Re: The Backhoe: A Real Cyberthreat?
My argument simply is if this kind of awareness can be made more broadly available you end up with a more resilient infrastructure overall.
Sean, would you care to list the route, facility, ownership and customer attributes of the data base that you'd make public, and briefly explain the access controls you would impose on same? If this is not what you originally intended, then please show me the way ... thanks. Frank On Fri Jan 20 9:19 , sgorman1@gmu.edu sent: As you mentioned before this is largely because the customer (SIAC) was savvy enough to set the reuirements and had the money to do it. A lot of that saviness came from lessons learned from 9/11 and fund transfer. Similar measures were taken with DoD's GIG-BE, again because the customer was knowlegable and had the financial clout to enforce the requirements and demand the information. An anonymous data pool is just one suggestion of a market based mechanism to do it. ----- Original Message ----- From: Michael.Dillon@btradianz.com Date: Friday, January 20, 2006 5:37 am Subject: > > > Imagine if 60 Hudson and 111 8th > > were to go down at the same time? Finding means to mitigate this > > threat is not frivolously spending the taxpayer's money, IMO; > > although perhaps removing fiber maps is not the best way to > > address this. > > No, removing fiber maps will not address this problem > now that you have pinpointed the addresses that they > should attack. > > Separacy is the key to addressing this problem. Separate > circuits along separate routes connecting separate routers > in separate PoPs. Separacy should be the mantra, not > obscurity. > > End-to-end separation of circuits is how SFTI and other > financial industry networks deal with the issue of continuity > in the face of terrorism and other disasters. In fact, now > that trading is mediated by networked computers, the physical > location of the exchange is less vulnerable to terrorists because > the real action takes place in redundant data centers connected > by diverse separate networks. Since 9-11 was a direct attack on > the financial services industry, people within the industry > worldwide, have been applying the lessons learned in New York. > Another 9-11 is simply not possible today. > > --Michael Dillon > > > >
What data went into the system would depend on what questions you were looking to answer. I spend most of my time looking at the geographic diversity of fiber routes, so I'll use that as a very simple example. To answer that particular set of questions you would need the fiber routes for each provider, and they would need to be georeferenced. Other useful data would be the buildings lit by those fiber routes and lease costs. Users would then enter the buildings they want connectivity for. The system would find all the providers that could service that combination of buildings then calculate what the diversity of each provider is for that set of buildings, or what the diversity was if the user wanted to use more than one provider. Each provider would be given a score for that particular connectivity combination and a price, or the scores for each combination of providers. The user would then have a market indicator for diversity. You could have a vairety of metrics - the total distance between network paths, average distance, the variance, the number of times paths come with 100 feet of each other, the number of routes that are colocated etc. The providers do not give up any proprietary data and the customers have a set of indicators to make a more informed choice. Not the ideal solution, but the game was to come up with something that would be palatable to the providers. Companies like Last Mile Connections already keep provider supplied databases of lit buildings and prices to run auctions. This would just be another indicator for customers that also value diversity and resiliency. Protecting the master database would be important, but there are lots of mechanisms to do that effectively. The metrics are the key, and that of course is my angle on the game. ----- Original Message ----- From: Frank Coluccio <frank@dticonsulting.com> Date: Friday, January 20, 2006 1:53 pm Subject: Re: The Backhoe: A Real Cyberthreat?
My argument simply is if this kind of awareness
can be made more broadly available you end up with
a more resilient infrastructure overall.
Sean, would you care to list the route, facility, ownership and customer attributes of the data base that you'd make public, and briefly explain the
access controls you would impose on same?
If this is not what you originally intended, then please show me the way ... thanks.
Frank
On Fri Jan 20 9:19 , sgorman1@gmu.edu sent:
As you mentioned before this is largely because the customer (SIAC) was savvy
enough to set the reuirements and had the money to do it. A lot of that saviness
came from lessons learned from 9/11 and fund transfer. Similar measures were
taken with DoD's GIG-BE, again because the customer was knowlegable and had the
financial clout to enforce the requirements and demand the information. An
anonymous data pool is just one suggestion of a market based mechanism to do it.
----- Original Message -----
From: Michael.Dillon@btradianz.com
Date: Friday, January 20, 2006 5:37 am
Subject:
Imagine if 60 Hudson and 111 8th
were to go down at the same time? Finding means to mitigate this
threat is not frivolously spending the taxpayer's money, IMO;
although perhaps removing fiber maps is not the best way to
address this.
No, removing fiber maps will not address this problem
now that you have pinpointed the addresses that they
should attack.
Separacy is the key to addressing this problem. Separate
circuits along separate routes connecting separate routers
in separate PoPs. Separacy should be the mantra, not
obscurity.
End-to-end separation of circuits is how SFTI and other
financial industry networks deal with the issue of continuity
in the face of terrorism and other disasters. In fact, now
that trading is mediated by networked computers, the physical
location of the exchange is less vulnerable to terrorists because the real action takes place in redundant data centers connected
by diverse separate networks. Since 9-11 was a direct attack on
the financial services industry, people within the industry
worldwide, have been applying the lessons learned in New York.
Another 9-11 is simply not possible today.
--Michael Dillon
participants (2)
-
Frank Coluccio -
sgorman1＠gmu.edu