I have to agree with Dillon, the report was much more clear when names were named, contacts tried were listed, and the actual numbers and routes were specified. Although the report still wasn't complete (phone numbers, etc), which might have allowed someone around here to give out a better phone (if the contacts were obsolete). Anyway, in future, let's not try to be quite so polite. Clarity is necessary. But, at least some solutions were suggested, and we _can_ demonstrate that we are self policing! Overall, I feel that this is yet another example of why the Routing Arbiter is so important. We've experienced regular problems with bogus routes for many years. Time to go back and re-read all those RFCs on "policy-based" routing, which lead to BGP.....

From: Matthew Petach <mpetach@netflight.com> JVNC.net is blackholing my routes. We've called their NOC, their techsupport, and everyone listed in the whois listing.

...

In this way you accomplish the following:

1) clear identification of the problem, i.e. blackholed routes

2) clear identification of who seems to be causing the problem

3) clear identification of the contact means that you tried and the results or lack thereof obtained.

WSimpson@UMich.edu Key fingerprint = 17 40 5E 67 15 6F 31 26 DD 0D B9 9B 6A 15 2C 32 BSimpson@MorningStar.com Key fingerprint = 2E 07 23 03 C5 62 70 D3 59 B1 4F 5E 1D C2 C1 A2