About a 1,000 people work for the company in India, making it Huawei's largest software development center outside China. Earlier this year it announced plans to set up a $60 million manufacturing unit in Bangalore, with plans to spend an additional $40 million to expand its existing R & D center here. Huawei is believed to have so far invested $100 million in the R & D center. Huawei's manufacturing plan is designed to cash in on India's expanding telecom infrastructure. The network expansion could eventually be worth billions of dollars to global telecom equipment suppliers. The Huawei probe illustrates the uneasy relationship between China and India. The regional rivals fought a war in 1962. Relations have improved over the last decade, but China's close military ties with Pakistan have fueled concerns here about Huawei's intentions. Meanwhile, a recent nuclear power deal between India and the United States has raised concerns in Beijing.
* Suresh Ramasubramanian:
For the second time in the last five years, Indian security agencies have moved to slow Huawei's expansion plans out of concern for India's strategic telecom network.
For a contrast, consider the situation in Germany. Beginning this year, Germany's largest research network DFN will run on Huawei technology. Not many security concerns over here, apparently.
* Suresh Ramasubramanian:
For the second time in the last five years, Indian security agencies have moved to slow Huawei's expansion plans out of concern for India's strategic telecom network.
For a contrast, consider the situation in Germany. Beginning this year, Germany's largest research network DFN will run on Huawei technology. Not many security concerns over here, apparently.
A large number of optical networks across the globe are now Huawei, we are using their IP CPE (17xx/26xx/36xx/72xx replacements) in a number of products and these devices have stood up to significant security testing [including DDOS]. We have also type approved their Long Distance Optical platforms and DSLAMS and they work and work well. Also tested some ZTE equipment and it works well also. I hoping that Huawei do more in storage. Regards, Neil.
...on Wed, Aug 17, 2005 at 02:05:07PM +0100, Neil J. McRae wrote:
Tony Finch wrote:
For a contrast, consider the situation in Germany. Beginning this year, Germany's largest research network DFN will run on Huawei technology. Not many security concerns over here, apparently. A large number of optical networks across the globe are now Huawei, we are using their IP CPE (17xx/26xx/36xx/72xx replacements) in a number of products and these devices have stood up to significant security testing [including DDOS].
I assume that an Indian intelligence agency would be more concerned about things like hidden remote control or data collection services on the systems. Alex.
I assume that an Indian intelligence agency would be more concerned about things like hidden remote control or data collection services on the systems.
Exactly. The Chinese version of Cisco's CALEA code with different access methods would be pretty threatening in general. Not saying that they have one, did one, or will... but its a security risk even before you show intent on the part of Huawei. Maybe the Indian gov't is going to request the source to Huawei's code? I remember Germany or Russia requesting it of Microsoft for Windows and Microsoft complied. Deepak Jain AiNET
On Wed, 2005-08-17 at 17:55 -0400, Deepak Jain wrote:
I assume that an Indian intelligence agency would be more concerned about things like hidden remote control or data collection services on the systems.
Exactly. The Chinese version of Cisco's CALEA code with different access methods would be pretty threatening in general. Not saying that they have one, did one, or will... but its a security risk even before you show intent on the part of Huawei. Maybe the Indian gov't is going to request the source to Huawei's code? I remember Germany or Russia requesting it of Microsoft for Windows and Microsoft complied.
Requesting the source code and/or having access to it is really meaningless unless you have the skill and capabilities to compile it *and* use it. There is no sure way to know that the source code in your left hand is what was used to compile the binary in your right hand. -Jim P.
Requesting the source code and/or having access to it is really meaningless unless you have the skill and capabilities to compile it *and* use it. There is no sure way to know that the source code in your left hand is what was used to compile the binary in your right hand.
Even if you compile your left hand into your right hand. See Ken Thompson's "Reflections On Trusting Trust" (http://www.acm.org/classics/sep95/). To complete the references, Reference 4 ("An unknown Air Force document") is Karger & Schell's paper on a Multics pen-test, which is available at http://www.acsac.org/2002/papers/classic-multics-orig.pdf Karger and Schell did a "30 years later" retrospective, also available at http://www.acsac.org/2002/papers/classic-multics.pdf Between the India/Huawei thing and the MS05-039 mess, this is a good time for everybody who hasn't read all 3 of them to read them - under 40 pages for all 3, and the 24 pages of the first Karger&Schell you can probably skim.....)
In message <200508180155.j7I1tnXw009434@turing-police.cc.vt.edu>, Valdis.Kletni eks@vt.edu writes:
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Requesting the source code and/or having access to it is really meaningless unless you have the skill and capabilities to compile it *and* use it. There is no sure way to know that the source code in your left hand is what was used to compile the binary in your right hand.
Even if you compile your left hand into your right hand. See Ken Thompson's "Reflections On Trusting Trust" (http://www.acm.org/classics/sep95/). To complete the references, Reference 4 ("An unknown Air Force document") is Karger & Schell's paper on a Multics pen-test, which is available at http://www.acsac.org/2002/papers/classic-multics-orig.pdf
Karger and Schell did a "30 years later" retrospective, also available at http://www.acsac.org/2002/papers/classic-multics.pdf
Between the India/Huawei thing and the MS05-039 mess, this is a good time for everybody who hasn't read all 3 of them to read them - under 40 pages for all 3, and the 24 pages of the first Karger&Schell you can probably skim.....)
Also bear in mind how hard it is to find a cleverly-concealed back door. Think how hard it is for reviewers to find ordinary bugs, let alone one that someone tried to conceal. --Steven M. Bellovin, http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb
On Wed, 17 Aug 2005, Florian Weimer wrote:
For a contrast, consider the situation in Germany. Beginning this year, Germany's largest research network DFN will run on Huawei technology. Not many security concerns over here, apparently.
Huawei are one of the suppliers for BT's "21cn" IP-based replacement for the UK's telephone network. http://www.btplc.com/News/Articles/ShowArticle.cfm?ArticleID=c15461a1-6d24-4... "Ciena and Huawei have been chosen in the transmission domain to supply the optical electronics that will convert the signals carried at high capacity over the cables connecting the metro and core nodes." Tony. -- f.a.n.finch <dot@dotat.at> http://dotat.at/ BISCAY: WEST 5 OR 6 BECOMING VARIABLE 3 OR 4. SHOWERS AT FIRST. MODERATE OR GOOD.
participants (9)
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Alexander Bochmann -
Deepak Jain -
Florian Weimer -
Jim Popovitch -
Neil J. McRae -
Steven M. Bellovin -
Suresh Ramasubramanian -
Tony Finch -
Valdis.Kletnieks＠vt.edu